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In Essay One, I estimate how demographic characteristics associate with habitual
purchase of sweetened carbonated soft drinks (sCSDs), as different demographic groups respond
to marketing variables controlled by the sCSD industry. My method and assumptions cleave
neither to conventional economic analysis nor to medical and nutrition literature interested in
sugar and soft-drink consumption. No assumption in my estimation process violates arguments
in later essays. Results identify household purchase behaviors for relatively fine demographic
groupings, are not linear in income or education level, and further vary by gender of the head of
household and by type of sCSD industry marketing tool. The richness and detail of results
appear to be unique, and capable of answering more questions than I ask in this work, validating
the logic behind the uncommon methodology.
In Essay Two, I review empirical and theoretical results from medical/nutritional science
on added sugars, obesity, and health, as well as psychology, decision theory, behavioral
economics, neuroeconomics, and social psychology literature. Each explains mechanisms by
which individuals may fail to maximize their own lifetime utility in their eating patterns. I offer a
descriptive model and a framework that accommodate evidence indicating that conventional
economic assumptions do not hold for some class of individuals in their dietary habits relative to
high-energy, low-nutrient foods. The challenge to expand conventional rational-choice/demand
theory may help economists better model actual consumer dietary behavior, or help economists

Charles Rhodes – University of Connecticut, 2013
embrace a partial inability to do so comprehensively. Either result should impact how economists
assess demand and discuss policy options.
Essay Three explores types of market failure associated with sCSD consumption and
options for correcting them. Policy recommendations to correct the full set of market failures
flow from my empirical results and from my review of and linkage to scientific evidence
provided by neighboring disciplines. Because policy proposals here, some extant some new,
specifically address empirically verified mechanisms that seem to undermine utility-maximizing
behavior, greater Pareto efficiency and better U.S. health outcomes should follow from careful
adherence to this policy set – more than for any previously proposed policy set to reduce
unhealthful food consumption that I have found.
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Chapter 1

Dissertation Overview &
Sweetened Carbonated Soft Drinks in the U.S.

1.1

Dissertation Overview
In Essay One, “An Empirical Analysis of Household-Level Sweetened Carbonated Soft-

Drink Purchase Behavior By Socio-Demographic Sub-Group,” I estimate with some precision
the demographic characteristics associated with habitual purchase of sweetened carbonated soft
drinks (sCSDs) as different demographic groups respond to marketing variables controlled by
the sCSD industry. No assumption in my estimation process violates arguments in later essays.
I expect to contribute to the literature because my method and assumptions are not
conventional to empirical analysis in industrial organization or marketing literature, while I
explore consumer economics ignored by medical and nutrition literature interested in sugar and
soft-drink consumption. I offer results that identify household purchase behaviors for relatively
fine demographic groupings, results that are not linear in income or education level, and that
further vary by gender of the head of household and by type of sCSD industry marketing tool.
The richness and detail of the results appear to be unique, and capable of answering more
questions than I ask in this work, validating the logic behind the uncommon methodology.
Separately from identifying who is purchasing a high volume of sCSDs and who is
purchasing in association with price, sale, and advertising incentives, I seek to understand why
heavy drinkers of sCSDs do this despite clear evidence from the medical community that poor
health is likely to result from this practice in a variety of ways. How one answers this question
greatly affects what one considers to be relevant economic analysis, as well as how one believes
economic analysis should inform policy choices.
1

In Essay Two, “When Regular Soft-Drink Consumption Fails to Maximize Utility: A
Dynamic Theoretical Model Flexible to Failures of Rationality,” I review empirical and
theoretical results from medical/nutritional science on added sugars, obesity, and health, as well
as psychology, decision theory, behavioral economics, neuroeconomics, and social psychology
literature. Each explains mechanisms by which individuals may fail to maximize their own
lifetime utility in their eating patterns. I refer to this quasi-exogenous literature to inform and
comment on consumer behavior as it relates to habitual consumption of unhealthful foods, of
which sCSDs are the primary example in the U.S.
Neoclassical theories of rational choice tend to be positive, and do not analyze the
processes underlying decisions. Essay Two presents a descriptive model informed by
experimental results and theory from neighboring disciplines. I pose that pertaining to cheap
ubiquitous high-energy low-nutritive foods, neoclassical models overreach in the strictness of
premises about individual decision processes. The behavioral economic platform in Essay Two
focuses on biological and psychological decision processes. This broader analysis provides
insight into specific failures of the rational utility maximizing model, and indicates policy
recommendations to correct individual failures to maximize utility.
I expect this essay to contribute to the literature by introducing a simple framework that
draws on empirical evidence indicating that conventional economic assumptions do not hold for
at least some class of individuals in their dietary habits relative to high-energy, low-nutrient food
consumption. The challenge to expand conventional rational-choice/demand theory may help
economists improve modeling of actual consumer dietary behavior, or to embrace a partial
inability to do so comprehensively. The latter effect may impact how economists assess demand
and discuss policy options, and perhaps affect the degree of confidence with which they do both.

2

Essay Three, “Habitual Soft-Drink Consumption: How Markets Fail, and How Policy
Prescriptions Must Adapt,” explores types of market failure in the sCSD industry and options for
correcting them. Essays One and Two identify consumer behaviors and market failures, focusing
on those that tend to be overlooked by conventional economic and industrial organization
analyses. Policy recommendations to correct the full set of market failures flow from my
empirical results (Essay One), and my review of and linkage to scientific evidence from
neighboring disciplines (Essays Two and Three). In other words, I am presenting a holistic
scientific analysis of poor nutrition in America.
I expect this essay to contribute to the literature by presenting a simple framework to
explain why economists seem to overlook certain market failures, and by advocating a more
robust set of policy options. Policy proposals offered here are designed to effectively improve
U.S. health outcomes associated with sCSD overconsumption, based on mechanisms that have
been theoretically and then empirically identified by relevant science from economics and
neighboring disciplines. Policy proposals include some options extant in the literature, but also
encompass new options, with both sets specifically addressing particular mechanisms that
undermine Pareto efficiency in sCSD markets and more broadly. The policy set proposed here is
designed to more fully correct sCSD market failures – including failures of the market
environment and individual decision making to conform to neoclassical expectations – than
would proposals currently advocated in any single literature. If implemented in toto and as
described, the set of policy proposals offered here would positively impact U.S. health outcomes
to a degree unachievable by any subset of policies currently proposed, and should improve U.S.
diets beyond reduced sCSD consumption.

3

1.2 Cultural Context of the sCSD Product Category
Figures relating the rapid expansion of overweight and obesity in the American population
over recent decades have been cited so often that they may have begun to lose their power to
alarm. But the numbers depicting epidemic rises in diet-related health problems when understood
in their proper context cannot fail to alarm, once one admits that the term “epidemic,” while not
microbially based, is appropriate. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
use the term epidemic in this context (cdc.gov website, accessed November 2011), and the World
Health Organization (WHO) uses “Pandemic” for the situation globally (Swinburn et al. 2011).
Defining obesity as having a body-mass index (BMI 1) over 30, 2010 numbers from the CDC
indicate that every state in the U.S. has an obesity rate over 20%, with 12 states having obesity
prevalence of over 30% (Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia,
[http://www.cdc.gov 2]). For reference, not a single state had obesity prevalence over 14% in
1990. For adults over the age of 20 years, the CDC calculates the combined nationwide rate for
those either overweight (34.4%) or obese (33.9%) by the BMI measure to be 68.3 percent. Only
one-third of Americans remain at or below a broad scientific measure for “normal” weight.
Overweight and obese individuals are at increased risk for many diseases and health conditions, including
the following: hypertension, dyslipidemia (for example, high LDL cholesterol, low HDL cholesterol, or
high levels of triglycerides), Type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, stroke, gallbladder disease,
osteoarthritis, sleep apnea and respiratory problems, [and] some cancers (endometrial, breast, and colon).

1

Body Mass Index, or BMI, is calculated in standard American measure as: weight (lbs.) / [height (in.)]2} x 703;
and in metric units as weight (kg) / [ [height (m)]2. Thus a 5-foot five-inch person weighing 150 lbs. has a BMI of
24.96, on the cusp between “normal” (18.5-24.9), and “overweight” (25-29.9). Any BMI below 18.5 is considered
“underweight.” “BMI is calculated the same way for both adults and children,”
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/trends.html, or http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/overwt.html, accessed 19
November 2011.
2
All facts in this paragraph and the indented quote are from http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/trends.html, or
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/overwt.html, or
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/adult_BMI/index.html, accessed 19 November 2011. LDL is lowdensity lipoprotein (the “bad” part of cholesterol), and HDL is high-density lipoprotein, who’s high ratio relative to
LDL is considered a good marker in cholesterol evaluation.
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American health is faltering, and the current trend is persistent and negative. Seventeen percent
of U.S. children and adolescents are now obese, triple the rate from a generation ago, 3 with 35%
of American children now overweight or obese (Harris et al. 2009).
The economic costs of overweight and obesity are large and growing. One estimate by
Columbia University, Oxford, and Harvard Public Health specialists is that costs for treatment of
obesity-related diseases will rise in the US by $48-66 billion per year by 2030 (Wang et al.
2011). For baseline reference, Finkelstein et al. (2009) estimate the 2008 cost of obesity-related
diseases in the U.S. at $147 billion, so Wang et al.’s estimated increases on the order of one-third
more. Finkelstein et al. estimate that in 2006 obese individuals spent about 42% more on health
care, or $1429 per capita, versus normal weight people.
What do these grim numbers and ominous projections have to do with sweetened
carbonated soft-drinks (again, sCSDs)? How can one food category, particularly one that
averages 94% water, 4 be attributed particular blame in the obesity epidemic? 5
While marketed to the consumer brain for their flavor, effervescence, kick (caffeine),
color, and overall enjoyability, most sugar-sweetened beverages enter the digestive track as
nutrient-deficient simple sugars in a form and quantity the human body did not evolve to tolerate
well (Wolf , Bray, and Popkin 2007). Sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs), and particularly
sCSDs, the largest category by consumption within SSBs, have a special place at the head of the
line when the medical community attributes factors associated with overweight, obesity, and
dietary-based illness. While there is more detail in Essay Two, it is useful to summarize here

3

http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/childhood/index.html, accessed 19 November 2011.
NPLAN 2011; The National Policy & Legal Analysis Network to Prevent Childhood Obesity, p 15.
5
“…(O)besity is a multifactorial condition…(.) (I)t is extremely difficult to identify, much less quantify the relative
contributions of each factor in epidemiological studies” (Johnson et al. 2009, p 1016).
4

5

some of the reasons that sCSDs and SSBs are exceptional, as these reasons motivate both the
focus and in part the methodology of my empirical work.
The first reason is the sheer quantity of SSBs in the American diet. This quantity has
been increasing for decades. The second reason is the class of biological effects (on body and
mind) of the sugars in SSBs. Added sugars are sugars added to foods in processing, excluding
naturally occurring sugars such as in oranges, onions, or milk.
Soft drinks and other sugar-sweetened beverages are the primary source of added sugars in Americans’
diet. Excessive consumption of sugars has been linked with several metabolic abnormalities and adverse
health conditions, as well as shortfalls of essential nutrients.
American Heart Association Scientific Statement (Johnson et al. 2009, p 1011)

Marriott et al. (2010) confirm that sCSDs are “the main contributor of added sugars in the
diet of all age/gender groups [from 4-8 years to 31 to 50 years] with a higher mean gramequivalent contribution of added sugars from soft drinks beginning in adolescence, peaking in
adulthood, and evidencing lower contribution after age 50” 6 (p 247). Even the eldest groups are
not immune to the effects of SSBs in the diet, however: “today all ages consume far more sugar
from SSBs and related beverages than any other time” [in human history and in recent decades]
(Popkin 2010). “Market research data show that in the 1990s, soft drink consumption increased
more quickly than consumption of any other food group” (French, Story, Jeffery 2001, p 312).
A 2011 National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Data Brief reports that
“approximately one-half of the population aged 2 and older consumes sugar drinks [SSBs] on
any given day. …Among boys 2 -19 years, 70% consume sugar drinks on any given day”
(Ogden et al. 2011, p 2). About half of this half of the population that consumes SSBs daily, or
25%, consume at least 200 kcals per day, equivalent to more than one 12-oz can of sCSD per
day. Just over half of all SSB calories are consumed at home (p 5). Five percent of Americans

6

Females in the 51-to-70-years life stages group, and both genders in 71+ years consumed added sugars in “grain
products” more than from sCSDs.
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consume at least 567 kcals from SSBs daily, equivalent to more than four 12-oz cans of cola (p
2). “…[T]he American Heart Association has recommended a consumption goal of no more than
450 kilocalories (kcal) of sugar-sweetened beverages—or fewer than three 12-oz cans of
carbonated cola—per week” (p 1, emphasis added).
Reports based on the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES)
surveys from 1988-1994 and from 1999-2000, the gold-standard food recall surveys on which
US food consumption data is based, both found the number one contributor of energy intake to
be soft drinks, at over 7% of total average daily caloric intake in the 1999-2000 period (Block
2004; the NCHS data just cited is NHANES based). In a 2001 Journal of Nutrition article, Susan
Krebs-Smith of the National Cancer Institute lists 42 food categories that together comprise more
than 99.99 percent of added sugars in the American diet. Carbonated soft drinks are first at
33.2% (one-third), followed by fruit drinks at another 9.8%. Including fruit drinks, the six food
categories after sCSDs (fruit drinks, candy, cakes, ice cream/ice milk, ready-to-eat cereals and
cereal bars, and sugar/honey) together comprise the second third of total added sugars (to
66.1%), leaving the remaining 35 categories to round out the final third. In their American Heart
Association Scientific Statement, Johnson et al. (2009) list regular soft drinks as accounting for
33% of all added sugars in the American diet, with fruit drinks another 9.7%. The Dietary
Guidelines for Americans, 2010 groups soda, energy drinks, and sports drinks together as 36% of
added sugars in the American diet, followed by sugar-sweetened fruit drinks, again at 10%.
Consumption of sCSDs peaked in 1997, but this is almost entirely offset now by the rise
in very-near-category sports drinks and energy drinks and other SSBs, with the balance offset by
bottled water. Sports drinks and energy drinks are sCSDs in all but name, with a slight ingredient
twist that often includes no reduction in sugar content (Popkin 2010; Harris 2011). “Over the
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past 30 years, total calorie intake has increased by an average of 150 to 300 calories per day, and
approximately 50% of this increase comes from liquid calories (primarily sugar-sweetened
beverages). At the same time there has been no apparent change in physical activity” (Johnson et
al. 2009, p 1016). Nielsen and Popkin (2004) confirm that dietary calories from SSB
consumption tripled from 1977 to 2001. To make the 150-300 kcal/d increase tractable, consider
that to burn off the 140 kcal/d in a 12-ounce soda, an 85-kg man (187.4 lbs.) would have to get
out of his chair and walk for 50 minutes (Bleich et al. 2009). If physical activity is flat, as has
been found, the effect of adding non-nutritive calories is predictable.
McCrory et al. (2002) confirm the fact that Americans are becoming obese in larger
numbers and earlier in life due to increased caloric intake and not due to a decrease in physical
activity. This characterizes a classic energy imbalance. When this energy imbalance is positive, it
must lead to weight gain (although not in a simplistic or linear fashion, as has been commonly
applied by economists and others concerned with the sCSD-weight correlation, Hall et al. 2011).
SSBs contribute directly to obesity in children, adolescents, and adults (Malik et al. 2004, 2010;
for children only, Ludwig, Peterson, Gortmaker 2001). As SSBs account for half the average
American calorie increase over recent decades, their contribution is larger than for any other
food. Portion sizes and number of servings of SSBs have increased over time, replacing more
nutrient-rich dietary choices including milk with nutrient poor beverage substitutes (Nielsen and
Popkin 2004). Duffey and Popkin (2006) find that when they separated foods and beverages into
similar clusters by nutrient profile and health effects, being in the unhealthy food cluster
predicted being in the unhealthy beverage cluster, and vice versa. High SSB purchase may be a
useful marker for poorer overall diet.

8

While some mechanisms by which SSBs contribute to obesity are debated, others are
well-established, as will be detailed in Essay Two. But there is no confusion about whether SSBs
contribute to obesity. Johnson et al. (2010) make clear that the jury is back: Vartanian et al.
(2007) conducted a meta-analysis of 88 cross-sectional and prospective studies, and found that
higher sCSD intake was associated with not only greater (average daily) energy intake, but with
higher body weight, lower intake of other nutrients, and poorer indicators of health. 7 Following
their 18-month prospective study of 810 adults (not then obese), Chen et al. (2009) found that:
a reduction in liquid calories had a stronger effect than did a reduction in solid calorie intake on weight
loss. Of the individual beverages, only intake of sugar-sweetened beverages was significantly associated
with weight change. A reduction in SSB intake of 1 serving/[day] was associated with a weight loss of 0.49
kg (95% C.I.: 0.11, 0.82; P=0.006) at 6 [months] and of 0.65 kg (95% C.I.: 0.22, 1.09; P=0.003) at 18
[months] (p 1299).

The SSB contribution to health problems goes beyond the particular and unrivaled effect
of SSB calories on daily caloric imbalance and obesity over time. The liquid sugars in SSBs
increase the risk of diabetes and cardiovascular disease independently of their contribution to
obesity. Harvard School of Public Health’s Frank Hu (2010) explains that while “(u)ntil recently,
the role of [refined] carbohydrates in cardiovascular disease risk has received scant attention” (p
1541), a prospective study over 12 years with over 50,000 participants indicates that refined
carbohydrates are likely to cause even more atherosclerosis and heart disease than saturated fat
would “in a predominantly sedentary and overweight population” (p 1542).
Essay Two presents scientifically established metabolic effects of sugar consumption on
weight, health, and effects that may mimic addictive properties that could influence decision
7

Malik et al. (2010) note that the type of study may affect the degree of association between SSB consumption and
obesity [citations deleted, emphasis added, p 1358]:
…[D]ifferences in study design, methodologies, and data quality have made it difficult to observe a consistent effect.
Cross-sectional studies are not optimal because of the high potential for intractable confounding and reverse causation.
Experimental studies are not well suited to capture long-term patterns because compliance tends to wane with increasing
duration, but they do provide important insight into potential underlying biological mechanisms. Prospective cohort
studies tend to provide the most robust evidence despite a large degree of diversity between studies in terms of outcome
measurements, size, and duration of follow-up. Therefore, greater emphasis should be placed on larger studied of longer
duration that are better powered to detect an effect. In this literature [SSBs and obesity], the longest and largest studies
show stronger and more consistent associations compared with smaller and shorter studies.
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making. Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis (2012) describe the abuse potential for sugar explicitly:
“sugar acts on the brain to encourage subsequent intake” (p 28). Princeton psychology
researchers Avena, Rada, and Hoebel (2009), in a larger discussion of the neurobiology of sugar
and fat binge eating, review literature on similar dopamine pathways between drug addicts and
“carbohydrate cravers” and conclude: “Collectively, these clinical studies support the view that
overeating can affect behavior and brain systems in a manner that resembles aspects of
addiction” (p 625). The American Heart Association’s recommended daily limit for added sugars
in the diet is less than the gram-equivalent sugar in a 12-ounce can of cola (144 kcal/day) for an
average adult woman (100 kcal/day), and a half teaspoon less than the recommended limit for an
adult male (150 kcal/day; Stanhope et al. 2011). So it is worth considering whether a 12- or 20or 36- or 48-oz “can/bottle/cup” of sCSD is “overeating” in the sense of binge eating. 8
Ogden et al. (2011) find every age group of males from adolescence to the age of 60
derive more than 150 kcals/day from SSBs (the average, including 2−5 years, is 178 kcals/d,
peaking at 273 kcal/d for 12−19-year olds). Females significantly differ from males in all but the
2−5-year group, and are over the adult 100 kcal/day recommendation from SSB calories alone in
age groups from adolescence to at least the age of 40, averaging over 100 kcals/d across all
groups, including 2−5 years. To reiterate: on average Americans above the age of 5 and below
the age of 60 (perhaps 40 for females 9) are exceeding their entire daily added sugar limit as
recommended by the AHA from sugar-sweetened beverages alone. Specifically this excessive

8

Avena, Rada, and Hoebel use the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.) to define binge
eating, as repeatedly eating a larger amount than normal in less than 2 hours, along with combinations of other
aspects, including: eating when not physically hungry, eating much more rapidly than normal, and eating alone
because one is embarrassed. Heatherton and Baumeister (1991) use a more general definition: “eating that results
from disinhibition of dietary restraints” whether or not within a pattern of bulimia as clinically defined (p 86).
9
The lack of greater age definition makes the cutoff unclear. For females in the 20-39-year group, the average is 138
kcal/d, for the 40-59 group it is 86 kcal/d, and above 60 it is 42 kcal/d. There is a steep drop off, that by interpolation
probably doesn’t fall below 100 kcal/d until at least the age of 50. But there is no way to be sure from the Ogden et
al. (2011) data configuration.
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amount counts no other added sugar calories from any source, in any processed food, including
ready-to-eat cereals, breads, and other items not even classified as sweets, as well as of course,
not counting non-SSB sweets. By established medical and nutrition standards, the average
number of SSB ounces per day per American is an overconsumption of discretionary calories
defined as allowable across all sources. 10
This information raises questions relevant to the mechanisms of consumer choice that
economists rely upon. Regular soft-drink consumption may affect lifetime utility in more than
one way. As desirable consumables for which one might expect that in the roughest sense
demand increases with income (thus having at least one aspect of a normal good, like demand for
cars), sCSDs simultaneously have at least some commonly known negative health(/side) effects
(like pork lard for cooking, an empirically demonstrated inferior good). All consumers may not
know about obesity, diabetes, hypertension, and cancer risk, but the association of sCSDs with
some of these effects and at least dental caries is a reasonable assumption as to the knowledge
base of nearly every sCSD consumer. To argue the opposite would be absurd given even the
minimal nutritional knowledge one absorbs being raised in the U.S.
10

Current sCSD average consumption rates estimated by the U.S. government and the medical community suggest
that as few as 15% and perhaps 25% or more of the U.S. population is driven over recommended daily limits of
added sugar by sugared beverage consumption alone, with specific demographic groups tending even further beyond
recommended limits predominantly due to sweetened beverage consumption (range calculated from information in
Johnson et al. 2009; Marriot et al. 2010 [esp. Table 7, from which Table 23 (the only table in Essay Two) is partially
constructed]; and Chapter 3 in USDA’s Dietary Guidelines for Americans, 2010]). “On the basis of the 2005 US
Dietary Guidelines, intake of added sugars greatly exceeds discretionary calorie allowances, regardless of energy
needs” (Johnson et al. 2009), meaning people consume too many added sugars daily, regardless of how many
overall calories comprise the baseline recommended amount for the man, woman, or child. Thus use of the term
“overconsumption” follows. Overconsumption of added sugars (artificially added, not naturally occurring) spans
nearly every demographic category, with sCSDs the single largest contributor. Further, sCSDs (along with fruitades/fruit drinks) as a portion of calories rise substantially for consumers who take 20 to 35 percent or more of their
total calories from added sugars (Marriot et al. 2010, Johnson et al. 2009). Recommended daily limits for added
sugars are easily reached if one consumes a single 12-oz can of classic Coke (144 kcals), and are almost certainly
exceeded with a 20-oz bottle (240 kcals). Two things are noteworthy here. First, for the standard caloric product
versions, Pepsi has more sugar than Coke per serving. Second, these numbers mean that a single product unit per
day (12 or 20 ounces) represents at least the entire daily overage for added sugars for an individual, as estimated for
actual American diets using dietary recall surveys, the current academic standard. Exact figures appear again in
Essay Two.
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If the “bad” aspects are known and people drink less as income rises, sCSDs are no
longer normal but inferior goods – a testable hypothesis discussed in the results section (Chapter
5).
Of interest to the economist must be whether decisions stay rational and the individual
utility maximization assumption is satisfied when current consumption of a good may be
counterbalanced over time by undesirable aspects of this good, and when near the time that the
choice to consume is made the consumable may affect the brain chemistry used to evaluate
expected utility. If either effect occurs, the assumptions of rational choice and utility
maximization may find too little footing to be used as definitive premises for quantitative
analysis. Essay Two explores evidence relevant to these concerns, and offers theoretical models
flexible to the assumption of rational utility maximization in the regular choice to consume highadded-sugar foodstuffs.
Essay Three continues this effort in an attempt to match policy prospects with
mechanisms by which markets or individual utility maximization might fail. Essay Three
explores evidence that the formation of dietary habits may not follow processes the economist
would consider to be consistently rational, and that the breaking or re-training of dietary habits is
far from trivial. Essay Three considers empirical evidence that the comprehensive marketing
environment in conjunction with cultural factors that have developed in recent decades have
increased sCSD consumption by mechanisms that tend to be ignored by economists due to
economists’ own default assumption set. A core argument is that the current soft-drink culture is
deeply engrained in the market environment and consumer psychology, and that only by
influencing the market environment and consumer psychology can this health-degrading culture
begin to be reversed.

12

Essay One

An Empirical Analysis of
Household-Level Sweetened Carbonated Soft-Drink Purchase Behavior
By Socio-Demographic Sub-Group
Chapter 2

Introduction and Motivation

2.1

Overview
In this essay I use data from actual household purchases and industry advertising over

three recent years, and conduct multivariate regression to identify how specific demographic
groups vary in their purchase response to marketing of sweetened carbonated soft drinks
(sCSDs) at the product category level. My empirical design appreciates findings, insights, and
arguments made in Essay Two.
Empirical results reveal patterns of household purchase response to sCSD-industry price,
sale, and advertising signals (marketing variables) that vary significantly by identifiable
demographic characteristics. Along with household income, racial classification, and household
size (or number of children), the sex, highest level of education, and age of the household head
all tend to expose significant differences in purchase response to sCSD marketing variables. By
interacting income and education with other demographic variables, I identify where effects
associated with certain demographic characteristics predict larger or smaller purchase responses,
and to a degree how robust these effects are.
Isolating the effects of either price, or sale, or advertising on household purchase,
“highest education level of high school or less” for the household head tends to be the most
robust predictor of higher sCSD purchase, followed by “household income at or below the
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poverty level for a family of four.” There is more variability by racial groups, a fact to which this
work draws considerable attention. It is clear that households headed by Asian males are
inordinately responsive to marketing variable incentives, and purchase according to textbook
predictions for a normal good, in a way that no other sex-specific racially identified head-ofhousehold type does. In contrast to Asian-male-headed households, most groups confirm
purchase behavior roughly consistent with sCSDs being an inferior good. Male-headed
households tend to be more purchase responsive to marketing variables than female-headed
households, with and without children present in the home. Reacting to price and advertising (but
not to sale), lower-middle and lower income households with children purchase more sCSD as
the number of children in the home rises, whereas middle-income and higher-income households
buy less sCSD as the number of children in the home rises. This indicates an income-based
difference in how much sCSD parents allow their children to drink, with parents on the lower
spectrum becoming more tolerant as they have more children in the home.
After controlling for other effects, very few of the estimated and predicted purchase
patterns are linear in effect from a low to high level within a variable – income, education level,
age, or number of children. This suggests a complexity of behavior that belies predictions from
the broadest forms of modeling, and justifies the attempt to identify effects at more refined levels
of demographic identification than are typically selected for estimation and analysis.
The empirical results from estimation and prediction in this work identify high-purchaseresponse demographic sub-groups. As such these results may be used to identify or confirm the
effectiveness of sCSD marketing strategies for commercial exploitation by the industry, or used
by policy makers concerned with the overconsumption of sCSDs.
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2.2

Research Objectives for Empirical Essay
The empirical work uses sCSD purchase data at the household level from early 2006 to

the end of 2008 across 16 major metropolitan areas and their environs, together sampling around
1/3 of the U.S. population. This includes grocery or general merchandiser purchase of containers
brought home, and not restaurant, movie house, or vending machine purchase data. Soft-drink
industry television advertising exposure for weeks matching purchase data are also used (both
data sets collected and processed by The Nielsen Company). Representing each household in
each data week generates around 2.6 million household-level observations.
The scope of the effect of sCSD consumption on American health, the diversity of the
U.S. population, and existing evidence from a range of academic literatures present many
questions that may be addressed using three years of marketing data for and household purchase
of sCSDs – particularly when demographic information is available for all households in a
demographically-weighted sample.
Research already confirms that people vary widely in their nutrition knowledge, beliefs,
and choices (Variyam and Golan 2002; Guthrie and Variyam 2007; Neff et al. 2009; Powell and
Chaloupka 2010). Differences in sex, age, income, education, and ethnicity partly account for
this variety. Analysis is limited to characteristics we can observe or infer. But even within these
limitations, consumers are combinations of characteristics. Researchers may regress on categoric
variables such as age or income, but ultimately individuals exist in multiple dimensions, and the
higher-income young may not behave as the higher-income old, in ways that can significantly
differ from linear estimation results based on age or income alone. Demographic variables alone
may never explain a large portion of household differences in tastes (Zhen et al. 2009).
Estimations based on broad averages may poorly identify associations of high variability.
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While some behavioral trends may be roughly identified by broad isolated characteristics,
combinations of observable characteristics are more likely to identify trends at an interesting
level. Of course sCSD purchase rises with household size. Similarly, people expect sCSD
demand to vary by income level, education level, and racial group, and probably by the sex of
the head of household. But why should any difference in purchase across changing household
income be strongly similar across racial groups, or across levels of education? Might it not be the
case that a college education would affect one’s response to a price or advertising change
differently if they were earning $20k/yr. versus $100k/yr. – whether for a luxury car, frozen
chicken, or for sCSDs? By interacting demographic variables to identify specific demographic
sub-groups, my objective is to determine if purchase responses to sCSD industry marketing
variables – price, sale/price promotion, and advertising – differ significantly in ways that are not
captured by aggregate variables.
Studies with few demographic categories find that higher levels of family income or of
formal education are associated with higher diet quality, and less added sugar intake (Thompson
et al. 2009, Zoellner et al. 2011). Formally, in this empirical essay: I seek to analyze
demographic variables in more disaggregate units, to determine which sets of household-level
demographic characteristics are associated with the strongest sCSD-purchase response to sCSD
industry marketing variables. Thus I examine consumer behavior in more detail, while also
implicitly checking for the relative robustness of effects already identified in the literature across
characteristics. For example if lower-educated households buy more sCSDs relative to highereducated households, is it true that lower-educated Hispanic households buy more sCSDs than
higher-educated Hispanic households when they are on sale? If so is the difference greater or less
than the difference for Asian households?

16

The same work can address numerous other questions. When deriving estimates for finer
levels of demographic characteristics interacted across income or education levels, are responses
linear – which would validate a categoric variable approach – or non-linear? Non-linear
responses would suggest that marketing strategies or policy proposals based on broad categoric
data may prove inefficient. There is an existing literature associating demographic characteristics
with high added-sugar consumption or high sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) or sCSD
consumption, but from my search, the entire literature derives from single- or two-day dietary
recall surveys. Compared to these results, does behavior identified by a three-year panel confirm,
dispute, or add useful gradients to current findings?
There is more than one valid perspective on whether sCSDs are normal economic goods,
or inferior economic goods. They are highly palatable, and their consumption has doubled with
rising incomes in the U.S. since the 1960s. Use is high enough that many people clearly do not
treat sCSDs as a rare treat, despite strong suggestions that they should from repeated iterations of
the USDA’s Dietary Guidelines (and food pyramid). This suggests sCSDs are a normal good.
However, medical/nutrition literature using dietary recall data for added sugars generally
(Thompson et al. 2009) and for SSBs (Zoellner et al. 2011) finds that consumption falls in rising
income, suggesting that sCSDs are an inferior good. What will this analysis based on actual
purchase history suggest about the basic nature of sCSDs as an economic good?
None of the prior studies interact education and income to control for education effects
within income effects (and vice-versa), and only Thompson et al. interact either with racial
group. If there are ethnically-based differences in purchase of sCSDs, the difference in purchase
associated with rising education or income may well not be identical between racial groups, and
Thompson et al. find differences from their nutrition survey data. By interacting purchase
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reactions to various marketing variables within education-racial-group or income-racial-group
bands, the robustness of education or income effects to sub-cultural tastes may be implicitly
checked. Delineated by demographic characteristic, are the same people that nutritionists,
psychologists, and behavioral economists (including decision theorists) suggest would be poor
food decision makers the same ones that respond least to price incentives, and most to sale and
advertising incentives for sCSD purchase?
I also explore all of the above for difference in the sex of heads of household, including
in the presence of children. Do poorer or less educated parents buy more sCSDs than bettereducated or higher-income parents? Are either group more reactive to sCSD advertising on
television or to price promotions? Does racial grouping affect these reactions? Which household
characteristics are associated with the highest reaction to all marketing variables when children
are present in the household? Which the least? Which households will tax-based policies likely
affect most, which will education-based policies affect most, which will advertising restrictions
affect most?
Broadly: will this deeper analysis, derived from panel data and household responses to
industry marketing confirm, refute, or expand existing understanding in meaningful ways?

2.3

Literature Review: sCSD Markets and Consumers
Given the multiple objectives across this dissertation, literature review is broken into

pieces at appropriate places for each essay, with the “Cultural Context” section (1.2) serving as
background for all three essays. The following sub-sections address: market facts, market
structure, and marketing facts relevant to the sCSD industry and its dominant place in the SSB
category; and relevant literature of others who have correlated sCSD or SSB consumption with
demographic factors.
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2.3.1

CSD Industrial Organization and Marketing
Industry structure of the sCSD or SSB industry is not a focal point of this work.

Arguments can be made that the evolution of the American market that culminated in tripling of
consumption of SSBs from 1970 to 2001 may not have occurred under an industry structure not
dominated by one or two industry leaders of exceptional profitability, and power (market,
economic, and political). But this is speculative, and does not affect other findings here. Some
indications of industry structure and power are here in order to establish a general background
before examining sCSD purchases by demographic type at the household level, and to partially
sketch circumstances relevant to policy proposals in Essay Three.
The Coca-Cola Company, founded some 125 years ago in 1886 and now based in
Atlanta, is the most successful soft-drink company. It began when an Atlanta pharmacist
combined a caffeinated kola nut from Africa with coca leaves from South America, putting
together a spiced sugar-sweetened water-based “tonic.” Coca-Cola calculates that across its
beverage line, worldwide customers now consume 1.8 billon servings per day – nearly one for
every 3 people on the planet. These servings of more than 3,500 products are brought to over 200
countries by over 146,000 employees, in a profitable manner, indicated by 49 consecutive years
of stock dividend share increases. Beyond standard corporate webpage features, the Coca-Cola
website has a tab linking to the company’s 2010/2011 Sustainability Report, and a “Heritage”
tab. They well know their products and how to market them and their brand. 1
During World War II, Coca-Cola worked closely with the US Department of War to provide free Cokes to
army soldiers. As a result of a lobbying campaign, they were allowed to break sugar rationing rules and to
create Coke plants in European countries with the support of the government, ultimately becoming
synonymous globally with SSBs (Malik et al. 2010, p 1355).

PepsiCo, building from the 1898 formulation of Pepsi Cola, is based in New York state,
and is the only clear rival to Coca-Cola for market share in the sCSD industry. PepsiCo has
1

http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/ourcompany/index.html, accessed 9 May 12.
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diversified much further into snack and other food market divisions, having developed or
acquired hundreds of brands, many easily recognizable in U.S. stores, and perhaps not associated
with PepsiCo (Quaker Oats, Lay’s, Aunt Jemima, etc.).
Some estimates attribute these two companies with controlling roughly three-quarters of
the world beverage market (Sharma et al. 2010).
The Coca-Cola Company (40%) and PepsiCo (33%) dominate the flavoring syrup and
concentrate manufacturing industry (North American Industry Classification System: 311930,
comprised of 151 companies in the U.S.), for use in fountain drinks, manufactured soft drinks,
and powdered concentrates. These two manufacturers alone define an industry Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index, or HHI, of over 2500, designating it a highly concentrated industry (>2500).
The soft-drink manufacturing industry (NAICS: 312111, comprised of 1,209 companies
in the U.S. that blend flavorings and water, then package and distribute soft drinks) is dominated
by the Coca-Cola Company (28.6%), PepsiCo (26.8%), and Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc.
(8.6%). These three manufacturers alone manifest an HHI of over 1610, defining a moderately
concentrated industry (1500-2500). While less concentrated than the flavoring syrup and
concentrate industry, this number may seem counterintuitively low. This HHI covers all six softdrink categories as defined by the Federal Trade Commission. These categories are: sCSDs (43%
by industry revenue), fruit beverages (15.2% by revenue), bottled waters (12.6%, including
spring, with flavoring, and vitamin and mineral enhanced), functional beverages (11.3%,
including energy drinks, and ready-to-drink teas and coffees), sports drinks (8.7%, including
liquid and powdered formulas), and an “other” category (7.2%, including ices, dairy-based
drinks, and soy-based drinks) (NPLAN 2011). If one removes waters, “other,” and teas and
coffees (but not energy drinks), the HHI for soft-drink manufacturing begins to edge higher.
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Coca-Cola and Pepsi are dominant in multiple soft-drink categories, including bottled water.
Negative consumption trends in sCSDs give way to profitability for other soft-drink categories,
often among brands owned by the majors that dominate sCSD market share. While estimation in
this essay is restricted to sCSDs due to data limitations, it is important to discuss policy options
for the SSB category, to avoid companies adapting brand strategies that would allow them to
keep consumer SSB sugar consumption high while cutting sCSD market share within the SSB
category. 2 Market share of sCSDs has been yielding to other SSBs such as energy and sports
drinks for at least a decade, since around 1997.
The three primary soft drink manufacturers have historically employed differing
relationships with independent bottlers and distributers. A 1999 Wall Street Journal article
indicates an antitrust lawsuit filed by an exclusive distributor of Coca-Cola against the Coca-Cola
Company for discriminatory pricing between distributors. Exclusive distribution rights had been
challenged by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) two decades earlier, but the bid failed
(Deogun 1999). Eventually the Coca-Cola Company had enough of this and: “In February 2010,
bought out the remaining interests in Coca-Cola enterprises, the main contracted bottler, giving
the Coca-Cola Company control over 90% of the North American volume” (NPLAN 2011, p 12).
A 1999 FTC report indicates “rapid structural change that transformed” the sCSD
industry in the 1980s and early 1990s. The FTC had challenged large horizontal integrations of
franchises and bottlers, but not vertical acquisitions. Beyond the FTC merger enforcement
activities, the Department of Justice (DoJ) leveled price-fixing cases in the mid-to late 1980s
“against CSD bottlers affiliated with each of the leading concentrate firms” (Saltzman, Levy, and
Hilke 1999, p vii). The report found that:

2

This statement is defended by medical/nutrition knowledge and market conditions explored in Essays Two and
Three.
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Horizontal franchise acquisitions by Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola bottlers led to higher CSD prices and lower
per capita CSD volumes, as hypothesized. … Vertical integration was associated with lower CSD prices for
alternative measures of the degree of vertical integration (as hypothesized)… lower[ing] CSD prices by 4.3%.
… The results for third bottler acquisitions varies with the local market shares of the franchises being
acquired. On average, large franchise acquisitions were associated with lower CSD prices (1.2%) and higher
per capita CSD volumes (14%) [suggesting price-elastic consumer demand]. [The reverse was true for small
franchise acquisitions.] (p viii).

The same report notes that DoJ investigations and indictments led to “guilty pleas or convictions
for price fixing between and among CSD bottlers” (p 2).
The sCSD/SSB industries are rich fields for the study of market power issues, both for
price and industry structure, but also for the effects of persuasive advertising for an industry able
to get its products into basically any public forum that might allow commercial food sales. The
extent to which the SSB market shapes the food marketing and food consumption environments
that Americans face is a topic in Essays Two and Three. Public opinion tends to turn against SSB
manufacturers when discussing marketing to children (Harris et al. 2011; NPLAN 2011).
Manufacturers of sCSDs are the largest marketer of any food product to children, and the number
one advertiser to children in schools, with over 60% of total spending (NPLAN 2011, p 23, 25,
figures based on FTC 2008).

2.3.2

Associations Between Demographic Factors, SSB Consumption, and Health Literacy
Literature strongly supports the efficacy of examining purchase patterns over a multi-year

panel to identify how demographic sub-groups respond to marketing of unhealthful foods. I find
no evidence that anyone has done this using purchase data rather than dietary recall for sCSDs.
Socio-demographic factors are associated with differences in dietary choice. DeshmukhTaskar et al. (2007) find that food group consumption varies by socioeconomic, demographic,
and lifestyle factors in a 1,266-person sample of young adults. Stevens-Garmon, Huang, and Lin
(2007, using Nielsen HomeScan data) show that the direction of ethnic influence is not always
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(2007, using Nielsen HomeScan data) show that the direction of ethnic influence is not always
predictable, as African Americans, Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans all buy more fresh
organic produce than Caucasian Americans. Remember from Marriott et al. (2010) that high
added-sugar intake is associated with lower intake of many micronutrients. Kant and Graubard
(2007) use NHANES data in conjunction with serum blood tests, finding that ethnicity and
education level are stronger independent predictors of micronutrient intake than income level,
and that after controlling for income and education levels, ethnic differences persist as
independent predictors. This suggests that ethnic grouping could explain more variance in
household sCSD purchase than differences in household income or head-of-household education
level, a testable hypothesis here. Kranz and Siega-Riz (2002) find that ethnicity, income, and
level of the female head of household’s education are among the determinants of added sugar
intake for 2-to-5-year-old preschool children. This links purchaser decisions to added sugar
intake, and suggests that policies that effectively reduce the head of household’s purchase may
help reduce sugar intake for non-shoppers in the household.
Soederberg Miller et al. (2011), define health literacy as “the ability to obtain, process,
and use health information in managing one’s health” (p 803). Health literacy for many
Americans remains consistently low over time, despite generations of rising average incomes
and educations (Kumanyika 2009, responding to Popkin, Siega-Riz, Haines 1996). Beydoun and
Wang (2008) measure nutrition knowledge and beliefs about the importance of nutrition. They
find significant correlation between higher diet quality and higher education or higher income at
high levels of nutrition knowledge and beliefs, but not at low levels of nutrition knowledge and
nutrition beliefs. (See 6.7.3 for more detail on the authors cited in this paragraph.) This suggests
that demographic variables here (education and income level, racial group, age, or presence of

23

children in the household) cannot fully identify household characteristics associated with sCSD
purchase, because nutrition knowledge and beliefs within sample households are not data in this
quantitative analysis. To the degree that sCSD purchase behavior does not closely proxy
nutrition knowledge and beliefs, there will be an implicit grouping of potentially identifiable
knowledge and belief levels within levels of demographic variables in the empirical work of this
study. This is a data-driven limitation.
Beydoun and Wang use cross-sectional data, and do not use race as a factor, so the
implementation of panel data on purchase for a particularly unhealthful food (sCSDs) in this
study has the potential to satisfy or fail to satisfy predictions that follow from Beydoun and
Wang’s results that associate lower diet quality with lower education or lower income. We
would expect from Beydoun and Wang’s results a higher sCSD purchase response to Advertising
(at least, possibly also less negative response to rising Price) for lower-education and lowerincome groups.
Zoellner et al. (2011), claim to be the first to account for demographic differences in a
sample population while also examining the association between health literacy skills, healthy
eating, and SSB consumption. They find that a one-point rise in health literacy score (Newest
Vital Sign, 0 to 6) is associated with intake of 34 fewer SSB calories per day. The nonsignificant positive associations they find between education and income categoric variables and
Healthy Eating Index (HEI) score (where health literacy is significant) importantly indicate that
increasing education or income alone are inadequate to predict a healthy eating profile. They
conclude that a measure of health literacy is a better predictor of HEI scores and SSB
consumption than education or income, and consequently caution against using income and
education status as proxies for health literacy. My quantitative work does not use any direct
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measure of health understanding, and by necessity proxies household application of nutrition
knowledge by the HHH education variable, another data-driven limitation.
However, Zoellner et al.’s results are compromised by the fact that they only regress
education and income as categoric variables. It is my precise hypothesis that there is nonlinearity across income and education levels, and across these levels within ethnic groups that I
test. If proven, this non-linearity would compromise the statistical significance of a linear
regression fit. 3 Their caution is well taken and I cannot claim that regressing on levels of income
or education would lead to statistically significant associations with level of health literacy. But
from their results, a useful conclusion emerges that speaks to my hypothesis that sCSDs are so
unhealthful that heavy household purchase naturally proxies for poor nutrition knowledge. There
are significant inverse relationships between HEI scores and SSB kcals/day for health literacy
scores, age (by year), and sex, as well as a significant inverse relation between the categoric
variable education and SSB consumption. So while not tying my household-purchase data with
nutrition knowledge is a limitation, it is one mitigated by the overlap of relevant results with
those found when health literacy scores are accounted when associating demographic traits with
diet quality.
To the extent that my analysis will overestimate the influence of education or income
level on sCSD purchase owing to a failure to identify health literacy across household types, a
specific policy prescription must follow, both from Zoellner et al., and from those who identify
low functional nutrition knowledge in the U.S. generally (including Kumanyika). Raising the
general level of nutrition knowledge and knowledge of the specific medical consequences of
consuming too much added sugar too frequently can only serve the general public and societal
goals for improving health. The assumption that those with the highest levels of income and/or
3

Results indicate latent non-linearity of fit does compromise the statistical significance of a linear regression fit.
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education will automatically use better critical skills in their nutrition choices finds modest
support at a broad categoric level, but application of this assumption as a premise to the
household level is not unambiguously supported by the literature. Assuming that those with the
highest income or education levels make better food choices ignores the larger problem of eating
habits across more than two-thirds of Americans, habits that at very least “need improvement”
(Finke and Huston 2003, p 151, citing the HEI rating for the American average level of nutrition
knowledge, as defined by the USDA’s Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion).
I have found one study that presages some of my methodology and research goals.
Thompson et al. (2009), use many similar categories for demographic variables, across a
nationally representative population, and with interaction of demographic terms, from a 29,000person National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) to assess “interrelationships of” added sugar
intake, socioeconomic status, and race/ethnicity in U.S. adults. They claim theirs is the first study
to associate demographic factors with added sugar intake as a means to “formulate effective
nutrition intervention programs” (p 1377). (The variant work with a marketing orientation here
appears to be the second.) The NHIS is a cross-sectional study conducted annually by the
National Center for Health Statistics, and consists of a clustered, randomized sample of U.S.
households. Thompson et al., regress age, income and education levels, and ethnic/racial groups,
along with an interaction of education level with racial groups and by U.S. region, on a
transformed dependent variable representing dietary intake of added sugars. Separate regressions
are run for men and women. For Age, there are 3 groups, 18-39, 40-59, and 60+ years; for Race,
non-Hispanic Whites, African Americans, and Asians, as well as Hispanics, and American
Indian/Alaskan Natives; for education level, less than high school, high school, some college,
and college or greater; for (family-size adjusted) income less than 200% of the poverty level,
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200-299%, 300-399%, 400-499%, and 500%+. Interaction is only reported for education and
race/ethnicity variables.
Thompson et al., find significant inverse associations between sugar intake and education
level or income levels for men and for women. Race/ethnicity groups significantly differ, with
Asian Americans the lowest consumers, and African Americans the highest, with AfricanAmerican men followed closely by White and American-Indian/Alaskan-Native men in high
sugar consumption. For race interacted with education level, Thompson et al., find significant
drops in sugar intake with rising education level for Whites, African Americans, Hispanic men,
and American-Indian/Alaskan-Native men. The relation for Hispanic and AmericanIndian/Alaskan Native women was “not clearly delineated,” and no relation could be discerned
for Asian Americans.
The order of sugar intake by ethnic group does not change between males and females,
the education and income effects are linear, and the interacted education-ethnic effects are linear
for all groups except non-Hispanic Asians and Hispanic women. “Groups with low income and
education are particularly vulnerable to diets high in added sugars. However, there are
differences within race/ethnicity groups that suggest that interventions aimed at reducing the
intake of added sugars should be tailored to each group” (p 1382). Thompson et al. note that
while strong independent relationships exist between demographic factors and added sugar
intake, environmental factors, including “greater advertising” may also affect outcomes. Their
results fulfill the prediction of Beydoun and Wang that low income and low education will be
associated with lower diet quality, in the form of higher added sugar intake.
These are strong results that suggest comparisons and research questions for the
contribution to the literature provided by the quantitative work here.
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2.4

Expected Contribution to the Literature
From my review of the literature to date, this is the first work that estimates how rising

education level for a fixed level of household income will variously affect purchase quantity
depending on the ethnicity of the household, and does the same fixing education level across
rising income level, while remaining flexible to non-linearity of effects across levels of education
or income. For example, for female-headed households, the drop in sCSD purchase associated
with higher education level is much stronger for Hispanic households than for White, AfricanAmerican, or Asian female-headed households (while Hispanic female-headed households are
highest in purchase at the lowest education level when income level is also low). The drop is
even larger for male-headed Hispanic households, and the drop is non-linear in rising education
at different income levels for more than one of the racial groups.
My method of estimating correlations between sCSD consumption at the household level
and specific demographic characteristics differ from the two primary related literature sets in
important ways, in part by linking the two in what from my review appears to be a unique way.
I differ first from the general Industrial Organization and Marketing literatures by not
using a structural model to estimate demand for brands within the industry, or to infer pricing
and competitive strategies reflected in market shares within the industry. This choice was largely
motivated by insights into medical effects of SSB overconsumption, which for sugared
beverages are aside from minor differences in sugar content, independent of the brands
consumed. Also, drawing from fields related to economics that are not beholden to neoclassical
assumptions, Essays Two and Three here challenge whether structural models are even
appropriate for the sCSD industry and consumption as it currently exists in the U.S. Use of a
reduced-form specification avoids the assumption implicit in neoclassical estimations that
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consumers rationally maximize utility in their choices. 4 Every aspect of the empirical design I
employ in this essay is flexible to challenges to the assumptions of neoclassical economic theory
that I explore in Essays Two and Three. The estimation strategy here is a demonstration of how
to examine consumer behavior without assuming rational behavior and utility maximization for
all sCSD consumers.
But I maintain interest in how price, incidents of discounting at point of purchase (“sale”
events), and advertising – all now at the sCSD industry level – influence household purchasing
across clearly delineated demographic characteristics. Consumer response to marketing variables
remains a primary focus of estimation, leaving this work in the Industrial Organization and
Marketing class, at least as much as other consumer economic works are.
Company or marketing research certainly identifies brand demand and consumer
responses to marketing incentives down to fine demographic characteristics, as any large-market
profit maximizer should. The primary contribution here then is that while ignoring the brand
reactions that Marketing literature prizes, results here identify an otherwise rarely specified level
of detail in describing which demographic sub-groups respond to what degree to sCSD industry
marketing incentives (the price, sale, and advertising just mentioned). Marketing data may often
be too detailed or too private to allow policymakers to identify groups apparently at risk for
health problems associated with the U.S. population’s primary source of added sugar intake. This

4

A prevailing method of economic estimation in Industrial Organization and in Marketing employs a structural
model, estimating demand. Structural models of demand offer the advantage of allowing post-estimation calculation
of price-elasticities of demand by product, and the posing of market counterfactuals for analysis. A reduced-form or
“ad-hoc” model is estimated without relying on the assumptions that fail if transitivity and/or consistency of
revealed preferences are violated. Quantities purchased are still regressed on price, but a reduced-form model is
appropriate for estimation that is not reliant on assumptions of economic theory that consumer choices are rational,
i.e., consistent and utility maximizing. Neither does a reduced-form model preclude such behavior. This method
respects the possibility that there are reasonable conditions under which regular consumption of sCSDs may not be
rational (as economists use the term). Quantitative results are unaffected by how we infer whether rational or
irrational economic decisions predominantly characterize the decision to consume sCSDs regularly. The reasons for
this choice are explored in detail in Essays Two and Three.
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work identifies these groups, as well as which sCSD industry marketing techniques seem to
provoke purchase changes to what degree.
I differ second from the literature based on dietary-recall-data studies, such as those
discussed in the previous section, not only by identifying high-sCSD-consumption demographic
sub-groups in greater detail, but also while relating consumer behavior to sCSD industry price
sale and advertising incentives.
Dietary survey recall data has the advantage of being at the individual rather than at the
household level. However, one thing all of the dietary-recall-data studies have in common is that
when they aggregate or categorize results to examine demographic factors, they use fewer
categories than I regress for income, education, or ethnic group variables, and rarely interact
characteristics to achieve tighter grouping. My method is designed to contribute to the literature
in part by offering a greater level of precision in the association of effects than others have, and
in part by using panel data for actual purchases rather than single-day, or two-day (over a ten-day
period) dietary recall survey data. My work is confined to sCSDs, but as Essay Two (Chapter 6)
will demonstrate, the case is now for the contrarian to prove that regular sCSD (SSB)
consumption is not among the single most unhealthful dietary choices that some portion of the
population makes daily. Regular consumption of sCSDs does not prove low nutrition knowledge,
but there is little question that there is a strong association (Beydoun and Wang).
By focusing on sCSDs, I study the “worst” of the added sugar products by volume and by
single-product health effect (as supported by section 6.7). Data for relevant SSBs would have
been preferable, but sCSDs are the clear leader in the category, by two- or three-to-one.
NHANES dietary recall survey methods are frequently cited for self-underreporting of
food consumption (Huston and Finke 2003). I use three years of actual household purchase data
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rather than single- or two-day dietary recall, as every other study does. This removes one type of
bias (dietary recall reporting), while perhaps introducing others (non-random sample, adjusted to
reflect a random sample by Nielsen methodology 5). Nielsen HomeScan has its own
underreporting issues that rise with large families and female heads of household (Zhen et al.
2009).
By using more categories and more interaction of demographic variables, it is possible to
identify associations between demographic variables and sCSD purchase finer than what
Thompson et al. analyze. By interacting each group with sCSD industry-level marketing
variables, it is possible to identify certain “environmental” factors contributing to sugar
overconsumption that Thompson et al. cannot account for, but refer to as important.
Thus the analysis here may confirm or refute the findings of Thompson et al. (and
Beydoun and Wang, and others) as they apply to the #1 source of added sugars in the U.S. diet.
This analysis can further explore the robustness of demographic associations with one type of
sugar intake in at least two ways. It first can identify whether the demographic associations noted
in the medical/nutrition literature hold when regressed using panel data on actual purchase versus
cross-sectional self-reporting, and second can identify associations at more refined demographic
levels than are typically reported. Further, it can identify whether effects are generally linear
across categoric variables. It can also identify the degree to which these demographic
associations with sCSD intake are associated with specific marketing tools (price, sale, or
advertising), checking for robustness of household purchase responses to the marketing variables
across income, education, and racial groups. From specific demographic sub-group responses to
marketing variables (and the robustness of these), we may infer policy strategies specific to the

5

Einav, Leibtag, Nevo, 2010 indicate this is not likely to be a problem.
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marketing of sCSDs that most seems to affect, to use the phrasing of Thompson et al. (p 1382),
those groups “particularly vulnerable to diets high in added sugars.”
The empirical method here is unique not only because it exploits a large panel data set to
generate results to an almost bewildering (or annoying) level of detail, but because this proof-ofmethod attempt in fact yields an extremely rich set of results from which multiple specific
hypotheses may be tested. The resulting wealth of coefficients ripe for accurate predictions of
consumer behavior verify the non-linearity of behavior within and across categoric variables and
validate this cumbersome approach.
While results here present a narrow set of configurations for household-realistic
combinations of demographic characteristics, perhaps dozens more may be easily constructed,
each informative as to how purchase differs by relevant real-world demographic dimensions.
Broadly, results here do add a level of robustness to the findings of Kant and Graubard
that education level and (to a lesser extent) ethnicity are stronger predictors of high added sugar
and low micronutrient intake than household income level; to the findings of Stevens-Garmon,
Huang and Lin that ethnic influence is not always predictable for food consumption; and to the
findings of Kranz and Siega-Riz that ethnicity, income, and level of female head-of-household
education help determine household sugar intake (including for children). Results here follow
some patterns identified by Thompson et al. that rising education level and rising income level
are associated with lower added sugar intake, but the results here are much weaker for the
income level association. As with Thompson et al., results here show significant difference by
racial group, and by racial group interacted with education level, and particularly high sCSD
(Thompson et al. use overall dietary sugar) consumption for a low-education, low-income
combination. This study specifically overcomes the linear education and income effects that
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Thompson et al. find, as well as dispensing with their restriction that holds the rank order by
racial group fixed for both males and females (here as heads of household). The greater number
of variables and the demonstration of non-linear effects when categoric variables are
disaggregated to levels greatly expand the quantitative detail relevant to policy that Thompson et
al. themselves originally expanded to help policymakers target those groups overconsuming
added sugars (here restricted to one product type). Targeting can be more specific using this
method, and reactions by demographic sub-groups to specific policy vectors may be more
precisely anticipated.

2.5

Overview of Research Design and Results
I conduct multivariate regression on demographic and marketing variables, the dependent

variable being quantity of sCSDs purchased by a household in a week. Because non-purchase in
a week may result from not being in the market for sCSD purchase in a week (the household
never considers purchase that week), or from a rejection of the marketing variable profile that
week (the household considers purchase, but does not locate a satisfactory product, price, etc.),
there is a sample selection problem when regressing marketing variables on household purchase.
One can address the sample selection problem using a two-step Heckman (also known as
a “Heckit”) model. Within this model, dynamic elements are used in the probit stage, so the
effects are appreciated in the model here, but transfer (through the inverse Mills ratio) to the
ordinary-least-squares regression without introducing autocorrelation error. Interacting
demographic characteristics identifies demographic sub-groups. These sub-groups are
themselves interacted with marketing variables. The result is a coefficient for each sub-group’s
purchase reaction to each sCSD-industry marketing variable.
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The two-step process yields a set of coefficients that must be properly adjusted to yield
correct marginal effects. These marginal effects are combined to analyze specific purchase
behaviors, and combined into household-realistic characteristic profiles that predict purchase
behaviors specific to levels of income and education, racial group, and sex of the head(s) of
household, among other characteristics.
Results suggest that nutrition education policies will benefit all demographic groups, but
that some are in more dire need than others. Combining the empirical results here with findings
discussed in Essays Two and Three supports a range of policy options. Advertising restrictions
should be considered. Tax-per-ounce policies may be effective in alerting consumers to the fact
that the USDA is interested in discouraging consumption of sCSDs (SSBs), and any device that
raises consumer awareness that the product is unhealthful when consumed daily in common
container sizes is likely to affect purchase more than simple taxation on any scale currently
proposed. Per-ounce soft-drink taxes are unlikely to significantly dissuade purchase for
committed buyers, who by numerous household-realistic profiles already demonstrate habitual
sCSD purchase, even when the outlay appears to be four times the percentage of the household
budget of higher-income households. I propose based on empirical results and established peerreviewed findings from other fields that sCSD marketing environments be modified, and that
sCSD-industry advertising budgets (across all media) be scaled and matched into a fund that is
pre-designated for use to generate and air carefully designed public-service announcements that
educate the public to the dangers of products and diets high in added sugars, and help educate the
public to conscientiously change unhealthful dietary habits.
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Chapter 3

Methodology and Model Specification
3.1

Selecting Into the Market for sCSDs – A Heckman Sample Selection Approach
In the introduction (1.2), I summarized reasons that the regular consumption of sCSDs

may not reflect rational economic behavior upon which a structural model of demand depends.
Reduced-form modeling (RFM) offers the implicit advantage of letting the data speak for
themselves, without being encumbered by layers of assumptions about economic behavior or
about functional form (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2008; Della Vigna et al. 2009; Dahl and Della
Vigna 2009; Basker 2005; Chen and Shapiro 2006).
The research here attempts to distinguish different demographic groups’ purchase
responses to marketing-mix variables for sCSDs. The dependent variable is total ounces
purchased by a household in a time period. A purchase response to marketing variables requires
involvement in the specific market in which a decision is made to purchase or not. “The market”
is then more than a physical space, or an area where buyers and sellers transact, exchanging
goods for money – such as a Designated Marketing Area (DMA), which may be understood to
be a city and its environs. 1 Rather, “being in” or “selecting into” the market means at some level
a household member actively considers purchase. “The market” is a solution to an equation
consisting of sellers, their evident marketing tools (e.g., price, sale, advertising, product
characteristics), and buyers, within a venue (the local Designated Marketing Area) that exists in a
specific time frame. Here each observation period, one week, is counted as a new market in
which potential buyers may transact with sellers if both choose.

1

Defined more precisely in the Data section, as “the spatial range of metropolitan commercial television broadcast
markets, …[that] thus extend across urban households to suburban and some rural households.” The Nielsen
company defines DMAs and generated the data sets employed in this study.
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Typically for shelf-stable products, whose quality by definition does not degrade over
weeks or even months, consumers may purchase a large amount in one period, and consume
from their stockpile over subsequent periods. Purchase data would reflect this with a large
number of “zero-purchase” weeks, and much larger than serving-size consumption at purchase
incidents. The final data configuration here reflects exactly this, presenting a large number of
“zero” observations for household purchase by week. This presents one mode of the classic
limited dependent variable problem for econometric modeling.
In distinguishing among the extant regression models appropriate for a limited dependent
variable that is continuous and non-negative, data may be censored or truncated. Panel data with
continuous information on household purchasers ensures that there are observations for
demographic explanatory variables even when the dependent variable is zero for a period. This
defines a censored dependent variable. Truncation occurs when both dependent and explanatory
variables are not observed when a latent explanatory variable is above (below) a threshold.
Truncation is a specialized case of censoring, involving more information loss (Cameron and
Trivedi 529). For the marketing variables in this research – Price, Sale, and Advertising – the
definition of truncation is partially met. Explanatory and dependent variable information is
missing for zero-purchase weeks, but the continuing presence of demographic information about
potential consumers assures that some explanatory variables do exist. Thus the dependent
variable will have aspects of being censored and of being truncated. Given a limited dependent
variable, a researcher must assess whether the data and research question match existing models,
and if so, whether the limitations associated with any one model are tolerable given the data,
research question, and alternative models.
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To model participation in the sCSD market, one may code a purchase occasion as a “1,”
and non-purchase as a “0.” But then a coded non-purchase “0” represents a household in a
metropolitan area in a week, a household that may or may not be participating in the market. One
type of 0 occurs for market participants – who by the definition of market participant, consider
buying – but who have chosen not to buy. Perhaps they found no lemon-lime flavor or price
discounts this week, or judged that there was enough at home already, so bought nothing. A
second and distinct type of 0 occurs for those who never considered buying sCSDs in the
observed week: non-participants in the market. This group’s “0s” reflect their lack of economic
presence/being/existence in the market transaction set of agents-forum-time. Because the 0s are
of two types – market participants with true-zero responses to the current marketing mix, and
non-market participants who are not reacting to the marketing mix in their observed behavior –
there is in examining only the observable 0s, a failure to identify the market participants who
choose a no-purchase response to this period’s marketing mix of variables. Market participation,
even when the result of considering a sCSD purchase is to not purchase at that time, should be
coded “1,” when the data are capable of presenting only a “0.” This is the crux of the selection
bias problem – we see only “0s” when we do not see purchase, without knowing whether the
zeros are responses to marketing mix variables by participants in the market, or zeros
characterizing lack of participation in the market.
In his 1979 Econometrica article, James Heckman proposed a model to correct for bias in
the selection of a data sample. The sample selection bias considered in the current research is not
a bias in the selection of households, but a bias in the identification of household participation in
the market for observed periods of zero-purchase. Restated, the need here is to correct for a selfselection bias, determined by individual choice to participate in the market, not a need to correct
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for a selection bias stemming from Nielsen’s method of sampling. 2 Heckman modeling to correct
for self-selection bias is an accepted method for the data type used here (Zhen et al. 2009).
Econometrically, with yi* as the latent variable for market participation, xi the
explanatory variable set, β a vector of coefficients, and an additive error term u i , the attempt is
to model:

y i* = xi ' β + u i .

(1)

To approximate this, we use actual observations yi, such that:
yi = 1 when yi* = 1,
and

yi = 0 when yi* = 0.

But we never observe:
yi = 0 when yi* = 1.
Observing this would fully identify consumer consideration and rejection of marketing
variables, as opposed to consumer disengagement from the market in a given zero-purchase
week. But there is not and will not be data to comprehensively identify who among our Nielsen
households considered purchasing sCSDs in a sampled week. In other words, the true number of
non-purchases that reflect consideration and rejection of marketing variables observable by a
potential consumer in a week cannot be unambiguously distinguished from non-purchases
resulting from a household’s complete inattention to the potentially observable marketing
variables for the week.
Without the ability to exactly identify which households are responding to marketing
variables in their (non-)purchase, there is an implicit misspecification in modeling purchase as a
2

For there to be sample selection bias in the selection of households, Nielsen must be contracting households that do
not cumulatively define a representative cross-section of U.S. households. This conclusion is not supported by the
literature (Einav, Leibtag, Nevo 2010), especially as Nielsen provides its own demographic sampling correction
information, which is employed here, and is described in the Data section.
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direct response to marketing variables. This misspecification defines an econometric need to
discriminate market participants from non-market participants. The Heckman two-step model
establishes two equations, a selection equation assessing the probability of market participation in
a given observation period, and an outcome equation gauging the quantitative result of
participation. In this application, the first equation assesses the probability that a household
selects into the market in a given observation period (modeling purchase decisions), and the
second equation gauges the purchase quantity resulting from participation (modeling expenditure
decisions). The dependent variable in the selection equation is a probit probability variable, 1 if
purchase occurred and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in the expenditure equation is ounces
purchased by a household in a period, contingent on participation in the market. In the selection
equation, purchase is equated with market participation, so the dependent variable does not fully
reveal the latent probability of market participation (as distinct from non-participation, which also
generates a 0 observation).
In modeling the decision to purchase or not separately from the expenditure decision,
there is an attempt to identify factors influencing market participation, while the error term
captures the influence of unobservables. By Heckman’s design, using parameter estimates and
variance from the selection model to inform estimation of the expenditure decision attempts to
correct for the latency of the dependent variable in the expenditure equation. As participation in
the market is only observed when there is positive purchase, there are no zero-purchase
observations directly used in estimation of the second-stage, the expenditure equation.
Formally, using an asterisk (*) to denote latency of market participation, and
remembering that there can be no negative probability or negative purchase, the dependent
variables for the selection equation, y1 , and the outcome equation, y 2 , are:
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1 if y1* > 0
y1 = 
*
 0 if y1 = 0

(2)

 y 2* if y1* > 0
y2 = 
*
− if y1 = 0.

(3)

*
So y 2 , quantity purchased, is observed only when y1 > 0 , meaning the decision to purchase has
*
*
been made. The probability of observing y 2 is the probability that y1 > 0 times the conditional
*
*
*
*
*
*
probability of y 2 given that y1 > 0 : f*( y 2 | y1 > 0 ) x Pr[ y1 > 0 ]. 3 When y1 = 0 , y 2 is not

meaningful; that is, without purchase, quantity purchased is not relevant. Linear modeling of the
*
*
latent dependent variables y1 and y 2 , on respective parameterized explanatory variable sets (

X i' β i ), and with additive errors ε 1 and ε 2 , appears so:
(selection / market participation)
(outcome / expenditure)

y1* = X 1' β1 + ε 1 , and

(4)

y 2* = X 2' β 2 + ε 2 .

(5)

From here, we can begin construction of the conditional expectation for y 2 , using only positive
'
values of y1 (where y1 >0  X 1 β1 + ε 1 >0) :

E[ y 2 | X 1 , X 2 , y1* > 0] = E[ X 2' β 2 + ε 2 | X 1' β1 + ε 1 > 0] .

(6)

E[ y 2 | X 1 , X 2 , y1* > 0] = X 2' β 2 + E[ε 2 | ε 1 > − X 1' β1 ].

(7)

This reduces to:

X1 and X2 can be identical, but this may lead to identification issues, as discussed further in subsection 3.2 below. ε 1 and ε 2 may or may not be correlated. 4 The error terms are expected to be

3

Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p 548.
When the errors are not correlated, by assumption or by demonstration, this becomes a Tobit model ( y1* = y 2* ),
and there is no selection bias problem. Because the zero value is a theoretically random censoring point and the
censoring point could take other values, the model can also be called a Tobit model with stochastic threshold. The

4
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correlated here, as the portion of unidentified latent market participation will affect both
equations, as will any other unobservable characteristic that effects both the decision to purchase
and quantity of purchase. Existence of correlation between the two error terms itself confirms
that selection into the market occurs in part from unobservables (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005
552). As long as this correlation holds, selection bias is a problem, and ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression will give us the first term on the right-hand side in (7), but will not yield
consistent estimates, due to the unresolved expectation following it (a nonlinearity, and a likely
'
source of heteroskedastic error). Our interest in obtaining E[ε 2 | ε 1 > − X 1 β1 ] must focus on

error terms ε 1 and ε 2 .
*
*
Given the latency of y1 and y 2 , it will not be possible to derive a precise relationship

between ε 1 and ε 2 without some assumptions about the distribution of ε 1 , ε 2 , or both. If we
assume that the error in the expenditure equation is a multiple of the error in the market
participation equation, plus some noise statistically independent from the participation equation,
the relationship between ε 1 and ε 2 can be characterized as a linear model (Cameron and Trivedi
2005, p 551) 5:

ε 2 = δε 1 + ξ .

(8)

Now the independence of ξ and ε 1 can be used to generate the following result after
substituting the right-hand side of (8) for ε 2 in equation (7):

E[ y 2 | X 1 , X 2 , y1* > 0] = X 2' β 2 + E[(δε 1 + ξ ) | ε 1 > − X 1' β1 ]
bivariate sample selection model here may also be called a model with a probit selection equation, or a type 2 Tobit
model (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p 547-8). Here the model is referred to throughout the paper as a Heckman
model, as no assumption is made that the error terms in the two equations are not correlated, and this terminology
distinguishes the model here from the specialized case known as the Tobit. The model presented here is also known
as the “Heckit” method, or “Heckit model,” the name being a play on the combination of Heckman and probit.
5
Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p 550, note that this is a weaker distributional assumption than the joint normality of
ε 1 and ε 2 , which is required for the maximum likelihood estimator of the Heckman.
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= X 2' β 2 + δE[(ε 1 | ε 1 > − X 1' β1 ] .

(9)

For the particular case of left-truncation at zero for standard normal distributions, which
describes the outcome equation, as it is regressed on only positive purchase observations after
the probit estimation, probit results can be employed as follows to solve for all but the δ term in
(9):
ε ε
− X 1' β1 
E[(ε 1 | ε 1 > − X 1' β1 ] = σE  1 | 1 >

σ 
σ σ
 X 'β  
 X ' β 
= σφ  − 1 1  / 1 − Φ − 1 1 
σ  
σ 



 X ' β    X ' β 
= σφ  1 1  / Φ − 1 1 
σ 
 σ   
 X 'β 
= σλ  1 1  ,
 σ 

(10)

where φ is the standard normal density, Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function,
and λ ( z ) =

φ ( z)
Φ( z )

. 6 λ (z ) is commonly known as the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). In equation (10),

the undesignated sigma serves as the δ from equation (9), so δ may now be employed to
signify the coefficient on the IMR. Because δ is estimable as the covariance between the errors
of the probit and outcome equations, this δ may be depicted interchangeably below with “ σ 12 ”
as in equation (12). Using the condensed proof in (10), the IMR, and δ as the covariant-error
coefficient, equation (9) reduces to:
6

Equation (10) can only be solved using: 1) the theoretical expectations for a left-truncated moment of a standard
normal z, (z ~ N[0,1]), that E z | z > c = φ (c ) / 1 − Φ (c ) ; and 2) employing the symmetry of the standardized
normal density function around zero to transition from the second to the third line (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p
540-541; citing in the definition of λ (z ) , T. Amemiya, Advanced Econometrics, Cambridge, MA, Harvard
University Press, 1985).

[

]

[

]
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E[ y 2 | X 1 , X 2 , y1* > 0] = X 2' β 2 + δλ ( X 1' β1 )] .

(11)

Similar methods involving theoretical expectations for a left-truncated moment of a standard
normal z can be used to solve for the left-truncated variance 7:

V [ y 2 | X 1 , X 2 , y1* > 0] = σ 22 − σ 122 λ ( X 1' β 1 )( X 1' β 1 + λ ( X 1' β 1 )) .

(12)

In equation (11), equation (7) has morphed into something practical. Heckman two-step
estimation treats the sample selection bias problem as an omitted variable problem, the omitted
'
'
variable being the δλ ( X 1 β1 ) term from equation (11), or σ 12 λ ( X 1 β1 ) from equation (12). 8

The first step in estimation is running the probit model for the selection equation. From
equation (4) above, the standard normal assumption on the error term yields a probit model:

Pr[ y1* > 0 | X 1 ] = Φ ( X 1' β1 ) .

(13)

The observation-level likelihood estimator for the probit equation, with vectorized x and over n
observations, is:
n

L( βˆ ) = ∏ [Pr(Φ (x1' i βˆ1 )] y1i [1 − Pr(Φ (x1' i βˆ1 ))]1− y1i , y=0,1.

(14)

i =1

φ (x1' i βˆ1 )
ˆ
. Having
Probit estimation yields β̂1 , and then the observation-level IMR: λ (x β1 ) =
Φ (x1' i βˆ1 )
'
1i

recovered the IMR to be used as the missing variable, the outcome/expenditure equation is
regressed only on positive purchase observations, and with Heckman’s adjustments, can be run
as an OLS regression. In the following equation (15), the subscript i and the vectorized x
designate an observation-level estimation equation for the OLS equation:

y 2i = x '2i β 2 + σ 12 λ (x 1' i βˆ1 ) + v i .
7

(15)

Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p 540-541, 549.
The two-step model offers some advantages to the maximum likelihood estimation of Heckman when data are
problematic and for large datasets (StataCorp. 2007. Stata Statistical Software: Release 10. College Station, TX:
StataCorp LP, p 560).
8
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The Heckman two-step estimator, with equation (14) informing equation (15), is an efficient
2
estimator of β 2 . 9 Even with the resulting β̂ 2 and v̂i , we still need estimates of σ 12 and σ 2 to

calculate our mean and variance, from theory equations (11) and (12). σˆ 12 is the estimated
coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio from the probit-equation results. 10 This is the last piece
2
necessary to calculate σ 2 , to obtain the Heckman-adjusted standard deviations for the outcome

equation coefficients:

σˆ 22 = N −1 ∑ i [vˆi2 + σˆ 122 λˆi (x1' βˆ1 + λˆi )] ,

(16)

where λˆi = λ (x1' i βˆ1 ) . Correlation of the probit-side and OLS-side errors can be confirmed by
testing whether σˆ 12 , or ρ = σˆ 12 / σˆ 2 , are 0. If they are, there was no selection bias problem, and
OLS estimates would be consistent without employing Heckman’s method.

3.2

Identification Considerations Associated with the Heckman Two-step Estimator
“Exclusion restrictions” are variables that exist only on the probit side of the model,

intended to explain selection into the market without necessarily explaining quantity purchase
once commitment to purchase is certain. Exclusion restrictions help to more robustly identify the
model, without relying solely on the nonlinearity of the functional form (Cameron and Trivedi
2009, p 546, 543).
It is easy to imagine that a highly shelf-stable product like canned or bottled sCSDs may
be stocked in the homes of consumers, and that stock levels may affect likelihood of purchase.
Attempting to construct a household-stock-level variable from recent purchase behavior would
create an autocorrelation problem in OLS regression. As demographic variables of interest are
9

Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p 550.
Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p 550.

10
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time-invariant, standard solutions to an autocorrelation problem (primarily, differencing between
time periods) is not appealing. But with the two-equation framework, calculated levels of
household stock can be entered on the probit side, and then are regressed only on probability, not
on current quantity purchased. As the household stock variable does not present in both
equations, it is not factored into the inverse Mills ratio, which channels information between the
two equations.
Frequency of purchase (number of weeks per year) is likely to be correlated with
probability of market participation, with no necessary connection to quantity of purchase, and
thus serves as a second exclusionary restriction, further identifying the model of estimation.

3.3

Parameter Interpretation and Inference
Bringing the IMR into the outcome equation (OLS regression) as an “omitted” regressor

affects coefficient estimates for OLS-equation explanatory variables, as well as effecting the
OLS error term. The relation between coefficients and standard deviations is still useful for
inference, but coefficients directly from the OLS estimation reflect outcomes that are not fully
corrected for selection bias. Marginal effects of variables common to the probit and OLS
equations of estimation, characterizing those with selection bias, must be further adjusted.
Marginal effects of explanatory variables are the derivative of the expected value of the
dependent variable in the OLS equation with respect to components of xi. Given the entrance of
probit estimates into the OLS equation through the IMR, marginal effects need to be calculated
that include the effects (including heteroskedasticity) from the IMR. 11

11

Breen, p 42-3. And “It is quite possible that the magnitude, sign, and statistical significance of the effect might all
be different from those of the estimate β , a point that appears frequently overlooked in empirical studies” (Greene
2003, p 783).
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Marginal effects for the specific explanatory variables that are common to both the OLS
and probit equations are calculated as follows. In equation (17) below, β 2 k is the OLS
coefficient, from which the related effects of xk in the probit model (selection equation) must be
subtracted, to avoid overstating the true impact of xk on y. 12 For any variable that exists on the
OLS side only, β 2 k is the marginal effect. β 1k in (17) is the probit coefficient for the kth
explanatory variable, and σ 12 is the covariance between the error vectors from the probit and
OLS equations (reported as “sigma” under “Probit y” results tables). The IMR, now vectorized,
represents the standard normal density function evaluated at a particular value of an explanatory
variable and its parameter, corresponding to the probability represented by the standard normal
cumulative distribution function evaluated for the same explanatory variable and parameter:

λ (x 1' k β 1k ) =

φ (x 1' k β 1k )
. This notation for λ removes right-hand-side fractions from the
Φ (x 1' k β 1k )

marginal effects calculation for any variable common to both equations. Thus the final marginal
effect for any single such common variable, ∂y / ∂x k , must be calculated as follows:

∂E ( y 2 | y1* > 0)
= β 2 k − σ 12 λ (x 1' k β 1k )[x 1' k β 1k + λ (x 1' k β 1k )] .
∂x k

(17)

Every active consumer rejection of sCSD marketing variables cannot be observed, but if
they were, this would expand the number of identified market participation incidents. Thus the
probability of participation is to some unknown extent estimated too low. If we expect that most
people who consider buying a sCSD in fact do, then we may expect this underestimation to be
small. Regardless of our expectation, the undercounting of market participation does factor into
the secondary OLS estimation and the subsequent calculation of marginal effects. Those
12

Breen, p 42-3. This process is consistent with Saha, Capps, and Byrne 1997, and Byrne Capps, and Saha 1996.
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explanatory variables that correlate more strongly with purchase will have slightly inflated
coefficients. This occurs because some of the non-purchase observations (zeros) correctly belong
to the market response set, rather than to the non-participation set in which they are counted.
Similarly, explanatory variables that correlate more strongly with non-purchase will have slightly
deflated coefficients, as a portion of the non-purchase observations (zeros) correctly belong to a
market response set, rather than to the non-participation set in which they are counted (too many
zeros are factored in). The magnitude of these effects will be proportional to the extent that the
“true-zero participation responses” exist and are neither observed nor econometrically identified
by the specific application here of Heckman’s method.

3.4

Actual Estimation Models
Multiple models, all Heckman-type, based on equation (11) above, which resolves to

equations 19 and 20 below, are presented in Chapter 5: Empirical Results. This section
summarizes the models of estimation, and lays out the variable types used in each.
Once again, the general set of research questions and hypotheses are aspects of the
motivating question: How are different demographic characteristics associated with purchase
responses to sCSD marketing variables? So the explanatory variable set for the reduced-form
model will interact demographic characteristics with marketing variables. The model will also
use seasonal binaries, and the necessary “exclusion restriction” variables discussed in section 3.2
above. Chapters 4 and 5 will explain aspects of the data, but for now, it is helpful to know that
for estimation observations are at the household level for one week. The corresponding
subscripts “i” (household) and “t” (time period = one week) will now together replace the “i” for
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individual observations, as used above from equation (14) on. So with the notation change,
equation (15) reads:

y 2it = x '2it β 2 + σ 12 λ (x1' it βˆ1 ) + vit ,

(18)

with “2” still designating the second (expenditure/OLS) equation, and “1” the first
(selection/probit) equation.
In every model that follows, demographic and marketing variables exist in both
equations, with seasonal binaries in the expenditure equation (Summer, Fall, and Winter, against
the Spring base group), and exclusion restriction variables in the selection equation (Weeks in
the year a household buys 2 liters or more, and the moving average of household stock of sCSDs
based on recent purchases). The single exception to this is the variable for purchase on
Discount/Sale, which cannot be regressed properly on the probit side, for reasons to be explained


x it' ) and non-demographic ( x it' )
below. Notationally, if x '2it is decomposed into demographic ( ~
component vectors, and the lambda term in (18) is folded in with the non-demographic
component vectors, we do not need numeric designation for the two equations, and can simplify
notation from (18) as we decompose the explanatory variable set:


xit' β + x it' γ + vit ,
yit = α 0 + ~

(19)

where α 0 is the intercept, belonging to neither β nor γ , the unscripted coefficient vectors for
their respective explanatory variable sets. Interaction of the demographic explanatory variable set
with each of the three marketing variables (that exist individually in the non-demographic
variable vector) involves a simple replication of the demographic component vector for each
marketing variable – i.e., the second right-hand-side term in (19) appears in the third, fourth, and
fifth terms:
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yit = α 0 + ~
xit' β + P * ~
xit' β + Sale * ~
xit' β + Adv * ~
xit' β + x it' γ + vit .

(20)

The expenditure equation in each of the following models of estimation can be conceived as (19)
or (20). In simpler models (with no interaction of terms), the demographic and marketing
variables (except Sale) are identical in the Probit and OLS halves. But identification of purchase
responses to the three marketing variables for particular demographic characteristics is possible
through interaction of demographic and marketing terms. In all the models, interaction between
the demographic variables and each of the marketing variables – Price, Sale, Advertising – is
introduced only in the expenditure/outcome equation. 13
The models fall into three classes, based on the resolution of the demographic variables
involved. Capital letters designate model types for clarity, but model names are not acronyms.
The BASIC model uses demographic variables at a category level, that is, for a category such as
household Income, which is a categoric variable spanning all (16) distinct levels defined in the
original data set. The exception is that racial groups (the White, African-American, Asian, and
Other Race groups in the Race categoric variable, plus Hispanic 14) exist distinctly from the Race
category, in order to have meaning. The BROAD model breaks each demographic category into
distinct levels within the category, with each level being a separate group, and a separate
regressor. The BASIC and BROAD models are regressed in the style of equations (19) and (20)
[no marketing-variable interactions (19), versus with interactions (20)]. The REFINED model
uses the levels of the BROAD model, such that each demographic variable can be conceived as
the interaction of two demographic category levels from the BROAD model (say, second level of

13

The purpose of the demographic-marketing variable interaction is to identify quantity response, where the probit
equation only attempts to identify selection into the market. Also, as will be addressed below, any variable with
“Sale” in it cannot be properly estimated on the probit side, details in section 4.4.
14
“Race” when capitalized refers to the variable, which is the four groups. “Racial groups” capitalized or not, refer
to the set of five groups, adding Hispanic to the original set, with the understanding that when reference groups are
chosen, “Race” uses White, while “Hispanic” implicitly uses non-Hispanic.
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Income with a specific number of children in the home), to identify consumer reactions at a
much more refined level than either of the two previous model levels. Each demographic
variable is then a sub-group comprised of elements of the two groups from which it is derived.
All the demographic variables so defined in the REFINED model are also interacted with the
marketing variables, per (20). Some readers may benefit by turning now or during the model
descriptions in 3.4.1 – 3.4.3 to Figure 1 (located after sub-section 3.4.3), which describes
demographic variables in each level of the model.

3.4.1 The BASIC Model
This model is an exercise in the fundamental modeling approach. It can confirm basic a
priori hypotheses about signs and significance of estimated coefficients for broadly-defined
(categoric) explanatory variables, and may expose coefficients that do not match hypotheses,
highlighting variables to be more carefully examined in the BROAD and REFINED models,
with their more disaggregated demographic variables. Even for the BASIC model, a small
number of reference(/base) group choices need to be made to avoid the dummy variable trap (see
Figure 1, last column). In all versions of the BASIC model, the reference demographic group is
White, non-Hispanic, with no children. Reference groups become more refined in subsequent
models, but assumptions are held as consistently as is feasible across the models.
In the BASIC model, each demographic category is undifferentiated, so coefficients are
interpretable as increments to be applied across the levels that comprise a category, such as Fem
Educ, which denotes the highest education level attained by a female head of household. In
interpreting estimation results, these increments are econometrically constrained to be monotonic
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in direction and size, whether levels within the category – Grade School, 15 Less than High
School, High School, Some College, College, Post-College – are monotonic increments or not.
For example a coefficient of 9.18 for the category Fem Educ mandates the interpretation that
Less than High School households purchase 9.18 x 2 ounces on average in a week, while College
households buy 9.18 x 5 ounces per week.

3.4.2

The BROAD Model
Disaggregating a categoric variable into discrete levels permits one to identify non-

monotonic changes in direction and size of purchase response. If for example a particular
category level (e.g., Some College in Fem Educ) varies significantly in size or direction from
being two marginal effect (reported coefficient) units from Less than High School. Exploring this
possibility is the mission of the BROAD model. This exercise largely confirms that marginal
effects do vary in a non-linear fashion both in direction and in size. The BASIC model is naive in
its restriction that effects of categoric variables remain linear for sCSD consumption. The
BROAD model requires more reference-group choices, to avoid the dummy-variable trap. In all
versions of the BROAD model, the reference group is White, non-Hispanic, upper tranche of
Income, Post-College Education (Female or Male head of household), Household Size of one,
with no children, and (Female or Male head of household) Age between 50 and 65 years. The
value of “breaking out” from a categoric variable into levels to measure non-linear impacts will
become evident in the Data and Results chapters.

15

Category levels for Education as they exist in the BROAD and REFINED models, fold the “Grade School” into
the “Less than High School” level, to avoid needless complexity that is unlikely to offer illuminating identification,
and that would be based on a very low number of actual observations for household heads whose highest level of
educational attainment is grade school. More sophisticated models thus employ five, not six, levels of Education.
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3.4.3 The REFINED Model
In the BROAD model, there are however no coefficients that directly inform how, say,
Whites of different Income levels vary in their purchase responses, although this is an interest of
this research. Discussing any racial group as a unitary group masks large differences in quantity
purchased per week and response to marketing variables associated with Education or Income
groups that a racial group spans. Each variable in the REFINED model exists as a combination
of two demographic characteristics, with or without an interaction with a marketing mix variable.
So a demographic-demographic combination (sub-group) exists at a level for each of two
combined categories or groups. For example Female Educ Less HS is a group, that when
interacted with levels of Income, generate six sub-groups. Similarly, x1PvInc is a group (defined
in Figure 1), that when interacted with Female Educ levels, generates five sub-groups. Because
demographic variables exist as specific demographic sub-groups of one trait combined across the
possible variants (levels) of another demographic trait, these interacted variables can identify
sub-group consumer responses to a level of accuracy unachievable in the BASIC or BROAD
models.
For example within the categories Income and # of Kids are households at the second
defined level of income that include one child. So this unique sub-group exists at the second
level of six in Income and the second level of five in # of Kids. Sets of interacted variables
comprise the following seven combined categories, where HH designates “household,” and
HHH designates “head of household”:
•

Income x (Male/Fem HHH) Education

•

Income x Race (/Hispanic)

•

Income x HH Size

•

Income x # of Kids in HH
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•

Income x (Male/Fem HHH) Age

•

(Male/Fem HHH) Educ x Race (/Hispanic)

•

(Male/Fem HHH) Educ x # of Kids in HH.
The high number of coefficients resulting from this specification allow the identification

of marginal effects specific to precise demographic sub-groups, and comparison of results in
multiple configurations (e.g., across levels of Income and separately across number of children),
for deeper insight into real-world behavior. Income or Education effects (which are generally
expected to conflict) can be checked for their robustness across Race, Number of Children, or
Age.
Within each of the bulleted combined categories, a reference sub-group is dropped to
avoid the dummy variable trap, so every variable in any category combination is estimated as the
marginal effect versus the reference sub-group. This allows for comparison of a set of marginal
effects that all reflect to the same reference group (a set spans all combinations of the two
demographic groups that are interacted in sub-groups from the BROAD model). Comparison of
sets occasionally establishes a level of consistency enabling some comparison of results across
different demographic-demographic category combinations – a method that introduces another
level of analysis for marginal effects on marketing-variable interaction variables.
However, because the combination of two categories establishes a second-tier dummyvariable trap, beyond dropping the reference sub-group, one level of one of the categories cannot
be combined with all of the levels of the other category in the combination. Summary statistics,
and previous iterations of estimation informed the choices of which category levels should
simply be listed as variables in the equation of estimation, rather than including them in the
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combined category sets. 16 Little inference is done on these variables, which are included in the
estimation because dropping them entirely would resign their effects into the reference groups,
rather than controlling for their effects. Base group choices for the REFINED model are
combinations of the same base group assumptions made for the BROAD model.

Figure 1 (set).

Demographic Variables By Type, for the BASIC, BROAD, and REFINED
Models

BASIC: 9 Demographic Variables (7 variables for Fem or Male HHHs, 9 if both are
HHHs)
Variable
Type
Range
Base Group Assumption
categoric
16 levels: under $5k – $100k+
Income
categoric
6 levels: Grade School – Post-Collg
F HHH Educ
6 levels: Grade School – Post-Collg
M HHH Educ categoric
binary (4) White, Afr-Amer, Asian, Other
Race
White
binary
Hispanic
Not Hispanic
categoric
1–9
HH Size
categoric
0–7
# of Kids
categoric
9 levels: <25y – 65+
F HHH Age
categoric
9 levels: <25y – 65+
M HHH Age
To add marketing variable interaction, each of above also times Price, Sale, and/or Advertising.

16

Because Income and Education are the primary interacted categories, the category level drops are taken from the
other five categories: No Male HHH, No Female HHH, Other Race, 4 Kids or more, Female Age greater than 65,
Male Age greater than 65, and HH Size 5 or more. The un-combined category levels listed here, from the secondtier dummy variable trap, were not interacted with marketing variables.
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(Figure 1, continued)
BROAD: 38 Demographic Variables (7 variables for Fem or Male HHHs, 9 if both are
HHHs)
Variable
Type
Range
Base Group Assumption
binary
HalfPov4Inc
Household income level,
binary
1xPov4Inc
relative to average poverty level
5xPov4Inc
binary
2xPov4Inc
for a family of 4, 2006 -2008,
binary
3xPov4Inc
approximated by the 16 Nielsen
binary
4xPov4Inc
levels for household income.
binary
5xPov4Inc
binary
Fem Less HS
binary
Fem HS
Head of household’s last level
Fem Post Collg
Fem Some Collg binary
of
education.
HHH
is
Female,
binary
Fem Collg
or Male, or both. Less High
binary
Fem Post Collg
School includes Grade School,
binary
Male Less HS
for 6 levels.
binary
Male HS
Male Post Collg
Male Some Collg binary
binary
Male Collg
Male Post Collg binary
binary (4) White, Afr-Amer, Asian, Other
Race
White
binary
Hispanic
Not Hispanic
binary
HH size 1
binary
HH size 2
HH size 1
binary
HH size 3
binary
HH size 4
binary
HH size 5+
binary
No Kids
binary
One Kids
No Kids
binary
Two Kids
binary
Three Kids
binary
4 Kids+
binary
Fem Age <30
binary
Fem Age 30-40
Fem Age 50-65
binary
Fem Age 40-50
binary
Fem Age 50-65
binary
Fem Age 65+
binary
Male Age <30
binary
Male Age 30-40
Male Age 50-65
binary
Male Age 40-50
binary
Male Age 50-65
binary
Male Age 65+
To add marketing variable interaction, each of above also times Price, Sale, and/or Advertising.
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(Figure 1, continued)
REFINED: 256 Demographic Variables (7 variables for Fem or Male HHHs, 11 if both are
HHHs)
Variable
Type
Range
Base Group Assumption
binary
(178 variables)
HalfPov4Inc x
Fem Less HS
binary
1xPov4Inc x
Fem Less HS
Each level of
5xPov4Inc x Fem Post Collg
binary
2xPov4Inc x
Fem Less HS
Income
interacted
5xPov4Inc x Male Post Collg
binary
3xPov4Inc x
Fem Less HS
with
each
other
5xPov4Inc x White
binary
4xPov4Inc x
Fem Less HS
demographic
5xPov4Inc x HH size 1
binary
5xPov4Inc x
Fem Less HS
variable
level
5xPov4Inc x No Kids
binary
HalfPov4Inc x
Fem HS
from
BROAD.
5xPov4Inc x Fm Age 50-65
binary
1xPov4Inc x
Fem HS
5xPov4Inc
x Male Age 50-65
binaries
⁞
binary
4xPov4Inc x
Male Age 50-65
binary
5xPov4Inc x
Male Age 50-65
binary
(78 variables)
Fem Less HS x
No Kids
binary
Fem Less HS x
1 Kids
Each level of Fem
binary
Fem Less HS x
2 Kids
Educ and Male
binary
Fem Less HS x
3 Kids
Educ interacted
Fem Post Collg x No Kids
binary
Fem HS
x
No Kids
with
#
of
Kids
in
Male Post Collg x No Kids
binary
Fem HS
x
1 Kids
HH
binaries
⁞
binary
Male Post Collg x 2 Kids
binary
Male Post Collg x 3 Kids
binary
Each level of
Fem Less HS x
White
Fem/Male Educ
binary
Fem HS
x
White
Fem Post Collg x White
binaries interacted with
⁞
Race
and
with
Male Post Collg x White
binary
Male Collg x
Hispanic
Hispanic=yes
binary
Male Post Collg x Hispanic
To add marketing variable interaction, each of above also times Price, Sale, and/or Advertising.
To avoid a second-level dummy variable trap, one group from each demographic set must also be dropped from
the interacted variable sets. Candidate groups were indicated by data configuration or results from earlier
estimations. These groups are regressed without interaction with either Income or Education variables, and
without interaction with marketing variables, but had to be regressed to avoid folding their effects into
reference-group assumptions: No Male HHH Head, No Female HHH Head, Other Race, HH Size 5+, 4 Kids+,
Fem Age 65+, Male Age 65+. Certain Other Race interactions were possible to introduce into the demographic
interactions without challenging the second-level dummy variable restriction. Separate inference has so far not
been done on these, as this group is narrow.
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Chapter 4

Data and Empirical Implementation
4.1

Data Source and Scope
Data are from AC Nielson, weekly HomeScan, spanning three years from February 2006

through to December 2008 (152 weekly “Process Periods”), and 16 Designated Marketing Areas
(DMAs): Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Hartford & New Haven, Houston,
Kansas City, Los Angeles, Miami – Ft. Lauderdale, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco –
Oakland – San Jose, Seattle – Tacoma, Springfield – Holyoke (MA), and Washington D.C.
DMAs are defined by the spatial range of metropolitan commercial television broadcast markets
to the county level, and thus extend across urban households to suburban and some rural
households. This data set combines specific purchase information, recorded after purchase by
household members, with the demographic information of the participating household. Because
some households end HomeScan participation and others enter in a given year, the number of
households (HHs) in each annual panel varies: 17,278 households in 2006; 17,883 in 2007;
17,772 in 2008; for an average 17,628 households in an annual panel. 17 After data management
procedures that included totaling daily purchases to the weekly level, there were 459,392 nonzero purchase observations within the sweetened carbonated soft-drink product category, across
all HHs over the three years.
Also from Nielsen are sCSD (television) advertising data corresponding to Nielson
DMAs. The television advertising industry has defined standard units known as “gross rating
17

The dataset is resolute to the household level, but not to individual-level data. It is not possible to identify who in
a household or how many in a household are drinking the sCSDs purchased. If one member in a larger household
dominates demand for sCSDs, demand is averaged, despite the individual demand being the true driver, and at
consumption levels above the household average. There is similarly no information about the health, body mass
index, or nutrition education of household members, any of which could prove helpful in pursuing questions of
interest.

57

points” (GRPs) that measure a target audience’s viewing exposure to specific advertising within
a broadcast market. 18 Nielsen advertising data categorizes the DMA-level GRPs to a certain level
of demographic granularity. For example the entire data set includes age-specific GRPs for
children. For variable construction here, this enables calibration of mean advertising exposure to
the age-specific number of individuals in a household.
Raw data from Nielsen offers a “projection-factor weighting” number for each household
in each year. This number is computed using a proprietary Nielsen methodology to weight each
HH so that the dimensions of particular demographic characteristics can be treated as
proportionally representing true population frequencies within the DMA. For example, given the
relatively few sampled HHs with household heads under 30 years of age, the Projection Factor
associated with such a household would be higher than for a household with a head between 50
and 65 years, but the same Projection Factor assigned to the HH would also be weighted to
reflect Income, Race, and other demographic characteristics, in order to make the HH
representative of households similar to others in the DMA by any of a range of measures.
Nielsen-assigned Projection Factors at the HH level are used to weight the data in this study, so
that inference on estimation results applies to populations, rather than merely to Nielsen samplehousehold behaviors. Assuming that Nielsen’s Projection Factor methodology is sound, the
particular 16-DMA sample here implies that for this study there was effective sampling from
roughly one-third of the U.S. population. With proper econometric application, estimation results
should prove statistically robust.
Wider than the category of sCSDs alone, about half (48%) of all sugar-sweetened
beverages (SSBs) are purchased in supermarkets and general merchandise stores, about 20% in
18

More specifically, the GRP number is a total derived from multiplying the percentage of households that are
projected to have seen a telecast of an advertisement (or class of advertisements) times the frequency of telecasts,
and summing across the full range of telecast frequencies defined by Nielsen.
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restaurants, and about 12% each in convenience stores and vending machines. SSB consumption
occurs about 52% at home, and 48% away from home (Ogden et al. 2011; NPLAN 2011).
Only store purchases with containers brought home are in the Nielsen data set. Thus
findings here represent a lower limit for the purchase effects of marketing variables, and relevant
to the policy debate, a lower limit to the health effects from sCSD consumption. There is nothing
specific to this data set or empirical methodology that allows inference as to the linear or
nonlinear application of these marketing variable responses to away-from-home purchase
decisions and use. The degree of overlap between results from this purchase-based analysis and
results from National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) recall-based analysis
may inform the extent to which it is appropriate to generalize the marginal effects identified in
this work to include away-from-home consumption. From only the results here, inferring the
influence of marketing variables on away-from-home consumption behavior by demographic
sub-group would necessarily be speculative, and therefore will not be undertaken.
Nielsen HomeScan has underreporting issues that rise with large families and female
heads of household (Zhen et al. 2009). But these may be small compared to the other standard
food consumption methodology. NHANES dietary recall survey methods are frequently cited for
self-underreporting of food consumption (Huston and Finke 2003).

4.2

Scale of Analysis for Dependent and Explanatory Variables
The research questions of interest in this paper focus on the extent to which different

demographically identified groups respond to price, “sale”/discounting, and advertising (the
marketing-mix variables) for sCSDs as a product category. Weekly HH purchase total of any
sCSD, in ounces, is the dependent variable of final estimation in all models.
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Based on information and conclusions presented in Essay Two on health effects
associated with habitual sCSD consumption, the interest of estimation here is not to identify
brand-specific reactions to price sale or advertising. The biological effects of sCSD consumption
are not brand-specific. Whether one consumes the 240 calories in a 20-ounce bottle – or 23% of
the daily carbohydrates recommended for a 2000-calorie diet – from Coca-Cola Classic or a
generic cola brand, or any other from a panoply of sCSD brand choices, is irrelevant to one’s
stomach or liver. So this analysis is structured to use household observations to identify the
effects of marketing variables at the product-category level.
Defining marketing-mix explanatory variables to address consumer response at the
product-category level leads to different definitions than variables defined to estimate demand at
the product level (food > product category > brand > product). Variables defined for structural
demand estimation would tend to rely on product-specific prices sales and advertising. The three
marketing variables defined below are not product specific, but each yields a coefficient that can
be interpreted in ounces per week, once multiplied by some selected value of the product
category variable – here average value of the continuous marketing variable across the final data
configuration.
Demographic variables will be defined when describing their statistical characteristics in
Chapter 5, and will pertain to either the household head(s), or the entire household.

4.3

Marketing Mix – Price Index
The Price variable here is an index, in dollars per ounce. It is constructed in multiple

steps – designed to insulate against any potential endogeneity between the Price Index and HH
quantity purchased. Household purchases in ounces are first matched with purchase price and
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divided to give prices per ounce paid by the household in a given week. This term enters as one
of the two element types of the Price Index, for weeks in which purchase is made. Purchase
prices in ounces are then sorted to the brand level in a DMA, so each brand has a unique priceper-ounce for any DMA-week combination. Total ounces purchased by a household in a week
are adjusted using the Projection Factor, to better approximate true population purchase at the
brand level across the entire dataset. Totaling these for any process period yields a projectionfactor-adjusted sample-wide total purchase in ounces. Sorting this by brand generates brand-level
numerators to be paired with a sample-wide total purchase denominator to yield a vector of
“U.S.”− market shares by brand. Brand prices in a DMA-week are then weighted by the “U.S.”−
brand-market shares, then averaged, yielding the second element type of the Price Index. So
actual prices per ounce from household purchase are the Price Index entries in weeks in which
purchase occurs, while the average DMA-week Price Index just described is retained as the price
the household faces for weeks in which no purchase was made. All Price Index values are
adjusted for inflation across the three-year data span, using a Consumer-Price-Index monthly
adjustment factor from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Multiplying the brand-price-per-ounce in a DMA-week times the “U.S.”-market share
decouples the levels of price and quantity in the resulting brand-share-weighted average sCSD
price for a DMA-week combination, while retaining the plausibility of both the average price
and the average market share for the product-category. Price is determined exogenously for the
category, not for the individual brands purchased by the HH; and brand-price is weighted into the
Price Index by “national” market share, not the particular HH’s or DMA’s cross-sectional
purchase. Price determinations are made by individual manufacturers and retailers, not the sCSD
product category. Endogeneity would occur only if all soft-drink manufacturers and retailers

61

were coordinating DMA-wide prices simultaneously with household-level purchasing decisions.
So by construction the non-purchase-week price observations in the Price Index are resistant to
endogeneity that can result from simultaneous price-quantity solution observed in household
purchase.
While the construction of the Price Index is consistent with targeting consumer response
to the entire product-category, the coefficients of estimation on the price variable may depict less
quantity response than they would if prices were constrained to the specific products an
individual HH routinely considers purchasing, but these cannot be completely identified. We
may expect price-response coefficients to be of lower magnitude than if the coefficients
corresponded to prices on household-selected products rather than on the full product category.
This would be an effective damping of the signal conveying price-reactivity in household
purchasing, because category prices are regressed on what ultimately must be household
purchases of a limited number of actual products whose specific prices do not exist as unique
regressors.
For purchase weeks where the price-per-ounce represents the actual prices paid (first
element type), there is a small chance of price-quantity endogeneity entering the Price Index,
despite the other controls. An appropriate test for price endogeneity was conducted after
estimation (and confirmed that price-endogeneity cannot be biasing results in this model – full
description in Chapter 5).
Being based on Nielsen-sample household purchases in a DMA-week, the Price Index
may not represent the entire choice set of the price-product options that individual shoppers may
conceivably face in the supermarket aisle or refrigerator case. Simply put, if a particular product
is not bought in a DMA in a week, its price is unknown, and cannot be factored into the index.
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This data-driven difference must generate results different from what they would be if the goal
were to model consumer demand given a specific choice set constructed from the actual and
entire bank of shelf-available sCSD choices and known prices. Given the relatively large market
shares for dominant brands (and store brands as a group), this difference may be academic, but as
only one data structure is used here, there is no way to know to a certainty.
It is important to remember that because the Price Index here is built from actual
purchases rather than the actual choice set, it is likely to favor by inclusion more pricecompetitive products, products on sale, and possibly more heavily advertised products than the
entire population might buy, particularly if brands not well-represented in the national market
share constructed here proved to be consistently significant and higher in DMA-market share
than they appear to be here. Compared to constructions built from fully-known shelf availability,
prices, and documented promotions, the estimated mean prices for the sCSD category here may
well be lower, the estimated mean percentage of the category on sale may be higher, and the
effect of advertising may be higher than if these variables could be regressed on a fullinformation price-product set.

4.4

Marketing Mix – Discount/Sale
The Disc/Sale variable is not an index, it simply identifies any type of HomeScan-coded

“Sale” or price promotion from the many types that Nielsen defines. If the HH noted that the
item was discounted in price, (without specifically identifying a coupon application exclusively),
the variable is non-zero. Among the marketing variables, the Disc/Sale variable has a unique
problem because it is binary in nature. In this dataset, there are values in the Price Index and
Advertising Index when there is no purchase observation for a HH-week, but there is no
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identification of whether an item was on sale if it was not purchased. There is purchase without
Disc/Sale, but every time Disc/Sale exists as a positive binary, there must have been a purchase.
This creates two problems with probit estimation on a 0–1 dependent variable. First, because
there is a one-to-one correspondence between Sale and purchase, a linear combination of other
explanatory variables of selection to purchase may be expected to total to Sale – the classic
perfect multicollinearity problem, which can push standard errors higher. Particularly for the
Sale variable, the standard error approaches infinity. Second, because there is a one-to-one
correspondence between Sale and purchase, there is no variability between the Sale explanatory
variable and a “1” for the probit dependent variable. 19 So putting any Sale variable or
demographic-marketing interaction variable involving Sale on the probit side only creates
specific estimates with no standard deviations. (In practical estimation, econometric software
returns a string of missing values for the row, where other variable estimates have standard
errors, z-scores, p-values, and 95%-Confidence Intervals). This failure of variability in turn
artificially deflates the IMR, thus upsetting the correct Heckman adjustment of the OLS equation
– the correct Heckman adjustment being the point of employing the probit “selection” equation
in the first place.
Leaving aside this econometric problem, there is an economic argument to be considered
as well in leaving Disc/Sale out of probit-side estimation. The probit estimation step attempts to
identify who is “in the market” versus who is not. Recognizing that we are not talking about
durable goods, but a product that is very widely available and a very small portion of budgetary

19

If this is still not clear, understand that of the four possible configurations for household purchase observations in
the sCSD market, data limitations determine that only three are observed: “on Sale”=1 when “quantity
purchased”=1; or “quantity purchased”=1 with “on Sale”=0; or “quantity purchased”=0, therefore “on Sale”=0.
There are no observations for which “on Sale”=1 and “quantity purchased”=0 – a situation which must exist for
households in the sCSD market in a given week. Without this fourth observation type, there can be no variability in
the Sale-Purchase relationship in the probit equation.

64

expenditure to begin with – so that price promotions will effectively save a buyer a few cents or
at most a very few dollars – one can see that the motivation to buy a small consumable item on
sale necessarily follows the decision to buy at all. An item being on sale may affect the timing of
purchase, but does not affect whether one is considering purchase. This is because if the
information that something is on sale can impact the decision-making process, then one is
already considering or amenable to purchase, and is therefore already in the market. Buying
something on Sale cannot be a determinant of market participation, because it follows from
market participation. So exclusion of the Disc/Sale variable in probit estimation is reasonable on
strictly logical grounds, given that this dataset does not identify price promotions without there
having been purchase. Disc/Sale may well affect quantity purchased, and is thus regressed and
interacted with demographic variables in the OLS equation exactly as the Price and Advertising
variables are.

4.5

Marketing Mix – Advertising Index
The Advertising variable (generally designated “Adv” or “Advert” in Results tables) is

also an index, and its units are in GRPs at a household level, specific to a particular DMA in a
given week. The specific advertising data configuration used here is GRP exposures for a DMAweek combination, across types of television broadcast (cable, network, syndicated, and spot
television placements), for each of five age categories: 2–5 years, 6–11 years, 12–17 years, 18–
24 years, and 25+ years; thus presenting 20 GRP numbers for each DMA-week. I calibrate
household-specific GRP exposure to the number and age of HH members by adding the GRP
exposure types into a HH weekly total according to demographic data listings for age and
number of each household member. Thus the advertising observation for a specific household in
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a week is that household’s estimated exposure to television advertising of any sCSD, with GRP
exposure based on the number and age of that HH’s members, and on the original DMA-week
GRP exposure indexes compiled from Nielsen.
As with the Price Index, some factors may influence our expectation of magnitudes of
estimated variables associated with the Advertising Index. Also as with the Price Index, the
construction of the Advertising Index is consistent with targeting consumer response to the entire
product-category, so the coefficients of estimation on Advertising variables may depict less
quantity response than they would if advertising were examined for the specific products an
individual HH routinely considers purchasing. Identifying these is outside the scope of analysis
of consumer responses to product-category-level marketing variables. Paralleling the potential
effect associated with the Price Index, there could be an effective damping of the signal
conveying advertising-reactivity in household purchasing, because category-level advertising is
regressed on what ultimately must be household purchases of a limited number of actual
products whose specific advertising GRPs do not exist as unique regressors. On the other hand,
advertising triggers for any product in the sCSD category may trigger purchase desire for a
household’s preferred brand(s), given a known spillover effect from sCSD advertising (Zheng
and Kaiser 2008). There may thus be an additive rather than a dampening effect in the
Advertising Index which is implausible for the Price Index.
We may also begin with expectations that household response to weekly changes in
sCSD advertising may be low, because they are minor incremental changes to well-established
taste and brand perceptions. In other words, consumption changes based on weekly advertising
changes may naturally be of a much smaller dimension in effect on purchase behavior than the
bank of name recognition and associative desire that marketing experts call the “brand equity”
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retained in consumer perception. Many of the name-brand sCSDs have built brand equity over
decades, even well over a century for Coca-Cola, Pepsi, and Dr. Pepper – with 7-Up a relative
youngster, given its introduction in 1929. Any study of brand equity must be external to the
reduced-from estimation here on product-category-level marketing variables. But this cannot
discount the fact that regular U.S. consumers of sCSDs have been influenced over a lifetime by
sCSD advertisements, so the marginal weekly advertising exposures documented in these data
may be unlikely to affect significant shifts in what may be habitual purchase behavior. This may
result in low marginal effects from Advertising and Advertising-interacted variables relative to
other marketing variables.
From an opposing perspective, the coefficients on the Advertising Index and its
interaction terms may be artificially inflated, if manufacturers analyzing their markets over
decades choose to advertise at historical times of peak purchase, as the drive to increase market
share might suggest doing. This would result in high correlation between Advertising and
purchase quantity that is purely correlative with, and in no statistically identifiable way
determinative of, relatively higher purchase.

4.6

Balancing the Panel by Including Non-purchase Observations for Households
A dataset consisting of only purchase observations cannot directly represent the choice

not to purchase as a valid response to a price promotion or increased advertising. So regressing
on only positive observations with no other modeling correction would mis-specify a model
seeking to answer these research questions. It is therefore necessary to balance the panel with
demographic information fully listed for every week in which households are in the panel,
including weeks without purchase. The integrity of the Nielsen data-gathering process ensures
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that these filled-in zeros are actual purchase observations for the household for the week. As the
Price and Advertising Indices are constructed so that they have non-zero values in non-purchase
weeks for every household, the “fill-in” expands the ability of the existing dataset to characterize
real-world behavior. With every house existing in the Nielsen panel during a year now having an
observation – zero or positive purchase – every week, the number of observations rises to
2,666,124. With the filled-in zeros, non-purchase observations represent 82.8% of all
observations. The post fill-in data configuration reveals in a way that is less obvious before the
fill in, that given the extremely shelf-stable nature of the product, HHs do appear to purchase at
supermarkets usually to replace consumed HH stocks of sCSDs.
The filled-in zero-purchase observations create cell space in the data for implementation
of the “household stocking variable” to be used as an exclusion restriction variable (section 3.2).
Based on tabulated numbers for HH-average annual frequency of purchase (10.16, st. dev.
0.046), and frequency of purchases greater than 67 ounces (7.77, st. dev. 9.17, in Table 1, section
5.1), out of thirteen fixed stocking intervals constructed, the six-week degrading stock variable
fit best. The “MovgAvgHHstock6” variable begins with the week’s purchase in ounces, and
subtracts one-sixth of the volume for each subsequent week, overlapping with addition and stock
subtraction for any new purchase.
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Chapter 5

Empirical Results
5.1
5.1.1

Descriptive Statistics and Pre-Regression Data Analysis
Descriptive Statistics and Selected Race-/Hispanic-Specific Means
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables, with

many demographic variables here covering an entire demographic category. Category-spanning
variables used in the BASIC model will be decomposed into category levels for more complex
versions of the model later. Across all observations, including zero-purchase weeks for
households, the weekly HH-average purchase total (the dependent variable) is 47.8 ounces, the
equivalent of two now standard-sized 20-ounce bottles, plus a 1960’s standard-serving-sized 8ounce bottle. The coefficient of variation (CV = standard deviation/mean) of 342% indicates the
extreme variation in purchase quantity when over 80% of observations are zero purchase. So it is
useful to see how the purchase statistics change when only positive purchase observations are
considered, the next line in the table. Counting only the HH weekly observations for which
purchase occurs, the average rises over five times to 277.4 ounces, the equivalent of four twoliter bottles, again plus a 1960’s standard-serving-sized 8-ounce bottle. For this amount, the CV
has dropped to 109%, depicting high variance but far less than for the zero-purchase-inclusive
average. The mean number of weeks in a year that HHs purchase more than a two-liter bottle (a
six-pack of 12-ounce cans is more fluid than a two-liter bottle; variable depicted
“WksHHTotOzGrtr67,” the first exclusionary restriction, in probit estimation results) is 7.77,
with a CV of 118%, again depicting large variance in HH behavior. These basic statistics support
the observation that sCSDs are routinely purchased in quantities greater than for immediate
consumption, stocked, and consumed over a period of time.
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The Price and Advertising variables are each indexes, constructed across all sCSDs to a
weekly level within each DMA. The mean price in $/oz across all DMAs for all weeks is 2.2
cents per ounce, with a CV of 11%. The following line, with a CV of 44%, reflects prices
adjusted for inflation using Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index tables. For this
second mean price-per-ounce, the maximum value is forcibly determined by excluding prices per
ounce above $0.50, as this is over twenty times the mean and many standard deviations away,
suggesting errors in data entry by participating households.
The CV for average HH advertising exposure in GRPs is 74%, indicating far less variance
than for the purchase and purchase frequency variables above. The minimum and maximum show
a wide range in weekly sCSD-advert GRPs from the most to least saturated markets.
The portion of purchases that Nielsen HomeScan participants indicated were on sale in
some form is 30.5%, which indicates something about the timing of purchases, or as can be
inferred by the mean of weeks-per-year-greater-than-67-ounces, the timing of household restocking purchases. Again, a CV of 151% indicates high variability in sale purchase – a single
standard deviation defines purchase-on-sale frequency from 0 to 75 percent. On average under a
promotional price discount (sale) households purchase 328.5 ounces, with a relatively miniscule
standard deviation. As might be expected, mean purchase on sale is some 50 ounces more than
the 277.4-ounce mean for positive purchases broadly, or about 2/3 of a two-liter bottle.
Moving to the demographic variables, the sixteen Nielsen categories for household
income range from “Under $5000” to “$100,000 & Over.” The mean HH Income of 20.8 in this
dataset indicates around $50,000 per year, although the standard deviation indicates little
population concentration around this mean. Note that one standard deviation pushes up to the
$70,000 range, or pushes down to the $25,000 range.
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Education levels and Age levels are for the household head. It is important to understand
that there may be a single head of household (HHH, male or female), or two heads of household
(both male and female). All HHH-identified Nielsen variables apply to a single sex. For either
sex of HHH, there are six levels within the category that can define the highest level of education
completed, and a null option indicating there is no HHH of that sex in the home. The higher
mean education level for Female versus Male HHHs falls between High School graduate and
Some College, as it also does for Male HHHs. The variance suggested by adding or subtracting a
standard deviation indicates little concentration around the mean, and greater variation in the
Male education level.
Under Nielsen’s “Race” variable there are four groups, and the portion of each in the
sample is reported by the mean here: White 76.1%, African American 13.4%, Asian 4.6%, Other
Race 5.9%. Whether a HHH identifies as Hispanic is identified with a binary question separate
from the Race question. It is therefore possible to be non-Hispanic, or White-, AfrAm-, or AsianHispanic, and all of these combinations exist in the data. The only way to not be one of these is
to identify as Other Race and select Hispanic versus non-Hispanic. 1 Other Race would also
include any other group not self-identifying as White or Asian, including Hawaiians and other
indigenous peoples of the Americas or elsewhere. So there is no pre-determination of strongly
correlated behavior between the Other Race group and the group identifying as Hispanic versus

1

For the BASIC model data configuration, which should cleave closely to the data configurations for subsequent
models: White-Hispanic - 87,012 observations (divide by 152, for roughly 572 households); African-AmericanHispanic – 10,496 observations (divide by 152, for roughly 69 households); Asian-Hispanic – 7,820 observations
(divide by 152, for roughly 51 households); Other-Race-Hispanic – 99,420 (divide by 152, for roughly 654
households). There are 204,748 observations for self-identified Hispanic households in the demographic record,
roughly 1,347 of the yearly average number of sample households in the 17,500-range. This number of households
matches the combined total of households from the four-choice Race-identification numbers just listed. The “OtherRace-Hispanic” number as a fraction of all Hispanic households also matches the correlation coefficient between
Hispanic and Other Race of 0.523 in Table 5 below, confirming that just over 50% of self-identified Hispanics
choose the Other Race option in the Race category, to self-identify their “Race” as unique from White, AfricanAmerican, or Asian.
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non-Hispanic. Of the sampled households, 7.7% self-identify as Hispanic, but these are
necessarily all distributed across the four Race categories.
Mean household size is 2.4, but again, the standard deviation suggests little clustering
around the mean. 26.9% of households have one or more children. When children are in the
home, the HH purchase average including zero-purchase weeks is 50% higher than the overall
HH purchase average mean, but across only positive purchases, the mean with children is only
10% higher (not shown here). The HHH average Age for females (~45 years) is higher than for
males (~40 years), but the dispersion is again high, and higher for male HHHs.
The mean values for the seasons represent their proportion in the data, and reflect that the
first weeks of January 2006 are not in the dataset.
It will prove useful in analysis of model results to have benchmark comparisons of
Income, Education level, and HH Size averages across racial groups, and the lower portion of
Table 1 offers these. 2 The average income for White HHs is close to the whole-sample average,
with almost the same standard deviation. African-American and Other Race averages are lower,
with African American HH incomes being a bit more dispersed. Hispanic average HH incomes
are greater than White HHs, and Asian average HH incomes are much higher than for all other
groups, with the least dispersion. This higher income corresponds with outstandingly higher level
of Education, averaged across Male and Female HHHs, for Asian HHs. Again self-identified
Hispanic HHs top White HHs, which also place lower than Other Race HHs in average HHH
Education level. African-American households have the lowest average Education level (High
School), just greater than one entire level (of the 6) below the Asian average (of almost halfway
2

All of these demographic numbers specifically correspond to the Nielsen sample, and are calculated before
application of Nielsen’s Projection Factor, which is used to generalize purchase behavior to the larger populations of
the sampled DMAs. From a previous note: “Racial groups” capitalized or not, refer to the set of five groups, adding
Hispanic to the original “Race” variable set, with the implicit understanding that when reference groups are chosen,
“Race” uses White, while “Hispanic” implicitly uses non-Hispanic.
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between Some College, and College). Whites maintain the smallest average HH Sizes at between
2.25 and 2.5, with an increase in size and dispersion for African American average HH Sizes,
also under 2.5. For other non-White groups, there is an increase in average household size
relative to White HHs, all of these being closer to 3 than to 2 or 2.5. On average, Hispanics
maintain the largest HHs.

5.1.2

Mean Purchase By Demographic Variables Decomposed to Category Levels
For the demographic variables that were category-wide in Table 1, Table 2 decomposes

the category variables, as well as Race, Hispanic, and a few additional variables at the end of the
table, for reference. For each level of these variables, statistics for mean weekly HH purchase in
ounces (zero-purchase weeks included) are listed. Bold numbers indicate the highest mean
within the category cluster. Income levels are relative to the federally-defined poverty level for a
family of four (Pov4Inc, or PvInc), which is in the $20,600 range from 2006-2008. 3 Income is
decomposed into the following levels: from zero to half the Pov4Inc, half the Pov4Inc to
Pov4Inc, from Pov4Inc to twice Pov4Inc, etcetera, through to 5 times the Pov4Inc and higher.
The highest income category in Nielsen’s raw data is “$100,000 and above.” This notation
referencing the poverty level for a U.S. family of four over the data period will be applied in
future tables and results, sometimes with variants of shorter notation, such as: “3xPovInc” or
“HfPvInc” or even “2xInc.” Because the highest mean weekly purchase by one of these groups
is for 3xPov4Inc, it is immediately clear that consumption is unlikely to increase or decrease in a
linear fashion across all the income levels. This is something to consider when examining

3

U.S. Department of Health & Human Services website, accessed 5/19/2011: http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/figuresfed-reg.shtml . 2006: $20,000; 2007: $20,650; 2008: $21,200.
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regression results for the BASIC model, which assumes a linear relationship for single-increment
changes in category level.
Defining five levels of education for HHHs of either sex, we see that across both sexes
there is a strict fall in weekly purchase for each discrete category-level rise in education for the
HHH, from over 72-oz/wk. down to half that amount, under 37-oz/wk. The span by Education
level is larger for Female HHHs.
At 34.5 ounces/wk, Asian stands out as the lowest average weekly purchase by Race,
with Whites above African Americans, and Other Race highest at 53.6 ounces. Self-identified
Hispanics, while existing across these four groups, do as discussed make up around 50% of
Other Race, and fall in just behind Other Race, at 52.4 ounces/wk.
Ounces purchased per week (still including zero-purchase weeks) do strictly rise in
Household Size and in Number of Children, but not by equal increments – per capita purchase
actually falls as the number of people in the home (by either measure) rises.
For either sex of HHH, the age level with the highest weekly purchase is 40-50 years.
This fact corresponds well to HHH-Age breakdowns by HH Size and presence of children (see
Tables A-1a – A-1d in the Appendix).
For reference, mean weekly ounces purchased for only Male HHH (“No Fem Hd”) and
only Female HHH (“No Male Hd”) are included. Male-only HHH homes average about 10%
more than Female-only HHH homes, at about a 12-ounce can less than the 47.8-ounce general
HH average (including zero purchase weeks) from the first line of Table 1 above. This is
consistent with the fact that, except for the lowest level of Female Education, households with
Male heads (or both) buy more on average than households with Female heads (or both) at every
level of Education and Age. The Male- and Female-only averages are less than the general HH
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average because they tend to have smaller household sizes. (In Tables A-1a. and A-1c. , “No
Female Head” [Male only HHH] has the most observations of any “Age group” at HHsize=1,
and sixth-most of 10 for HHsize=2, and is quite small after that. “No Male Head” [Female only
HHH] has the most observations of any “Age group” in any breakdown in Table A-1 by far at
HHsize=1, and the third-most of 10 in the next-smallest HHsizes=2 and =3.)
As expected, controlling for no other factors, the highest mean weekly purchase is in
Summer, followed by Autumn, Spring, then Winter – basically dropping with average seasonal
temperature for the U.S.
Table 3 lists mean weekly HH ounces purchased for the same variable set as Table 2, this
time for positive purchase weeks only (zero-purchase weeks not included). Most category-level
means rise by four or five times the Table 2 means, and again, bold numbers indicate the highest
mean within category clusters. Of interest, the highest means within a few key categories shift.
The highest purchase in the income category shifts up one sub-group to 4xPov4Inc. There is
evidence from Tables 2 and 3 that while not uniform in direction, sCSD purchase rises with HH
Income. So initial evidence suggests a weak expectation for a positive income effect, reflecting
sCSDs are a normal good. I will proceed to interpret results beginning from this perspective.
Also in Table 3, the Male Education level with the highest purchase shifts from Less than
High-School to High School. But the striking result is the move of the Asian HH mean from the
lowest mean when zero-purchase weeks are included, to the highest mean when zero-purchase
weeks are excluded. When Asian households do buy they buy in relatively large quantities –
perhaps for holidays, with little consumption between, perhaps at membership clubs with
outstanding stockpiling behavior. Hispanic HHs drop from the second highest mean with zeropurchase, to second-lowest without zero-purchase, so seem to be buying less in bulk and storing
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less. This would be consistent with lower access to membership stores and larger supermarkets
(possibly from relatively lower automobile ownership), and inadequate home storage space – all
characteristic of urban-center, less mobile populations, possibly with lower income. That
African-American HHs have the lowest average when zero-purchase observations are excluded
may support this hypothesis.

5.1.3

Frequency Distributions for Demographic Variables
Table 4, presented as a set of smaller tables for easier viewing, gives the frequency

distribution for the demographic categories, by category level, as used in the BROAD and
interacted in the REFINED models. Fewer than 4% of the sample HHs are in the lowest income
category, 3xPov4Inc has the largest frequency at 27%, and 15.6% are in the open-ended highestincome level. One-third of households have two members, with just under 20% in HHs of 3
members. Three-quarters of Nielsen HomeScan HHs in this dataset self-categorize as White,
under 13.4% as African American, 6% as Other Race, and 4.6% Asian. The 7.7% who selfidentify as Hispanic are distributed across these categories, favoring the Other Race (as noted in
footnote 1).
For the sex-of-HHH-delineated Education and Age levels, frequencies cannot total 1,
because HHs exist with one and with more than one household head. Just under 20% of all
sampled HHs have No Male Head (so no Male Education or Age levels), and just under 10%
have No Female Head (so no Female Education or Age levels). The two lowest levels of
education in the raw dataset are combined to “Less than High School,” leaving five levels of
Education. “Some College” is the most frequent highest level of Education completed by HHHs
for either sex. For both sexes Post College runs roughly double the percentage of Less than High
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School, but both are under 10%, while all frequencies between these highest and lowest
Education levels are above 20%. The mode for both sex of HHH Age levels is 50-65 years,
owing in part to a larger span than the 40-50 level. At the lowest and highest levels, fewer than
4% of Female HHHs and fewer than 2% of Male HHHs are under 30, while just over 10% of
Male and Female HHHs are 65 or older.

5.1.4

Correlation Matrix for Dependent Variable, Marketing Variables, and Categoric
Variables in BASIC Model
To understand relations between variables defined in the data matrix before controlling

for the influence of other variables in regression, close examination of the correlation of
marketing and demographic variables to each other and to weekly HH ounces purchased will
prove useful. The following discussion is based on correlation coefficients generated after
variables were projection-factor weighted, so the marketing variable correlations are more likely
to reflect true population characteristics of the 16 DMAs represented, rather than particular traits
of the Nielsen sample population. This does not affect correlation values for demographicdemographic variable comparisons.
Table 5 displays the correlation matrix for the dependent and explanatory variables in the
BASIC model. Most of the correlation coefficients in the table, positive and negative, are in the
hundredths in magnitude, so are little correlated. All others are specifically addressed here as part
of the overall analysis. Only two correlation coefficients are above 0.7 (MaleEdu-MaleAge at
0.772, and HHsize-KidsThereAll [presence of any children] at 0.722) , and another two above
0.5 (FemEdu-FemAge, at 0.546, and OtherRace-Hispanic, at 0.523). Other correlations do not
meet rule-of-thumb standards for inferring notable correlation. Nonetheless, many inferences on
the simple direction of correlation confirm insights from the Race-specific means in the lower
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part of Table 1 above. Also, although the coefficients are low or very low, Price is negatively
correlated with quantity purchased (-0.034), while Sale and Advertising are positively correlated
with quantity purchased (0.404 and 0.02), all as expected. Sale and Advertising are negatively
correlated with price, but very weakly (-0.022 and -0.043). So proceeding with prudent
observation of direction of correlation may offer insights that could inform data relations
preceding regression analysis.
Household Income and level of Male HHH Education are both weakly correlated with
purchase quantity, although opposite their expected directions (-0.0051 for Inc, 0.026 for
MaleEdu). Regression results will confirm whether or not these seemingly confounding effects
are strong enough to persist, or will disappear when controlling for other factors. Household Size
and Presence of Children are weakly correlated with purchase quantity (0.113 and 0.079), but
positively as expected. The again weak but unexpectedly positive correlation between HH Income and Price noted in the last paragraph may reflect households with higher incomes buying
more name-brand soft-drinks than their lower-income counterparts. This explanation may hold
for Male HHH Education level and Male HHH Age. Name-brand preference could similarly help
explain the relatively strong positive correlation between Asian households and weekly Price
(0.121), as Asian households have the strongest correlation of any racial category to Income
(0.096), and the correlation is positive. Correlations with weekly Price for Household Size
(-0.043), Presence of Children (-0.034), Female Age (-0.0211), and the White (-0.052) and African-American (-0.035) racial groups are all negative, generally as predicted by economic theory.
The correlations of the demographic variables with Sale are mostly positive, as expected,
with some negative correlations in racial categories (AfrAm -0.002; Asian -0.01) of small
magnitude. The exception in Sale is the small negative correlation associated with rising Income
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(-0.002), and rising Female HHH level of Education (-0.002). As both of these were negative in
weekly ounces purchased, and are also negative in weekly Advertising exposure, it suggests that
high Female HHH level of Education and high Income are correlated with lower purchase
generally, and low or negative response to marketing variable incentives. The exception is the
negative Price correlation in rising Female Education, as discussed above.
Beyond the negative correlation with weekly Advertising for Income and Female HHH
level of Education, data suggest that Male HHH level of Education (-0.026), Asian race (-0.012),
Household Size (-0.03), Presence of Children (-0.034), and Male HHH Age (-0.002) are all
negatively correlated with weekly Advertising, although the absolute value of every correlation
coefficient in the column is smaller in magnitude than 0.034. Picking out the positive correlation
coefficients between demographic categories and weekly Advertising, the data offer limited
evidence that African Americans (0.005), Other Race (0.013), Hispanics (0.033), and HHs with
lower income (-0.026) and lower Education level of the HHH (FemEdu -0.015, MaleEdu -0.017)
are receiving more advertising exposure for sCSD products than their counterparts. The positive
correlation coefficient on Female HHH Age (0.011) may reflect larger families in rising Age to a
larger degree than for Male HHHs (-0.0019), so concluding that Female HHHs are targeted with
more advertising is more tenuous than for these other categories.
Higher Education is positively correlated with higher Income (FemEdu 0.243, MaleEdu
0.419), but not strongly, and higher Age is correlated with higher Income for Male HHHs (0.26),
but not for Female HHHs (-0.043). For Race and Hispanic category binaries, White (-0.012),
African American (-0.041), and Other Race (-0.003) are negatively correlated with HH Income,
and Asian (0.096) and Hispanic (0.02) HHs positively correlated.
Female and Male HHH level of Education are negatively correlated (-0.145), suggesting
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that HHs with two high levels of education or two low levels of education are more exceptional
than HHs where levels differ. HHH Age and Education level are positively correlated, more
positively for Male HHHs (0.772) than Female HHHs (0.546).
Only White HHs are weakly but negatively correlated with both HH Size (-0.074) and
Presence of Children (-0.087), implying White HHs tend to be smaller. All other Race groups
and Hispanic are weakly but positively correlated with Presence of Children (AfrAm 0.028,
Asian 0.058, Other 0.067) although African-Americans are also negatively correlated with HH
Size (-0.003), implying African-Americans without children are more likely to live in smaller
HHs than other non-White racial groups. Hispanics have larger correlation to Presence of
Children (0.102) and HH Size (0.119) than the base Race category groups. Hispanic and Other
Race are correlated (0.523), as explained in the description of the Race binaries. As expected,
HH Size and Presence of Children are obviously correlated (0.722), but not to a high degree (i.e.,
less than 0.8), supporting inclusion of both variable types for the REFINED model. (A
correlation matrix checking for multicollinearity between sub-groups in these two categories
before including both in the REFINED model revealed no multicollinearity of a magnitude likely
to skew regression results.)
The ten correlation coefficients between HHH Age and Race binaries indicate that White
HHs tend to have older HHHs (FemAge 0.055 MaleAge 0.108), there are relatively fewer HHs
with older Male African-American heads (FemAge 0.002 MaleAge -0.137), and relatively fewer
HHs with older heads who are Female Asian (FemAge -0.05 MaleAge -0.024) or Female
Hispanic (FemAge -0.053 MaleAge 0.011). It also appears that Other Race HHs tend to be
younger in profile on average (FemAge -0.058 MaleAge -0.018). This could reflect the nature of
how families accrete into the Nielsen survey system.
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5.1.5

Graphic Relations Between Marketing Variables
The focus of this work is to identify what types of households respond most or least to

marketing variables. There is not an attempt to identify when certain groups react differently by
week, season, or event, or whether manufacturer marketing strategies are maximizing profits.
Nonetheless, general insight into the behavior over time of category-level marketing variables
may prove interesting, in part because category-level variables may appear to mask the strategies
of specific companies in the industry, or it may show common strategies across the big
competitors. If there are common strategies among big competitors, we would expect sharper
more dynamic movement. Given a common scale for graphing, if strategies are masked by
industry-wide movement, we would expect flatter lines, with little deviation from the mean
values presented in Table 1 above.
Analyzing marketing data at the product-category level does not facilitate identification
of whether there is a category leader, i.e. whether a particular firm or firms drive the industry or
singularly push the dynamics of marketing variable change over time. Some small insight into
sCSD industry dynamics may be culled from graphing category-level marketing variables
against each other. Fierce price competition might dampen peaks and valleys in an industryaverage price plot as any company’s price rise would be offset by another’s price drop. I will
assess here whether average prices do go down when percentage volume sold on sale increases
(perhaps the -0.0216 coefficient between the two in Table 5 is not fully informative?), whether
price rises closely match advertising increases, and whether changes in percentage on sale and
mean GRP exposure (advertising) seem correlated in magnitude over time. Total purchase in a
pan-DMA-week is also plotted for reference with marketing variables.
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In Graph 1: Average Price and Percent Sold On Sale, the mean inflation-adjusted
average price across all DMAs for a given data week (weeks 1 – 152) is plotted against the leftaxis measure (mean Adj'd Avg P by DMA-week), while the mean percentage purchased on
Discount/Sale (including zero-observation weeks) is plotted against the right-axis measure (mean
DiscSale). As may be expected despite the fact that this is product-category-level analysis and
not the behavior of individual firms, there is a strong direct negative correlation between average
price and volume purchased on sale, confirmed by the many shaped spaces in the graph defined
by price rising and falling exactly as percentage purchased on sale falls then rises. (The -0.0216
from the correlation matrix does not appear to tell the whole story.) Because the very highest
percentage-on-sale peaks are not directly at the same time as the lowest average prices per week
(and least percentage on sale similarly is not simultaneous to the highest price peaks), there
appears to be true price shocking in the market, rather than relatively higher prices appearing as a
function only of lower quantities on sale.
In Graph 2: Average Price and Average Advertising Exposure, the mean inflationadjusted average price across all DMAs for a given data week is again plotted against the leftaxis measure (mean Adj'd Avg P by DMA-week), and the mean HH exposure to sCSD
advertisements in GRPs (HHgrpPP) is plotted against the right-axis measure. As might not be
expected from industry-wide data, there appears to be pulsing in advertising frequency. This is
consistent with optimal marketing behavior (Doganoglu and Klapper 2006), but need not
necessarily indicate collusion. The Coca-Cola company spends 12% of all soft-drink advertising,
by a broad measure that includes bottled waters and pre-packaged teas and coffees, followed by
Pepsi at 7% (NPLAN 2011, p 45). Restricted to the sCSD category alone, these two giants may
create an industry pulsing effect just from their own advertising cycles.
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Relative to the first quarter of 2006, the Turin Winter Olympic Games (February 10-26,
2006) demonstrates high exposure. There are obvious but not consistent pulses concentrated in
summers. After a pulsing drop through the spring of 2008, the summer pulsing strategies
converge into a steady build through the summer into the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games
(August 8-24, 2008), after which they fall off relatively precipitously, perhaps in response to the
beginning of the Great Recession. Notably, there is little graphical evidence that advertising is
high during or immediately preceding most price pulses – at least averaged over the product
category. So this does not appear to be a profit-strategy common to the industry.
Because the x-axes are identical between Graphs 1 & 2, the average price line establishes
a comparative baseline common to the two graphs. One can compare the non-Price dash lines
between the two, to assess whether Sale and Advertising seem to move conjointly at the industry
level. There is no easily determined pattern that is parallel, either in synchronization, or with one
of these variables leading at a cognizable interval. There is a slight downward trend in both
advertising exposure and percent purchase on sale from the highs of early 2006 to the flats of
2007, to levels in late 2008 that tend to be below 2006 and 2007 averages.
If price swings in 16-DMA-wide average price of over 10% within a year can be
considered dynamic for a relatively low-cost food item, then there is dynamic pricing. It is easy
to count about seven peaks in percentage on sale per year, which corresponds fairly well to the
number of times a year that the average household tends to buy more than two liters of sCSD
(remember also from Table 1 that 30.5% of all purchases are made on price-promoted sCSDs).
Again, note that cumulative-average industry behavior may deviate in appearance from
rational strategy for a single firm – although it may mimic that of a profit-maximizing firm if
there is little aggressive competition or tacit collusion in price, sale, or advertising.
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In Graph 3: Average Price & Oz By Week -- All Purchases, the mean inflationadjusted average price across all DMAs for a given data week is again plotted against the leftaxis measure (mean Adj'd Avg P by DMA-week), and the average Projection-Factor-adjusted
pan-DMA-total-by-week is plotted against the right-axis measure (Avg total in Oz). There is a
general tendency for total purchase quantity to move opposite a peak or crevice in pan-DMAweek price – a healthy overall price-responsiveness somewhat confounded only in the highdemand middle quarters of 2008.
Because the x-axis and quarterly and annual reference lines are identical across the three
graphs, the price-quantity comparison of Graph 3 can translate to sale-quantity, and advertisingquantity comparisons. Quantity purchased is obviously highest in summer, followed closely by
autumn months. Quantity purchased often peaks when price dips. Comparing peaks in total
average purchase with the peaks in percentage on sale reveals some simultaneity (especially in
the second and third quarters of 2006, fourth of 2007, and second of 2008), but inconsistent comovement in direction and magnitude. For example, there is a notable increase in purchase in the
middle quarters of 2008 that seems poorly reflected in percentage bought on sale, relative to
2006 and 2007. Exceptionally high percentage purchased on sale at the end of 2006 also did not
correspond with relatively high purchase volume.
Peaks in advertising occasionally seem to lead total purchase peaks by a week or two, but
there is no graphically appreciable strong correlation between average weekly HH GRPs and
total quantity purchased. As examples, a strong cumulative advertising pulse in the first quarter
of 2007 seems to have no or negative effect on total sale quantities in following weeks, while the
relative jump in total sales in the middle quarters of 2008 does not seem provoked by spikes in
average HH GRP on the order of the 2000-and-above HH GRP levels seen in spring and summer
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2006, spring 2007, or spring of 2008. As a population, consumers do not appear to have
immediate Pavlovian response to marginal sCSD industry-wide advertising pulses. Regression
results attempt to identify whether specific demographic sub-groups are particularly purchaseresponsive to sCSD advert absorption in the same week.

5.2

Execution of Estimation – Methods, Inference, and Econometric Testing Common to
All Models
All models use the same purchase, demographic, and advertising datasets, but results can

and do vary as we would expect them to, as the level of resolution of demographic variables is
increased from the BASIC to the BROAD to the REFINED model.

5.2.1

Notes on Probit Results, Common to All Models
Probit equation results are described briefly in 5.3.1 (BASIC Results) and 5.4.1.

(BROAD Results) below. Every model with the same probit-equation variables has the same or
quite similar (generally to the thousandths place, or better) probit coefficients. For the few
variables identical to the lower-level models, the probit-equation coefficients from the REFINED
model hold signs and magnitudes that are similar, such that no model differs greatly in its nondemographic variable probit coefficients. The single exception to this rule is that the Advertising
coefficient estimates for the probit in BASIC models are negative, while positive for the more
sophisticated BROAD and REFINED models.
One common coefficient is the reported rho value ( ρ = σˆ 12 / σˆ 2 , notation as in eqn. [16]),
which is significantly non-zero in all versions of the model. This result determines that selection
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and outcome equations do have correlated (non-independent) error distributions. 4 This confirms
at every model level estimated here that the selection model is appropriate, that is, a simple OLS,
Tobit, or Two-Part model would be mis-specified if applied to this data configuration. In all the
models, the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR= λ ( z ) =

φ ( z)
, where z is the probit regressor set) is
Φ( z )

significant at below the 1% level, suggesting that the appropriate correction factor for the OLS
equation is transferred through the two-step estimation process.

5.2.2

Notes on Heteroskedasticity, Common to All Models
All OLS-side equations are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust OLS variance

estimators. From testing on previous versions of the models used here, heteroskedasticity of error
is expected (across households, and across DMAs), so robust estimators are applied proactively. 5

5.2.3

Notes on Endogeneity, Common to All Models
As noted in section 4.3, despite a construction that makes unlikely the simultaneous

solution of price and quantity at the same level of decision-making, a small chance of price being
an endogenous regressor makes hypothesis testing prudent. The standard Hausman test for
endogeneity tests two variants of a model, but on the assumption that one of the estimators (the
4

“The errors [between the probit and OLS equations] covary despite proper [Heckman two-step/Heckit] model
specification. In essence then, both equations are affected (in part) by the same random perturbations (or random
perturbations tend to covary)” (Breen: 35, citing p. 383 in: Berk, R.A., and Ray, S.C. (1982) “Selection biases in
sociological data.” Social Science Research 11:352-398).
5
Double checking, by testing for heteroskedasticity of errors after a heteroskedasticity-robust variance estimator is
applied is not accommodated by STATA 10. Using notation from Chapter 3, and a definition of W to be
x '2i β 2 + σ 12 λ (x1' i βˆ1 ) from equation (15), the variance correction estimator employed is described here as it is by
STATA (STATA 10, Reference A-H: 562-3):
V = σˆ 12 (W ' W ) −1 (W ' RW + Q)(W ' W ) −1 . Note that Q = ρˆ 2 (W ' DZ ' DW )V p ( Z ' DW ) . In Q, D represents
the square diagonal matrix of dimension N = # of observations, with λ (x1' k β1k )[x1' k β1k + λ (x1' k β1k )] (from equation
(17)) as the diagonal elements; Z is the data matrix of probit equation covariates (“ x1' k β1k ” in the above notation);
and Vp is the variance-covariance estimate from probit estimation of the selection equation.
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OLS without an instrumental variable) is consistent and fully efficient. But the sample-selection
model is used precisely because without it, OLS estimation is inconsistent and biased (Cameron
and Trivedi, 2005: 546, Breen: 36). So the standard Hausman test of endogeneity [estimator:
V(b0) – V(b1)] is econometrically inappropriate for any of these models. Use of the “seemingly
unrelated estimation” command in STATA allows estimation of b0 against b1 in a way that is
always defined. It estimates V(b0 – b1) by V(b0) – cov(b0, b1) – cov(b1, b0) + V(b1), instead of the
questionable standard Hausman (STATA 10, Reference Q-Z: 352-354).
Because the price-quantity configurations are theoretically identical across the five
models, I use the third of the five model variants, the BROAD model without marketing
interaction variables. If this model displays price endogeneity, all of the models will; if not, none
of them will. I generate a lagged Price Index, and regress separately to generate the “consistent”
(i.e., non-endogenous) b0 to compare against the previous regression results b1 (note that no
independent OLS regression is conducted here). The test is whether b0 and b1 are the same. With
41 degrees of freedom, the chi-square statistic is 29.84. The exact level of significance (p-value)
on the assertion that the test statistic is in the critical region above the critical value for a χ2
distribution with 41 degrees of freedom (roughly 52) is 0.902, so we cannot reject the equality of
the common coefficients across b0 and b1. To be certain, I also add to this test a test of whether
the means of the two Price Indexes (lagged and not) are different. With 41 degrees of freedom,
the chi-square statistic is 30.28. The exact level of significance (p-value) on the assertion that the
test statistic is in the critical region above the critical value for a χ2 distribution with 41 degrees
of freedom (roughly 52) is 0.911, so we again cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of
common coefficients across b0 and b1 and particularly across the differing Price Indexes.
Therefore b1 (the default vector of coefficient estimates across any model reported here) does not
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display price-quantity endogeneity, consistent with the particular construction of the Price Index
to avoid it. Lagging the Price vector in anticipation of endogeneity would be redundant.

5.2.4
5.2.4.a

Notes on Hypothesis Testing, Common to All Models
Marginal Effects (MEs) and “mfx adjustment”
Hypothesis testing is done on second-stage OLS coefficient estimates after two-step

Heckman estimation, with marginal effects (MEs) interpreted only after a further stage of
adjustment that conforms to equation (17) in section 3.3 above (Breen 1996; Byrne, Capps, Saha
1996; Saha Capps, Byrne 1997). I will refer to this as “mfx adjustment.” As explained in the text
supporting equation (17), direct inference on OLS variables common to the probit equation is
inappropriate to describe the behavior of those who have selected into the market. 6 Practical
application of this correction involves construction of the elements of equation (17) from
estimation results, in a formula that yields a result to which the delta method may be applied “to
compute the [standard error] of a non-linear function for which it is too complex to analytically
compute the variance.” The delta method uses a Taylor series to linearly approximate a nonlinear function, then this linear-approximate result is used to compute variance for inference on
the relevant estimate, whose distribution is the function of multiple parameters (Vance, p 1416,
including quote). The difference between the mfx adjustment numbers used for inference and the
original OLS coefficient estimates are ultimately not predictable in linear fashion. This mfx
adjustment process of defining linear approximate solutions for multiple parameter distributions

6

Saha, Capps, and Byrne: “It is proposed that the marginal effect expressions are incomplete in almost all
consumption demand studies that use the Heckman approach” p 181. “As is well-documented in the theoretical
literature but rarely applied in the applied literature, the calculation of these marginal effects must be adjusted to
account for sample selection bias” (Vance, p 1418). Vance offers an example in his paper where failure to apply the
mfx adjustment led to “misleading inferences …[being] drawn with respect to the precision of the estimated
coefficients” in other authors’ peer-reviewed published work.
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yields marginal effects that are often 20-35% smaller than the original OLS-side coefficient
estimates (selection into the market is a restriction), but some of which fall by more than 90%,
and a few of which rise in size. Signs of the marginal effects rarely flip from original OLS-side
coefficient estimate signs, but this does occur with numbers relatively close to 0 in magnitude. 7
The final “coefficient estimates” vector for inference is thus a combination first of
coefficient estimates taken directly from OLS estimation, for variables unique to the OLS
equation, and second of products of the mfx adjustment process (adjusted MEs), for variables
existing in the OLS and probit equations. Within this vector, the “coefficient estimates/MEs” on
demographic variables (including demographic-demographic interaction variables), on the
constant, and the seasonal binaries are directly interpretable in ounces purchased. Remembering
that the OLS-side estimation is for positive-quantity observations only, these are quantities when
the HH buys sCSDs, not weekly quantities (for all but a very few HHs). Within the same vector,
all estimates/MEs that are – or are interacted with – the continuous marketing-mix variables
(Price, Advertising) must be multiplied by some value for the continuous variable to be
interpreted in ounces. For all inference, the data-wide average value of each continuous
marketing-mix variable is used to calculate marketing-mix variable MEs in ounce-equivalents.
Standard errors for the mfx-adjusted ME estimates generated from the delta method
application are almost uniformly too similar to the original variance-covariance matrix values
associated with OLS-side output to significantly affect the results of hypothesis testing, such as
for simple z-scores and critical p-values. 8 OLS standard errors are used for hypothesis testing.
7

Rare exceptions include 3xPov4Inc & FemAge65+ in the BROAD model with marketing, and 2xPvIncxFmPCollg
& 1xPvIncxSmCollg in REFINED.
8
Standard errors (even heteroskedasticity-robust ones) may vary from OLS results because an estimate of the IMR
is used, so the estimate brings its own standard error into an already heteroskedastic model. As with the coefficients
versus marginal effects on variables common to both equations of estimation, whether the variance is higher or
lower is not predictable (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005: 550; Vance: 38). Greene states that there are also unknown
parameters of the IMR, in addition to its heteroskedasticity (Greene, 2003: 785). While checking for differences
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Despite the need to correct for marginal effects to conduct proper inference on the
households that select into the market, the non-mfx-adjusted OLS-side coefficient estimates still
represent the marginal effects of variables on the population as a whole. So we must expect at the
least that estimated coefficients for the marketing-mix variables remain of expected signs
(negative on Price, positive on Sale and Advertising) for the unadjusted OLS-side coefficient
estimates. Along with the constant, seasonal dummies, and the two exclusion-restriction
variables, the OLS-side marketing-mix variables are of the expected sign in all five levels of the
model, confirming to an extent the choice of specification of models, variables, and estimators.
All nine of these variables are significant at the 1% level in all five versions of the model, with
the exception of DiscSale in REFINED, which is significant at the 10% level. 9

5.2.4.b Projection-Factor Weighting of the Data, and Average Continuous Variable
Values
Inference and prediction on continuous (marketing and marketing-variable-interacted)
variables requires that the final OLS/mfx-adjusted estimates be multiplied by some value of the
continuous variable. In every interpretation and prediction, averages for the continuous
marketing variables across the final data configuration are used. These averages are presented in
between the adjusted and unadjusted standard errors is driven by statistical theory (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005: 550),
in practice here, the effective mathematical differences between the adjusted and unadjusted standard errors proved
almost uniformly negligible in their ultimate effect on z-scores or p-values, as differences are routinely under 2% of
the absolute value of the standard error. To be clear, z-scores and p-values may differ between OLS estimates and
mfx-adjusted ME values for identical variables, but the standard error value strongly tends to be identical to within
2%, regardless of the estimate or corresponding mfx-adjusted value. For the REFINED model, delta-methodgenerated standard errors are identical to the OLS-side standard errors for all un-interacted variables (i.e., all the
variables for which such calculation is appropriate). So using the OLS variance-covariance matrix on the mfxadjusted vector is extremely unlikely to change significance calculations for any single un-interacted variable, and
because much relevant inference is done on combinations of estimates/MEs, any possible effect is diminished
further. References exist that directly assert that STATA automatically does the standard error correction properly,
meaning that any further delta-method correction would yield very similar results
(https://files.nyu.edu/mrg217/public/selection.pdf, accessed 26 August, 2011).
9
This higher variance may be expected for a binary variable that has had much of its variation explained (controlled
for) through its interaction with some 250+ specific demographic sub-groups.
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table results with marketing-variable interactions, under the “X” column in various results tables.
The numbers are not averages in the original metrics of the variables, as the data had to be
weighted by application of the Projection Factor. The highest Projection Factor in this dataset is
16,632, so every variable in every observation for every HH is scaled to a fraction of that HH’s
Projection Factor, i.e., divided by 16,632. This makes the averages for any variable seem of
questionably small magnitude – but the values are exactly proportionate to the data scale used for
estimation. For all of the binary variables, the mfx-adjusted estimate results need no further
correction to be in ounces/purchase.
In section 4.4, specific properties of the Disc/Sale binary are discussed, and how they
affect estimation strategy. While the HH purchase reaction to Disc/Sale is a function of the
continuous probability distribution describing the portion of the sCSD category that is on sale in
a data week, the variable is binary at the estimation level, so regression occurs on Disc/Sale as a
binary. Disc/Sale and its interaction products evaluate in interpretation and prediction either as
existing (=1), or not (=0). As they are not points on a continuum, they are not multiplied by the
Disc/Sale pan-data average for interpretation as the Price and Advertising variables are.

5.2.4.c

Failures of Statistical Significance at the 10% Level for Variables in a 2.6-MillionObservation Dataset
With the high number of observations common to every level of the model applied here,

it may seem strange that the number of variables that are not significant at p-value 0.000
increases as models increase in sophistication. There are multiple sources for this dispersion, and
not every one of these sources jeopardizes the inference of economic significance due to failure
to meet an arbitrarily defined level of statistical significance.
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First, the variability within the data that define a random explanatory variable in a sample
defines the concentration or dispersion of the values for that variable. There is a fixed amount of
variability in the Price Index, for example (every HH that does not purchase in a DMA-week
faces the same price for that DMA-week combination; variability in Advertising data is even
less). So when the Price Index is interacted with dozens, or hundreds of demographicdemographic (binary) variables, the fixed variability within the sample is used to define
dispersion for all the related variables. This simple preponderance of variables drawing on a
fixed amount of statistical dispersion, as applied to smaller and smaller sub-groups, may push
higher standard errors on individual estimates. This becomes clear by the time inference is done
on the REFINED model. P-values for the same sub-group in one of the four estimate sets (uninteracted, and interacted with each of the three marketing variables) is 0.000, while for another
it is above 0.5. It is not a compelling argument that a sub-group acts very similarly within itself
in one dimension (resulting in the very low p-value), and with extremely divergent behavior
within itself in a similar dimension (resulting in a very high p-value). There appears in cases to
be more a lack of information sufficient to identify small variance from the mean, than may be
warranted by the actual unobserved variance from the mean. The common expression for this
among econometricians is “asking too much identifying information from the [limited amount in
the] data.” This is observed in the higher number of p-values greater than 0.10 in all marketingvariable-interacted variable sets in the REFINED model, but particularly in Advertisinginteracted variables versus Price- or even Disc/Sale-interacted variables.
The underlying motivation of this research is to fully exploit the natural variability in
such a large and reliable dataset to more accurately identify consumer behavior to the level of
demographic sub-groups. This successful attempt, because it is successful, has challenged the
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bounds of the identifying information inherent to the variability in the data. As final prediction is
done on combinations of individual mfx-adjusted estimates, the ultimate effect of many
individually less-than-reasonably-significant values does not to an uncomfortable extent
undermine the quality, force, or statistical significance of the final-level (total effect) inferences
made here.
The second reason that many variables display high standard errors despite the number of
observations is that individual variables may not affect the dependent variable to a significant
degree. Often here, this does not seem to be a compelling cause, given significant effects
documented for elements of the variable in other levels of the model, or even in other estimate
clusters in the same model (four total, from equation (20)). This is a critical realization, because
it discounts the most common explanation for low absolute values for z-scores.
Third, the effect of the variable may not differ much from the effect on the dependent
variable of the reference group with which that variable is affiliated. This is possible, but if true
might commonly manifest in variables whose statistical significance diminishes as variables get
closer in definition to the reference group. This does not appear as failure of significance often
occurring in sub-groups close in definition to the reference sub-groups in the REFINED model,
but there is limited evidence that this happens in the coarser BROAD model, especially for
Female Age and # of Kids, but possibly in racial grouping as well.
Fourth, there may be bi- or multi-modal behavior within the defined variable’s
demographic group or demographic sub-group. A few examples may clarify. In the BASIC
model, it seems unlikely that each Nielsen-defined increment in Income should have identical
marginal responsiveness to the marketing mix for sCSDs. While any level may display unique
behavior, richer HHs may behave more alike, poorer HHs may behave more alike, and each of

93

these groups may behave unlike the other. In the BROAD and REFINED models, for HHs
having a fixed number of children, say one or three children, one parenting style may be quite
permissive of high consumption of sugar, while another parenting style may be quite restrictive
with respect to sugar consumption. There may be enough of each type to have its own separate
mean, but no way to econometrically identify parenting style given the data here (particularly if
level of Education is not determinative of parenting style). The two styles are lumped into a
single class based solely on the number of children in the home. While their separate modes may
be and are folded into a single mean, this is at the expense of a high standard error, because the
bi-modal behavior within the defined demographic group forces high variance from the single
mean.
While the research design here is to sharpen our ability to see which specific
demographic characteristics are associated with which purchase responses, the econometric
efficacy of this approach remains limited by the available data. High standard errors can reflect
this limitation more than they reflect a failure of the affected variable to represent an
econometrically useful level of demographic specificity within the demographic variable set to
which it belongs.

5.2.5

Notes on Exclusion Restriction Variables, Common to All Models
The particular mean of 7.77 for the exclusion restriction variable “WksHHTotOzGrtr67”

in Table 1 supports the choice of six weeks as an appropriate stock draw-down period for the
second exclusion restriction variable, “MovgAvgHHStock6” (described in section 4.6). 10 While
a linear approximation of complicated household behaviors, when regressed on probability of
10

Six (weeks) times 7.77 is 46.62, a reasonable approximate to the number of weeks in a year. This is by far the
closest number of full weeks (data process periods) that fit within a 48- or 52-week year (the two types in the threeyear data span) without going over.
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purchase, this constructed variable proved to be a statistically significant predictor of probability
of purchase (p-value 0.000) in every version of the model to which it applied, as just noted.

5.2.6

Notes on “Goodness of Fit” Metrics, Common to All Models
Two-step Heckman estimation results offer no standard metrics commonly used to judge

whether one model fits the data better than another. No R2 is appropriate, because the missing
variable adjustments from the probit stage upset classic OLS R2 calculation. No Akaike
information criterion or Bayesian information criterion scores can be calculated, as the two-step
Heckman does not use maximum-likelihood estimation in the second stage, so no maximum
likelihood can be reported. It will become evident, that in examining results from progressively
complex versions of the model, the constant, almost all the seasonal dummies, and with
exceptions the un-interacted-marketing-mix variables all shrink in magnitude as model
complexity increases. This suggests that more variation is explained by more refined
demographic variables (and their interaction with marketing-mix variables), so that less
variability must be explained by “catch-all” constants, binaries, and to an extent un-interacted
continuous marketing-mix variables. So without conventional explicit goodness-of-fit measures,
empirical evidence exists that the most complex models here fit best.

5.3
5.3.1

BASIC Model – Estimation Results and Prediction
BASIC without marketing variable interaction – probit and OLS results
Reference group choices on the demographic variables must be made for every model,

and must not conflict for probit and OLS equations. The BASIC models use White, non-

95

Hispanic, No Children for reference group demographic variables, and Spring (Ssn1) as the
reference group for seasons.
The probit stage of estimation yields coefficient estimates for explanatory variables that
are used only indirectly in final results, but the coefficients of estimation (hereafter: coefficient
estimates, or coefficients, for brevity) do have signs indicating whether a variable is associated
with greater or lesser probability of purchase, which is meant to proxy for selection in the
market. Particularly for an item such as sCSDs that are so easily stockpiled in the home, we
expect that quantity of purchase may be high for infrequent purchasers, which might reverse the
signs on the same variable’s coefficients between the probit and OLS steps in estimation. This in
fact occurs.
Table 6 presents estimation results for the BASIC model without marketing variable
interaction of the demographic variables, including in the bottom half of the table, results from
the probit step in estimation. All probit variables are significant at the 1% level, except for
Female & Male Education, which are both significant at the 5% level. The probit regression
coefficient for the constant is negative, as one would expect, fitting a regression line with
roughly 83% of all observations being zero purchases. Probit results are identical for the BASIC
model with marketing variable interactions, except for the inter-equation variables listed after the
probit constant in result tables.
The probit equation coefficient on the Price index is positive (27.629) and significant
(pval=0), as occurs in every level of the selection model discussed in this paper. For proper
interpretation of continuous variables, the Price and Advertising (-0.00013) estimates should be
calculated at particular values, and as for OLS estimate interpretation the means are used (Price
mean=0.007407, Advert mean=374.631). The corrected probit-side estimates for inference for
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Price and Advertising are then 0.205 and -0.049 respectively – and now of magnitudes consistent
with all the other probit estimates, between zero and one.
In previous iterations, estimate results where the probit coefficient on Price is negative,
always simultaneously have a positive Price coefficient estimate on the OLS side, which implies
a positive price reaction in quantity purchased for the general population – a poor result, not
faced here. As discussed in the last subsection, all the OLS Price coefficients before mfx
adjustment are negative as theory suggests. It is useful to recall that the probit equation is to
determine which variables are most likely to be correlated with participation in a sCSD DMAweek market. If we assume that almost all branded products cost more per ounce than private
labels, and understand that of the top 95% of purchases by brand across a sugared and diet sCSD
dataset, only 15.11% are private label, then it is clear that consumers display preference for
higher cost brands as a percentage of all purchase. For example, the Coca-Cola brand is a
premium brand, costing more than private label and many lesser-known brands, and Coca-Cola
(for Classic and/or Diet) holds a market share in this data set larger than any other name brand,
and larger than the sum of all private label brands (see Table A-2 in the Appendix, truncated for
length to 75% of purchases by brand). A positive association between Price and selection into the
market should not be surprising.
The corrected probit-side Advertising estimate is negative and significant (-0.049,
pval=0) in both BASIC models. This is not expected, but the BASIC is an estimation built on
demographically coarse averages, so some counterintuitive results can occur. Negative
Advertising estimates on the probit side do not persist in the more sophisticated BROAD and
REFINED models, so pose little threat to the integrity of the modeling structure.
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The household Income coefficient (-0.054) is negative, although it is positive in the OLS
and marginal effects in BASIC models. This may be an initial sign that sCSDs are an inferior
good. Education is negative for Female and Male HHHs (-0.005 for both), and for all Race
groups against the White reference group (AfrAm & Asian -0.2, Other Race -0.193). Hispanic
(-0.163) is negative against the non-Hispanic reference group. This is not necessarily intuitive,
given that Hispanics have a relatively high mean weekly purchase across the full observation set
(Table 2), so are likely to select into the market with relatively high frequency. This is a point of
query to keep in mind as we proceed to more refined models. The probit estimate on the
probability of selection into the market for HH Size is counterintuitvely negative (-0.057), but
that for presence of children (Kids there All, 0.105) is positive. Both Female & Male Age probit
estimates are negative in rising age group (-0.07, and -0.016 respectively).
The exclusionary restriction variables, Weeks in the year that HH total ounces Purchased
are Greater than 67 ounces (0.161), and Moving Average HH Stock (coef.=-0.0003), are of the
expected signs, and significant at the 1% level, suggesting functional adequacy.
The unadjusted OLS coefficients at the top of Table 6 precede mfx adjustment. While
most inference follows from the mfx-adjusted presentation of the same variable set (Table 7), the
model structure is supported by the marketing variables all being of the correct direction, and
significant at p-value=0. If they were not, the model would be suggesting that the population as a
whole is not reacting as expected to marketing variables. However, the p-values are the same for
coefficients and Heckman-adjusted MEs, so do note before leaving Table 6 that all coefficients
are significant at the 1% level (as we would expect, asking at this stage for very little identifying
information from many observations on very broadly defined variables). The single exception is
for the p-value=0.067 for positive number of children in the home (Kids there All). This is still
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better than the 10% level, but may indicate bi-modal or multi-modal behavior for HHs with
children, as described in 5.2.4.c.

5.3.2

BASIC without marketing variable interaction – marginal effects
Table 7 presents the marginal effects [δy/δxk from eqn. (17)] of this first BASIC model,

that without marketing variables presents purchase responses to sCSD marketing by the most
generalized demographic groups. These MEs tend to be smaller than the OLS coefficient
estimates for the corresponding variables in Table 6. This is mathematically implied by equation
(17), and the application of equation (17) is precisely to correct for overestimation of marginal
effects (sub-section 5.2.4a, above). The exception is on the Discount/Sale variable. Because it is
not present in the probit equation it does not change.
Generally, the MEs are interpretable as HH total ounces for a given week in which sCSD
purchase occurs. Continuous-variable corrections using the pan-data average values involves
multiplying the first column value by the (unrounded) second column value for the marketingmix variables. This correction yields the following ME values in ounces per purchase for a data
week: Price -1106.018 becomes -8.192, and Advertising 0.0198 becomes 7.424. These
continuous-variable MEs will be discussed below for these corrected values, not the ME values
in the first numeric column of Table 7.
The marginal effect of Price (-1106.018 * 0.0074=-8.19) is negative, while Sale (58.835)
and Advertising (0.05 * 374.63 = 7.42) are positive, as expected. The other non-demographic
variables – the constant (84.1), seasons (Ssn2 46.7, Ssn3 45.9, Ssn4 45.7), and the exclusionary
restriction variables – are all of the expected signs and plausible magnitudes. So all of the
variables that may quickly define whether the most basic model seems to be performing to
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expectations are of the expected sign and highly significant. At 84.1 ounces, the constant is 2
liters, plus ¾ of an extra 20-oz bottle, per week.
The Price ME is -8.19 ounces per penny increase per ounce. This is a much smaller
quantity response, given a data-wide mean price of 2.2 cents per ounce, than a unilateral ownprice elasticity for the top brand names greater in absolute value than 2.8 would seem to
suggest. 11 But this low quantity response is anticipated by the particular construction of the Price
vector, which is an average over all purchased products in a DMA in a week, not a price on the
particular product(s) purchased in the week by the observed HH. Because this construction does
not change by HH characteristic or across models, the differences between Price response
coefficient estimates for particular demographic MEs to sCSD category-level changes can
readily be compared. The same holds for the Sale and Advertising coefficient estimates (relative
to the coefficients on the demographic variables and seasons).
Income is the first demographic variable, and is positive as expected, at 3.028. Through
the 24 income levels in the Nielsen Income category, this means that the highest-income group
would purchase 72 ounces more than the lowest-income group, equivalent to a six-pack of 12ounce cans.
In level of Female and Male Education, the effect is negative, with the magnitude for
each increment higher for Female (-5.959) than Male (-4.762). Thus, if the effect is
monotonically negative, we would expect the fall in mean purchase from Grade School to PostCollege education to be around 30 ounces, but for the same span across Male Education, the fall
would be around 24 ounces. We may look to more sophisticated models with the question of
whether the negative effect of Education on purchase seems consistently weaker for Males than
Females. If so, this could indicate a higher tendency for the level of formal education to affect
11

Cotterill, Putsis, Rabinowitz, and Druckute, p 235-6, in Tremblay and Tremblay 2007.
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applied nutrition education in Female HHHs versus Male HHHs. The magnitude of each jump in
level is larger for Education than for Income, but there are more levels in Income. Which of
these is likely to persist in the larger effect, and for which other demographic characteristics,
must again be determined by more sophisticated models to follow.
Relative to the “White” reference group, African-Americans (-15.755) buy 1¼ fewer 12ouce cans per purchase, while Asians (37.188) purchase not quite two and Other Race (19.562)
not quite one 20-ounce bottle(s) more than Whites when they buy. Hispanics (-20.359) purchase
roughly a 20-ounce bottle per purchase less than reference-group non-Hispanic HHs. From the
Race-specific means at the bottom of Table 1, Hispanic HHs in this dataset have higher average
Income, and higher average Education than Whites African-Americans and Other Race, either of
which could drive lower purchase.
It will prove useful to remember that any actual HH is a cross-section of demographic
traits. For example, any HH whose purchase pattern exactly follows the reference group, but that
has an attribute that differs from the reference group and that is associated with a higher purchase
in ounces per week, must have an offsetting lower purchase correlation for a differing attribute,
so that the effect balances to the reference-group mean. If the HH differs from the purchase
pattern of the reference group, then the differing MEs will explain by how much. To
demonstrate, we know from Tables 1 & 5 that Hispanic homes have larger HH sizes and more
Kids in HH than other race-based groups. So if one of these characteristics has a large ME
(HHsize), there must be an offsetting smaller/negative ME (Hispanic, Kids in HH) to
compensate, unless the specific HH is truly exceptional in its purchase behavior (which cannot
be identified in this construction). Adding Hispanic (-20.4), HHsize (+25.8), and Kids in HH
(-2.5) results in a number much closer to the reference mean than the original MEs seem to
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suggest – particularly for low numbers of children, after which the linearity of the HHsize ME
begins to force less plausible differences (given the known purchase means from Tables 1, 2 &
3). So while estimation identifies the direction, magnitude, and significance of certain attributes
in their correlation with purchase, it is not particularly helpful to imagine any single attribute in
isolation, as it cannot exit isolated from other attributes identifying actual HHs. This limitation is
relaxed in more complicated versions of the model by combining all relevant characteristics into
specific household types for prediction of purchase effects by type.
For each additional HH member, this BASIC model estimates just over two 12-ounce
cans more of purchase (25.764). The presence of children in the home is associated with a
negative impact on purchase quantity (-2.554), such that on a strict continuum a HH with five
children would buy one can less per purchase than a HH with no children. Without considering
the counteracting effect between the HH-Size and #-of-Kids-in-HH variables, the children
variable is counterintuitive. While statistically significant, this latter effect if judged in isolation
seems suspect, and is also one to verify or overturn with evidence in more flexible specifications.
Age-bracket increments in Female HHH Age (3.004) are slightly larger than the
increments for Male HHH Age (2.798), both positive, and at around 3 ounces per purchase
roughly the magnitude in increment as for Income. A ten-year rise in Fem/Male Age (roughly
two increments) translates to about a half a 12-ounce can. Comparing these MEs to means from
Tables 2 and 3, these MEs seem to be artificially pulled toward zero by a rise from young to
middle age for HHHs, driven by increasing family size, followed by a drop in ounces per week
for HHHs aging from middle age to elderly (consult also Tables A-1a and A-1c for HH Size by
Age). Again as for Income, the purchase incidence averages by Age category level do not
suggest monotonic increase, so more refined models may escape the econometric stricture of the
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BASIC model and display some negative and some positive coefficient estimates for Female/
Male Age that may more closely parallel expectations set by the weekly means in Tables 2 and 3.

5.3.3

BASIC with marketing variable interaction – marginal effects
Table 8 lists probit results, and OLS coefficient estimates from the BASIC model

including interactions of each of the demographic variables with each of the three marketing
variables. The last three columns are the marginal effects of each variable of estimation from the
combined effects of the two equations, the p-values for these MEs, and the average values at
which continuous marketing variables are calculated (see 5.2.4.b regarding Disc/Sale). The
marketing variables interacted with demographic variables do not exist in the probit equation, so
the OLS coefficient is the ME. The OLS coefficient is multiplied times the data-wide average
value for the appropriate continuous marketing variable, so each ME in the third-to-last column
for marketing variable interaction terms is in ounces, just as for the MEs for the demographic
variables above it in the column. 12
A caveat is in order, as vocabulary for “marginal effect” overlaps here. Each Table 8
“δy/δx” column value is a δy/δxk [as in eqn. (17)], and therefore a marginal effect in that it is
properly mfx adjusted. But each table value is not the combined marginal effect (CME) of a
dependent variable constructed from every explanatory variable that comprises an aspect of a
particular marketing variable or of a demographic characteristic (example below). In contrast to
results from the BASIC model without marketing-variable interaction variables, the CMEs for
the marketing or demographic variables are no longer immediately inferable from a single value

12

Process descriptions are intentionally repeated at each model level to accommodate readers who are focused only
on certain sub-section results.
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in the table. 13 The combined marginal effects must be totaled from table values with components
common to a particular marketing variable or demographic characteristic. The total effect (TE)
of a demographic characteristic adds the constant and the un-interacted marketing variable MEs
to the relevant demographic variable’s CME. However, because no characteristic exists in
isolation from the other characteristics regressed here, ideally TEs should be constructed in a
configuration that represents a possible household with a value for every relevant demographic
dimension described by this model configuration. TEs for marketing variables are totals of the
un-interacted ME for the variable, along with all MEs resulting from interaction with that
marketing variable.
As an example of a marketing variable CME, adding every variable from Table 8,
column δy/δx, that has “Adv x …” to “Wkly Advert” yields a positive CME for the advertising
effect, although not every Advertising-interacted δy/δxk is positive. In fact, combining “Wkly
Advert” with any single Advertising-interacted term for a group-specific Advertising reaction
reveals that all of the demographic characteristics are net positive in purchase response to
Advertising (numeric results demonstrated below).
While the unadjusted OLS coefficient on Price (-179.84 * 0.0074 = -1.33) is negative as
expected across the population in or out of the weekly sCSD market, the BASIC with marketing
interaction model is the only model version with a positive CME for the un-interacted Price
variable (826.47 * 0.0074 = 6.12), and for every individual price reaction (“P x …” + “Wkly
Price DMA”), and for the cumulative price reaction, or TE, ([Σ“P x …”] + “Wkly P DMA”) of
the in-the-market portion of the population {([Σ“P x …”] * 0.0074) + 6.12 = 5.60}. Thus four
versions of the model have negative cumulative Price reaction CMEs for mfx-adjusted marginal
13

Of course the values in Table 7 may be seen as CMEs, as without the marketing interaction variables, the CME
reduces to the reported MEs – the two are equivalent where there is no marketing variable interaction. The same
relation will hold for Table 11, compared to the CMEs in Table 13.
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effects, and there is this single exception. This suggests that the Heckman model specification is
fairly robust, and either somewhat sensitive when more aggregated variable definitions are used,
or that in BASIC with marketing it is possible that a positive price reaction may result from a
favoring of brand products, similar to the discussion for probit results for Table 6 in 5.3.1. Any
such positive price reaction is not identified by more complex versions of the model. The former
explanation seems more plausible.
The cumulative positive Price ME after mfx-adjustment is not large, and when examined
carefully does not demonstrate an assessment of non-economic behavior for the in-market
sample. The reference groups White, non-Hispanic, and No Kids are particularly and
exceptionally negative in their price reactions, as evidenced by three of the four positive
reactions (Asian 1.6 + Hispanic 2.2 + Kids There All 0.46 account for 4.22 of the 5.60 net
positive Price effect) in the table. These reactions versus reference groups explain 75% of the
positive net Price ME, leaving the positive ME for Female Education (which may or may not be
explained by a preference for name brands among higher-educated Female HHHs, per the
argument for a positive price effect described in 4.3.1). So any confounding result is quite small,
and may prove particular. The residual 1.4-ounce positive cumulative Price reaction is small
relative to the incremental magnitudes of coefficient estimates for Income, Education, and most
racial categories. So if this single version of the model is not accurate by a small amount in one
dimension (and that based on an index as much as on personal choice), confidence in the
modeling approach may be maintained.
For “Disc/Sale” the unadjusted OLS coefficient and the mfx-adjusted ME are identical
(81.46). Combining the “Disc/Sale” ME with any of the “Sale x …” interaction terms (“Sale x
…” + “Disc/Sale”) yields uniformly net positive sale-response MEs, and the cumulative Sale
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ME, or TE, is positive as well ([Σ“Sale x …”] + 81.46= 170.9), rising from the un-interacted
Disc/Sale ME, as may be expected. The unadjusted OLS coefficient on Advertising is also
positive as expected (0.05 * 374.631 = 18.75). The two-ME combination on marketing effects
and demographic characteristics (“Adv x …” + “Wkly Advert”) shows all positive reactions to
“Wkly Advert,” and the cumulative Advertising effect, or TE, {([Σ“Adv x …”] * 374.631) +
18.75 = 13.47} is positive as well. But this TE is less than the un-interacted Advertising ME, due
largely to the relatively strong negative “Adv x Hispanic” and “Adv x Kids there All” MEs, each
relatively less reactive to Advertising than is its reference group.
The other non-demographic variables – the constant (69.4), seasons (Ssn2 32.9, Ssn3
26.7, Ssn4 20.6), and the exclusionary restriction variables – are all of the expected signs and
plausible magnitudes, with p-values of 0.000. So all of the variables that may quickly define
whether the most basic model seems to be performing to expectations are of the expected sign
and highly significant. At 69.5 ounces, the constant is about 2 ounces over 2 liters, and 15 ounces
less than the constant in the version without marketing-variable interaction, meaning more
variability in the dependent variable is explained by the explanatory variables than in the first
model.

5.3.4

BASIC with marketing variable interaction – combined marginal effects (CMEs)
The marginal effect of any demographic group’s specific reaction to a marketing variable

is a combination of that variable’s marginal effect from column δy/δxk, and of the ME (in
ounces) for the marketing variable with which it interacts. These two-variable combination MEs
will be referred to as CME in (marketing variable). For example, the CME in Price of
Household Income (HH Inc) will involve its ME, and the ME for the HH-Inc Price-interacted
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term. I evaluate all Price- and Advertising-interaction terms at their respective (projection-factoradjusted) averages, provided in the “X” column in results tables for models including marketing
variable interaction. Thus:
CME in Price for HH Inc = δy/δx of HH Inc + (δy/δx of P x HH Inc* X of Wkly P DMA)
CME in Advert for HH Inc = δy/δx of HH Inc + (δy/δx of Adv x HH Inc * X of Wkly Advert)
CME in Sale for HH Inc = δy/δx of HH Inc + (δy/δx of Sale x HH Inc).

(21)

It is important to remember that variable CMEs in a marketing variable (e.g. CME in Price for
HH Inc) are marginal, not total effects. Many CMEs in Advertising in the following table are
negative, but the TEs in Advertising (variable ME + “Adv x …” + “Wkly Advert”) are all
positive, as just described.
The first column of figures in Table 9 presents the ME for each variable from Table 8,
for reference. The second column of figures are the combined marginal effects in Price for each
of the demographic categories in the BASIC model with marketing variable interactions, the
fourth column for CMEs in Advertising, and the sixth for CMEs in Sale. Each of these CMEs
more fully identifies the volatility unique to that demographic trait’s marginal reactivity to
marketing variable changes than is possible in the BASIC model without marketing variable
interactions with demographic category variables. The effects from Tables 7 and 9 are estimated
using identical data, with all of the basic variables identically defined, so the Table 7 MEs are
also provided for reference in the last column.
Differencing the list of MEs in the first column, or the CMEs in Price, Advertising, or
Sale, from the list of MEs in the last column shows that there is no common move in direction or
size of change. Identifying the response to marketing mix variables separately by each variable
and re-combining the effects to a marketing-variable-specific CME therefore does reveal
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dynamic reactions to marketing mix variables specific to each demographic characteristic that
are not completely identified in the model without marketing-variable interactions. One thing to
notice is that the direction of the CME in Sale matches the ME from Table 7 for every variable,
while signs on Price and Advertising CMEs may differ (Price in 3 of 11, Advertising in 2 of 11).
This demonstrates that the magnitude of the Sale effect may dominate the Price and Advertising
effects. 14 In general the direction and degree of difference between the MEs from the BASIC
without marketing interactions and the ME for a variable in the first column – which is
calculated having isolated particular marketing variable reactions, without the marketing variable
reactions being reported in the first ME – say something about marketing-variable
responsiveness for the characteristic. For example, Asian moves most, almost 50 ounces
including a reversal of sign (37.2 to -12.3, ca. -130%), whereas Male Age changes by around
-10% (2.8 to 2.5). HH Size moves less than 10% (25.8 to 27.1), but when the information in the
columns between is understood (next paragraph), it becomes clear that this is because the
expected Price and Advertising reactions are of nearly equal size, and there is little dynamic
response to Sale in rising HH size.
The numeric columns after the CMEs in Price and the CMEs in Advertising show the
difference for each variable between the CME from the previous column and the CME if one
standard deviation is added to the average at which the first CME is calculated (a “shock”
increase in Price or in Advertising). A binary Sale is either present or not, and there is neither an
average at which it is evaluated nor a standard deviation for an “either/or” state. Statistical
significance for CMEs is now the joint significance of the variable’s ME and the variable’s

14

Indeed in the parallel Table 14, for the BROAD model, only 3 signs differ between the MEs for the Broad without
marketing variable interaction, versus five for Price and five for Advertising. This result supports the possibility that
the magnitude of the Sale effect may dominate in determining direction of the ME when all effects are combined, as
they are in models without marketing variable interaction with demographic variables.
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reactivity (ME) to the marketing variable. A Wald test on the MEs that together comprise a
combined marginal effect may prove statistically significant where the OLS-side table p-value
for the component variables may be greater than 0.10. Joint significance tests for each “CME in a
marketing variable” finds that every one is significant at the 1% level, with the exceptions
presented in the following two paragraphs.
Male Edu is above the 10% level in Price and Advertising, and above 5% in Sale (Price
0.928, Adv 0.173, Sale 0.057). Male Edu is far from conventional measures of acceptable
statistical significance for one or both of two reasons. First, its mean is perhaps coincidentally
too close to the intercept in effect not to be overwhelmed by its standard deviation in calculation
of statistical significance by the student’s t test. Second, it may well be multi-modal (see subsection 5.2.4.c), meaning there are distinct areas of clustering within the larger distributions
generating the data (not only for lower- versus higher-educated Males but for these groups across
Age, # of Kids, and HH size, which are all not broken into specific control groups in this model).
Any such distinct distributions (cluster areas) are agglomerated into this category and forcibly
characterized by a single mean, so we would expect dispersion to raise the standard deviation
enough that relative to the near-zero mean, it must force a high p-value. Thus the effect that Male
Edu has on the dependent variable is small, and may be real, but the dispersion within the
category does not allow standard characterization of that effect to be statistically significant. To
re-state, the implicit robustness checks offered by models covering the same elements as in the
Male Edu variable attest that it is statistically significant, despite the values here.
No other exception is above 5% significance. African American has a p-value of 0.01 for
the CME in Sale. Asian has a p-value of 0.047 for CME in Price, and of 0.042 for CME in
Advertising. Other Race has a p-value of 0.022 for CME in Price, and of 0.014 for CME in Sale.
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At this level of aggregation bi-modal behavior (see sub-section 5.2.4.c) within these groups is
plausible. Later, more sophisticated models indicate that bi-modal behavior exists in these
groups.
The CME in Price of moving from one HH Income category to the next (3.96) falls as
expected from the corresponding ME for HH Income (4.3), indicating that HHs with higher
incomes are more Price sensitive than lower-income HHs. Higher-income HHs have lower
CMEs in Advertising, by the same measure (3.9 versus 4.3), meaning they are less responsive
than lower-income HHs. Adding a standard deviation to the average values at which the CMEs
are evaluated has a small effect in the expected direction for Price (-0.2), but not for Advertising
(-0.4). This suggests that higher-income HHs buy less in increasing Price, while lower-income
households are responding more positively to Advertising. 15 More sophisticated models that
offer MEs by income level and interaction with Advertising may serve to check whether lower
income HHs are consistently responding more strongly to Advertising. The CME in Sale of
moving from one HH Income category to the next (3.6) is lower than the HH Income ME (4.3),
so in general higher-Income HHs buy fewer ounces when they buy on Sale than lower-income
HHs.
The CME in Price of moving from one Female Education category to the next (-8.7) rises
from the corresponding ME (-9.3), indicating that HHs with higher-educated Female HHHs are
less Price responsive than their lower-educated counterparts. But as the CME in Sale rises (-7.6
versus -9.3) in rising Female Education, buying on Sale seems preferred in higher Female
Education, despite the relative Price insensitivity versus lower-educated Female HHHs. The
effect of Advertising seems stronger for lower-educated Female HHHs, by the negative CME
15

The same result could also follow from lower-income households absorbing much more sCSD advertising with
the same conversion rate to purchase as higher Income HHs.
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(-9.39 versus -9.33), and because the effect falls in rising Advertising, by the (-0.06) to a plusone-standard-deviation shock to Advertising.
The CME in Price for Male Education (0.07) is a fall from the Male Educ ME of 0.333,
opposite the effect for Female Education. For Male HHHs rising Education translates to more
Price responsiveness in this specification. And a standard deviation shock to the Price average
(-0.15) confirms this. The CME in Sale is negative (to -1.9 from 0.33), indicating that Male
HHHs with lower education buy relatively more when the sCSD is on Sale. The CME in
Advertising is negative (to -1.06 from 0.33), so as with Income and Female HHH Education,
lower-income HHs buy more in rising Advertising than higher-income HHs. The effect is
strengthened by a standard-deviation shock (-1.47), indicating that Advertising effectiveness
demonstrated by correlation with more ounces purchased by lower-educated Male HHHs is
linear or even rising (there is no clear diminishing return to Advertising to lower- versus higherincome HHs in this dimension). The same is true for Female HHHs, to a lesser degree.
To re-iterate, by these results in BASIC, lower-income and lower-educated HHs respond
more to Advertising than their higher-income and higher-educated counterparts, and are more
responsive to Sale in lower Education for Male HHHs, but not Female HHHs. In rising Male
Education and in rising Income, Price responsiveness rises, while it falls in rising Female
Education. With placement denoting higher responsiveness to the marketing variable, here is a
simple grid:
Income

Fem Educ

Male Educ

Lower

Adv, Sale

Price, Adv

Adv, Sale

Higher

Price

Sale

Price
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Nothing stands out as breaking from common-sense economic rationale – and the fact that each
group and its Hi-Lo opposite is responsive to either Price or Sale is a reasonable sign that the
correlations for these key variables here are in some sense sensible.
The Race CMEs are relative to the White base group. The MEs of African-American
HHs (Afr-Amer) (-30.4), Asian HHs (-12.3), and Other Race (8.8) HHs are much more negative
than their MEs in the previous specification (Afr-Amer -15.8, Asn 37.2 [reverses sign], OthR
19.6), meaning these three racial groups’ buy fewer ounces relative to White HH reference group
average purchase when the three marketing variable effects are isolated and controlled for. AfrAmer HH purchase falls very slightly in Price ME, (to -30.6), and drops (-0.16) when a standard
deviation is added to the mean at which Price is evaluated. So the Afr-Amer HH is responsive to
Price in the expected direction, a fraction more than White HHs are at mean Price. The CME in
Price for Asian HHHs rises some 15% versus the base group (to -10.7 from -12.3), and the
difference from a Price shock is also positive (0.96), so Asian HHs are consistently less Price
sensitive than White HHs, or by comparison given the same reference group, than are Afr-Amer
HHs, or Other Race HHs. The CME in Price for Other Race HHs falls versus the ME (to 7.9
from 8.9), as does the response to a positive Price shock (-0.59), so Other Race HHs are more
Price responsive than White HHs.
Comparing their first-column MEs to their Sale response, Afr-Amer HHs rise relative to
White HHs by over 20 ounces (-8.36), Asians by 90 ounces (82.9, the largest response by more
than double of any in the table), and Other Race by 2 ounces (10.8). Asian HHs and Other Race
HHs also have the expected increase in response to Advertising (Asn to -10.5 from -12.3,
OtherRace to 11.2 from 8.9, the largest positive response to Advertising in the table), and
relatively strong positive responses to a standard-deviation shock to Advertising (1.9 and 2.4),
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relative to the White HH reference group. Afr-Amer HHs fall very slightly in Advertising CME
(-30.66), with a negative difference to an Advertising shock (-0.3), so are less responsive to
Advertising than the White Reference group – despite averaging lower in Income and Education,
which based on the simple grid above (and Table 1, bottom) might seem unexpected.
The large, even extreme given the magnitudes, marketing variable responsiveness of
Asian and Afr-Amer HHs relative to White HHs is rooted in response to Sale. The positive
response to Sale explains and overwhelms Asian HHs positive response in Price CME. Opposite
the Asian and Afr-Amer HH MEs that change a lot in difference from the White reference group,
the difference from the White reference group for Other Race (to 8.9 from 19.6) actually shrinks.
Still, Other Race is the only variable in this table that has expected responses to every marketing
variable interaction and to a standard deviation addition to continuous marketing variables. So
amplitude of the specific marketing-variable reactions is clearly a factor in the magnitude of net
effect, with Other Race magnitudes cumulatively smaller than Asian and Afr-Amer in Sale.
Leaving the Race variables but staying within “racial group” variables, the CME for
Hispanic (versus non-Hispanic) HHs decreases in size relative to the ME from Table 7 (to -11.6
from -20.4), and exactly opposite of Other Race, does not react relative to its base group in the
expected direction for any of the marketing variable interactions or standard deviation shocks
(from -11.6, in Price a rise to -9.5 [1.3], in Adv a large fall to -16.9 [-5.5], in Sale a fall to -13.9).
It is not yet clear whether strongly habitual purchase of sCSDs would be reflected in high
responsiveness (HHs very attentive to changes) or low responsiveness (HHs buy regardless of
marketing signal changes) to large marketing variable changes.
Comparing the ME to the CME in Price for perhaps the least definitive category, HH
Size, there is a drop in ounces, as economic theory predicts (from 27 to 24.7), and the correct
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sign for a positive shock in Price (-1.4). Kids in HH now reverses sign from the last model’s ME
(of -2.5) to 10.9, but rises in CME in Price, with a further rise to a positive Price shock. In
practice, when there are Kids in HH, it raises the HH size, and the changes in HH size are larger
than the Kids in HH changes, so the net reaction is of economically sensible signs (falling
purchase in rising Price).
The same is not true for CME in Advertising. HH size rises to 28.5 as expected, but the
fall in Kids in HH in Advertising is larger. For a positive shock to Advertising, again the
unexpected negative for Kids in HH (-2.4) is not reversed by the positive in HH Size (1.5) as it
was for a Price shock. Again unexpectedly, the quantity response to Sale is negative for both,
falling slightly to 26.6 (from 27) for HH Size, meaning smaller HHs buy more on Sale, while
Kids in HH falls from 10.9 to -13.1, a reversal and very large drop in quantity in rising number
of children in a HH. A result that HHs with more Kids buy less on Sale than HHs with fewer
Kids seems counterintuitive to economic logic. There are two responses to this. First, we must
check to see if this type of result is robust to more sophisticated models reported later. Second,
we may consider if HHs with more Kids are buying more frequently or more consistently than
HHs without Kids, in which case we might infer a habitual buying behavior that is resistant to
the influence of changes in marketing variables. Like the Hispanic variable, Kids in HH displays
no expected response in any marketing variable CME, or to increase in standard deviation on
either the Price and Advertising marketing variables.
Sex of HHHs are identified by the Education and the Age variables. Rising Female Age
moves opposite rising Female Education in CME for Price (falling from 9.4 to 8.2, and
remaining negative in a positive price shock, at -0.65), and in CME for Sale, falling from 9.4 to
8.3, meaning younger Female HHHs favor price promotions over older Female HHHs. This
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result maintains the parallel wherein a group favors either lower Price or more Sale, but not both.
Younger Female HHHs are more responsive to Advertising (8.2 from 9.4) just as lower-educated
Female HHHs are, and as for Education, the negative Advertising response in rising Age (-1.3)
holds for a positive shock to Advertising.
Along with Male Education, Male Age is the least responsive in ounces of purchase to
marketing variable changes of any variable in the table. The CME in Price falls to 2.45 from 2.5
ounces, and the fall is supported by the -0.03-ounce response to a positive Price shock. The CME
in Advertising is also of expected sign, but rises from 2.5 to 2.6, with a 0.1-ounce response to a
positive shock. As for Female HHHs, younger Male HHHs are more responsive to Sale, as the
1.68 CME is less than the 2.5 ME, although the gap is narrower for Male HHs. Another simple
grid may help summarize:

Lower

HH Size
Sale

Higher

Price, Adv

Kids In HH
Adv, Sale
(Price)

Female Age
Adv, Sale

Male Age
Sale

Price

Adv, Price

.

It is only the larger negative response in HH size overwhelming the positive in Price in # of Kids
that pushes Price into “Higher,” but the result then remains consistent with the hypothesis that
Price and Sale responsiveness in ounces may contrast for levels within a variable, consistent with
the theory that consumers seek lower (average) price for readily available non-credence goods.
As a general test of either the model or the applicability of economic theory to these
variable groups, 7 of 11 responses to adding a standard deviation change in Price are of the
expected sign, with 4 of 11 of the expected sign in Sale, and 4 of 11 in Advertising. This totals
15 of 33, or just under half of the responses from the BASIC model with marketing being of
expected sign. This type of analysis is predicated on two assumptions. First, that the base groups
are not coincidentally the most responsive to marketing variables – which is not at all clear here,
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but the reference group assumptions are held as close as possible through the model levels, so
this compromise may not much impede inter-model comparison. The second assumption is that
for this product category and the magnitude of these variables in the HH budget, the effects of
marketing-variable standard-deviation shocks would remain linear, and therefore unexpected
signs do not indicate expected curvature (diminishing returns) when the sign is unexpected in the
quantity response to a shock. This assumption is consistent with the strictures on ME for
coefficient estimates in the BASIC model. For a rise in variable by type, the response to
marketing variable interaction is most consistent with economic expectation for Race (7/9), then
HH Size and Education (2/3 over Male & Female), Income (1/3) , and Hispanic and Kids in HH
(0), with no expectation for rising Age (because this is the least likely to be linear in response,
given the rise then fall in HH size through Age levels).

5.3.5

Prediction – Introduction to Combined Marginal Effects (CME) Tables, Common to
All Marketing-Variable-Interaction Models
For the BASIC, BROAD, and REFINED models, estimation correlates sCSD purchase

behavior according to seven demographic categories: Income, sex of HHH (for Educ level and
Age), Education, Race/Hispanic, HH Size, # of Kids, and Age. If any four of these are held
constant, a single table allows comparison of the other three, and different HHH sexes can be
compared using similar tables. This structure is held as close to parallel as possible across the
three model levels to identify demographically correlated differences in purchase response and to
show the advantages of more sophisticated constructions. The result is Combined Marginal
Effects tables of mean predictions. The predictions, Ŷ0 for each cell in a CME table, are linear
combinations of combined marginal effects, each calculated from mfx-adjusted estimate results
that are aggregated to include marketing-variable interaction effects for each variable. Thus:
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Yˆ0 = E[Y | X] = αˆ 0 + βˆ1 X 1 + βˆ 2 X 2 + ... + βˆ x X x ,

(22)

where X is a vector of CMEs that together are required to fully characterize the
demographic dimensions that define a HH, plus the intercept. 16 Each Xx is the CME
corresponding to a specific demographic group or sub-group, consistent in construction with
equation (21). As every demographic group or sub-group is a dummy variable, the actual linear
combination devolves to Xx’s each evaluated at Xx=1 (with all of the Xx=0 terms omitted),
including Xx’s reaction to a marketing variable. If the marketing variable is continuous, it is
calculated at its pan-data average.
Each model level will present at least one set of three CME tables, meant to identify
purchase response by Income level, Education level, racial group, and sex of HHH for realistic
profiles of representative homes. In the first table the four elements held fixed are: (1) HH
Size=4, (2) # of Kids =2, (3) which defines the presence of Female & Male HHHs (sex of HHH
assignment=both), (4) both HHHs assumed to be Age 40-50 years. In the second table the four
elements held fixed are: (1) HH Size=3, (2) # of Kids =2, (3) Female ONLY HHH, (4) assumed
to be Age 40-50 years. The third table is identical to the second, but the sex of the HHH is Male
ONLY, not Female. Age level 40-50 years for the HHH in Tables 2 & 3 represents the HHH Age
for either sex of maximum average weekly purchase, with or without non-purchase weeks
included. Each set of three CME tables depicts purchase reactions to a particular marketing
variable: Price, Sale, or Advertising.
16

The constant is not required here, and is only required in calculation of Total Effect (TE) for a variable, a
calculation that would also include the MEs on the un-interacted marketing variables. The constant is included in
every cell of every CME prediction table here simply to bring the ounce totals closer to the weekly levels expected
from Table 3. The constant is quite high in BASIC models, and shrinks as the models increase in complexity, so
including the constant also keeps relative cells from being different to the point of seeming unrelated if they are
compared across model levels. Technically the cells in prediction tables are marginal total effects (MTEs) plus a
constant, but the distinction between CMEs that are combinations of CMEs plus a constant and MTEs that are
combinations of CMEs plus a constant does not seem worth introducing “MTE” in the main text. As the primary
interest from regression is marginal effects for variables, no total effects will be constructed unless requested by a
reader, who with these results, could easily calculate TEs for him- or herself.
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The fixed elements in the table can be varied. For example the number of children in the
household could be changed across two of three variable categories, differing by Income or
Education levels, and/or by racial group. A very wide array of results can be defined by
prediction tables in this manner. As the emphasis on the income and education effects by racial
group is a key focus here, the Price, Sale, and Advertising table sets associated with these are
presented here.
In every model, each CME is a combination of two mfx-adjusted variable MEs, one for
the variable and one for the variable interacted with the marketing variable of focus. As an
example, in the BASIC model’s single table where HHsize=4, 8 of these (2-ME) CMEs are
combined with the constant, for nine terms in the final cell-level CME (built from 17 mfxadjusted estimates). The level of the model determines the number of elements in each predicted
value in a CME table cell. Based on degree of overlap with reference sub-group assumptions,
most cells are combinations of 6 to 9 terms, each term itself being a CME. For either single-sex
of HHH table, CMEs for the other sex’s Education and Age are dropped, HHsize=3, and all else
is the same. There are fewer terms combined for cells whose elements overlap with the reference
group helping to define the intercept (constant). Thus for “White” as a column, there is no Race
element in the prediction calculation. By adopting the reference group for season “spring” for all
9 tables across the three model levels, I avoid adding an extra term to the prediction calculation.
Any of the assumptions are flexible, but would generate a completely separate set of three tables.
Predicting for a different season would simply require adding that season’s estimate to the
existing prediction calculation.
To focus on how lower and higher Education effect HH purchase over the span of
Income levels and vice-versa, each table is divided into four quadrants. The upper left and upper
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right span Income levels for fixed levels of Education – here High School Educ and College
Educ. The lower left and lower right quadrants span Education levels for fixed levels of Income
– here 1xPvInc and 4xPvInc. The non-Hispanic Race groups (not including Other Race, because
while it is regressed to control for its effect, Other Race is not clearly defined and is therefore of
marginal interest in final analysis for this study), and Hispanic are columns across left and right
halves of every table, so racial-group-specific analysis can be conducted. Cells may also be
totaled or averaged in any dimension (row, column, or quadrant) to make inferences. Because
each cell is a combination of between six and nine 2-variable CMEs in Price, and there were very
few 2-variable CMEs in Price with p-values above 0.01 to begin with, those cells deemed by
individual standard errors in the mfx-adjusted output table to be most likely to fail a significance
test were tested. All such candidate cells proved to be significant at the one percent level, so all
cells in all tables have pval=0.000.

5.3.6

Prediction – BASIC with Marketing Variables, Combined Marginal Effects Tables
Table 10a presents household-realistic predictions of purchase response by demographic

group and that group’s reaction to a rise in Price (CMEs in Price) relative to a reference subgroup. Every cell holds fixed HHsize=4, # of Kids=2, Age of HHHs Fem/Male=40-50, and the
constant is added. The reference group for season, “spring” is assumed. The first observation
pertaining to this table of predicted values is that the purchase quantities (for a week, but not
every week, just purchase weeks) are all in a plausible range, given the averages listed in Table
3. They may be seen as trending slightly lower than expected, but simply changing the season to
summer would bring almost every number in the table within the span of the averages in Table 3
(214 – 335 ounces). Table 10a is not a bad first approximation of household purchase behavior,
given its limitations. In Table 3 the span from the lowest to the highest average purchase in
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ounces for a demographic group is 121 ounces. Prediction from estimation should provide a
more dynamic range, by accounting for dynamic reactions to marketing variables unique to
demographic sub-groups, assuming they do in fact differ. The span for the HHsize=4 BASIC
prediction (Table 10a) is 148, wider than 121, as expected, yet still fairly narrow. This may be
due to the strictures of variable definition, but this notion can only be confirmed by results from
later models. The spans for Price CMEs for the same HHsize=4 combination will be compared
for the BROAD and REFINED prediction tables.
Between cells in a row and for many cells in columns, given the strictures of BASIC
model variable definition, values generally change by small regimented amounts. The change in
amount by row is the same for every racial group. There is no objective way to match the levels
for the BROAD and REFINED models to the BASIC for Income. To generate values
comparable across the three tables, specific choices must be made. I choose to use the average
Nielsen increment for each of the 24 defined levels, and apply some common sense, such as
calculating at the third of the first four levels, rather than at the second, and trying to appreciate
the weighting of the original Nielsen 2-digit income codes for odd-level breaks. 17 A single
increment is $5000, constrained to be a uniform incremental rise for each $5000-increase in HH
income. This explodes the values a bit toward the bottom half of the upper quadrants of tables
10a,b, & c (the 10-ounce difference from HfPvInc to 1xPvInc becomes a 24-ounce difference
from 4xPvInc to 5xPvInc). Lower-income HHs are constrained to be buying less than upperincome HHs from the extension of the 3.96-ounce purchase increase correlated with each rise in

17

Nielsen’s levels begin at 03 (under $5000) and end at 27 ($100,000+). Income levels clearly defined in BROAD
and REFINED need to be constructed for the BASIC. With “Inc” representing the Income CME (4.311, from Table
9): HfPvInc=Inc*1.5 (at $7.5k, to Nielsen level ‘06’); 1xPvInc=Inc*4 (at $15–20k to Nielsen level ‘11’);
2xPvInc=Inc*7 (at $35k to Nielsen level ‘16 to 17’); 3xPvInc=Inc*13 (at $65k to Nielsen level ‘21’);
4xPvInc=Inc*17 (at $85k to Nielsen level ‘26’); 5xPvInc=Inc*23 (at $115k to Nielsen level ‘27’, but at the low
end).
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Income level. If other versions of the model confirm that the poorest HHs buy less, this might
imply that sCSDs are seen as a minor luxury (treat), and/or that sCSDs are not being used as a
cheap calorie source. 18
The Education adjustment is much more straightforward, simply adding “Grade School”
into the Less High School level so it counts as two increments solves the mismatch between
BASIC and the later models. Similarly, the Age levels are only slightly expanded in the BASIC
from later models, and are listed in Table A-1d for reference. As Age is fixed at the same level in
all cells of all three tables for levels extant in the data, no real adjustment applies. But the
increment on Age would begin to seem unrealistic in the higher Age brackets if prediction for the
BASIC model was done in a table spanning Age (with the highest Age group buying over 60
ounces at purchase, driven just by their age, roughly 20-ounces more per purchase than the
mean-highest-purchase Age group (40-50 years).
The definition of Income results in a predicted income effect on purchase as positive 3.96
ounces per purchase for every $5000 bump in Income, with no curvature or satiety. Based on this
definition, the income effect (increased purchase in rising Income, with an 85-ounce-span from
lowest to highest Income at fixed Education level, as evident in upper quadrants) dominates the
education effect (falling purchase in rising Education, 40-ounce-span from lowest to highest
Education level at fixed Income level, as seen in lower quadrants) in absolute value, a result not
confirmed in BROAD and REFINED models.
Another aspect of analysis can be taken by averaging all the values for fixed HS Ed
across all Income levels (upper-left quadrant, avg=249, st.err.=32.53) and for fixed College Ed

18

As could be strictly rational for those so poor that they are chronically calorie deficient. But I imagine this level of
chronic calorie deficiency is more extreme than a Nielsen HomeScan participant HH is likely to be enduring.
Remember from the motivation section, the calorie richness of sCSDs does nothing to promote satiety. Sweetened
CSDs do not alleviate hunger much better than plain water.
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across all Income levels (upper-right quadrant, avg=228, st.err.= 32.53). Between these two,
there is an average fall of 20 ounces per purchase. Comparing them to 1xPvInc (lower-left
quadrant, avg=199, st.err.=18.69) and 4xPvInc (lower-right quadrant, avg=247, st.err.=18.69)
across all Education levels, we find an average rise of 48 ounces per purchase at the higher fixed
Income level. Purchase rises over 25% in the Income difference, versus falling 15-20% in the
education difference – again the income effect dominates the education effect. The difference
between the highest-purchase racial group (White) and the lowest (Afr-Amer) is 31 ounces, but
this amount is less than the span across either Income levels (76 oz), or Education levels (40 oz),
meaning that differing racial group is a smaller determinant of purchase than either of these other
factors, as originally hypothesized. Later models will confirm or overturn this finding.
Each racial group has a single adjustment that applies uniformly to all the cells in its
column(s). The constraint that every level change in Income or Education is identical in
purchase-ounce effect dictates that increments are the same for every racial group, so the
difference between any two columns is fixed for every cell, regardless of which row – e.g., Asian
HHs moving from 4xPvInc to 5xPvInc increase by 21.3 ounces, as do White, Afr-Amer, and
Hispanic HHs.
Racial groups can be ranked from highest to lowest purchase either by average quantity
purchase response across the table for each of the four half-columns for each racial group, or
totaling all 22 cells for each racial group. White (total=5382, avg=244) is the largest, followed
by Asian (5221, 237), then Hispanic (5057, 229), and finally Afr-Amer (4709, 213). For the
BASIC model, the quantity purchase differences between racial groups are fixed across all 4
quadrant averages, for all three Price-CME tables: White-Asian has a 7-ounce average
difference, White-Hispanic has a 15-ounce average difference, White-Afr-Amer has a 31-ounce
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average difference. The racial group averages and rankings cannot change for Female or Male
only HHHs in the BASIC specification. Regardless of racial group, there are uniform responses
to variable level changes. Intuitively, uniform changes within each racial group to changes in
Income, Education, and sex of HHH seem overly restrictive, but this notion can also be
confirmed by results from later models.
Comparing the HHsize=3, two Kids, for Female or Male ONLY HHH, the linearity of
changes constrains sex of HHH comparison, if they indeed differ. All cell-by-cell differences
comparing descriptive cells between Tables 10b and 10c are less than 20 ounces. The linear
increments seem particularly restrictive for Education level increments in Male only HHH, at
-1.4 ounces. Differences for fixed Education level HS versus College across Income levels are
only 3 ounces, within same-racial-group columns. The education effect appears to be extremely
weak for Male HHHs, only 6 ounces total difference across education levels, whereas across all
Income levels, the total effect is 86 ounces – over ten times the education effect. While the table
results are statistically significant they strain credibility of the inference, given economic
intuition and results from BROAD and REFINED. The Female only HHH education response
seems it must be more dynamic than the Male only education response, but the plausibility of the
inference is again tempered by the binding linearity of purchase-ounce changes across variable
levels. If this prediction set is accurate, Male HHHs (with two Kids) buy less than Female HHHs
(with two Kids) in HS Ed, but buy more than Female HHHs when either has College Ed – results
at odds with earlier versions of estimation results for more sophisticated models.
As may be anticipated given the linear restrictions of the BASIC variable definitions,
Tables 10b & 10c together are not very dynamic in range, with one cell below 140, and one
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above 270 (both in the Female HHH table). This narrow span will be compared later to results in
more flexible specifications.

5.4
5.4.1

BROAD Model Results – Estimation Results and Prediction
BROAD without marketing variable interaction – probit and OLS results
Reference group choices on the demographic variables must be made for every model,

and must not conflict for probit and OLS equations. The BROAD models use the top levels of
Income and Education (5xPov4Inc, Fem Post Collg, Male Post Collg), White and non-Hispanic,
HHsize=1 and No Kids, and Female and Male Age 50-65 years as reference group demographic
variables, and Spring (Ssn1) as the reference group for seasons.
The probit stage of estimation yields coefficient estimates for explanatory variables that
are used only indirectly in final results, but the coefficients of estimation do have signs indicating
whether a variable is associated with greater or lesser probability of purchase. These probabilities
proxy for selection in the market. Particularly for an item so easily stockpiled in the home, such
as sCSDs, we expect that quantity of purchase may be high for infrequent purchasers, which
might reverse the signs on the same variable’s coefficients between the probit and OLS steps in
estimation. This in fact occurs.
Table 11 presents estimation results for the BROAD model without marketing variable
interaction of the demographic variables, including in the bottom half of the table, results from
the probit step in estimation. All probit variables are significant at the 1% level, an even more
significant variable set than that for the BASIC without marketing variable interaction probit,
suggesting better identification of demographic (sub-)groups sharing relatively common
behavior. The probit regression coefficient for the constant is negative, as one would expect,
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fitting a regression line with roughly 83% of all observations being zero purchases. Probit results
are identical in the BROAD model with marketing variable interaction, except for the interequation variables listed after the probit constant in result tables.
The probit equation coefficient on the Price index is positive (45.988) and significant
(pval=0), as occurs in every level of the selection model discussed in this paper. For proper
interpretation of continuous variables, the Price and Advertising (0.000013) estimates should be
calculated at particular values, and as for OLS estimate interpretation the means are used (Price
mean=0.007407, Advert mean=374.631). The corrected probit-side estimates for inference for
Price and Advertising are then 0.341 and 0.005 respectively – and now of magnitudes consistent
with all the other probit estimates, between zero and one. Discussion of the positive probit
coefficient on Price is in sub-section 5.3.1. The probit and OLS coefficients on Advertising are
positive as expected in the BROAD models.
In demographic variables we see a nearly element-by-element reversal of coefficient sign
between the probit and the OLS coefficients, with all of the marketing variables, and with all of
the OLS demographic variables in Income, Education, and racial group following expectations
from either theory or from the category level averages from Tables 2 & 3, with the exception of
Hispanic.
The exclusionary restriction variables, Weeks in the year that HH total ounces Purchased
are Greater than 67 ounces (0.178), and Moving Average HH Stock (coeff.= -0.0004), are of the
expected signs, and significant at the 1% level, so meet minimum requirements for functional
adequacy. Each is larger in magnitude in the expected direction than for the BASIC model. 19

19

An identical increase occurs in REFINED (to 0.181 and -0.00043 versus the BROAD’s -0.00039) relative to
BROAD, a further indication of better specification at each model level.
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The unadjusted OLS coefficients in the first numeric column at the top of Table 11
precede mfx adjustment. While most inference follows from the mfx-adjusted presentation of the
same variable set (Table 12, replicated for convenience as the bold numeric column in Table 11),
the model structure is supported by the marketing variables all being of the correct direction, and
significant at p-value=0. If they were not, the model would be suggesting that the population as a
whole is not reacting as expected to marketing variables.

5.4.2

BROAD without marketing variable interaction – marginal effects
Table 12 presents the marginal effects [δy/δxk from eqn. (17)] of this first BROAD

model, that without marketing variables presents purchase responses to sCSD marketing by
demographic group levels. These MEs tend to be smaller than the OLS coefficient estimates for
the corresponding variables in Table 11. This is mathematically implied by equation (17), and
the application of equation (17) is precisely to correct for overestimation of marginal effects
(sub-section 5.2.4a, above). There is an exception for the Discount/Sale variable, as it is not
present in the probit equation, so does not change. Generally, the MEs are interpretable as HH
total ounces for a given week in which purchases of sCSDs occur. Continuous-variable
corrections using the pan-data average values involves multiplying the first column value by the
(unrounded) second column value for the marketing-mix variables. This correction yields the
following ME values in ounces per purchase for a data week: Price -1313.277 becomes -9.727,
and Advertising 0.011 becomes 3.958. These continuous-variable MEs will be discussed below
for these corrected values, not the ME values in the first numeric column of Table 12.
The marginal effect of Price is negative, and of Sale and Advertising positive, as
expected. The other non-demographic variables – the constant, seasons, and the exclusionary
restriction variables – are all of the expected signs and plausible magnitudes. So all of the
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variables that may quickly define whether the model seems to be performing to expectations are
of the expected sign and highly significant. At 65.4 ounces, the constant is just under 2 liters,
roughly 20 fewer ounces than for the BASIC without marketing variable interaction, indicating
that the level breakout of demographic variables identifies more observable variation.
The Price ME is -9.73 ounces per penny increase per ounce. Discussion of the
magnitudes of un-interacted marketing variable MEs is in sub-section 5.3.2.
All Income level MEs are negative relative to the highest-income-level reference group,
as expected for purchase rising in income, or a “positive effect.” The effect is not linear however,
with 4xPov4Inc (-11.388) deviating least from 5xPov4Inc (effect in constant) purchase behavior,
but 2xPov4Inc (-33.765) rather than HalfPov4Inc (-23.124) deviating most from 5xPov4Inc
purchase behavior. This effect is one demonstration justifying the level breakout from the
BASIC categoric variable configuration.
There is a strict purchase-quantity drop in rising Education level for both Female and
Male HHHs, with the smallest drop at Post College (in the constant). Male Less HS and HS
differ by a single ounce, however, indicating that purchase behavior is nearly identical before
Some College. In contrast to the BASIC models, we now see that the span in ounces across
Education levels (62 for Female, 45.5 for Male) is much larger than the span across Income
levels (22.5), indicating that the education effect dominates the income effect.
In racial group only, the BROAD without marketing variable interaction holds the exact
same variable configuration as the BASIC model without marketing variable interaction, and the
estimation results match in purchase rank from highest to lowest: Asian (40.7), Other Race
(17.6), White, Afr Amer (-19), Hispanic(-21). Both differ from BASIC with interactions (White,
Asian, Hispanic, Afr Amer). Of course the exact estimates do not match in the BASIC and
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BROAD models for racial group variables, because the configuration of other controlling
variables has changed.
HH Size rises in fairly linear fashion compared to variable level sets other than
Education, jumping 53 ounces from HHsize=1 to HHsize=2, then by 24 ounces, then 33 ounces,
then to 44 ounces for HHsize=5+. The offsetting drop in purchase quantity relative to the No
Kids base group is not linear, peaking at Three Kids (-41). As an experiment consider a sole
HHH with some number of children, such that HHsize=2 implies One Kid, and so on. Then
roughly in ounces for the combined HH Size and # of Kids MEs only, HHsize2=50 (53.7 – 4),
HHsize3=57.5, HHsize4=60, HHsize5+=110. Per capita purchase actually falls sharply, with
smaller per capita purchase at HHsize5+ than at HHsize2.
Female Age levels do not display coefficients in concordance with the prediction from
Table 3 that 50-65 has the highest purchase, else all these would be negative. But it is plausible
that quantity purchase rises in Age (with average HH size by Age level), then falls above 65
years. Male Age indicates a strong preference among young Male HHHs that fades in Age, with
the 50-65 level folded into the constant for an equivalent “0” value neatly fitting the pattern of
falling purchase in rising Male Age level.
“No Fem HHH” means only Male HHH, that is, relative to any HH with a Female HHH.
Excepting the oddly high Fem Less HS 91-ounce ME, the general pattern of Male versus Female
Education and Age implies that to be consistent, No Fem HHH (95.8) should be noticeably but
not greatly larger than No Male HHH (81.1), and it is.
As for all the models, with spring as the base group, ounces at purchase fall with average
temperature for the season (summer 32, fall 26, winter 19). As for all the models, the
exclusionary restriction variables are of expected sign (annual # of HH weekly purchases > 67
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ounces 0.178, and moving-average HH stock over 6 weeks from purchase -0.0004) and
significant at pval=0.

5.4.3

BROAD with marketing variable interaction – marginal effects
Table 13 lists probit results and OLS coefficient estimates from the BROAD model

including interactions of each of the demographic variables with each of the three marketing
variables. The last three columns are the marginal effects of each variable of estimation from the
combined effects of the two equations, the p-values for these MEs, and the average values at
which marketing variables are calculated (see 5.2.4.b regarding Disc/Sale). For the marketing
interaction variables, the OLS coefficient is the ME, so the continuous Price and Advertising
variables are multiplied times the data-wide average value for the relevant marketing variable.
From this perspective, each ME in the third-to-last column for marketing variable interaction
terms is in ounces, like the MEs for the demographic variables above it in the column.
While the unadjusted OLS coefficient on Price (-1160.794* 0.0074 = -8.60) is negative as
expected across the population in or out of the weekly sCSD market, the un-interacted mfxadjusted Price variable, which is never used alone for interpretation, is positive (103.811* 0.0074
= 0.769), although in ounces not much over zero. The cumulative ME of all Price and Priceinteracted variables is negative {([Σ“Price x …”] * 0. 0074) + 0.0769 = -68.533}, and much
smaller than 0.769, meaning the CME for the individual variable price reactions (“P x …” +
“Wkly P DMA”) tend to be negative. But there are exceptions that are net positive: Male Less
HS & HS (base: PostCollege); all the racial groupings (bases: White, non-Hispanic); One Two &
Three Kids (base: No Kids); all Female & Male Age levels (Base: 50-65 years) except Male
Ages <30 & 40-50 years. In realistic combinations of variables, the HHsize CMEs between -6.2
and -11.3 ounces would offset most possible combinations that include these positive price
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effects. The largest positive single-variable CME is FemAge<30yrs, but the positive would be
offset by larger negative values for all levels of Female Education except Some College.
Younger Hispanic Female HHHs with children may not have negative Price reactions, but there
are few realistic combinations that would be positive in total effect in Price.
For “Disc/Sale” the unadjusted OLS coefficient and the mfx-adjusted ME are identical
(73.2* 1 = 73.2). Combining the “DiscSale” ME with any of the “Sale x …” interaction terms
(“Sale x …” + “Disc/Sale”) yields uniformly net positive sale-response MEs. At lower Income
levels, in Male Education levels, Hispanic, HH Sizes, and One & Two Kids there are clusters of
“Sale x …” MEs that are negative relative to their reference groups, but the “Disc/Sale” ME pulls
them all net positive in combined ME. The cumulative Sale ME is positive as well ([Σ“Sale x
…”] + 73.2 = 3.91). If one carefully combined a Hispanic HH of 4 members, lowest Income,
lowest Male HHH Education, with two Kids, a negative total effect in Sale might be achievable –
and believable if we surmise limited access to large supermarkets or shopper-club/big-box stores.
The unadjusted OLS coefficient on Advertising is also positive as expected (0.022 *
374.631 = 8.14), and the un-interacted mfx-adjusted Advertising variable, which is never used
alone for interpretation, is positive (0.022 * 374.631 = 8.27 [larger than OLS; equations appear
identical only due to rounding]). The two-ME combination on marketing effects and
demographic characteristics (“Adv x …” + “Wkly Advert”) are all positive reactions to “Wkly
Advert.” Relative to their reference groups, at all levels of Income, lowest Female Educ, all Male
Educ, Hispanic, HH Sizes 2 & 4, One & 3 Kids, Fem Age 65+, and Male Age levels except 65+,
there are “Adv x …” MEs that are negative, but the “Wkly Advert” ME pulls them all net
positive in combined ME. The cumulative Advertising effect {([Σ“Adv x …”] * 374.631) + 8.14
= -15.44} reverses from the un-interacted ME to negative – a function of all of the base-group-
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relative reactions. The largest of these is for Male Age <30 at -7.13, followed by Hispanic at 4.43, and HfPvInc at -3.85, 1xPvInc at -3.05, and Male College Educ at -3.04. Peculiarities of the
BASIC prediction tables notwithstanding, these groups closely parallel those I guessed to be
high-consumption groups, before conducting this analysis. When controlling for HH Size and
other factors, it may be that these groups share a purchase behavior that is resistant to
Advertising in some way? Or perhaps the chosen base groups respond most to advertising? From
Graphs 1 & 2 we may recall that Advertising, Prices, and percent of sCSD category on Sale do
not appear to display clear correlation, so these groups’ counter-intuitive response to Advertising
does not seem motivated by the pursuit of better price or discount (assuming that together they
dominate the mean versus the base group levels). If we assume that the now around $500 million
spent year after year in the sCSD category on advertising generally has the intended effect of
stimulating purchase, 20 then perhaps these particular groups are watching fewer television ads
for sCSDs than their reference-group counterpart HHs, and are getting less than the projected
exposure.
The other non-demographic variables – the constant (59.8), seasons (Ssn2 28.9, Ssn3
21.4, Ssn4 13.6), and the exclusionary restriction variables – are all of the expected signs and
plausible magnitudes, with p-values of 0.000. So all of the variables that may quickly define
whether the BROAD model seems to be performing to expectations are of the expected sign and
highly significant. At 59.8 ounces, the constant is 8 ounces less than 2 liters, below the constant
in all previous specifications, just as the seasonal dummies drop in size with each model,

20

Harris et al. (2011) report $948 billion in SSB and energy drink advertising in 2010, up 5% from 2008. Threequarters is spent on television advertising, with Coca-Cola leading the pack at $300 million, followed by Pepsi at
$250 million, across all of their SSB products. Similarly, NPLAN 2011 finds $1.4 billion in total advertising
expenditures in the SSB industry (2010), and sCSDs have 45% of industry revenue.
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meaning more variability in the dependent variable is explained by the explanatory variables
than in earlier models.
Before moving to the discussion of combined marginal effects, let us consider some
differences based on sex of HHH, because the No Male HHH Hd and No Female HHH Hd
variables are not interacted with marketing variables, so have no CMEs. Evidence from the
BASIC and BROAD models generally indicate that Male HHHs purchase more than Female
HHHs. Simply totaling all of the Male-HHH-specific MEs yields a higher total than totaling all
of the Female-HHH-specific MEs in any of the four BASIC or BROAD models. Lower-educated
Female HHHs do out-purchase lower-educated Male HHHs, but higher-educated Male HHHs
still buy more than higher-educated Female HHHs, and do so consistently in the BROAD Age
MEs, but not the BASIC Age MEs. The “No(Sex)HHH” variables lay it out explicitly.
Remember a HH may have a Male and Female HHH, so these variables identify HHs expressly
with one sex of HH head. Returning to Table 13, HHs with No Male head (56.8) average 9.5ounce smaller purchase than HHs with No Female head (65.2). These values are 30 ounces less
for Male Only HHHs and 25 less for Female Only HHHs than in the BROAD model with no
marketing variable interaction variables (No M HHH 81.1, No F HHH 95.8), supporting the
methodological choice that discretely breaking out the marketing variable interactions would
identify more variation in specific groups, leaving less for broad “catch-all” variables to explain.
Through a wide-angle lens, the sex of HHH effect favoring higher purchase for Male HHHs
tends to persist for quadrant totals in the sex-of-HHH-specific prediction tables at all model
levels, despite MEs across most models demonstrating the exceptionally high purchase quantities
for Female HHHs with low Education levels.
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5.4.4

BROAD with marketing variable interaction – combined marginal effects
The marginal effect of any demographic group’s specific reaction to a marketing variable

is a combination of that variable’s marginal effect from column δy/δxk, and of the ME (in
ounces) for the marketing variable with which it interacts. For example, the CME in Price of
Household Income (HH Inc) will involve its ME, and the ME for the Price-interacted term. I
evaluate all Price- and Advertising-interaction terms at their respective (projection-factoradjusted) averages, provided in the “X” column in results tables for models including marketing
variable interaction (see equation (21)). 21
The first column of figures in Table 14 presents the ME for each variable from Table 13,
for reference. The second column of figures are the combined marginal effects in Price for each
of the demographic categories in the BROAD model with marketing variable interactions, the
fourth column for CMEs in Advertising, and the sixth for CMEs in Sale. Each of these CMEs
more fully identifies the volatility unique to that demographic trait’s marginal reactivity to
marketing variable changes than is possible in the BROAD model without marketing variable
interactions with demographic category variables. The effects from Tables 12 and 14 are
estimated using identical data, with all of the basic variables identically defined, so the Table 12
MEs are also provided for reference in the last column.
Differencing the list of MEs in the first column, or the CMEs in Price, Advertising, or
Sale, from the list of MEs in the last column shows that there is no common move in direction or
size of change. Identifying the response to marketing mix variables separately by each variable
and re-combining the effects to a marketing-variable-specific CME therefore does reveal
dynamic reactions to marketing mix variables specific to each demographic characteristic that

21

Process descriptions are intentionally repeated at each model level to accommodate readers who are focused only
on certain sub-section results.
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are not completely identified in the model without marketing-variable interactions. One thing to
notice is that the direction of the CME in Sale matches the ME from Table 7 for all but 3 of the
33 variables, while signs on Price and Advertising CMEs differ more (Price in 5 of 33,
Advertising in 5 of 33). This demonstrates that the magnitude of the Sale effect may have the
potential to dominate the Price and Advertising effects in the model without identified
(separated) interaction effects. In general the direction and degree of difference between the MEs
from the BROAD without marketing interactions and the ME for a variable in the first column –
which is calculated having isolated particular marketing variable reactions, without those being
reported in the first ME –say something about marketing-variable responsiveness for the
characteristic. For example, HalfPovInc (46, with sign reversal), Asian (-30), and Fem & Male
HHH Ages <30 (Fem -34, with sign reversal; Male 28) move most, whereas Hispanic, some
Education levels, and HHs with Kids move very little in this differencing.
The numeric columns after the CMEs in Price and the CMEs in Advertising show the
difference for each variable between the CME from the previous column and the CME if one
standard deviation is added to the average at which the first CME is calculated (a “shock”
increase in Price or in Advertising). A binary Sale is either present or not, and there is neither an
average at which it is evaluated nor a standard deviation for an “either/or” state. Statistical
significance for CMEs is now the joint significance of the variable’s ME and the variable’s
reactivity (ME) to the marketing variable. A Wald test on the MEs that together comprise a
combined marginal effect may prove statistically significant where the OLS-side table p-value
for the component variables may be greater than 0.10. Joint significance tests for each “CME in a
marketing variable” finds that every one is significant at the 1% level, with the exceptions
presented in the following four paragraphs. There are 21 of these exceptions out of 99 CMEs in
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marketing variables, of which 11 (over 6 of the 33 groups) are above the 10% level. Statistical
significance poses little problem for inference.
All of the Income levels have some 2-variable CMEs with p-values greater than 1%, but
only 3xPov4Inc fails by the 10% conventional measure for at least two such CMEs, perhaps due
to a confluence of behavior with the 5xPov4Inc reference group. 1xPov4Inc has p-values for
CMEs in Price and Advertising of 0.019 and 0.017; and 2xPov4Inc has a CME in Sale of 0.381.
3xPov4Inc has p-values for CMEs in Price, Advertising, and Sale of 0.622, 0.46, and 0.013.
In racial groups, Asian has p-values for CMEs in Price and Advertising of 0.070 and
0.045, perhaps suggesting bi-modality within the group that may be exposed in the REFINED
model. Other Race may be acting like the White base group, as it has p-values for CMEs in Price
and Advertising of 0.761, and 0.210.
One Kids has p-values for CMEs in Price of 0.666 and in Advertising of 0.358, while
Three Kids has p-values for CMEs in Price of 0.761 and in Advertising of 0.210.
The Female Age levels 40-50 & 65+ are not statistically significant at the 10% level,
most plausibly due to largely similar behavior to the 50-65-years base group. Female Age 40-50
has p-values for CMEs in Price, Advertising, and Sale of 0.509, 0.974, and 0.086. Female Age
65+ has p-values for CMEs in Price and Advertising of 0.818, and 0.136.
At this level of aggregation bi-modal behavior within some of these groups is plausible,
while every level in the BROAD model now has a reference group compared to which it may be
similar in purchase behavior.
The marketing-variable CMEs for the BROAD model with marketing variables display
strict rises or falls across levels within a demographic category only in Female & Male
Education (not in Sale for Male Educ), and HH Size, but even in these, the increments vary
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considerably. This result strongly undermines the implicit validity of structure for the broadly
defined variables in the BASIC model, which assumes strict rise or fall within incremental
categories. This may suggest further advantages in identifying true correlates of behavior by
exploring a further level of refinement in the definition of the demographic subgroups, as in the
REFINED specification.
The CMEs in Price for Income levels are relative to the 5xPov4Inc reference group. The
CMEs in Price for HfPov4Inc (17.3), 3xPov4Inc (1.5, or by significance, “0”), and 4xPov4Inc
(6.3) are above the Income reference group value, and 1xPov4Inc (-8), 2xPov4Inc (-10.2) are
less than the Income reference group value, but all five do fall from the first-column ME to the
CME in Price, as theory predicts they should, assuming the richest group (the reference group) is
less Price sensitive. Except for the lowest Income level, variations from the reference group for
Income are within one 12-ounce can per purchase. All Income levels display expected purchase
reactions to a one-standard-deviation addition in the Price Index. For the CMEs in Advertising
however, the most responsive group seems to be the richest, as all others fall from the firstcolumn ME to the CMEs in Advertising, supported further as all fall with a positive shock to
Advertising. Oddly, the unexpectedly negative reactions to a shock in Advertising are nearly
linear, with the strongest at the lowest income level, and the weakest at the highest. This result is
noteworthy first in contrast to the non-linearity of the CMEs for Income levels, and second
because this result directly conflicts with implications from the BASIC model (5.3.4) that
suggest “that higher-income HHs buy less in increasing Price, while lower-income households
are responding more positively to Advertising.” If lower-income HHs are absorbing much more
Advertising than higher-income HHs, they may be displaying a saturation effect, and if they are
responding more strongly to Advertising shocks, it seems the response may not be in the
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direction sCSD advertisers intend. Positive responses to Sale (CME in Sale minus first-column
ME) occur only for 2x- & 4xPov4Inc, relative to the base group. This result shows that higherIncome HHs (4x- & 5xPov4Inc) are most responsive to Sale, again bringing into question results
from the BASIC model.
This is not to say that lower-income HHs are not responsive to marketing variables as a
whole. Any variable that reverses sign from the last numeric column in Table 14 to any of the
CMEs in Price, Advertising, or Sale columns has shifted by more than its own magnitude, and
therefore represents a highly responsive group to marketing variables. (This is independent of the
analysis conducted on marketing variable shocks.) In fact HalfPov4Inc has the largest span in
ounces for a reversal of sign of any value in the table, from -23 to 17 for CME in Price, and
1xPov4Inc has a rare 25-ounce rise in CME in Price versus its Table 12 ME. We must conclude
that the lowest Income levels are highly responsive to Price changes, although less than the
reference group in Advertising and Sale. 3x- & 4xPov4Inc also reverse signs for CME in Price
versus their Table 12 MEs, also indicating a highly responsive group to Price variable changes.
To be sure, as a category, the Income levels change from ME (the last numeric column) to CME
in Price Advertising and Sale in larger amounts than any other category in the table, meaning
that Income level is on average the best characteristic for identifying responsiveness to
marketing variable changes when these are regressed separately.
From Tables 2 and 3, the span in mean purchase from highest to lowest Education levels
is larger for Female Educ than Male Educ, with Post College being the lowest value for both, and
the same relation holds for the MEs and the CMEs in all three marketing variables. CME
differences from the Post-College reference group by Education level are much more dynamic
than for Income level differences from their reference group. For CME in Price for instance, the
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difference from Female Less HS (87.4) to Fem College (36) is 51, nearly twice the difference
from HalfPov4Inc (17.3) to 2xPov4Inc (-10.1). Roughly similar ratios hold for Advertising and
Sale, and the span in Male Educ is always larger than the span for CME in a marketing variable
for Income levels. This suggests that the size of the education effect dominates the size of the
income effect, in direct contrast to BASIC model (with marketing interaction) results. This
inference is strengthened by recognizing the robustness of the results. As with the same
Education variable sets from Tables 12, 2, & 3, there is a strict fall in rising Education level
across both sexes of HHHs in every CME in a marketing variable (except that the Sale effect is
larger for Male HS than for Male Less HS, and both are above Some College 22).
The strength of the Education effect does not imply exceptional responsiveness (large
changes in ounces) to marketing variables in comparison to the reference groups, but for Female
Education the CMEs in Price and Sale are consistently in the expected direction (the only set for
which this holds), and the fall in ounces for the CME in Price is further supported by negative
responses to a positive Price shock for all Fem Educ levels. Price reactivity is highest for the two
lower Female Education levels (-4.9, -3.5) versus the higher ones (-1.6, -2.8), where for Male
HHHs the opposite holds (-0.1 and 0.2, versus -0.7 and -0.6). This may imply that Female HHHs
with lower Education care more about price. Whether this is driven by lower incomes associated
with the lower Education levels is a hypothesis implicitly identified in REFINED. 23 Only Fem
Less HS responds positively in Advertising and is also positive to a shock in Advertising. So
oddly, Fem Less HS and Fem Post College respond most to Advertising, while all other levels

22

This result identifies the effect responsible for the overlap between Male Less HS and Male HS in Tables 3 and
12.
23
Price interactions with variables fixed in Education level but spanning Income levels in REFINED do confirm
more price responsiveness (higher ME average magnitudes) in Education levels of Some College and less, versus
College and Post College (Table 20b).
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are negative in Advertising. There is clearly no linear progression in reaction to a positive shock
in Advertising for either the Female or Male Educ set.
Compared to Post College, Male Education levels are less consistent than Female
Education levels, in part because Male HS is less responsive than its base group in every CME in
Price, Advertising, or Sale and the two shocks, the only group besides Hispanic, One Kids, and
FemaleAge65+ for which this holds. The other Male Educ levels fall in CME in Price, supported
by negative responses to a positive shock in Price, but all the Male Educ levels also fall in
Advertising, with negative responses to a positive shock in Advertising. All Male Educ levels
fall in Sale, meaning Post College defines the largest response to Sale – so the lower Male Educ
levels react opposite the responses for Female Educ, and in Sale act more like the lower Income
levels than the higher Income levels.
Comparing just the MEs from the first column or Table 12 with the CMEs in Price for
similar terminal Education levels for Female and Male HHHs, Female HHHs buy more than
Male HHHs at lower Education levels, but less at higher Education levels. The same holds for all
but College for CMEs in Advertising, and Female HHHs buy more at every Educ level for CME
in Sale.
There is a 36-ounce (40%) drop in ME level from Fem HS (82.1) to Fem Some College
(46.5) that replicates a bit smaller in the CME in Price, Advertising, or Sale columns, but a drop
of corresponding magnitude (20-ounce, or 33%) occurs for Male HHHs only between Some
College (60.5) and College (40.1). This suggests that there is a discrete level at which nutrition
awareness of sCSDs may find application, but a level higher for Male HHHs than for Female
HHHs, and clearly not a linear function in either sex of HHH’s Educational level. This may be
associated with Kids in HH, but that cannot be checked without interacting demographic
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variables, or perhaps creative cross-tabulation of elements in the dataset. In the REFINED model
this sex-of-HHH-specific result can be checked by racial group.
Across Education levels, Female HHHs react en bloc as expected to a positive shock in
Sale whereas Male HHHs en bloc do not, and the expected negative reactions to a plus-onestandard-deviation Price shock are uniformly higher for Female HHHs. We may conclude from
these results that Female HHHs are more responsive to marketing variables than Male HHHs for
sCSDs, which generally have a low impact on HH budget. This may confirm that Female HHHs
are more likely to manage HH budgets carefully, rather than confirming a sex-of-HHH-specific
allegiance to sCSD marketing choices. Results leave no question that HH reactivity to marketing
variables does vary by sex of HHH.
Focusing on first-column MEs, racial groups peak in difference at -37. This magnitude is
at the low end of deviations in Education-level CMEs (40), indicating that the education effect
likely trumps any effect deriving from racial grouping, just as the education effect trumps the
income effect. The CME in Price for Afr-Amer HHs (-36) is less than the White reference group,
while Asian (9.8) and Other Race (1.1) HHs purchase on average more than White HHs. These
racial group results closely parallel Table 3 averages, with the exception of the Other Race rank
amongst the 5 groups – here above Whites, there below – suggesting Other Race HHs are more
reactive to marketing mix variables than White HHs. The difference between Afr-Amer HHs and
the White reference group doubles (with no sign reversal) from ME (-19) to CME (-37), which
parallels a 49-ounce sign reversal from Table 7 ME (37.2) to ME (-12.3) in Table 9, so this result
confirms that Afr-Amer HHs are very responsive to marketing variable changes. Comparing the
first-column MEs to CME in Price, Afr-Amer HHs (-37 to -36), Asian HHs (9.3 to 9.8), and
Other Race HHs (0.9 to 1.1) all rise, although by very low amounts in ounces. Afr-Amer (0.5)
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Asian (0.3) and Other Race (0.1) HHs are all less responsive to a Price shock than the White base
group (and are therefore “unexpectedly” positive).
But as may be expected from the “quick grids” in 5.3.4, groups relatively unresponsive in
Price are highly responsive for CME in Sale, and here also in Advertising and positive shock to
Advertising. The sizes of these reactions in ounces overwhelm the small positive responses in
Price. Compared to its own ME measured against the White base group, in Sale, Afr-Amer HHs
rise over 25 ounces per purchase, Asian HHs a full 2-liters per purchase, and Other Race 12
ounces per purchase (starting from a single ounce difference from the base group). The AfrAmer HHH response (1.7) to an Advertising shock is half again that of Asian HHHs (1.1), but
Other Race (3.4) is double the Afr-Amer response. For the moment leaving aside Hispanic
versus non-Hispanic HHs, all three non-White Race groups have higher purchase responses than
Whites to a shock/increase in sCSD industry Advertising, and Afr-Amer and Asian HHs are even
more responsive to price-promotions/labeled discounts. This is the strongest identification of
effect in the Table by HH characteristic, as Female HHH Education is the only other variable set
in Table 14 to have nearly as uniform a purchase response for CMEs in Price, Advertising, or
Sale and to positive shocks. The magnitudes for Race CMEs are smaller than for Fem Educ in
Price, but larger in Sale and on par (but all in the expected direction) in Advertising. Non-White,
non-Hispanic HHs respond more positively to Advertising and Sale and to a shock to
Advertising in CME results.
Hispanic HHs are uniformly weaker in response to marketing variables than nonHispanic HHs. Compared to the first-column ME, each of the marketing variable CMEs and
associated positive shocks push the Hispanic ounce response in the direction opposite what
economic theory generally predicts. Versus the first-column ME (-19.9), negative response in
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CME in Advertising (-24.3) is larger than the positive response for the CME in Price (-16.6),
which is larger than the negative response in Sale (-21.7). Hispanic HHs begin 20 ounces lower
in purchase than non-Hispanic HHs, which is likely offset to an extent by larger HH sizes
(bottom of Table 1, and large magnitudes here). The CME for Hispanic (versus non-Hispanic)
HHs contracts in size relative to the ME from Table 12 but by a negligible amount (to -19.9 from
-20.1) – as with Table 9, Hispanic versus non-Hispanic HHHs are relatively non-reactive to
marketing variables, meaning this contrast does not follow the same form as the White/nonWhite reactions to marketing variable shocks seen in Race variables.
By higher responsiveness to the marketing variable set relative to its reference group,
here is another simple grid, for Income, Education, and racial group (split responses are in
parentheses, and designated by the greater number of level responses within the set):
(non-White)
Income

Fem Educ

Male Educ

Race

In Group

Price

Price, Sale

(Price)

Adv, Sale

Base Group

Adv, (Sale)

Adv

Adv, Sale

Price

Hispanic

Price, Adv, Sale

.
While MEs for HH Size do run higher in magnitude versus the HHsize=1 reference group
(76.5 – 162) than Education levels do from their reference group (41 – 96), there is the implicit
ability in HH size to control for per capita effects, which average in the 33-ounce range, less than
any Education level difference from its reference group value. Policy recommendations focused
simply on HH size would seem particularly unfocused and perhaps unhelpful. In this
specification by CMEs, Education level therefore seems to be the dominant policy-relevant
explanatory variable group.
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The CMEs in Price show all HH sizes buying less in rising Price, and HHsizes2-5+ also
respond as expected to a standard deviation Price shock in a gently but not strictly linear fashion.
HHsize=3 & HHsize =5+ also react positively versus the HHsize=1 base group for CME in
Advertising, and as expected to an Advertising shock. No other reactions are as expected, which
includes all purchase responses to Sale, reflecting that HHsize=1 is most responsive to Sale. This
result is counterintuitive if one expects larger HHs to manage budgets by looking more to price
discounts, but is not counterintuitive if one expects that demand will be less flexible for larger
HHs, so keeping HH stocks within certain benchmark amounts may mean more frequent
purchase, and quantities of purchase on Sale will be lower.
Comparing MEs to Table 12 MEs, Kids in HH as a group respond more dynamically than
HH Size when specifically controlling for marketing variable changes. Kids-in-HH MEs for
Table 14 tend to be closer to zero, having controlled for marketing variable effects (smaller by -2
to -11 ounces, with 4Kids+ expanding slightly), in contrast to the expansion in purchase (of a
fairly uniform 23 ounces per level) associated with similar comparisons for HH Size. This
confirms what was only suspected for Table 9 results, that Kids in HH is fundamentally a
different type of characteristic identifying demographic differences in HH purchase response
than is HH Size. Compared to the first-column MEs or the Table 12 MEs, CMEs in Price,
Advertising, and Sale do not move uniformly or in pattern for # of Kids. CMEs in Price
compared to first-column MEs are higher than the No Kids reference group for One and Three
Kids (-2 to -1.3, and -35.9 to -35.7), but lower for 2 and 4 Kids+ (-9 to -9.5, and -32 to -33.9).
Similarly referring to the first-column MEs, the CMEs in Advertising are higher than for No
Kids (of expected sign) for 2 and 4Kids+, but lower for One and Three Kids. The 4 Kids+
response to Advertising is the largest positive response to an Advertising shock of any group in
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the column, over 25% larger than the next nearest value. But not all #-of-Kids levels are positive
in Advertising, so generalizing from this strong effect is not prudent. Three Kids and 4 Kids+
have higher CMEs in Sale versus their first-column MEs, while One and 2 Kids are strongly
negative versus the base group response to Sale. This supports the hypothesis that HHs with
more children will seek price discounts more than HHs with fewer children. I have no hypothesis
for why there seem to be strong behavioral breaks in sCSD purchase and reversals of behavior as
additional children are added to HH averages, or why this is not mirrored in HH size results. The
robustness of these effects can be checked using REFINED model results.
Comparing first-column ME to CME in Price, no Female Age levels are negative (e.g.,
Age65+ -2.5 to -0.9), meaning that Fem Age 50-65 are the most Price responsive group. All the
other Fem Age levels are positive to a positive Price shock as well. The two lowest Fem Age
levels are positive in Advertising and to a shock in Advertising, while the other levels fall
relative to 50-65. Only the 40-50 Fem Age group has a positive CME versus ME in Sale. So the
50-65 reference group is by far the most responsive to all three marketing variables, except for
Fem Age <30 and 30-40 being positive in Advertising, which seem consistent with the BASIC
table quick grid for lower Education and lower Income. Again, the Female Age levels 40-50 &
65+ are not statistically significant at the 10% level, most plausibly due to largely similar
behavior to the 50-65-years base group.
In contrast to Female HHH behaviors broken down by Age level, Male HHHs all respond
as expected for CME in Price and to a standard-deviation Price shock, and all but Male Age 4050 rise in purchase for CME in Sale. Only Males 65+ react positively in Advertising, and to a
shock in Advertising. This means that the 50-65 reference group is much less responsive for
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Male HHHs compared to Female HHHs. Male Age is another example in addition to Female
Education of a set that is both more Price and more Sale sensitive than its reference group.
Exactly opposite the purchase behavior for Female HHHs Age <30 who purchase much
less than their 50-65 reference group and far less than the Female 30-40 group, Male HHHs Age
<30 have MEs about 30 ounces higher than their first-column ME for every CME in Table 14
than does the 30-40 group. There is also a large fall from Male Age 40-50 to 65+. While the MEs
between the highest and lowest Female Age values

(-32.9 and 0.5) span about 32 ounces, Male

Age <30 is 56.8 ounces versus 65+’s -14.8 ounces, a span more than double that for Female Age.
If HHsize is adjusted to per capita, Male Age represents the largest span for any set in the table.
Half this span is accounted for by the gap between <30 and 30-40. Controlling for other factors
using regression has greatly altered the rank of Male Age <30 for Age level in ounces purchased
from its last place in Table 3. Male Age <30 are by far the highest purchasers in their set – and
Price and Sale sensitive, but have the largest negative response in the table to a positive shock in
Advertising (-7.5). The motivation for this high purchase seems independent of weekly
Advertising changes at the sCSD category level. This introduces the prospect that there is
acculturation and habit beyond the influence of weekly Advertising campaigns. The question
then becomes is this perhaps counterintuitive result found for other high-consumption groups, or
is high Advertising influence found for relatively lowest consumption groups? These are exactly
the type of questions to bring to the BROAD and REFINED prediction tables.
It is unlikely that all three marketing variables are each linear in effect. If all three were
linear in effect, adding together the three differences between each CME in a row to its’ firstcolumn ME might roughly add to the difference between the Table 14 ME and the Table 12 ME.
This approximation does not occur for either variables where all the reactions follow standard
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economic predictions (Fem Less HS, Male Age 65+, 4 Kids+) or for those like Hispanic and
Male HS that react “as expected” in none of the CMEs. The ME-CME difference is based on
identifying and accumulating group-specific reactions to marginal changes in each of the three
marketing variable values, and as may be expected for reactions that cannot all be linear,
standard deviation shocks to these variables do not total or approximate the ME-CME effect. The
sole function of the CMEs is to identify direction and to a lesser extent magnitude of each
demographic variable level’s reactivity relative to its reference group. Attempting to find some
common link between groups that either react as expected to all or none of the shocks to identify
common HH types that may be resistant to marketing variable changes in their purchase behavior
– because they buy very rarely or because they are so habitual in purchase that marketing
variable changes do not matter to them – does not yield any ready conclusions.
As for the BASIC model, and respecting that such a metric is dependent on the referencegroup choices, we can measure how many marketing variable shocks were of the expected sign.
At the very least the measure applies fairly equally to the BASIC and BROAD models, although
the BROAD has more reference group assumptions. In Table 9, 7 of 11 reactions to Price shocks,
and 4 of 11 reactions to Advertising shocks and to Sale were of the expected sign. Reaction to
standard deviation shocks are about the same percentages for the demographic category level
break-outs of Table 14: 22 of 33 reactions (2/3) as expected for a Price shock, again about onethird for an Advertising shock, or 11 of 33, and 15 of 33 (about ½, an improvement over Table 9)
for existence of Sale.

146

5.4.5

Prediction – BROAD with Marketing Variables, Combined Marginal Effects Tables
Table 15a presents household-realistic predictions of purchase response by demographic

group and that group’s reaction to a rise in Price (CMEs in Price) relative to a reference subgroup. Every cell holds fixed HHsize=4, # of Kids=2, Age of HHHs Fem/Male=40-50, and the
constant is added. The reference group for season, “spring” is assumed. Changing the season to
summer would raise every number in the table by 28.9 ounces. The first observation pertaining
to this table of predicted values is that the purchase quantities (for a week, but not every week,
just purchase weeks) are all in a plausible range, given the averages listed in Table 3. For levels
within the demographic categories, average purchase in ounces including positive purchase
weeks span only 121 ounces in Table 3. Prediction from estimation should provide a more
dynamic range, by accounting for dynamic reactions to marketing variables unique to
demographic groups, assuming they do in fact differ. The span for the HHsize=4 BASIC
prediction for CMEs in Price (Table 10a) was 148, wider than 121, as expected, yet still fairly
narrow. Here in 15a, the BROAD model prediction table for CMEs in Price, the span is 222,
much more flexible than the BASIC prediction range for the same HH profile. The spans for
HHsize=4 will be compared for the REFINED prediction tables for CME in Price as well.
For the BROAD CMEs in Price here, for HHsize=4 we see the first incidence of HH
purchases for a group in a week predicted above 350 ounces, the nearest “50-ounce-even” level
above the highest weekly average for any level in Table 3, of 335.7 ounces (HH size 5+). All
such high values are marked in all prediction tables. The eight shaded cells here indicate high
predicted purchase for the lowest Income level, but more strongly predict high purchase for the
lowest Education level commonly shared by the HHHs for fixed Income levels 1xPvInc and
4xPvInc.
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By breaking demographic categories into levels, some of the strictures of the BASIC
model have been relaxed here. Between cells in a row, values that in Table 10a generally
changed by small regimented amounts, are now more flexible. The change in amount by row
across columns identifying racial group remains fixed.
By the particular definition of Income results and level changes in Tables 10a,b,&c, the
span from the lowest to highest level of Income was a fixed 85.2 ounces across all four racial
groups, achieved in strictly rising increments. The result was to conclude that the income effect
dominated the education effect (comparing purchase predictions for a low and high level of each
across all the levels of the other). Here increments of purchase in ounces between category levels
remain constrained across racial groups (say from 2xPvInc to 3xPvInc, or from HS to Som
Collg), but are no longer constrained to be uniform in size or direction of category level. Now
the lowest and highest values do not necessarily occur at the first and last levels defining a
category. For example in the first column, the lowest amount at purchase is 327, for 2xPvInc,
and the highest is at HfPvInc (354). The education effect is strictly negative in rising Education
level, whereas any income effect is less robust, falling in purchase from HfPvInc through
1xPvInc to 2xPvInc, then rising from 2xPvInc to 4xPvInc, then falling again from 4xPvInc to
5xPvInc. Still, there is a clear rise for corresponding cell values between the 1xPvInc (lower-left
quadrant), and the 4xPvInc (lower-right quadrant). So the BROAD model prediction tables are
able to convey some subtlety in overall effects.
Another aspect of analysis can be taken by averaging all the values for fixed HS Ed
across all Income levels (upper-left quadrant, avg=327, st.err.=20.1) and for fixed College Ed
across all Income levels (upper-right quadrant, avg=261, st.err.=20.1). Between these two
averages, there is a fall of 66 ounces per purchase. Comparing them to 1xPvInc (lower-left
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quadrant, avg=273, st.err.=60.91) and 4xPvInc (lower-right quadrant, avg=288, st.err.=60.91)
across all Education levels, we find a rise in average of 15 ounces per purchase, with much
higher variation. Purchase rises 5-7% in the Income difference, versus falling 45-52% in the
Education difference – again the education effect dominates the income effect.
The difference between the highest-purchase racial group average (Asian) and the lowest
(Afr-Amer) is 46 ounces, so the Afr-Amer HH average is 15.3% below the average across all
Asian cells in Table 15a. This amount is larger than the span across Income levels in any racial
group (27 oz), but much smaller than the span across Education levels in any racial group (162
oz), meaning that differing racial group may prove a smaller determinant of purchase than
Education level, but likely more than Income level. In contrast to the BASIC prediction table
results, here the Education-Income relationship has reversed, and racial grouping has risen in
prominence as a determinant versus BASIC model results. REFINED results will add even more
information to answer the fundamental question of which characteristic is most strongly
correlated with difference in sCSD purchase.
Each racial group has a single adjustment that applies uniformly to all the cells in its
column(s), across all quadrants, and all three tables. The constraint that every level change in
Income or Education is identical in purchase-ounce effect dictates that increments are the same
for every racial group, so the difference between any two columns is fixed for every cell,
regardless of which row. For example, predicted quantities drop by 6.3 ounces from 4xPvInc to
5xPvInc for Asian HHs, but also for White, Afr-Amer, and Hispanic HHs.
Predicted purchases by racial group can be ranked using a common metric, such as
average quantity purchase response across the table for each of the four half-columns for each
racial group, or a total for all 22 cells for each racial group. Asian (total=6789, avg=308) is the
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largest, followed by White (6574, 298), then Hispanic (6208, 282), and finally Afr-Amer (5779,
262). As held for the BASIC model, the quantity purchase differences between racial groups is
fixed across all 4 quadrant averages. Nonetheless, the first two largest purchasers have switched
rank from the BASIC prediction averages. For all three BROAD model CME in Price tables:
Asian-White has a 10-ounce average difference, Asian -Hispanic has a 26-ounce average
difference, Asian -Afr Amer has a 46-ounce average difference. The racial group averages and
rankings cannot change for Female or Male only HHHs in the BROAD specification, as they
could not in the BASIC. Regardless of racial group, there are uniform responses to variable level
changes. Intuitively, uniform changes within each racial group to changes in Income, Education,
and sex of HHH seem overly restrictive, but these constraints are relaxed in the REFINED model.
Comparing the HHsize=3, Two Kids, for Female or Male ONLY HHH, the linearity of
changes constrains sex of HHH comparison somewhat, but differences emerge that were not
evident in the BASIC prediction tables. Cell-by-cell differences between Tables 15b and 15c do
now range in places to more than 20 ounces. For Female HHHs in same-racial-group columns,
differences for fixed Education level HS versus College across Income levels are around 40
ounces, whereas for Male HHHs the differences are closer to 26 ounces. The full education
effect from lowest to highest level appears to be weaker for Male HHHs (74.7 oz) than for
Female HHHs (87.4 oz). The difference in effect between HHsize=3 Male only versus Female
only HHHs for fixed Income level (1x- or 4xPvInc) across education levels is lowest for the
lowest education level (less HS, 11.4) rises in HS (12.7), peaks at Some College (39.6), and falls
to the 25-range for College and Post College (27, 24.1). So Female HHH purchasing is most
similar to Male HHH in lower Education levels, and less similar in higher, but the function is
non-linear, peaking in the defined “middle” level of Some College.
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Female and Male HHHs differ in purchase (again across same-racial-group columns in
left-right adjacent quadrants) between 1x- and 4xPvInc by a fixed 14.3 ounces. By this set of
prediction tables, Male HHHs (with two Kids) buy more than Female HHHs (with two Kids) in
every comparative quadrant, and the sex of HHH effect is robust to all racial group differences.
As with the BASIC prediction tables, all cells are significant at the 1% level. Cells
deemed by individual standard errors in the mfx-adjusted output table to be most likely to fail a
significance test were tested. All candidates proved to be significant at the one percent level, so
all cells in all tables have pval=0.000.
Tables 15b & 15c together are less dynamic in range (Female Only range=147, Male
Only range=136) than Table 15a (range=222), but each is more dynamic than even the HHsize=4
Table 10a for the BASIC model. The more flexible specification is identifying more dynamic
purchase patterns – and this is only for CME in Price. Tables 9 for BASIC and 14 for BROAD
indicate there may be more variability for CME in Sale. (REFINED prediction tables exist for all
three marketing-variable CME sets.)
The requirement to fully drop entire levels within demographic groups to avoid the
dummy variable trap in the BROAD model is frustrating, as it buries the identification of how
base groups react to marketing variable changes. By interacting demographic variables to create
more refined variables, the REFINED model can shrink the reference groups, and identify even
more variation in specific sub-group behavior.

5.5

REFINED Model Results – Estimation Results and Prediction
Reference group choices on the demographic variables must be made for every model,

and must not conflict for probit and OLS equations. The REFINED models use the highest
Income and Education levels (5xPovInc, Fem Post Collg Educ, Male Post Collg Educ), White,

151

Non-Hispanic, HHsize=1, NoKids, FemAge50-65, and MaleAge50-65 for reference group
demographic variables, and Spring (Ssn1) as the reference group for seasons. These are
consistent with but more refined than reference-group selections for the BASIC and BROAD
models. Interacting each of the other demographic characteristics with Income, and # of Kids and
racial group (including Hispanic) with both Male and Female Education, defines eleven sets of
demographic-demographic variables, each with its own reference (sub-)group. 24 The eleven
reference/base groups are: 5xPovIncxFmPostCollgEd, 5xPovIncxMalePostCollgEd,
5xPovIncxWhite, 5xPovIncxHHsize=1, 5xPovIncxNoKids, 5xPovIncxFemAge50-65,
5xPovIncxMaleAge50-65, FmPostCollgEdxNoKids, MalePostCollgEdxNoKids,
FmPostCollgEdxWhite, MalePostCollgEdxWhite. These are delineated in Figure 1 at the end of
Chapter 3.
In addition to the first-level dummy variable drops just described, as explained in the
modeling section, the interaction of demographic categories necessitates a second level of
variable drop to avoid the dummy-variable trap. Certain category levels were regressed
separately, rather than being interacted with demographic or marketing variables, and rather than
being dropped entirely, in which case their effects would have been absorbed into the intercept
with other reference-group effects. Now that we are more familiar with the data, these may be
named without causing confusion, and the choices should appear to be reasonable given results
to this point: No Man HH Head, No Fem HH Head, Other Race, HH size 5Plus, _4KidsPlus,
Female Age 65+, Male Age 65+. Thus one group for each category to be interacted with Income

24

There would be twelve base groups if “non-Hispanic” were included, and three more “sets” if Hispanic were
referred to “non-Hispanic” directly. But this is done implicitly, clustering Hispanic with the Race variables in the
“racial groups” set, so only eleven sets of variables are counted. Hispanic does not refer to the White reference
group. The “non-Hispanic” condition is not imposed on the Race variables. Examining results, this does not appear
to make the Hispanic demographic- or marketing-variable-interacted results particularly vulnerable to statistical
insignificance compared to the other racial groups.
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and with Male/Female Education has been dropped, with the binary Hispanic category requiring
no further drop, and with the No Female/Male HH Head group applying to any sex-of-HHHspecific category. 25
The REFINED model is a demonstration of what is possible using demographicdemographic-variable and demographic-demographic-plus-marketing-variable interactions. No
version of REFINED is run without marketing-variable interactions on the demographicdemographic variables. Exhaustive use of the method and full description of results would prove
pedantic to most readers, but it should be clear that the current methodology can be applied in
order to model and contrast purchase behavior of fairly specific demographic sub-groups that are
still large enough to evoke interest. This degree of resolution and cross-comparativity enhances
the capacity to identify robust purchase patterns across specific sub-groups.
An example of checking for the robustness of an inferred effect is checking whether any
rise in purchase associated with a rise in Income is robust to the level of Education of the HHH.
While the individual marginal effects for sub-groups may seem to bounce up and down relative to
the reference group, average effects across part of the category may be compared, because all are
calculated relative to the same reference group.
One form of the familiar Wald hypothesis test combines coefficients and tests whether
they together are less than or greater than a scalar. Thus, to gauge whether quantity purchase is

25

Because each demographic-demographic combination defines a unique binary that exists separately from its
constituent components, as many Other-Race demographic-demographic combinations as possible were included in
estimation (7 of the 256 variables), to include this as a potential avenue for analysis. There was no econometric
conflict when also regressing Other Race as a second-level dummy trap variable (i.e. without demographicdemographic and marketing variable interaction), but p-values on three of the 7 Other-Race demographicdemographic variables seem high compared to neighboring values. (In the Income-Race set, neighboring values are
adjacent Income levels within Other Race or the same Income level for other racial groups. For the Education-Race
set of only two Other Race variables, neighboring values are the Post College demographic-demographic variables
in other racial groups). Perhaps the high p-values are the result of asking for very similar sets of identifying
information – one for the interacted Other Race variables, one for the “dropped” Other Race group – from a single
dataset (per explanation in 5.2.4.c).
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rising in Fem Educ within a fixed level of the Income category (say, level 3), the average of the
lowest two CMEs (Less than High School, High School) can be compared to an average of the
highest two CMEs (College, Post-College), paralleling the algebraic form of a Wald test. I name
this a “2x2” comparison, and I refer to “2x2” values.
The exact same method may be replicated across any interactive dimension. Thus
quantity purchase may be falling as Education rises in the Income x Male Educ combination, and
may be falling or rising in increasing Education when the Income x Male Educ combination is
interacted with the Price index. In interpreting patterns across levels within categories, phrases
such as “rises in Income,” “falls in Education,” and “is flat in Income,” are meant in the
context of a 2x2 comparison. For example, “for each Fem Educ level, purchase quantity rises in
Income” explains the comparison where the average of the lowest two Income-levels at a given
level of Fem Educ is a lower average than the average of the highest two Income-levels for the
same given level of Fem Educ. Thus one may or may not observe the average ME falling as level
of Fem Educ rises, while still observing that within each level of Fem Educ, quantity purchased
does rise between the lowest and highest (two combined) Income groups.
Table A-3 in the Appendix is a full tabular reporting of the REFINED model probit and
OLS results, and parallels Tables 8 and 13 in form. As with these previous tables, mfx-adjusted
marginal effects (δy/δx) for inference are listed in bold for demographic-demographic variables
in the third column from the right. The relevant p-values, and again, the average values at which
continuous marketing variables must be evaluated for inference are listed in the second and last
columns from the right. The continuous variable averages must be the same for all levels of the
model, as they refer to data elements unaffected by definition of demographic binary variables.
In addition, contained in the δy/δx column, after the demographic-demographic combination
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variables, and after the second-stage dummy-variable-drop regressors, are estimates of
interactions of marketing variables with each of the demographic-demographic combination
variables. The reader can see the effect in ounces for the prediction stage of interacting Sale, or
the Price or Advertising data-wide average value with each demographic-demographic variable.
Table A-3 is in the Appendix due to its length, and relevant sub-portions are extracted and
presented or built upon in new tables when discussing inference in this main text.
In the table, individual MEs are too numerous (256) to discuss individually, and vary
greatly as each represents two demographic traits that can each react differently. So I conduct
2x2 comparisons through the eleven different pairings (each of the other six traits interacted with
Income, and with # of Kids and Race interacted with both sex of HHH’s individual Education
levels). For each pairing, I compare totals and averages for one demographic variable trait held
fixed across the range of the other demographic variable trait in the pair, and the reverse (in
5.5.2). This will become clear as we proceed. A table will present the comparison figures for
each pairing for the CME with a marketing-variable interaction (Price: Tables 17a-k; Sale:
Tables 18a-k; Advertising: Tables 19a-k). Some discussion of patterns in the pairings of
demographic-demographic variables with marketing variables is presented (in 5.5.1) before the
2x2 comparisons (in 5.5.2), and before moving to the REFINED model prediction tables (in
5.5.3).
Before continuing to the 2x2 comparisons, discussion of the basic model markers will
confirm the integrity of the REFINED model as it did for the BASIC and BROAD models, and
issues of significance on MEs and CMEs will be discussed. The marginal effect of mfx-adjusted
un-interacted marketing variables is as expected: Price negative, Sale and Advertising positive
(see below for values). The other non-demographic variables – the constant (49.8), seasons
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(Ssn2=summer 26.7, Ssn3=autumn 18.5, Ssn4=winter 9.7), and the exclusionary restriction
variables (probit only, not in ounces: Weeks-in-the-year HH Total Oz >67, 0.18; 6-WeekAverage Moving HH Stock of sCSDs, -0.0004) – are all of the expected signs and plausible
magnitudes, with p-values of 0.000. In fact, the REFINED model has the largest coefficients on
exclusionary restrictions of any model, the smallest OLS constant (49.8 oz or 2/3 of a 2-liter
bottle, versus a high of 84 oz in BASIC without marketing variable interaction, and a previous
low of 59.8 oz in the BROAD w/mktg), and the smallest coefficients on the seasonal binaries,
which have shrunk with each increase in model sophistication. From the spring reference group,
each warmer season rises roughly 9 ounces or ½ a 20-ounce bottle, peaking in summer at 26.8 oz
at purchase over the spring average. So all of the variables that may quickly define whether this
model seems to be performing to expectations are of the expected sign and highly significant,
and are appropriately of larger or smaller size in the expected direction than in any previous
specification. The interaction of demographic characteristics to define sub-groups explains more
of the variation previously described by “catch-all” constants and binaries. At 49.8 ounces, the
constant is about a 20-oz bottle per purchase less than a 67.7-ounce, or 2-liter, bottle.
As in the BASIC and BROAD models, the probit stage of estimation yields coefficient
estimates for explanatory variables that are used only indirectly in final results, but the
coefficients of estimation do have signs indicating whether a variable is associated with greater
or lesser probability of purchase, which is meant to proxy for selection in the market. Particularly
for an item such as sCSDs that are so easily stockpiled in the home, we expect that quantity of
purchase may be high for infrequent purchasers, which might reverse the signs on the same
variable’s coefficients between the probit and OLS steps in estimation. This in fact occurs.
Consistent with previous models, the coefficient on probit Price is positive (and when evaluated
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at the Price Index mean is 0.409), the coefficient on probit Advertising is positive (and when
evaluated at the Advertising Index mean is 0.027), and the probit constant is negative.
The unadjusted OLS coefficient on Price (-1590.242* 0.0074 = -11.78) is negative as
expected across the population in or out of the weekly sCSD market. The un-interacted Price
mfx-adjusted ME is also negative (-82.33116* 0.0074 = -0.61), but given the number of
interaction terms and their draw on the stock of identifying variability in the data, the ME is no
longer significant at the 10% level (and the un-interacted Sale ME just barely makes the cut).
Beyond the mention of sign here, there is no inference on these marketing variable MEs in
isolation. The cumulative ME of all Price and Price-interacted variables is negative {([Σ“Price x
…”] * 0. 0074) + (-0.61) = -315.289}, much smaller than -0.61, meaning the CME for the
individual variable price reactions (“P x …” + “Wkly P DMA”) tend to be negative. But there
are numerous exceptions that are each net positive in comparison to their reference group. These
are presented with a discussion of significance levels below, along with discussion of
significance levels for Disc/Sale and Advertising interaction results.
For “Disc/Sale” the unadjusted OLS coefficient and the mfx-adjusted ME are identical,
and positive as expected (12.424). Combining the “DiscSale” ME with any of the “Sale x …”
interaction terms (“Sale x …” + “Disc/Sale”) yields negative and positive sale-response MEs –
each relative to a reference sub-group. The cumulative Sale ME is positive as well ([Σ“Sale x
…”] + 12.424 = 665.952).
The unadjusted OLS coefficient on Advertising is also positive as expected (0.015 *
374.631 = 5.75), and the un-interacted mfx-adjusted Advertising variable, which is never used
alone for interpretation, is positive (0.0174 * 374.631 = 6.51). The two-ME combination on
marketing effects and demographic characteristics (“Adv x …” + “Wkly Advert”) again yields
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negative and positive sale-response MEs – each relative to a reference sub-group. The
cumulative Advertising effect {([Σ“Adv x …”] * 374.631) + 6.51 = -114.788} flips from the uninteracted ME to negative – a function of all of the base-group-relative reactions, as occurred in
the BROAD model with marketing variable interactions.
In Table A-3, the variables that were dropped from the demographic-demographic
variable constructs (with the exception of partial inclusion of Other Race as noted in footnote 25)
and regressed separately are listed under the un-interacted demographic-demographic variable
set and before Price-interactions. “No Man HHH” is for HHs without Male HHHs, i.e. Female
only. The marginal total effect for this group controlling for all other factors in the table is 41.1,
less than half of the 84.1 ounces at purchase for Male only HHHs (“No Fem HHH”), clearly
indicating that Male HHHs are associated with much higher average purchase in single-sex HHH
households. Both these correlations are significant at p-value=0.000. Having four or more
children in the HH is associated with an extra 11 ounces per purchase controlling for all other
variable effects. But with a p-value of 0.582 we may expect there are bi- or multi-modal
“parenting styles” within the group. (This p-value if strictly interpreted forces the mfx-adjusted
ME to be interpreted as “zero ounces,” or no effect on household purchase. See next subsection
for discussion of this phenomenon for most REFINED model MEs.) The top Age groups for
Male and Female, regressed away from the primary demographic-demographic variable sets,
shows the oldest Age level for Female HHHs purchasing about twice (19.8) the amount the
oldest Age level for Male HHHs do (9.3) at each purchase, both significant at the 10% level,
although there may be some bi-modal behavior in Male HHHs for this level. Other Race
regressed separately is positive (46.81) and significant at the 1% level, adding to a HH total at
purchase a bit more than Female only HHH did. HH Size 5+ is strongly positive as may be
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expected from previous results – at 146 ounces, larger than any other two of these category-level
characteristics – with p-value=0.000.
As with the other basic markers of the model, there is nothing exceptional or
counterintuitive in these isolated demographic-category-level variables (regressed to avoid a
dummy-variable trap) that would bring into question the REFINED model or its application.

5.5.1

Significance Issues for Single-Variable MEs, Including Marketing-Variable
Interactions
In sub-section 5.2.4.c four reasons were listed why variables that in previous models were

statistically significant in their effect on the dependent variable might not be significant at the
10% level. Now that there are 256 demographic-demographic variables before marketingvariable interaction, certain patterns suggest which of the four reasons listed might be
determining failure to meet a 10% standard for statistical significance. These will be analyzed
also for marketing-variable interaction variable sets, as both element types construct CMEs on
which inference is conducted, directly in sub-section 5.5.2, and for higher aggregation of these
CMEs in sub-section 5.5.3.

5.5.1.a

Significance Issues for Demographic-Demographic Variable MEs
If one compares the p-values on MEs for demographic category level variables in the

BROAD models without and with marketing variable interaction p-values on demographic level
MEs (in Tables 11 and 13), no variable fails to be significant at the 10% level in both models. 26
This indicates that each demographic category level is to some provable degree different from its
26

There is a single exception for Fem Age 65+, but as the entire level is regressed separately in REFINED, without
demographic-demographic interactions or marketing-variable interactions to avoid the second-level dummy-variable
trap, this exception does not affect the substance of the argument in the main text.
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reference group, but more importantly proves there is adequate information to identify this
difference, and each has a unique effect on the dependent variable. This almost eliminates the
first two reasons in 5.2.4.c that there may be significance levels above an arbitrary standard, 0.10
here. There is the lingering concern that if the demographic-demographic variable describes a
sub-group with so few HHs representing it in the data (say, Female HHHs with Less than HS
Education and 5xPvInc Income level), the sub-group may not have enough observations to rise
to the level of statistical significance. But this point is moot, because using the Projection Factor
has already applied identifying information across known characteristics to weight results to the
DMA population level. Inference is on the population sampled by Nielsen, not on the sample,
which alone might have few of certain types of HHs. This does eliminate the first two reasons in
5.2.4.c that there may be significance problems with the demographic-demographic variables.
Remembering that each demographic-demographic variable in the REFINED model is a
combination of two significant demographic category-level variables from the BROAD models,
this leaves few primary reasons that a combination of two significant variables may not be
statistically significant at least the 10% level or better. Either the sub-group is too similar in
purchase behavior to its reference sub-group, a sub-group is bi- or multi-modal in its behavior
(see 5.2.4.c), or some of both reasons simultaneously. Every one of the 256 demographicdemographic variable MEs in Table A-3 with a p-value over 0.1 will be listed as a candidate in
one of these three groups, to demonstrate that there is a reasonable explanation for each which
diverges from the conclusion that the variable does not affect the dependent variable.
This is not a whimsical exercise. Demonstrating that the “poor” significance levels do not
diminish the variables’ explanatory power for the dependent variable by offering reasonable
alternative explanations is intended to remove some of the onus to prove that every 2-variable
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CME is statistically significant, or that strict statistical significance is an adequate measure of
relevance for every level of inference conducted here. This is useful because careful inference
(including “2x2 comparisons”) is conducted on not only the sign but the magnitude of the CMEs
on the understanding that the values being discussed do not fail to explain variations in HH total
ounces purchased (the final dependent variable of estimation). I argue here that this inference
offers insights into actual sub-group behavior in the market, or for similar sub-groups, such as
low-Income versus high-Income. (Once again, for the prediction tables, the combination of many
CMEs and the constant in each cell render the issue of significance moot, as the cells least likely
to have significant p-values based on ME significance levels are all pval=0.000.)
In Table A-3, p-values for the (mfx-adjusted) marginal effects of demographicdemographic combination variables are in the second-to-last column. MEs with significance
levels above 0.1 may be close in characteristic space to the reference group, indicating that their
behavior may be too similar to be identified as significantly different (statistically). But as being
in the reference group affects purchase behavior – which we know, because other groups
significantly differ from the reference group – being very similar to the reference group also
affects purchase behavior. Candidates for failing a standard significance measure for being too
similar in behavior to its reference group are (variable (p-val):: proximal reference sub-group):
* 5xPvIncFmCollgEd (0.331):: 5xPovIncxFmPostCollgEd;
* 2xPvIncFmPostCollgEd (0.749):: 5xPovIncxFmPostCollgEd;
* HfPvIncMPostCollgEd (0.229), 1xPvIncMPostCollgEd (0.183), 3xPvIncMPostCollgEd (0.196)::
5xPovIncxMalePostCollgEd;
* 4xPvIncWhite (0.292):: 5xPovIncxWhite;
* 3xPvIncHspnc (0.175), 5xPvIncHspnc (0.198):: (non-Hispanic)
* 4xPvIncNoKids (0.201):: 5xPovIncxNoKids;
* 4xPvIncOneKids (0.157):: 5xPvIncNoKids, possibly also bi-modal by parenting style, especially in
upper-Income HHs;
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* 3xPvIncFmAge50L65 (0.602):: 5xPovIncxFmAge50-65;
* 5xPvIncMAge30L40 (0.243):: 5xPovIncxMaleAge50-65;
* 2xPvIncMAge50L65 (0.137):: 5xPovIncxMaleAge50-65;
* FmSmColgEdWhite (0.184):: FmPostCollgEdxWhite;
* FmPostColgEdOthRace (0.111):: FmPostCollgEdxWhite;
* MColgEdWhite (0.37):: MalePostCollgEdxWhite;
* MPostColgEdAfrAm (0.345):: MalePostCollgEdxWhite;
* MPostColgEdOthRace (0.383):: MalePostCollgEdxWhite;
* MPostColgEdHspnc (0.491):: (non-Hispanic, possibly MalePostCollgEdxWhite).

Each of these assertions could be tested by carefully constructing and graphing
distributions from the original data, and visually or parametrically comparing them. This would
be time and labor intensive. Because the sub-groups are “sliced much thinner” than the category
levels, this might be the only way to hypothesis test assertions that an insignificant ME
represents a group too close in behavior to the reference group. The two could be combined and
regression re-run, but this could become extremely complicated with one pattern upsetting
another amongst the 256 variables with 12 base-group assumptions (including non-Hispanic).
To address assertions of bi-modal (or more) behavior within a sub-group, one shortcut is
to scan descriptive statistics Tables 2 & 3 for standard errors on demographic category level
means that seem relatively large compared to other levels in the category. These represent a rate
of dispersion inherent to the data that both naturally push standard errors in estimation higher, and
indicate a potential for bi-modal behavior within the sub-group. In fact, using Table 3 standard
errors to compare one level within a demographic category to the others within that category, we
may observe potential evidence for some candidates of bi-modal purchase behavior within the
sub-group (variable (p-val):: “yes” if standard error in Table 3 is largest in category and more than
one-third larger than next nearest / which half of demographic-demographic variable fits the
large-standard-error-in-Table-3 criterion, or if “no,” then my hypothesis for bi-modality):
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* HfPvIncFmHSEd (0. 361):: yes/HfPvInc;
* HfPvIncFmSomCollgEd (0.3):: yes/HfPvInc;
* HfPvIncMLHSEd (0.179):: yes/ HfPvInc & Male Less HS;
* 1xPvIncMLHSEd (0.138):: yes/ Male Less HS;
* 1xPvIncMSomCollgEd (0.889), 2xPvIncMSomCollgEd (0.599), 3xPvIncMSomCollgEd (0.321):: no/
this combination describes an extremely broad range of HH types in the US; some characteristic (and
unidentified) differences within this group defined only as medium Male HHH Educ and lower-middle
Income Male HHHs (heterogeneous application of similar nutrition information, perhaps);
* HfPvIncAfrAm (0.1)::yes/HfPvInc;
* 2xPvIncAfrAm (0.265), 3xPvIncAfrAm (0.181):: no/ because Afr-Amer has lowest average HH
Income by racial group, 2x&3xPvInc is more middle class within the group for some, and not for others,
with a split in behavior based on other characteristics;
* HfPvIncAsian (0.354):: yes/HfPvInc;
* 1xPvIncAsian (0.639):: no/ because Asian has highest average Income by racial group, 1x behaves like
HfPvInc in this racial group;
* 4xPvIncOthRace (0.908):: no/ large break in size of ME between lower Income levels and 5xPvInc for
Other Race; a hinge point in 4xPvInc is consistent with bi-modality in the sub-group;
* HfPvIncHHsiz1 (0.583), HfPvIncHHsiz2 (0.142), HfPvIncHHsiz3 (0.752), HfPvIncHHsiz4 (0.94)::
yes/HfPvInc, and extremely broad range of HH type measuring only by HH Size, which also covers
4xPvIncHHsiz2 (0.937);
* 2xPvIncTwoKids (0.283), 4xPvIncTwoKids (0.794), 5xPvIncTwoKids (0.968), 4xPvInc3Kids (0.139)::
no/ bi-modal by parenting style – perhaps especially in upper-Income HHs; the p-value is much higher at
4x- than at 2xPvIncTwoKids, and even higher at 5xPvIncTwoKids, which could also be similar in
behavior to 5xPvIncNoKids; since only 4xPvInc3Kids misses in 3Kids, followed by the next highest pvalue in the group by far at 5xPvInc3Kids, which also has an even more negative ME, (Inc)3xKids also
supports the hypothesis that upper-income parents may be more bi-modal in parenting behavior than lowand medium-income parents;
* HfPvIncFmAgeL30 (0.758), 1xPvIncFmAgeL30 (0.654), 2xPvIncFmAgeL30 (0.222),
3xPvIncFmAgeL30 (0.527), 5xPvIncFmAgeL30 (0.214):: yes/ Fem Age <30, (and HfPvInc for first
variable), having only one significant variable in this six-level group serves as the benchmark for multimodality in purchase behavior – Fem HHH Age <30 alone describes extremely broad range of HH types
in the US, by Education level, whether or not married, whether or not children;
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* 1xPvIncFmAge30L40 (0.814), 5xPvIncFmAge30L40 (0.869):: no/ reasons for Fem Age < 30 persist at
30L40, and p-values for both these are above any level in Fem Age < 30; for 5xPvInc, possibly like
reference group 5xPovIncxFmAge50-65 in behavior;
* 3xPvIncFmAge40L50 (0.342):: no// no immediate explanation as for other sub-groups; may be like
reference group 5xPvIncFmAge50L65, or bi-modal where portion of 3xPvIncFmAge40L50 are acting
like reference group;
* 1xPvIncMAgeL30 (0.65), 3xPvIncMAgeL30 (0.4), 5xPvIncMAgeL30 (0.264):: yes/ Male Age <30,
parallel explanation to Fem Age < 30;
* HfPvIncMAge50L65 (0.843):: yes/HfPvInc, very high p-value may indicate particular multi-modality
characteristic of very low Income for middle-aged HHH, which may vary by HH Size;
* FmLHSEdOneKids (0.801), FmHSEdOneKids (0.623), FmSmColgEdOneKids (0.274),
FmColgEdOneKids (0.122):: no (except Fem Less HS for first, and very high p-value)/ having only one
significant variable of five in this group is again a benchmark for bi-modality, here in parenting style,
which becomes much more uniform in Two Kids, then disperses again in 3 Kids;
* FmLHSEd3Kids (0.523), FmHSEd3Kids (0.157), FmSmColgEd3Kids (0.142), FmColgEd3Kids
(0.402):: no (except Fem Less HS for first)/ four of five variables in a group all having high p-values is a

benchmark for bi-modality, here in parenting style, which is much more uniform in Two Kids; the
standard error for 3 Kids is the fifth highest in Table 3, so indicates bi-modal behavior, but 4Kids+ has the
highest standard error in Table 3 by far, so “no”;
* MLHSEd3Kids (0.51), MPostColgEd3Kids (0.141):: yes/ (Male Less HS only), again 3 Kids is fairly
high standard error in Table 3;
* FmLHSEdWhite (0.354):: yes/ Fem Less HS;
* FmSomColgEdAfrAm (0.461):: no/ no immediate explanation as for other sub-groups, but given the
very high rate of incomplete college degrees in the US and the financial problems driving this number,
Afr-Amer HHs with the lowest average Income of the racial groups may be particularly vulnerable; AfrAmer College graduation rates (post-matriculation) are consistently lower, 27 potentially making the Some
College sub-group more diverse than for other racial groups;
* FmHSEdHspnc (0.124):: no/ some carryover from very high bi-modality and similarity to nonHispanic reference group from FmLHSEdHspnc;
* MLHSEdAsian (0.873):: yes/ Male Less HS & Asian;
* MLHSEdHspnc (0.211):: yes/ Male Less HS;
* 4 Kids+ (0.582):: yes/ 4 Kids+.
27

“Black Student College Graduation Rates Inch Higher But a Large Racial Gap Persists,” 2007. The Journal of
Blacks in Higher Education: http://www.jbhe.com/preview/winter07preview.html, accessed July 13, 2012.
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Many of the highest p-values on demographic variables may indicate both “too similar in
behavior to its reference group” and “bi-modal purchase behavior within the sub-group”
(variable (p-val):: proximal reference sub-group/ reason for bi-modality):
* 4xPvIncAfrAm (0.995), 5xPvIncAfrAm (0.929):: 5xPovIncxWhite/ some HHs in these sub-groups
may behave very closely to the White reference group, and others may maintain the divergent purchase
behavior of lower- and middle-Income Afr-Amer HHs;

* 2xPvIncNoKids (0.777), 3xPvIncNoKids (0.813):: 5xPovIncxNoKids/ as evident in Tables A-1a &
A-1c, these sub-groups are likely to “accidentally” cover HHs with relatively old and relatively young
HHHs across both sexes, forcing bi-modality in purchase behavior which the Female or Male Age <30
and 30-40 versus the 65+ level clearly demonstrates (after the demographic-demographic variables in
Table A-3);

* FmLHSEdHspnc (0.961), FmPostColgEdHspnc (0.813), MHSEdHspnc (0.832):: (first Fem Less HS)
& (non-Hispanic), bi-modality possible between HHs displaying any characteristic Hispanic (versus nonHispanic) purchase behavior, and the HHs purchasing in a similar fashion to the non-Hispanic reference
group.

5.5.1.b Significance Issues for Marketing-Variable Interacted Demographic-Demographic
Variable MEs
Marketing-variable interaction with demographic-demographic variables also generate
MEs that become elements in combined marginal effect calculation, whose magnitudes are to be
compared. For all marketing-variable-interacted variables marginal effects equal the (unadjusted)
OLS-side coefficients of original estimation (and standard errors remain the same).
There is no particular reason that reactivity to changes in marketing variables should be
as varied as quantity at purchase is, or that the same demographic-demographic variable sets that
describe purchase differences well should describe marketing variable reactivity well. Price
Advertising and Sale may have less impact on market participation and quantity purchased than
un-identified appetites within the family, or less impact than whether HHs that are not chronic
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purchasers have guests, birthdays, or holidays to purchase for. The number of occasional versus
chronic sCSD purchasers in a demographic sub-group could then affect the estimated impact of
marketing variables and the estimated standard deviation of the mean impact. It is one objective
of this work to identify for which sub-groups marketing-variable reactions are strongest and in
what direction – can we empirically identify who may seem to be purchasing in a manner that
seems economically irrational?
There are at least three reasons that such identification may not be sharp. First, there is a
structural factor muting the reactivity to the Price and Advertising indices – because they are
indices, not accurate measures of the exact prices that a particular HH cares most directly about,
or the exact exposure that a particular HH receives (due to both data limitations and the decision
to focus on the sCSD product category rather than particular brands). Similarly the type of Sale
is not captured in the Sale metric here, only that the Nielsen sample HH identified the item was
“on sale” in some form at the time of purchase, and to repeat (section 3.4, including footnotes), if
the item is on sale and no purchase was made, this is not identified in the data vector.
Second, if every sub-group in a set reacts in roughly the same economically rational way
to Price or Advertising changes, or buys roughly the same increased amount on Sale, we may
expect a fair number of MEs that are not significant at the 10% level, because MEs are relative to
reference sub-groups carved from this set. Although identifying that all or most HH types reacted
to marketing variable changes in a similar way would itself be an interesting result, in practice
more marginal effects closer to the reference sub-group reaction will mean fewer significant
results (see sub-section 5.2.4.c).
Third, as stated in 5.2.4.c there is a limit to the amount of identifying variability in the
data, and this structure asks for significance levels four times from the same (sub-group
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identifying) variable, three of which are the original variable interacted with a marketing variable
(per equation (20)). For any of these three reasons, p-values may tend to run high in the
marketing-variable interacted sets for reasons derivative of the structure of analysis, not due to a
failure of defined sub-groups to distinctively impact purchase. High p-values therefore should
not determine that magnitudes of ME fail to meet primary standards of relevance.
Advertising in particular is a DMA-wide average for the entire sCSD category. While
household exposure is scaled by the number and ages of HH members, there is no way to control
for two other factors which could easily diminish the statistical relevance of weekly changes.
First, it is a weekly effect entering a HH with lifetime exposure to such advertising. Second, if
demographic sub-groups vary in their response across DMAs to national and cable advertising
spots (spanning perhaps Dallas where the week’s average temperature is 100 degrees and Boston
where the same week’s average temperature is 78 degrees), standard errors on purchase response
for a demographic group common to both DMAs may be expected to rise. My intuition is that
Advertising-interacted sub-groups will have the least meaningful p-values, and in fact the lowest
percent of statistically significant interactions (pval<0.1) occurs for the same 11 sets interacted in
Advertising as in Price and Sale. The only consistently significant set in Advertising is Income x
FemaleAge, which could happen randomly.
Some sets may be highly reactive to changes in one marketing variable and not so much
in another, and this can be identified. There is no constraint that if a sub-group reacts to a
marketing-variable change in what seems an economically rational way, that the same sub-group
should react to all marketing-variable changes in what seems a rational economic way. From the
BASIC and BROAD analyses including calculated purchase reactions to a plus-one standard
deviation change in average value of the continuous marketing variable, it is clear that rarely do
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groups react to all three variables as economic theory may predict. While the selection of
reference sub-groups is not entirely arbitrary, it is not always a simple matter to infer what
economic theory may predict as a rational economic reaction, because MEs are relative to their
reference sub-groups.
Extending from previous arguments delineating reasons that demographic-demographic
variable p-values may be high, I recognize the limitations of the methodology, and do not take
high p-values on marketing-interacted variables as pure indication that the variable has no effect.
Magnitudes are considered in combined marginal effects, not just signs. By inspection,
magnitudes on many “insignificant” MEs are in line with significant values that neighbor them in
one of the levels in the demographic-demographic variable interacted with Price, Sale, or
Advertising. (Examples of variables “similar to their reference sub-groups” in 5.5.1.a above
demonstrate the “neighbor them in one of the levels” concept.)

5.5.1.b.i

Significance Issues for Price-Interacted Demographic-Demographic Variable
MEs

Looking at a set of MEs, for example all of the Price interactions for the full Female
Education-Income variable group, we can see how many are not statistically significant at the
10% level, and compare this to other sets. Patterns within or across these interacted-variable sets
may offer some insight into HH reactions and purchase behavior, and possibly whether the set
itself seems to be a good set for describing variability in response.
Table 16 is an analytic table referencing marketing-variable interaction results in ounces
from Table A-3. Table 16 presents the ratio of marketing-variable-interacted sub-groups that are
significant at the 10% level, the percent within each set that are significant at this standard, and
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comments. If these were ordered from highest percent significant at lowest, 6 of the 11 Priceinteracted groups are over 70% significant, 4 of 11 Sale-interacted groups, and 1 of 11
Advertising-interacted groups. Below 50% significant are 2 Price groups, 4 Sale groups, and 5
Advertising groups. So there is some clarity as to which interactions describe the most consistent
reactivity. Price x Income x Fem/Male Education are both above 80%, as is Sale x Income x
Race/Hispanic. Price x Income x Race/Hispanic is above 70%.
Income x Female Educ is the most consistent set in Table 16 (93%), meaning there is
relatively uniform response to increased Price relative to the reference sub-group (highest
Income x highest Fem Educ level, Price5xIncxFmPostCollg), reflected in a low number of
insignificant p-values. The strongest quantity reductions in increasing Price are for HS and Some
College, with the least at Post College. The only sub-groups failing the 10% standard are at the
Post College level, but with lower Income than the top level – but not all close sub-groups in
highest Education have high p-values. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant
value: -46 to 19.
Income x Male Educ is also quite consistent as a set (between 80-90%), but opposite the
Income x Female Educ set, purchase reaction in rising Price is positive relative to the reference
sub-group, although generally in a lower magnitude than the Female responses. By Education
level across Income levels, Female HHHs are more price responsive than Males. Most of the
Male HHHs coefficients close to zero, meaning behavior close to the reference group, are in Post
College Education (across Income levels). All the other Male Educ levels across Income levels
are more positively responsive in Price. Within each Male Educ level, lower Income levels tend
to be more responsive to a Price rise than do higher Income levels. The span in ounces from
lowest to highest significant value: 8 to 34.
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Income x Race/Hispanic is consistent as a set (between 70-80%) relative to the
Price5xIncxWhite reference sub-group. White HHs respond to rising Price with less purchase
more at higher Income levels than at lower ones, as do Afr-Amer and Other Race HHs. All
significant responses in Asian are negative, meaning strongly Price responsive, with the highest
responses at middle Income levels. Hispanic HHs are all between 2 and 9 ounces (positive)
versus the non-Hispanic base group – positive relative to the base, but not by much, and varying
little by Income level. The slight positive relative response may simply reflect more downtown
residents or less access to membership club supermarkets. For Income x Race/Hispanic, the span
in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -31 to 24.
For Income x HH Size the base sub-group is Price5xIncxHHsiz1, and it is also consistent
as a set in Price response relative to the base sub-group. As with Hispanic HHs the consistently
positive responses tend to be less than 10 ounces per purchase, although the 5xInc sub-groups in
multi-person HHs tend to be negative, and more price responsive at lower HH Sizes. A smallmagnitude downward trend from 2xInc suggests HHs are more responsive in Price as Income
increases – perhaps again reflecting motivation to join or access membership big-box chains. The
span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -7 to 15.
Income x # of Kids in HH is less consistent (between 60-70%) than previous sets in Price
responsiveness relative to the base sub-group (Price5xIncxNoKids). Every group, with and
without Kids, is most strongly negative in lower Income levels, and trends more positive in
upper Income levels, with OneKids and ThreeKids actually turning positive at upper Income
levels. This behavior would be consistent with habit of purchase overwhelming a negative Price
response at upper-Income levels with Kids – however most p-values over 0.1 are for exactly the
upper-Income sub-groups in OneKids and ThreeKids. This may imply bi-modal behavior in
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Price response for these groups, or simply purchase behavior too close to the base group
(although why the latter should be is not easily expected). Price responses clearly differ between
HH Size and # of Kids across Income levels, again supporting the choice to include both in
modeling. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -31 to 4.
Income x Female (Male) Age are inconsistent sets in Price responsiveness (close to 50%
are not significant at the 10% level). For Females there is little pattern, but there are more
negatives versus the Price5xIncxFmAge50-65 base sub-group at higher Ages, with least
consistency at lower Incomes in lowest Age groups. For Males there is also no pattern and small
magnitudes, but least consistency in Price response at higher Ages and middle Income levels.
The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value, (Female Age): -5 to 18. The span in
ounces from lowest to highest significant value, (Male Age): -14 to 9.
FemaleEducLevel x # of Kids in HH is a consistent set (between 70-80%) relative to the
PricexFmPostCollgEdNoKids reference sub-group. Almost all MEs are positive, only one
statistically significant ME in this set is negative. The reference sub-group Price responsiveness
is thus relatively high. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -10 to 35.
MaleEducLevel x # of Kids in HH is a quite consistent set (between 80-90%) relative to
the PricexMalePostCollgEdNoKids reference sub-group, more than for the Female set. All MEs
are negative. The reference sub-group Price responsiveness is thus relatively low, the opposite of
the parallel set in Female Educ and # of Kids. Both the Female and Male HHH sets for this
interaction have relatively strong magnitudes (absolute value from 0) compared to all sets in the
table, with Inc x Fem Educ arguably highest. The span in ounces from lowest to highest
significant value: -26 to -6.
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FemaleEducLevel x Race/Hispanic and MaleEducLevel x Race/Hispanic are not
consistent (near 50%) relative to their PricexPostCollgxWhite reference sub-groups. Positive and
negative MEs in these two sets tend to stay close to 0, suggesting these sets do not describe Price
reactivity as well as any of the other sets. Exceptions include Asian HHs in Female Educ, which
account for half of all the significant MEs in the Female Educ set, and in Male Educ LHS and
Afr-Amer HHs, which together account for 2/3 of the significant MEs, and have higher MEs in
ounces. So Asian HHs differ from the PricexPostCollgxWhite base in Female Educ, and AfrAmer HHs from the same base in Male Educ. 3/5 of Hispanic MEs in either set are not
significant at the 10% level, and magnitudes are small for the significant values (3/4 are
negative), so Hispanic HHs are either slightly more or not at all more Price sensitive than nonHispanic HHs. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value, (Fem Educ
Race/Hspnc): -5 to 26. The same span in ounces for Male Educ Race/Hspnc: -4 to 23.

5.5.1.b.ii Significance Issues for Sale-Interacted Demographic-Demographic Variable
MEs
Income x Female Educ is not a consistent set, but all reactions are negative below the
Post College level except HfPvIncFmCollgEd. The Sale5xIncxFmPostCollg reference sub-group
is clearly strong in quantity response when purchasing on Sale. Only the Post College sub-groups
across Income levels tend to be more positive. Fem Less HS is the most negative (least
responsive relative to base sub-group, and highly identified in this set), with higher Fem Educ
levels less negative, although College versus Some College is a potential exception. In Female
HHH Education, higher Education tends to mean more purchase when on Sale. Statistically
significant figures for the difference between the lowest groups across Education and the base
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(=5xIncxFmPostCollg) are frequently in the 2-4-liter range. These MEs are correlates for
incidence of positive purchase, and do not reflect more or less overall purchase for sub-group
HHs given the number of purchase weeks for the HH-type in a year. The MEs here would appear
the same if HHs in the reference group bought only once a year and drank less or if they bought
the same number of times per year as the other sub-groups in the set and drank much more
sCSD. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -279 to 39.
Income x Male Educ is also not a consistent set, with no significant MEs (to pval<0.1) in
the Less HS or HS groups. This is unlikely to be because behavior is similar to the
Sale5xIncxMPostCollg base sub-group, so must reflect multi-modal behavioral response within
the artificial 28 category. Relative to the base group, some lesser educated Male HHHs care about
buying on sale, and others do not. There is a reversal of sign from negative to positive MEs from
College through Post College, with the only negative signs in the highest Male Education levels
not significant. P-values also drop significantly for these groups, another indicator that high pvalues here are from multi-modality of behavior rather than similarity to the reference sub-group
in purchasing behavior. Male HHHs reverse in response to Sale with higher purchase at one
lower Education level (College) than Female HHHs (Post College), and in much higher
quantities between the last negative and the positive groups, ranging from 30-250 ounces higher
for Male HHHs at the higher Education levels versus Some College. MEs are much more
positive in College than Post College, meaning Sales responsiveness peaks at Male College,
whereas it peaked in Female Post College. There are pronounced differences again in purchase
behavior by sex of HHH for SalexIncxEduc, as there frequently has been in previous

28

Category determined in advance by Nielsen choices and mine, not by principal component analysis on raw data in
characteristic space.
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comparisons – the sex of the HHH does affect purchase and marketing-variable responsiveness.
The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -155 to 165.
Income x Race/Hispanic is a consistent set, with ¾ of the non-significant MEs occurring in
Hispanic lower Income levels, indicating they do not behave differently than their non-Hispanic
counterparts at the same Income levels. All significant MEs are positive, meaning that the
Sale5xPvIncWhite reference group is the least Sale responsive in the set. Positive MEs are of
highest magnitude for Asian HHs, followed by Other Race (especially at low- and middle-Income
levels), White, and finally Afr-Am HHs. The exceptionally strong Asian HH effect – up to 12 liters
difference between Asian and White HH average purchase for HfPvInc – is offset by a different
Asian variable below. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: 55 to 764.
Income x HH Size is not consistent, especially for smaller HHs, indicating that bi-modal
response to Sale versus the Sale5xPvIncHHsiz1 reference sub-group is stronger in smaller HH
groups. In contrast to the previous sets, there are no significant MEs larger than 75 ounces.
Surprisingly, HH Size is a poor descriptor of response to Sale. The span in ounces from lowest to
highest significant value: -44 to 75.
Income x # of Kids in HH is consistent in Sale response, with middle Income in
ThreeKids perhaps bi-modal. Compared to the Sale5xPvIncNoKids reference sub-group, every
value in the set is less responsive, except for the highest Income level with Three Kids. All of the
exceptionally large negative responses by group (i.e. for a single # of Kids across Income levels)
are at HfPvInc, perhaps indicating less access to price discounts in neighborhoods where
HfPvInc HHs are more commonly located. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant
value is third highest among the 11 sets: -480 to 95. Again, a clear difference in HH Size and #
of Kids in HH justifies the decision to include both regressor sets.

174

Income x Female (Male) Age are inconsistent sets in Sale responsiveness, with no clear
patterns in either relative to the SalexIncomexAge50-65 reference sub-groups, aside from more
negative values being significant in Income x Male Age. The span in ounces from lowest to
highest significant value, (Female Age): -62 to 59. The span in ounces from lowest to highest
significant value, (Male Age): -96 to 115.
FemaleEducLevel x # of Kids in HH is a consistent set relative to the
SalexFmPostCollgEdNoKids reference sub-group, except for at ThreeKids, which may indicate
bi-modal responsiveness to Sale in this group. All significant values are positive, meaning the
reference sub-group is relatively non-responsive to Sale. The highest responses are at Less HS at
every level, the fall in ounces to HS from Less HS tending to be around half the number of
ounces. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -55 to 402.
MaleEducLevel x # of Kids in HH is not a consistent set relative to the
SalexMPostCollgEdNoKids reference sub-group, but MEs tend to be positive. Oddly, all College
are negative and significant in large amounts relative to the other MEs in the set (buy 3-5 liters
less when Sale is noted), and these College MEs tend to be less than for the corresponding
Female set – but Post College does not continue the effect. With No Kids, purchase is higher at
lower incomes, but significance problems indicate Sale response behavior remains close to the
reference sub-group. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -154 to 110.
FemaleEducLevel x Race/Hispanic is consistent relative to the SalexFmPostCollgxWhite
reference sub-group, with perfect consistency for Asian HHs, and Afr-Amer HHs being the only
group with two insignificant values. All significant values are negative, with notably high
magnitudes for Asian HHs (nearly balancing out the very strong positive responses to Sale in
SalexIncxAsian above), and tame magnitudes relative to some other sets for non-Asian-HH MEs.
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The reference group is not Sale responsive relative to the entire set. The span in ounces from
lowest to highest significant value: -468 to -26.
MaleEducLevel x Race/Hispanic sub-groups have only 1/3 (7/20) statistically significant.
Negative and positive significant responses are almost evenly balanced in both directions from
zero. Either all Male HHHs are similar in Sale response (and behavior for all groups is similar to
the reference group), or there is bi-modal behavior across racial groups in Male Education levels.
The first hypothesis is not supported by results from previous models and other results within the
REFINED model. Having controlled for HH Size, Age, and # of Kids in HH, the second
hypothesis is plausible for different applications of the same nutrition education within the same
level of formal Education, or if beer drinkers are separate from sCSD drinkers. The span in
ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -155 to 42. Once again responses differ
dramatically for Male versus Female HHHs for the same racial group and level of Education.

5.5.1.b.iii Significance Issues for Advertising-Interacted Demographic-Demographic
Variable MEs
The group-within-set average magnitude of reactions in ounces is consistently lower in
Advertising than for Price, and certainly lower than for Sale. Because these are reactions to a
weekly change in Advertising relative to the more direct economic impact of Price and Sale
variables, this is expected. Long-term effect of sCSD industry or industry-leader advertising
cannot be measured or identified with this data set.
Income x Female Educ is not a consistent set, but all reactions are negative in Less HS,
the only consistent group in the set. The Adv5xIncxFmPostCollg reference sub-group is one of
the stronger positive quantity responses in Advertising, as all but two of the twelve significant
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MEs relative to the base sub-group are negative in double digits. Within each Education level,
the HfPvInc sub-group has a relatively positive response versus the other levels within the group,
except for Post College. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -20 to -9.
Income x Male Educ is not a consistent set, but all reactions are positive in HS, the only
consistent group in the set, and this group’s MEs have the largest magnitude of any group
interacted in Advertising (23 to 37 ounces). Male Educ at HS has the strongest positive reaction
to Advertising in the table relative to its reference sub-group. The Adv5xIncxFmPostCollg
reference sub-group response is lower than all significant responses except those for College
Educ, which are negative relative to this group, nearly opposite the relationship in IncxFemEduc,
where the high-Income high-Educ base sub-group had nearly the strongest response to
Advertising. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -12 to 37.
Income x Race/Hispanic is not consistent, with every racial group having significant
negative and positive MEs except Asian HHs, which displays all negative significant MEs of the
second highest magnitude in Advertising interaction (-12 to -39). There is a noticeably strong
negative reaction in Advertising for HfPvInc in every racial group except Hispanic, meaning that
the Adv5xPvIncWhite reference group is much more positive in purchase reaction to Advertising
than are any lowest-Income groups, but that the non-Hispanic reference group differs little from
the Hispanic, for which all ME magnitudes are low (-6 to 6). The span in ounces from lowest to
highest significant value in the set (racial groups), is -39 to 18.
A loose pattern across the four Race groups but not Hispanic is that the significant MEs
are more negative for lower Income levels, but rise or even flip positive at higher Income levels.
This enlists as evidence against the hypothesis that lower Income HHs are more likely to be
responsive to sCSD Advertising, and this pattern also presents in Income x Male Age. Opposing
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evidence is presented at the HfPvInc level by Income x Male Educ and strongly by Income x HH
Size, and ignoring significance levels also by Income x Female Educ.
Income x HH Size is less consistent (60-70%), less so for HH Size=4, possibly indicating
bi-modal response to Advertising. After HfPvInc, all significant MEs are negative versus the
Adv5xPvIncHHsiz1 reference sub-group, indicating that the base sub-group has a relatively high
response within the set. The effect parallels that in the racial group set, but in the opposite
direction. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -8 to 18.
Income x # of Kids in HH is not consistent in Advertising response, perhaps due to bimodal response behavior in No-, One-, and TwoKids, which display 4 of 17 significant p-values.
Inc x ThreeKids is completely consistent and strongly negative (the fourth highest magnitude of
any group in Advertising interaction, -14 to -31). Significant p-values are positive in NoKids,
and negative for any sub-group with Kids, relative to the Adv5xIncNoKids reference sub-group.
The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -31 to 13.
Income x Female Age is the only consistent sets in Advertising responsiveness, but with
no clear patterns relative to the AdvxIncomexFemAge50-65 reference sub-groups – significant
values are positive and large in <30, positive in 50-65, and mixed in between. The span in ounces
from lowest to highest significant value: -6 to 21.
Income x Male Age is less consistent in Advertising responsiveness, with all significant
values negative relative to the reference sub-group, meaning the AdvxIncomexAge50-65 base
sub-group is relatively strong in response to Advertising. The span in the 50-65 group is small,
consistent with approaching the base group in responsiveness. The span in ounces from lowest to
highest significant value: -22 to -2.
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FemaleEducLevel x # of Kids in HH is a less consistent set relative to the
AdvxFmPostCollgEdNoKids reference sub-group, except for at ThreeKids, which exactly
opposite the Sale response is the only group that is consistent within the set. All significant
values in the set are positive, meaning the base sub-group is relatively unresponsive to
Advertising. The group spanning FemEduc in ThreeKids is the third largest responsive group by
magnitude of all groups interacted in Advertising (15 to 39). The span in ounces from lowest to
highest significant value in the set: -14 to 39.
MaleEducLevel x # of Kids in HH is the least consistent set in the entire table relative to
its reference sub-group, AdvxMPostCollgEdNoKids. The exception is that all of the strongly
negative MEs for HS (in the -20s versus all other MEs of -4 to 4) are the only significant values
in the set. Despite significance questions, NoKids leans negative, where any positive # of Kids
leans positive in response to Advertising versus the base sub-group. The span in ounces from
lowest to highest significant value: -27 to -23.
Paralleling the noticeable separate effect for HfPvInc level across demographic groups
relative to other sub-group Income levels, Less HS differs from other sub-group Education
levels. Less HS is strongly negative in Advertising in Inc x Fem Educ (but not in Inc x Male
Educ), strongly positive in Fem Educ x # of Kids and Male Educ x # of Kids, and consistently
negative and smaller magnitude than for # of Kids in HH in Fem/Male Educ x racial groups.
Focusing only on Less HS for # of Kids, the significant MEs rise from 14 in NoKids, to 17 for
OneKids, 23 for TwoKids, and 39 for ThreeKids, demonstrating a clear significant rise in
positive effect of Advertising in rising # of Kids for Female HHHs of Less HS level of terminal
Education. The MEs for Less HS are not significant for the Male HHH groups, but the effect
noted for Female HHHs is underscored by the nearly uniform fall in purchase of around 20
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ounces when moving in Female or Male level of Education from Less HS to HS in “Adv x
(F/M)Educ x #Kids.” This is a perfect case of “insignificant” MEs nestling exactly into a
noticeable pattern of magnitudes – which they could not if they had no effect or only random
effect on the dependent variable (relative to the reference sub-group). For Female HHHs the
relatively high MEs on Less HS are high relative to all other sub-group values in the set, whereas
for Male HHHs the relatively high values on LHS break from the drop in ME magnitude for HS,
but match other insignificant sub-group MEs in magnitude. The relatively quite low negative
MEs in Male HS in the Adv x Male Educ x # of Kids in HH set are the only significant values in
the set. Clearly the strongly positive Advertising response in Less HS is much stronger in the
Female set versus the Male set in “Adv x (F/M)Educ x #Kids.”
FemaleEducLevel x Race/Hispanic is less consistent relative to the
AdvxFmPostCollgxWhite reference sub-group, with the only significant values in Race being the
perfect consistency for Asian HHs, one significant ME in Afr-Amer at Post College, and one
significant ME in Hispanic at Fem Less HS. The nearly unbroken block of insignificant MEs in
this set (outside of Asian HHs) indicates either behavior closely paralleling the base sub-group,
or bimodality in response behavior, and cannot simply be a result of asking the data for too much
identifying information, else the Asian HH MEs would also have significance problems (having
few observations relative to White and Afr-Amer HHs). The significant responses to Advertising
for Asian Female HHH HHs are strong in magnitude for the Advertising interactions (19 to 28).
Remember for this group in Sale there were very large negative MEs, but not large enough to
offset the most positive MEs in Sale interaction for Sale x Income x Asian, and in Price
interaction, there seemed to be positive MEs for this group, but perhaps not large enough to be
cumulatively negative with some of the Inc x Asian MEs in Price. Asian HHs is the most
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responsive to all three marketing variables of any group interacted with marketing variables, and
generally in the direction economic theory predicts, relative to the relevant reference sub-groups.
The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value in the set: -7 to 29.
MaleEducLevel x Race/Hispanic is less consistent relative to the
AdvxMPostCollgxWhite reference sub-group, with least consistency in White HHs, a bit more in
Afr-Amer HHs, and more consistent differences in Asian and Hispanic HHs. This may support
behavior consistent with the base sub-groups in White and Afr-Amer, possibly with bi-modality
in lower Education groups, based on other results. Asian HH MEs are the strongest within the set
and negative, meaning lower purchase in rising Advertising relative to the base sub-group. For
Hispanic versus the base non-Hispanic HHs, the effect is negative in lower Male Educ levels, but
flips positive at the highest Male Educ levels. Ignoring significance levels and the Asian HH
exception, purchase reactivity to Advertising seems to be a bit negative at lower Male Educ
levels and a bit positive at upper Male Educ levels, inconsistent with the Less HS effect noted
above. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value in this set: -16 to 9.
There seems to be no clear linear effect in Advertising that spans Income levels,
Education level, or sex of HHHs. The highest Incomes tend to be most positively responsive
across Education levels, the middle Incomes in Race, and lower Incomes in HH Size and # of
Kids in HH. Results are mixed in Inc x Age for both sexes of HHHs. Less HS seems most
responsive in # of Kids for Female, and to a lesser extent is at least on par for Male HHHs. But
in Educ x racial group, higher Education levels tend to break more positive in Advertising
response in ounces purchased versus lower Education levels. There is no strong and consistent
support across these single ME levels for my original hypotheses that the effect of Advertising
would be constrained by the weekly nature of the measure versus lifetime cumulative effect, and
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by the lack of correlation between product-specific advertising and purchase due to my chosen
data construction.
By combining MEs to Household-realistic representations in prediction tables, we can
better compare true effects of Advertising rather than relying on MEs cross-compared in
isolation.

5.5.2

Lowest 2-Level by Highest 2-Level Comparisons of CME by Sub-group, and by
Group (2x2 Inverse Comparisons), “Food Elite” hypothesis introduced
Having completed the defense of inference on the magnitudes of the elements in

combined marginal effects and analysis of patterns of significance within the variable and
interaction-variable elements comprising CMEs (e.g. 1xPvIncFmLHSEd and Adv
1xPvIncFmLHSEd), I now begin with 2x2-comparison analysis of CMEs in each of the
marketing variables. This analysis will provide a further way to compare empirical results with
hypotheses, paralleling ME and CME analyses in BASIC (Table 9) and BROAD (Table 14)
models, for the CMEs that are combined into the prediction tables. Prediction tables paralleling
the structures in BASIC and BROAD with marketing variables will be analyzed in 5.5.3. The
strength of this analysis is that with the exception of Hispanic in the racial group CMEs, every
CME in every table refers to the same reference sub-group, so there is implicit comparability
between all the CME values in any single table, from Table 17a to Table 19k.
For the Tables in Price, Sale, and Advertising, the analyses of the Income x Education
and Income x Race and Education x Race sets will receive more attention, because they are in
the closest competition for determining the largest and most consistent demographic
determinants of purchase patterns.
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5.5.2.a

2x2 Comparisons and 2x2 Inverse Comparisons of CMEs in Price
Table 17a presents CMEs in Price for Income-Level by Female HHH Education-Level

sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Female
Educ levels across Income levels we see averages of the values in an Education group that fall
from 214 to 24. The fall is not linear, but it is mostly one-directional, save for the 25% rise in
total from HS to Some College. A strictly one-directional fall in group totals on the left side
would indicate an unambiguously strong education effect, and we almost have that here. Most of
the change occurs in the drop between Less HS and HS, then there is a modest rise from HS to
Some College, and then a fall of roughly half to College, and again roughly half to Post College.
The combined totals in ounces for each group (from 1287 to 120) parallel the differences
between group averages. Thus accounting for any price effect, Female HHHs with the lowest
Education level purchase much more than any other Fem Educ group, with a steep drop to High
School, and very clear drops in higher Education after Some College. Within each Fem Educ
group, compared to the bottom two Income sub-groups, the top two Income sub-groups purchase
more by CMEs in Price – all groups “rise in Income,” confirming a positive income effect.
Percentage changes in 2x2 values 29 run from 24 to 1334 percent.
In the right half of the table, Income level is fixed, with each level spanning Fem Educ
levels. A strictly one-directional rise in group totals on the right side would indicate an
unambiguously strong income effect. There is no clear rise in purchase quantity by group totals
across the six Income levels (-217 to 929) or across group averages (-43 to 186). Yet comparing
the top two and bottom two Education levels within each Income level, every Income group has
29

This is the standard calculation of the absolute value of the ratio of the first value minus the second value over the
first value. Thus the first value (for example 378.4 in the first group, the sum of the first two sub-group CMEs)
subtracts the second value (468.8), and this result is divided by the first value.
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lower purchase in rising Female Education. Percentage changes in 2x2 values run from 39 to 326
percent.
Within each group the quantity purchased described by CME in Price follows
expectations, providing evidence for an income and an education effect. Is there any evidence
that one dominates the other for Female Education and Income? The group totals each span
about 1100 from lowest to highest, which is unhelpful. The near linearity in rising Education
level across Income levels (the first two left-side columns) is clearly stronger than the up-downup-up-down of Income level across Education levels (the first two right-side columns), so the
education effect is stronger for this set.
But this result is largely determined by a few consistent shifts. At each Educ level there is
a large increase from HfPvInc to 1xPvInc, and at below Post College Education levels, a drop of
over half from 4xPvInc to 5xPvInc. Each of these large moves reflects a strong difference in the
original mfx-adjusted ME more than a price effect (results in previous tables). These differences
that precede price effects may be consistent with an Income-based Food Elite who have attained
a lifestyle critical of sCSD consumption. The 4x- to 5xPvInc fall would be a positive
demonstration, and the HfPv- to 1xPvInc rise would be a negative demonstration of the same
effect. Similarly there is a large drop from Less HS to HS at every fixed Income level, and a
substantial drop from College to Post College (some College to College for 5xPvInc) in every
fixed Income level except 1xPvInc for which there is still a drop. This may be evidence for an
Education-based Food Elite, where breakpoints of nutrition awareness applied to HH decisionmaking may occur in the jump to HS Educ, and the jump from College to Post College Ed. This
is a separate line of hypothesis, but one that may be pursued using the same empirical results.
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Evidence for and against the Food Elite hypothesis will be mentioned occasionally, as a
secondary avenue of research hypothesis.
Table 17b presents CMEs in Price for Income-Level by Male HHH Education-Level
sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Male
Educ levels across Income levels we see combined totals of the values in an Education group that
fall and rise from -526 to 66, without a clear education effect. Four of the five groups fall in 2x2
comparison in rising Income, which fails to support a positive income effect within levels of
Male Education, but may offer modest support for an Income-based Food Elite. But any such
support is offset by the obvious rise from 4x- to 5xPvInc in Education levels below Post College.
For fixed Income levels across Male Educ levels there is not a strict rise from HfPvInc to 5xInc
which would unambiguously depict an income effect. 2x2 comparison shows a strict fall in
purchase associated with rising Education. So between both sexes of HHH in Income x
Education, there is support for a consistent education effect in both sex of HHH comparisons
although stronger for Female HHHs, weaker support for a positive income effect, and an obvious
difference by sex of HHH.
Table 17c presents CMEs in Price for Income-Level by Race/Hispanic sub-groups,
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Race/Hispanic levels
across Income levels we see combined totals of the values that vary significantly, from Asian
HH’s 1132 high to Other Race HH’s -641 low, with White, Afr-Amer, and Hispanic HH’s all in
the negative range between -350 and -200. Each group rises in Income by 2x2 comparison,
suggesting a positive income effect. Across Races, these rises tend to be the largest of any set of
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groups in the 17-set tables: 550 for Asian HHs, 330 for Other Race HHs, 270 for Afr-Amer HHs,
and around 200 for White HHs. This suggests a strong positive income effect on purchase,
controlling for any Price effect. Hispanic is unremarkable in its 33-ounce rise, meaning that the
quantity and price response separating Hispanic from non-Hispanic purchase behaviors is fairly
consistent across Income levels. This clear income effect across racial groups is supported by the
negative totals in lower (HfPv- through 2xPvInc) and positive totals in higher (3x- through
5xPvInc) Income levels on the right half of the table, without there being a strict rise in totals for
each level in the last numeric column. So there is strong, consistent, but not overwhelming
support for a positive income effect in Race/Hispanic.
Table 17d presents CMEs in Price for Income-Level by Household Size sub-groups,
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed HH Size levels
across Income levels we see that combined totals for groups are in a tight range compared to the
previous three tables, rising strictly by HH size from HHsize=1 103 to HHsize=4 587. This is a
clear but un-insightful effect that confirms the efficacy of the data and model structure, and a
relatively uniform Price response in HH Size. Only HHsize=4 rises in Income in 2x2
comparison, with HHsize=3 flat. That HH Sizes 1 and 2 are negative in rising HH Income with
HHsize=1 the stronger, may suggest a Food Elite effect that dissolves as more members enter the
HH, as the income effect strictly increases in HH size (per column percentage changes in 2x2
values). The primary income effect that would be evident in rising level totals on the right side
were this true does not present. Quantity does rise in 2x2 comparison of HH Size for fixed
Income level, but this is unremarkable. 30 If it did not, the data or modeling might come into

30

When there are only three values in a group, as for 5xPvInc x HH Size with its reference sub-group drop here, the
2x2 comparison uses the lowest and middle value, and the middle and highest value.
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question. HfPvInc is an exception but the magnitudes relative to the other CMEs in the column
do not suggest this indicates aberrant behavior.
Table 17e presents CMEs in Price for Income-Level by Number of Kids in HH subgroups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding
the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Number of Kids
in HH levels across Income levels we see that combined totals for groups are in an even tighter
range than for HH Size, with a low of -46 (OneKid) and a high of 258 (NoKids, total for only
five Income levels due to base drop). All # of Kids fall in Inc, presenting the second evidence in
the 17-series tables that lower-Income HHs buy more, even accounting for any Price effect (first
for Income levels across Race/Hispanic) – and the results are quite strong here, particularly for
HfPvInc, but holding for 1xPvInc as well. Switching to the right side of the table, there is a strict
fall in quantity for each rise in fixed Income level across # of Kids up to 4xPvInc, supporting the
inference that lower-Income HHs purchase more. Further, the quantity accounting for the price
effect rises with the # of Kids in HH at lower Income levels, but falls in rising # of Kids in HH at
higher Income levels. This may present evidence of an Income-based Food Elite, with HH
quantities unadjusted to the per capita level demonstrating lower purchase in ounces only at
higher Income levels. If this is due to parental restriction of sCSD availability in the HH, it
supports an Income-based Food Elite hypothesis. If this effect is overwhelmed by more frequent
incidents of purchase in a month or year by higher-Income HHs, then the effect is a spurious
result of the data configuration.
Table 17f presents CMEs in Price for Income-Level by Female Age Level sub-groups,
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Female Age Level
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across Income levels we see that combined totals for groups have the smallest span yet (-64 to
110), meaning that controlling for Price effect, Female Age does not identify particularly
distinctive behavior across Age group levels. But there are consistencies that appear having
controlled for the more dynamic Education and racial group factors. Group totals rise strictly in
Age level from -64 to 110, as do group CME in Price averages from -11 to 22 ounces per
purchase – there is rising purchase in Age level, which may seem counterintuitive having
controlled for HH Size and # of Kids in HH. All listed Fem Age levels fall in rising Income,
again indicating that lower-Income HHs consume more than higher-Income HHs, across Age of
Female HHH. Holding Income constant across Fem Age levels, the three lower Income group
totals are together much higher (223+12+195) than the three higher Income group totals (-55302+50), further supporting the point. Every fixed Income level of CME in Price rises in
quantity purchase with Fem Age level, except at the 1xPvInc level.
Table 17g presents CMEs in Price for Income-Level by Male Age Level sub-groups,
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Male Age Level
across Income levels we see that combined totals strictly fall from 441 to 176, meaning that
including any Price effect, younger Male HHHs purchase more ounces when they buy – exactly
opposite the case for Female HHHs across Age levels. The average difference from <30 to 50-65
is (73-35) about 40 ounces per purchase. Again the opposite of the Income x Age results for
Female HHHs in CME in Price, quantities rise in Income for all Male Age levels, with the
highest CME in every Age group at 4xPvInc. This again allows inference of a Food Elite effect
from 4x- to 5xPvInc, due to the fall noted in the first three Male Age levels and the implicit “0”
for the 5xPvIncMAge50-65 reference sub-group. And indeed the right side group totals and
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averages show much lower values for 5xPvInc than for 4xPvInc or any other Income level, even
allowing for the dropped CME. Group totals do not rise or fall consecutively or all rise or all fall
in Age for fixed Income level across Age levels. The positive income effect exists within Age
levels, but is not robust across them. At the lowest Income level (and 2x- & 4xPvInc), older Male
HHHs buy less than younger ones, while for the other Income levels, younger Male HHHs buy
less than older ones. There is more variety in this effect than in Female HHH, where only one
Income level broke the pattern of older HHHs buying more than younger HHHs.
Table 17h presents CMEs in Price for Female HHH Education-Level by Number of Kids
in HH sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table,
and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. Holding the #
of Kids in HH fixed, there is no strict rise or fall across Fem HHH Educ level totals (-295 to 27),
and only for OneKid does quantity purchased fall in rising Education. For TwoKids and
ThreeKids, there are rises of 20 and 45 ounces from the lowest to highest level of Education,
evidence countermanding the strong education effect recognized in Table 17a, but in much
smaller magnitude, so the robustness of the education effect in 17a remains. The Post College Ed
No Kids base for Female HHHs is relatively positive, since only 4 of the 19 CMEs in Price are
positive. All the group totals holding Educ level fixed across # of Kids in HH are negative below
the Post College level, with no pattern of rise or fall. Any other group average for an Education
level is less than the Post College average (12, the only positive value). Again, this undermines
the education effect described earlier, but by too small a magnitude to overwhelm the earlier
effect. Oddly at the HS and Some College levels, quantity purchased in rising # of Kids actually
falls by significant amounts, 56 ounces from No or OneKids in HS Educ, and 12 ounces in Some
College Educ. More Kids may mean less purchase in these specific conditions, including
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reaction to Price changes relative to the Post College No Kids sub-group. By Education level
across # of Kids, Fem Less HS purchase the least (-48), followed by Some College (-47), then
College (-43), then a thirty-ounce rise in group average to HS (-12), and a 24-ounce rise to Post
College (12).
Table 17i presents CMEs in Price for Male HHH Education-Level by Number of Kids in
HH sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. There are many
contrasts to the previous table. Here the MPostCollgNoKids reference sub-group is the lowest
purchase sub-group in the table, as all other CMEs in Price are positive. The span from lowest to
highest fixed # of Kids group total (346 to 550) is relatively narrow, and rises as expected in # of
Kids from No to Two. ThreeKids is exceptional in that it breaks pattern for the lowest total and
average (356, 69), and that a 2x2 comparison has the group rising in quantity with rising Male
HHH level of education, while it falls as expected in the other groups. This effect stems in part
from the lowest CME in the table, for MLessHSThreeKids, which is only one-third of the
second-lowest CME in ounces. Surprisingly, given other results, Male HHHs with the lowest
level of Education and ThreeKids purchase less when they do buy (7 ounces) than any other subgroup except MPostCollgNoKids. Male Less HS Educ level with TwoKids has the highest CME
in Price in the table, so this ThreeKids result seems anomalous, even if we were to assume twice
as many purchase incidents for the larger HH. Moving to the right side of the table, the largest
average across # of Kids is for HS (148), followed by College (121), then Less HS (84), then
Some College (62), with Post College (36) nearly half of the Some College average. Post
College is low enough to suggest an education effect, being lower than any other group, and a
dramatic drop from College. This effect may support an Education-based Food Elite effect,
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represented as a punctuated education effect kicking in at only the highest Education level. If
true, this would support the education effect noted in Tables 17a&b, and on nearly the same
magnitude of effect. This is opposite the result for Female Educ in 17h, with Male Educ in this
table making up for some of the less pronounced education effect for Male HHH in 17a&b,
whereas 17h detracts a bit from the original effect.
Table 17j presents CMEs in Price for Female HHH Education-Level by Race/Hispanic
sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. Holding racial
group fixed across Fem Educ levels, there is a span in group totals from the Table-17-set-low of
-1596 (avg -319) for Asian HHs, to 141 (avg 28) for Hispanic HHs. Note here that Other Race
needed to be dropped to avoid the dummy-variable trap, but due to the reference sub-group drop
at White Post College, there was room to re-enter one Other Race value at Post College, in
Female and in Male HHH education. The Other Race CME value seems consistent with other
Post College CMEs, which tend to fall from College to Post College, suggesting an education
effect. For every full-group racial group (not Other Race) there is a rise in purchase in 2x2
comparison. This seems a clear indication that the large positive income effect in racial group is
dominating the smaller education effect in racial group. This would be confirmed by a strict rise
in quantity by fixed Education level across racial groups on the right side of the table. This
indeed occurs up to the College level, so the large positive income effect does dominate the
education effect in racial group. The actual group totals and averages are dominated by the
strongly negative Asian HH CMEs, but as all of the Race CMEs refer to the same base subgroup, it is the relative change in totals and averages we can focus on not the sign or magnitude
of the totals or averages. The dramatic fall from College to Post College still suggests an
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education effect that must be taken seriously, and may well indicate an Education-based Food
Elite response that is robust to racial group. 31
Table 17k presents CMEs in Price for Male HHH Education-Level by Race/Hispanic
sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The CME group
totals and averages are less dramatic and sharp than in 17j, but signs on the totals and averages
are reversed on the left side of the table, ranging from -412 (avg -82) for Afr-Amer HHs to 45
(avg 9) for Asian HHs. For Asian and Hispanic HHs, two-value CMEs fall in rising Educ as
expected. The fall in White HHs is too small to be significant, so the 2x2 is “flat in rising
Education.” The two-value CMEs rise substantially in Education for Afr-Amer HHs. This seems
to indicate the income effect trumps the education effect in this group, a group that maintains the
most negative average CME by racial group in the table, relative to the MPostCollgWhite
reference sub-group. The right-side totals and averages by fixed Education level do not rise or
fall in pattern, but there is a clear positive quantity for Post College versus every other level,
exactly opposite the Female HHH Table 17j, presenting counter-evidence to a Food Elite
hypothesis.

5.5.2.b 2x2 Comparisons and 2x2 Inverse Comparisons of CMEs in Sale
Table 18a presents CMEs in Sale for Income-Level by Female HHH Education-Level
sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Female

31

This inference is tempered by the replacement of the “White” Educ level in the other fixed Educ level totals and
averages with “Other Race” in the Post College group only, so then every group total and average is based on four
values. Because White and Other Race CMEs refer to the same reference sub-group, this substitution is not
uncomfortably artificial.
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Educ levels across Income levels we see combined totals of the values in an Education group that
span from -21 to 538. The most responsive group by group average is Some College (90),
followed by Less HS (61), HS (39), Post College (39), and College (-3). While the response
neither rises nor falls strictly in Education level group averages, the two upper Education levels
are far lower than the two lower Education levels, expressing a strong although not linear
negative education effect. Quantity purchased on Sale does rise in rising Income for every
Education level, indicating a positive income effect on CME in Sale. This income effect is not
underscored by a strict rise in Income group totals on the right side, but there is a general rise in
Sale purchase in rising Income level evident by totaling the averages of the lower three Income
levels (82) versus the upper three (181), even if these totals are influenced by extreme values for
HfPvInc (-72) and 4xPvInc (163). It may not be immediately intuitive that higher Income groups,
particularly 4xPvInc, buy more on Sale per purchase, because the incentive may seem stronger
for lower-Income HHs. These correlative results likely reflect relative factors such as access to
big-box stores, larger family vehicles, or larger homes with more designated pantry space. These
factors may explain why HfPvInc is the only group with all negative CMEs in Sale relative to
5xPvInFmPostCollgEd. Four of the six Income groups fall in rising Education, meaning the
combination of a sub-group’s purchase relative to the base sub-group and the same sub-group’s
response to Sale relative to the base sub-group is smaller for the two higher Education levels in a
group than the two lower ones.
As is apparent from the MEs in ounces for marketing-variable-interacted terms, Sale on
average displays the most dynamic magnitudes of the marketing variables. Even accounting for
the relatively strong impact of Sale, for CMEs in Sale, the education effect dominates the income
effect in all three lower Income levels, and the income effect dominates the education effect in
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two of the upper three, with the edge going to the education effect over the income effect. 32 Even
the largest Income level average across Education levels (4xPvInc, 819) falls in Educ. This
finding has policy implications. This argument assumes that rising Education diminishes overall
purchase of an unhealthful product, rather than better educating shoppers as to the economic
value of buying any item at a discounted price.
There is no unambiguous evidence for an Education-based Food Elite behavior here,
despite the fall in averages for the two highest Education groups from the two lowest, but the
extreme drop from 164 ounces to 16 ounces in average for the 4xPvInc to 5xPvInc groups may
support an Income-based Food Elite argument.
Table 18b presents CMEs in Sale for Income-Level by Male HHH Education-Level
sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Male
Educ levels across Income levels we see combined totals of the values in an Education group that
fall and rise from -654 to 166, without a clear education effect. Relative to Female HHHs, the
Male 5xPvIncPostColleg reference sub-group is much more responsive in CMEs in Sale, with
only 10 of 29 CMEs positive (and only three of the 19 negative CMEs within 50 ounces of the
base point). If the highest Income-highest-Educated group is that high, we can anticipate a strong
commitment to either purchase, Sale, or both, and therefore a likely smaller education effect if
one is detectable. Three of the five groups rise in 2x2 comparison in rising Income, supporting a
modest claim for a positive income effect within levels of Male Education. Lower-Income HHs
prefer Sale in groups that fall in Income, as occurs in the lowest and highest education groups.
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In addition, only the least consistent Income levels – with mixed positive and negative CMEs by Education level –
rise in Education. Three of the four Income levels designated falling in Education by 2x2 comparison quantity drops
are larger value changes than both of the two “rises in Education” quantities (each around 60 ounces, at 3x- and
5xPvInc).
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This may also suggest that the income effect is stronger than the negative education effect in this
set. There is a loose pattern of rise in average ounces by Income group from HfPvInc to 5xPvInc,
except for an extreme dip at 4xPvInc, and a slight dip from 2x- to 3xPvInc. This also supports a
modest claim for a positive income effect within the set. While there is no strict rise or fall in
CME average by Education group on the left side, on the right side five of the six Income levels
rise in Education, perhaps indicating weak dominance of the income over the education effect.
The drive to get a deal may be overwhelming nutritional concerns, or the existing commitment to
sCSD purchase despite nutrition awareness may find greater expression when price discounts are
present. For CMEs in Sale, the dominant education effect for Female HHHs seems to contrast
with a weakly dominant income effect for Male HHHs.
For CMEs in Sale the drop in rising Income after level 2xPvInc, from College to Post
College, offers weak evidence for Food Elite behavior in Income x Male Educ.
Table 18c presents CMEs in Sale for Income-Level by Race/Hispanic sub-groups,
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Race/Hispanic levels
across Income levels we see combined totals of the values that vary significantly, with only 6 of
29 CMEs in Sale lower than the relatively low 5xPvIncWhite reference sub-group. Hispanic HHs
are only slightly more responsive on average than non-Hispanic HHs to Sale, having also
displayed the least reactivity for CMEs in Price. Other Race HHs are a bit more positive, but
even White HHs, who host the base sub-group have an average response four times larger. AfrAmer HHs are a third more responsive than White HHs in average CME in Sale for the group,
with notably high responsiveness for HfPvInc (311), which is twice the next nearest Afr-Amer
CME in Sale (156). Asian HH’s display the most extreme reaction of any group in any CME
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comparison, with the lowest CME (439 for 1xPvInc) being nearly half again the next highest
non-Asian CME in the table (311 in Afr-Amer). The CME in Sale for 3xPvInc Asian is three
times the next nearest non-Asian CME in the table. Asian HHs are extremely positive in Sale.
CMEs in Sale that fall in Income depict lower-Income HHs as preferring Sale more than higherIncome HHs. All racial groups rise in Income by 2x2 comparison, except for Other Race and
Afr-Amer HHs, the latter driven by the relatively large HfPvInc CME. Except for Hispanic HHs,
there is an exceptionally large quantity preference in HfPvInc versus 1xPvInc across racial
groups (the largest in every Race group but Asian) – meaning that the lowest-Income HHs have
strong positive Sale responses. This same HfPvInc group in contrast with 1xPvInc for CMEs in
Price was relatively unresponsive, so the poorest HHs specifically seek Sale for budget
management in sCSD purchase. The highest average on the right side is for 3xPvInc, but this is
strongly driven by the 951-ounce Asian HH CME, the group high in 3xPvInc, and to a lesser
extent by the strangely polar values in Hispanic HHs, the group low in HfPvInc.
Despite the high group total for HfPvInc, the modest average drop from 4x- to 5xPvInc
across racial groups and a comparison of the lowest two versus upper two Income level totals
(bold) do not support an Income-based Food Elite argument.
Table 18d presents CMEs in Sale for Income-Level by Household Size sub-groups,
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed HH Size levels
across Income levels we see that combined totals for groups are in a tight range compared to the
previous three tables, rising strictly by HH size from HHsize=1 255 to HHsize=4 651. This is a
clear but un-insightful effect that confirms the efficacy of the data and model structure, and a
relatively uniform Sale response in HH Size. For HH Sizes 1 and 3 lower Income HHs respond
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more strongly to Sale, for a 2x2 result “falling in Inc.” Only HHsize=3 rises in Income in 2x2
comparison, with HHsize=4 flat. On the right side, the HfPvIncHHsiz1 CME is relatively large
enough to show higher Sale response for smaller HHs given a fixed level of Income of HfPvInc,
but all other Income groups react as expected, with larger HHs having larger average CMEs in
Sale. Across these Income levels there is no particular rise or preference, but the lower three
Income levels average 92 ounces, a somewhat larger Sale response than the upper three Income
levels, with their average of 84 ounces. This seems to corroborate results from the first three Sale
CME tables here (18a–18c).
Table 18e presents CMEs in Sale for Income-Level by Number of Kids in HH subgroups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding
the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 5xPvIncNoKids
reference sub-group is highly responsive to Sale, with all but two of the other 22 CMEs in Sale
negative, often buying between 2 and 8 liters less per purchase. The “falls in Inc” shows
significant preference for Sale by lower-Income HHs versus higher in all but OneKids HHs.
TwoKids HHs are the least responsive to Sale by a large margin, based on group averages. On
the right side, there is no consistent rise or fall in response by Income group, and the preference
for Sale by lower-Income HHs is not evident in a bottom-three, top-three average of Income
group totals. Sale responsiveness oddly drops in rising # of Kids in HH in HfPv-, 3x- and
4xPvInc groups, and fails to rise in 2xPvInc, counter to any expectation that rising HH budgetary
pressures in rising # of Kids might provoke more Sale-seeking. For some reason HHs with fewer
Kids tend to respond more to Sales, although reactions either way are in an extremely tight
percentage range compared to all other 2x2 comparisons, tending to stay around 40% or less (last
column). One explanatory hypothesis would be HHs with more Kids not buying large amounts
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on Sale because they purchase replacement stocks on a regular schedule, not waiting for sale
incidents to stock up.
Table 18f presents CMEs in Sale for Income-Level by Female Age Level sub-groups,
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Female Age Level
across Income levels we see that combined totals for groups have a tempered span as HH Size
did (-131 to 128), meaning that controlling for Sale effect, Female Age does not identify
particularly distinctive behavior across Age group levels. But there are consistencies that appear
having controlled for the more dynamic Education and racial group factors. Group averages rise
strictly in Age level from -22 to 26 ounces per purchase – there is rising positive response to Sale
in Age level. By 2x2 comparison, there is strict preference for Sale across all Fem Age groups
among lower-Income HHs, consistent with HH Size and # of Kids tables. The right-side Age
group averages do not rise or fall in pattern. CMEs in Sale that rise by 2x2 comparison for fixed
Income level across Age are largest for lower-Income groups (HfPvInc 146, 2xPvInc 164, versus
3xPvInc 7, and 4xPvInc 130). The flat 1xPvInc and falling 5xPvInc 2x2 comparison groups
change by small margins. More experienced Female HHHs tend to prefer Sale purchases to their
younger counterparts.
Table 18g presents CMEs in Sale for Income-Level by Male Age Level sub-groups,
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Male Age Level
across Income levels we see that combined totals strictly fall from 329 to 98, meaning that
including any Sale effect, younger Male HHHs purchase more ounces when they buy – exactly
opposite the case for Female HHHs across Age levels. This Age-based effect is confirmed on the
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right side with all but the upper-most Income level falling in 2x2 comparison in rising Age. On
the left side, the 40-50 and 50-65 Age groups purchase more in rising Income, while the younger
groups do not. There is no strict rise or fall in Income level, but there is modest support for a
positive income effect when comparing the three lower-Income level group averages with the
three higher-Income level group averages. The highest-Income group has the only negative
group average (-10), offering modest support for an Income-based Food Elite if the effect is
measured after 4xPvInc.
Table 18h presents CMEs in Sale for Female HHH Education-Level by Number of Kids
in HH sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table,
and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The
FmPostCollegNoKids reference sub-group is relatively low in Sale response, with only three
lower CMEs in Sale of the other 15. Holding the # of Kids in HH fixed, there is strict rise across
Fem HHH Educ level averages to Two Kids (17 to 177), then a drop in average of 150 ounces.
All fixed-#-of-Kids groups fall in rising Female Educ in 2x2 comparison, indicating a consistent
education effect, even with Sale. On the right side, Female Less HS have a group average (165)
almost twice as high as the next nearest average (Post College 87). These highest- and lowestEducation groups are most consistently positive in Sale response. The two lower Education
groups together have an average (121) much higher than the two highest Education groups
averaged together (76), indicating more Sale response in lower Education HHs. Average CME in
Sale rises in the # of Kids for Less HS, Some College and College in much higher amounts (the
highest being for Less HS) than HS and Post College fall in # of Kids by 2x2 comparison. The
positive Sale effect tends on average to rise in # of Kids across all Female Educ levels, but the
largest such effect in ounces is by far for Less HS.
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Table 18i presents CMEs in Sale for Male HHH Education-Level by Number of Kids in
HH sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. As for Female
Educ x # of Kids, the MPostCollegNoKids reference sub-group is relatively low in Sale
response, with only three lower CMEs in Sale of the other 15. Averages by # of Kids group
across Male Educ levels are fairly tight in range (119 to 131), except for a fall by half for
ThreeKids. By 2x2 comparison, all such groups fall in Education meaning lower-educated Male
HHHs respond more to Sale, just as for Female HHHs. (The same was true in IncomexEduc
interaction CMEs in Sale only for Female HHs). On the right side, the lower two Education
levels averaged together (188) are substantially higher than the higher two Education levels
averaged together (25), meaning a clearly higher response to Sale in lower-educated Male HHH
homes, indicative of a clear education effect. For any fixed Male Education level, there is no
preference for Sale in rising # of Kids. As noted by CME in Sale ThreeKid HHs are relatively
unresponsive. Response in Male College is strikingly wan (average 2 ounces) relative to other
Education levels, but Post College (48) is also below half the next-highest group average. Male
HHHs with HS Educ (average 211 ounces) are the big responders in Sale.
Table 18j presents CMEs in Sale for Female HHH Education-Level by Race/Hispanic
sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. Holding racial
group fixed across Fem Educ levels, all full group CMEs are mixed, except Asian HHs which are
strongly negative, nearly offsetting the extreme positive responses in Table 18c. All group
averages by racial group are negative compared to the obviously highly responsive
FmPostCollgEdWhite reference sub-group. White HHs are only slightly negative (-3), with Afr-
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Amer (-37) much more so, but more than an order of magnitude below Asian HHs (-712).
Against non-Hispanic HH reactions in Sale, the CME in Sale average for Hispanic HHs is 20
ounces less per purchase. All groups rise in response in rising Female Education, demonstrating
that higher-educated Female HHHs value Sale purchases more. This is confirmed by averaging
the lowest two Education group averages versus the highest two on the right side. The effect is
opposite that noticed for Female Education in Table 18a, but seems to be of too small a
magnitude to completely offset it. Effects must be agglomerated to full HH characteristic sets to
tease out such answers. On the right side, the least responsive Fem Educ level across racial
groups is Less HS (-269), and the most responsive in Sale is College (-118), with the other levels
fairly close in average group CMEs in Sale (-191 to -199).
Table 18k presents CMEs in Sale for Male HHH Education-Level by Race/Hispanic subgroups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding
the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The CME group totals and
averages are less sharp than in 18j, with the Asian Male HHH average (-36) quite staid compared
to the Female HHH average of -711. By 2x2 comparison, Asian Male HHHs fall in rising Educ,
whereas the other racial groups rise as Female HHHs do, indicating that higher-educated HHHs
prefer Sale more than lower-educated HHHs. Also, as with Female HHHs, averaging the lowest
two Education group averages versus the highest two on the right side demonstrates the same
effect, the lowest response to Sale by far being at the lowest level of Education.

5.5.2.c

2x2 Comparisons and 2x2 Inverse Comparisons of CMEs in Advertising
As may be assessed by consulting Table A-3 (or the corresponding letter tables between

Price and Advertising CME table series 17 and 19), the magnitudes of CMEs comprised of an
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mfx-adjusted ME for a demographic-demographic sub-group and the ME for a continuous
marketing variable ME for the same sub-group tend to be the same or smaller in Advertising
versus Price, and for some groups, often of the same sign relative to the reference sub-group. The
contours of analysis by set in the 19-series tables will therefore often parallel the analysis of the
17-series tables, but there are key differences. The third phase of this analysis is presented here,
followed by prediction tables grouped by combinations of marketing-variable CMEs in realistic
HH characteristic configurations.
Table 19a presents CMEs in Advertising for Income-Level by Female HHH EducationLevel sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table,
and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The
5xPvIncFmPostCollege reference sub-group is relatively low in CME in Advertising, as only 4
of 29 values are negative, 3 of them in HfPvInc. For fixed Female Educ levels across Income
levels we see averages of the values in an Education group that fall from 227 to 19. The fall is
not linear, but it is mostly one-directional, save for the small rise in total from HS to Some
College. A strictly one-directional fall in group totals on the left side would indicate an
unambiguously strong education effect, and we almost have that here. Most of the change occurs
in the drop between Less HS (227) and HS (107), then there is a modest rise from HS to Some
College (114), and a then a fall of roughly half to College (65), and a further fall of roughly twothirds to Post College (19). The group total quantities in ounces for each group (from 1361 to 96)
parallel the differences between groups. Thus accounting for any Advertising effect, Female
HHHs with the lowest Education level purchase much more than any other Fem Educ group,
with a steep drop to High School, and very clear drops in higher Education after Some College.
Within each Fem Educ group, compared to the bottom two Income sub-groups, the top two
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Income sub-groups purchase more by CMEs in Advertising. Thus all groups “rise in Income,”
confirming a positive income effect.
Given the core variable ME patterns which the marketing-variable marginal effects
append, this pattern follows the Price reactions fairly closely. However, the severe drop in
average CME from Less HS to HS is much smaller in Advertising, meaning a more uniform
effect across lower Fem Educ levels, with the CME effect clearly higher for the lowest Educ
level versus the 5xPvIncFmPostCollg reference sub-group. That the averages by group are
higher in the first four Education-level groups is anticipated given that Price reactions should
tend negative and Advertising reactions positive given the same reference sub-group for both.
The strong drops in average from Less HS to HS, and from Some College to Post College may
indicate that the positive quantity association between weekly Advertising and the same week’s
purchase tapers sharply in effect when levels of higher critical thinking ability emerge. The fact
that 2x2 comparison shows purchase quantities falling in Education for every Income level
supports this hypothesis. But the result is not so simple, as by 2x2 comparison all Education
groups rise in Income. This suggests a positive income effect that refuses unanimous evidence of
a pure education effect for CMEs in Advertising for Female HHHs by Income and Educ levels.
In the right half of the table, Income level is fixed, with each level spanning Fem Educ
levels. A strictly one-directional rise in group totals on the right side would indicate an
unambiguously strong income effect. There is no clear rise in purchase quantity by group
averages (-25 to 205) across the six Income levels, or even in lower-three versus upper-three
averages across groups. Any income effect is therefore weak, with less evidence than for the
education effect. The average fall by 2x2 comparison in Education is larger than the average rise
by 2x2 comparison in Income, which further supports a dominant education effect reducing

203

purchase in rising Advertising. We know from Tables 17a and 18a that Less HS tends negative
versus the base group, and 1xPvInc and 4xPvInc tend to be high versus the base group. The level
totals between 17a and 19a for Income levels demonstrate parallel changes between levels
(roughly +15-20 ounces in 19a). Comparing Advertising effect in 19a to the Price effect in 17a,
there is no drop off from 3x- to 4x- to 5xPvInc as there was from Some College to Post College
in average CME. Thus the clear effect in rising to the top levels of Education that reduces
relative purchase in Advertising CME does not hold in rising to the top levels of Income. The
Advertising effect holds fairly consistently across Income levels while there is a drop off in
effect at upper Education levels. This indicates the negative education effect is dominant despite
a clear positive income effect, and may support an Education-based Food Elite. Both
observations have policy implications.
Table 19b presents CMEs in Advertising for Income-Level by Male HHH EducationLevel sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table,
and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The
5xPvIncMPostCollege reference sub-group is relatively high in CME in Advertising, as only 6 of
29 values are positive, so we may first surmise that upper Income & Education Male HHHs are
relatively more responsive to Advertising than the same elite group of Female HHHs. For fixed
Male Educ levels across Income levels we see a steep fall between an average of the first two
group averages (3, -65), and the top two group averages (-107, -59), demonstrating an education
effect, although a weaker one than the near-linear drop seen in the last table. Also unlike the last
table, this negative education effect is not undermined by any apparent positive income effect.
Only one of the five Education levels rises in Income in 2x2 comparison, and there is no pattern
or low-versus-high Income contrast on the right side of the table indicating an income effect.
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Supporting the education effect on the right side, every Income level falls by 2x2 comparison in
Education, with five of these six falls larger in magnitude than the only rise in Income on the left
side. So as for Female HHHs, Male HHHs display a negative response in purchase and
advertising CME in rising Education. There is no parallel support for inference of an Educationbased Food Elite.
Table 19c presents CMEs in Advertising for Income-Level by Race/Hispanic subgroups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding
the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 5xPvIncWhite
reference sub-group is neither high nor low in CME in Advertising, as 11 of the 22 Race CMEs
that refer to it are positive. Hispanic HHs across Income levels are uniformly less responsive
than non-Hispanics in CME in Advertising. As a reminder, holding the reference sub-group fixed
for both, CMEs in Advertising should raise group averages versus CMEs in Price. Against racial
group averages in 17c, here Hispanic HHs fall by 7 ounces, White HHs fall by 6 ounces, Other
Race falls by 4 ounces, Asian HHs have no significant difference, and Afr-Amer HHs rise 1.5
ounces. This result does not depict Afr-Amer HHs having a clearly positive response to
Advertising, because both CMEs in Advertising and Price are negative relative to the base subgroup. In fact, the relative positive means that Afr-Amer HHs are less responsive to Price
changes than the base sub-group to a greater degree than they are less responsive to Advertising
changes than the base sub-group. None of these results suggest strong consistent behavior
defined by the racial group characteristic.
Applying the same cross-table comparison to Income levels, the group average falls for
HfPvInc (28-ounce drop) and 1x- and 3xPvInc (16- and 2-ounce drops), and rises slightly in
5xPvInc (2 ounces), more in 4xPvInc (7 ounces), and much more in 2xPvInc (19 ounces).
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2xPvInc seems to be the big positive responder to Advertising across all of 19c – but the effect is
isolated, not trending through lower Income groups, as seen by the largest response, the 28ounce drop versus the 17c average for HfPvInc. Middle- and higher-Income HHs seem to
respond roughly the same or more positively than lower Income HHs, evident if we now split the
lowest two groups versus the upper four, as empirical results suggest we should. There is as yet
no support that lower-Income HHs are more positive-quantity-purchase responsive than middleor higher-Income HHs to Advertising, while there is some support that lower-educated HHHs are
more positive in response to Advertising than higher-educated HHHs. If this holds through
further analysis, policy implications must follow.
Table 19d presents CMEs in Advertising for Income-Level by Household Size subgroups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding
the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 5xPvIncHHsiz1
reference sub-group is relatively low in CME in Advertising, with only one sub-group in HH
Sizes larger than 1 having a negative CME. Against HH Size and Income group averages in 17d,
here all fall in Advertising CME versus Price CME, except that HHsize=4, HfPvInc, and
5xPvInc differ by only two ounces from their 17d averages. Despite the low base sub-group
value, HH Size does not seem to be identifying a purchase response in Advertising, except for a
counterintuitively negative move from the Price CME averages, when theory predicts a positive
move in Advertising. Still, quantity rises by 2x2 comparison in growing HH Size at every
Income level except HfPvInc, where it is flat. Evidence for an income effect on the left side is
split, and is mixed on the right, except that CME average for the lower three Income levels are
one-fifth higher when averaged (69) than the average for the top three Income levels (60), so any
income effect is negative in Advertising. This underscores that Adv x Income x HH Size results
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should serve to cushion any conclusions as to the effects of Advertising, a result in line with
previous caveats about interaction with this particular variable, in its marginal “weekly” form.
Table 19e presents CMEs in Advertising for Income-Level by Number of Kids in HH
sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The
5xPvIncNoKids reference sub-group is lower than other NoKids Income-level CMEs and lowerIncome CMEs for HHs with Kids, but generally higher than CMEs for higher-Income levels in
HHs with Kids. Comparing # of Kids group averages with the averages in 17e, averages rise
NoKids (20), One- and TwoKids (5, 15), and fall (ThreeKids -18). Only by combining the HH
Size and # of Kids (per the prediction tables) would it be clear whether there is positive response
in Advertising, but some of the confusing negatives in HH Size now seem reversible. All levels
fall in Inc, meaning that lower Income HHs have higher CMEs in Advertising, the effect noted as
missing in discussion of 19c. This again stresses that while 2-value CMEs do offer useful
insights, only HH-realistic combinations of characteristics can overcome complexity of results
and contrast purchase quantities with fewer caveats. The negative income effect is confirmed by
averaging the lower three Income level averages on the right side with the upper three – lowerIncome HHs are much more responsive in CMEs in Advertising than upper-Income HHs.
This may be an important indication of parenting styles differing for higher-Income
HHHs, if differencing the Advertising CME averages from the Price CME averages – which
would control for the portion of quantities independent of marketing variable interaction –
confirm the differences. The Advertising CME Income group averages rise or fall versus the
Price CME averages in ounces: HfPvInc (+25); 1xPvInc (+19); 2xPvInc (-7); 3xPvInc (+2);
4xPvInc (+1); 5xPvInc(-14). When attempting to control for purchase quantities by demographic
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sub-group without a marketing-variable-interaction effect, the lower two Income levels separate
from the flat or negative middle- and upper-Income groups with strong positive CME averages in
Advertising, opposite the Adv x Income x racial group set. Evidence that lowest-Income HHs do
respond more positively to Advertising than their higher-Income counterparts is growing, and
there is some support for purchase differences by parent HHHs between lower-Income HHs and
middle- or upper-Income HHs. But net results remain mixed, with the negative and positive
cross-table quantities for the lowest Income groups roughly cancelling each other out between
racial groups and Kids in HH. Again, prediction tables are the better tool for testing hypotheses
that include more than two HH characteristics.
Table 19f presents CMEs in Advertising for Income-Level by Female Age Level subgroups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding
the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 5xPvIncFmAge50-65
reference sub-group is lower than most lower Income-level CMEs and higher than two-thirds of
the higher-Income CMEs. Comparing Fem Age group averages with the averages in 17f,
averages rise modestly in CMEs in Advertising versus CMEs in Price: <30 (+4), 30-40 (+1), 4050 (+1), and 50-65 (+4). All groups fall in Income in 2x2 comparison, indicating a stronger
positive effect for lower- versus higher-Income HHs in Fem Age groups. Again cross-table
comparison of averages for groups by Income levels shows the lowest two Income levels rising
more than any other group falls. The middle- and upper-Income groups fall by around 3 ounces,
save 3xPvInc which rises 4 ounces, versus nearly an 8-ounce rise for 1xPvInc, and 11 ounces for
HfPvInc. Evidence that lower-Income HHs respond most positively by CMEs in Advertising
continues to grow. All Income levels in 19f rise in Fem Age, except 1xPvInc. I offer no
hypothesis as to why Advertising effects should rise or fall in Age once other characteristics are

208

controlled for. I do not claim this reflects cumulative Advertising effect extending beyond the
data set.
Table 19g presents CMEs in Advertising for Income-Level by Male Age Level subgroups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding
the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 5xPvIncMAge50-65
reference sub-group is lower than all but 4 other CMEs. Comparing Male Age group averages
with the averages in 17g, averages fall modestly in CMEs in Advertising versus CMEs in Price
across all Age groups and Income levels, the smallest fall being for Male Age 40-50 (-1), and the
largest for 4xPvInc (-8). Male Age <30 and 50-65 rise in Income by 2x2 comparison (40, 60),
meaning larger Advertising responses in higher Incomes, and fall as all the groups in Female
Age do, for 30-40 (-30) and 40-50 (-7). By 2x2 comparison in fixed Income level across Male
Age level, there is a mix of three rising and three falling in Male Age, but the magnitudes of falls
are much larger than for rises, weakly supporting a more positive Advertising effect in lower
Income HHs. This weak inference favoring more purchase in lower-Income HHs is confirmed by
comparing the three averages at lower Income levels versus the three highest.
Table 19h presents CMEs in Advertising for Female HHH Education-Level by Number
of Kids in HH sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the
table, and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The
FmPostCollgNoKids reference sub-group is relatively responsive in CME in Advertising, higher
than all but 5 of the 19 other CMEs. Comparing # of Kids group averages with the averages in
17h, averages fall in CMEs in Advertising versus CMEs in Price across NoKids, OneKids, and
TwoKids (-24, -7, -13), and rise for ThreeKids (17). Given that Advertising CMEs are expected
to rise versus Price CMEs, this is a strong negative reaction for all but the ThreeKids group.
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Whereas in 19a all Income levels fall in rising Education, here the rise in quantity for TwoKids
and ThreeKids in rising Education are larger in magnitude together than the falls in Education of
NoKids and OneKids, tempering the education effect noted above. Comparing the 17h fixed
Female Education level averages versus these, Less HS and Post College rise (+18, +13), while
HS, Some College and College fall (-17, -16, -14), leaving no clear pattern to characterize the
effect of Fem Educ level effect in Advertising across # of Kids. The two lower Educ levels
together have a smaller combined average (-35) than the two highest Educ levels (-16),
suggesting a larger Advertising effect at higher Fem Educ levels, but the magnitude of this is too
small to offset the very large difference (roughly +165 for the lower two Educ levels, and +42
for the higher two) in 19a. The negative Female Education effect persists despite this tempering.
All groups rise in 2x2 comparison of effect in rising # of Kids, except HS Educ, which displays a
larger Advertising effect with fewer Kids in HH.
Table 19i presents CMEs in Advertising for Male HHH Education-Level by Number of
Kids in HH sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the
table, and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The
MPostCollgNoKids reference sub-group is the least responsive sub-group in CME in Advertising
by far, with every CME above +25. Comparing # of Kids group averages with the averages in
17i, averages rise in CMEs in Advertising versus CMEs in Price across all levels, by 10 to 13
ounces, as may be predicted, but opposite the effect in all but ThreeKids for Female Educ.
Consistent with 19b, where all Income levels fall in rising Education, here all but ThreeKids fall
in rising Education, confirming an education effect for CMEs in Advertising. The rise in
ThreeKids is significant, suggesting that for this group the Advertising effect does break from
the others and is more positive for higher-educated Male HHHs. Comparing the 17i fixed Male
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Education level averages versus these, all groups rise except HS which falls by 7 ounces. Less
HS and Some College rise by 20 ounces, a larger effect than the 16- and 7-ounce rises for
College and Post-College, again supporting a negative quantity effect in rising Male Education
for CMEs in Advertising. By 2x2 comparison on the right side of the table, the rises and falls in
rising # of Kids are mixed, in the 20-30 ounce range, suggesting little, just as for Female Educ
levels in the same comparison.
Table 19j presents CMEs in Advertising for Female HHH Education-Level by
Race/Hispanic sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the
table, and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The
FmPostCollgWhite reference sub-group is relatively neutral in CME in Advertising, lower than
most values in White and Afr-Amer, but far greater than CMEs in Asian. Comparing racial
group averages with the averages in 17j, here White HHs rise slightly (+1), Afr-Amer HHs fall
by 5 ounces (over half given the low magnitude in Price), Other Race is flat (one CME), and
Asian HHs rise by 6 ounces, or around 2%. Hispanic HHs fall slightly (-1). So only Asian HHs
rise slightly in Advertising reactivity versus Price reactivity compared to the base sub-group. All
racial groups rise in Education by 2x2 comparison, undermining previous results supporting a
negative education effect in Advertising. Holding racial group fixed across Fem Educ levels, the
differences from group averages in 17j are small, ranging from -7 ounces for Less HS, to +5
ounces for College, with the other differences in the 1-to-2 range plus or minus. The results
slightly favor a positive effect in rising Education, but not enough to upset previous findings.
Table 19k presents CMEs in Advertising for Male HHH Education-Level by
Race/Hispanic sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the
table, and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The

211

MPostCollgWhite reference sub-group is relatively high in CME in Advertising, higher than all
but 3 CMEs of the 15 others in Race. Comparing racial group averages with the averages in 17k,
here White HHs rise slightly (+2), Afr-Amer HHs fall by 4 ounces, Other Race falls by half (12
ounces, one CME), and Asian HHs fall by 13 ounces. Hispanic HHs rise slightly (3). By 2x2
comparison, Asian and Hispanic HHs fall in rising Educ, whereas Afr-Amer HHs react more in
Advertising with rising level of Education, and the White difference is not significant. Holding
racial group fixed across Male Educ levels, the differences from group averages in 17k are
mixed, ranging from -16 ounces for Less HS, to -3 and -4 for HS, Some College, and Post
College, and +6 for College. The results favor a positive effect in rising Education a bit stronger
than for Female HHHs, but as for Female Educ across racial groups, not enough to upset
previous support for a negative education effect.

5.5.3

Prediction – REFINED, Combined Marginal Effects Tables
For the BASIC and BROAD models, prediction tables for CME in Price were presented

for demonstration. REFINED prediction tables will be presented for CMEs in all three marketing
variables. Prediction from estimation should provide a more dynamic range as variables become
more narrowly defined and the averaging of effect occurs over less broadly defined distributions.
The span in predicted weekly purchase amounts in ounces for the HHsize=4 BASIC prediction
for CMEs in Price (Table 10a) was 148, as expected wider than the 121 from Table 3 data
averages on positive purchase weeks, yet still fairly narrow. In 15a, the BROAD model
prediction table for CMEs in Price, the span was 222, much more flexible than the BASIC
prediction range for the same HH profile. The spans for REFINED HHsize=4 in the Price tables
is 616, for HHsize=4 in the Advertising tables is 655, and for HHsize=4 in the Sale tables is 664
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– all far more flexible than previous specifications. Expanding from even the BROAD prediction
tables, there are now a number of cells over 350, incidences over 550, and cells with values less
than one hundred, and even negative, of course all still relative to the reference characteristic
assumptions. All extreme-type values are marked in all prediction tables: 25%-shaded totals are
350+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals
are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
Much more of the dynamics of behavior between different HH types is captured in the
REFINED specification. The shackles of strict incremental rise or fall between Income or
Education level are gone, as are the fixed increments between racial groups regardless of Income
or Education level. Each sub-group reacts independently of other sub-groups, even if they share
common elements. Responses different from base-group assumptions stand now in sharper relief.

5.5.3.a

Prediction – REFINED, Combined Marginal Effects Tables in Price
Table 20a presents household-realistic predictions of purchase response by demographic

group and that group’s reaction to a rise in Price (“CMEs in Price”) relative to a reference subgroup. Every cell holds fixed HHsize=4, # of Kids=2, Age of HHHs Fem/Male=40-50, and the
constant is added, as for the first prediction tables in BASIC and BROAD. Cells differ by
Income level, Education level, and racial group, depending on their placement in the grid. The
unique combination of reference-group assumptions to which all the cells are relative is not a
combination presented in any of the prediction table configurations: 5xPvInc, (Fem/Male) Post
College, White, Non-Hispanic, HH Size=1, No Kids, (Fem/Male) Age 50-65. The reference
group for season, “spring” is assumed. Changing the season to summer would raise every cell
value by 26.7 ounces.
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In the first BROAD model CME in Price table, there were eight (25%-)shaded cells,
demonstrating high predicted purchase for the lowest Income level, but more strongly predicting
high purchase for the lowest Education level across fixed Income levels 1xPvInc and 4xPvInc.
None of the shaded cells were in the Hispanic columns. Here in 20a, 19 of the 88 cells are over
350 ounces in purchase. By percentage of cells in (half-)column or (half-)row, Hispanics (vs.
non-Hispanics) are the big purchasers when accounting for reaction to higher Price. This was not
clear looking at isolated MEs, and certainly not clear at the BASIC and BROAD levels (nor does
it hold for all three marketing variable prediction table sets). There is a clear insensitivity to Price
in Hispanic HHs that was not as perceptible in less sophisticated specifications.
Next by percentage in column or row it is clear that Less High School HHs are least
Price-sensitive of the Education levels, with HS a distant second: lower Education HHHs are
least Price-sensitive. Even the Price-insensitive Hispanic HH reaction strictly becomes less
positive in rising Education in the bottom half of the table (without falling from HS to Some
College at 4xPvInc). Hispanic HS Ed has 4 of 6 Income levels 25%-shaded, and Hispanic
College has but 1 of 6. This is a gradient display of the rough effect evident across the top half of
the table where every corresponding cell quantity drops from HS Ed to College Ed.
Next by percentage in column or row are HfPvInc x HS Ed (3 of 4), and 5xPvInc x HS
Ed (3 of 4), both in the upper-left quadrant. Both Income levels are insensitive to Price, but the
average of the four cells at HfPvInc is over 20 ounces higher than the 5xPvInc average (377
versus 355). 1x- and 2xPvInc each have 2 cells over 350 across the row, whereas 3x- and
4xPvInc do not. Lower-Income HHs are less Price sensitive than middle-Income HHs, but not
less Price-sensitive than upper-Income HHs ($100k/yr+). Perhaps the upper Income HHs no
longer consider sCSDs to be a portion of the HH budget worthy of concern, or perhaps they do
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not let Price increases on so small a budgetary item affect their purchase schedule or purchase
whims as middle-Income HHs relatively seem to. It is possible that the lower-Income HHs
behavior is not economically rational, because it is so much less Price responsive than the
reference sub-group. This might indicate habitual behavior trumping economic behavior. It is
also possible that the behavior is rational in buying more at a higher relative price, because the
higher margin paid is less than the search cost of matching a lower price given a pre-existing
commitment to purchase.
Next by percentage in column or row is White in HS Ed (3 of 6), whose cell values are
higher than Afr-Amer at every row in the table, so White HHs are less Price sensitive than Afr
Amer HHs. There are a few values for single MEs in Income and Education x racial group where
Afr-Amer MEs are higher or very close, but these have all been overturned because Afr-Amer
HHs are generally more Price-sensitive than White HHs. White HHs are less Price-sensitive than
Asian HHs at lower Income levels, and more Price-sensitive at higher levels. Asian HHs are
exceptionally Price sensitive for the lower three Income levels at fixed College Education, and at
the upper three education levels in fixed 1xPvInc, falling below 100 in these combinations (for 6
cells in Asian <100 ounces, the 10%-shaded cells, with one duplicate). At the higher fixed level of
Income, Hispanic HHs have an extreme taper in higher Education levels, generating the only
other sub-100 CME in 20a. The combination of high Income and high Education triggers a
reversal of purchase response in Hispanic HHs from the highest value in the table at Less HS
1xPvInc, to one of the lowest in the table at 4xPvInc Post College. Comparing changes in Income
level versus changes in Education level in Hispanic half-columns, the education effect is the
stronger driver of this extreme taper in predicted quantity.
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Moving now from the prevalence of exceptional predicted quantities to within- and crossquadrant analysis, in fixed HS Ed & fixed College Ed across Income levels (top half of table) all
racial group HHs are less Price sensitive (have higher average quantities) at the lower three
Incomes than the higher three, except Asian HHs. This may indicate stronger habit in purchase
behavior or reduced access to price-competitive purchase venues. In Price sensitivity, the income
effect is negative for all racial group HHs but Asian HHs. Asian HHs are more sensitive to Price
at higher education levels, and far less sensitive at either lower education levels or higher (top
three) Income levels. Separating sex of HHH will provide more evidence to analyze this
apparently anomalous Asian HH behavior. By Income-level-racial-group combination, every
CME is greater in HS (top-left) than College (top-right), with drops of 150 ounces common,
strongly underscoring an education effect. There are 10 CMEs in fixed HS over 350, but only 1
in fixed College. Averaging the values in the top-left (HS) quadrant and subtracting the average
from the top-right (College) quadrant, HS-educated HHs buy 114 more ounces when they buy
than do College-educated HHs.
In the lower-left quadrant there is a strong education effect, but short of a strict fall in
CME in Price for any racial group but Hispanic. In the lower-right quadrant, there is also a
strong education effect, but short of a strict fall in CME in Price for any racial group but White,
with a plateau between two Hispanic Educ levels. All racial groups have much higher CMEs
comparing the lowest two Educ levels to the top two, for 1x- or 4xPvInc quadrants (the gap is
smaller in Afr-Amer at 4xPvInc).
The difference in averages between these two bottom quadrants is HHs with povertylevel-Income for a family of four buying 57 more ounces at purchase than HHs with Incomes
four times the poverty-level-Income for a family of four. If the HS-to-College gap can be directly
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compared to a 4-times-HH-Income gap, we can say by these differences in average that the
education effect in HHs with both sexes of HHHs is dominant, nearly twice the income effect on
purchase – and that is allowing that the income effect in Price is negative, the reverse of
economic expectation (i.e., in the same direction as the education effect).
In fixed Educ level across Income levels (top half), the first observation is that the effect
across Income levels is certainly not linear, and in fact peaks in the HS quadrant at three different
Income levels for four racial groups. This is a strong indictment of the validity of the BASIC
model, and questions the soundness of the BROAD model. Across the rows, every racial group
except Asian HHs falls significantly in CME value from 2x- to 3xPvInc, and from 3x- to 4xPvInc,
and every group including Asian HHs rises significantly from 4x- to 5xPvInc. White and AfrAmer HHs fall significantly from HfPv- to 1xPvInc, but Asian and Hispanic HHs do not. Except
Hispanic HHs all racial groups rise in CME from 1xPvInc to 2xPvInc. The middle Income levels
seem most Price reactive (fewest 25%-shaded boxes in these rows in top half). There is a twist to
the argument for an unexpectedly negative income effect. Splitting the three lower-Income-level
HHs as a separate group from the three upper-Income-level HHs, there is a positive income effect
within the three-level Income groupings for White and Afr-Amer HHs at either fixed education
level, and for Hispanics at the College level. This suggests a possible spline in behavior between
the lower groups and upper groups in Income for certain racial groups.
Which racial group buys most by quadrant and overall when accounting specifically for
Price reactivity in the HHsize=4 combination? For the left quadrants (HS and 1xPvInc) Hispanic
HHs buy more than White HHs. The most reactive is Afr-Amer HHs in HS Ed, and Asian HHs in
1xPvInc (see Table 20d 33). For the right quadrants (College and 4xPvInc): White HHs are less
reactive than Hispanic HHs, with Asian HHs most reactive in College Ed, and Afr-Amer HHs
33

Table numbering order built for parallel numbering between Tables 10a,b,&c; 15a,b,&c; etc.
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most reactive in 4xPvInc. Table-wide highest-to-lowest cell average (least to most Price reactive
in predicted purchase): Hispanic, White, Afr-Amer, Asian. Relative to a common reference subgroup, Asian HHs seem the most economically rational in Price reaction, and Hispanic HHs least.
Table 20b (as 10b and 15b before it) compares the HHsize=3, Two Kids, for Female
ONLY HHHs. There are now only four cells over 350 ounces, and twice as many values under
100 ounces, in addition to the first four negative-value cells. Whereas the HHsize=4 table-wide
span was 616 ounces, the table-wide span here has shrunk to (402-[-65]=) 467 ounces, meaning
that Female HHHs are less different in their Price response than dual-sexed HHH households. In
HHsize=4, Hispanics were the least responsive group. Now Hispanic HHs (2 of 22) are second to
HfPvInc x HS Ed (3 of 4, with HfPvInc in fixed College also relatively high) as least responsive
to Price rises. As in HHsize=4, Hispanic HHs at the three lowest Income levels tend to have high
relative values, as do Hispanic HHs across all Education levels in 1xPvInc. The average for the
first column Hispanic (fixed HS and fixed 1xPvInc, 255) is slightly higher than the HfPvInc
average cross fixed HS and College Educ levels (251). Less HS was second highest by cell values
after Hispanic HHs before, and remains high in fixed 4xPvInc, but not very high in fixed 1xPvInc.
Asian HHs with Female only HHHs are now by far the most responsive in Price of any group,
having only 6 of 22 cells across the four half-columns over 100 ounces, and four cells more
responsive than the base sub-group (with one duplicate). For Female HHHs with Two Kids, Asian
HHs are the most responsive in Price, Hispanic HHs the least, and the difference between White
and Afr-Amer remains significant, but has narrowed considerably from HHsize=4.
As in the HHsize=4 table, across Income levels there is obviously no linear trend, and the
lowest three Income groups are much less responsive – have higher cell values – than the higher
three Income levels (3x3 comparison). The exception is for Asian fixed College, for which there
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is a clear reversal of this rule. All but Asian HHs rise from 3x- to 4xPvInc. Except for White (and
arguably Afr-Amers) HHs in fixed College, there is a large rise in ounces from 4x- to 5xPvInc, so
the clearly lower levels for the upper versus lower three Income levels does not pre-sage an
argument for an Income-based Food Elite.
All racial groups fall in 2x2 comparison of lowest to highest Education levels, except for
fixed 1xPvInc Asian HHs, and a flatness in Afr-Amer at 4xPvInc. This indicates a solid
education effect. But whereas in 20a the span in ounces between lowest and highest Educ levels
(lower half) was much larger than the span in ounces across Income levels (upper half), this is no
longer true in Female only HHHs. Again, the Female only HHHs are outside of HfPvInc more
price-responsive than both-sexed HHHs, but the income effect presents stronger than before,
larger than the education effect in at least this measure. Comparing the 1xPvInc quadrant to the
4xPvInc quadrant shows a rise in CME cell values in the three Race groups, further supporting a
stronger income versus education effect in Female HHHs. For Hispanic HHs, the negative
income effect observed in 20a still holds.
Comparing cell values in the HS quadrant versus the fixed College quadrant, values
uniformly fall for White and Afr-Amer HHs, indicating a solid education effect, but tend to rise
for Asian and Hispanic HHs, failing to support an education effect in this comparative
dimension. Aside from Asian HHs at 1xPvInc, which are already highly responsive in Price, and
Afr-Amer HHs also in 1xPvInc, there is a strong percentage drop off from College to Post
College, perhaps supporting an inference of an Education-based Food Elite. The exception to the
rule for higher-Income highest-education Afr-Amer Female HHHs – who only in Post College
have the highest value across the racial groups – may suggest a sub-cultural influence that could
make information-based policy mechanisms insufficient for some sub-groups.
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In Table 20d for Female only HHH households, the order of totals by racial group across
the table remains as for 20a: Hispanic, White, Afr-Amer, Asian. But in contrast Asian Female
HHHs are most responsive in every quadrant, by a large margin (differences row), and Hispanic
Female HHHs are relatively even less Price reactive than in dual-sexed HHH households,
dominating 3 of the 4 quadrants. This has policy implications.
Table 20c (as 10c and 15c before it) compares the HHsize=3, Two Kids, for Male ONLY
HHHs. Whereas the HHsize=4 table-wide span was 616 ounces, and the 20b table-wide span was
467 ounces, Male HHHs vary from highest-Income Asian HHs (707), to highest-Education
Hispanic HHs (38), for a table-wide span of 669, meaning Male HHHs differ more in their Price
responses than dual-sexed or Female only HHH households.
The striking result is that where before Asian Female HHHs were extremely Price
reactive, Asian Male HHHs are the least Price reactive of any group in the 20-series prediction
tables, with only 6 of 22 cells below 350, and four of these are paired duplicates, one pair at 349.
They are much more Price responsive at the higher two levels of education (2x2 and fixed
College versus fixed HS), but nonetheless display the first very strong positive income effect
(3x3) yet seen. The only other 350+-ounce cells are at lower Income and lower Education levels
for Hispanic HHs. The other racial groups join Asian in a clear negative education effect in 2x2
comparison (Less HS and HS versus College and Post College, lower half). While not uniformly
falling cell-by-cell between fixed HS and fixed College across Income levels and racial groups,
Male HHHs more consistently fall for this fixed incremental rise in Education than do Female
HHHs, demonstrating a solid education effect (weakest at HfPvInc). All racial groups in Male
HHH fall from HS to Some College, and all fall from College to Post College (except Asian at
4xPvInc, to a level well below Less HS and HS), further supporting an education effect.
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Except for Asian HHs, racial groups fall in the upper three Income levels versus the
lower three. Mixed results across quadrants and racial groups do not suggest that the education or
income effect clearly dominates the other in magnitude, but the results are more mixed when
trying to assess a strong income effect (comparing the lower-left to lower-right quadrants),
giving the edge to the more stable education effect.
In Table 20d there is a strong turn in which racial group is least responsive to Price rise.
For Male only HHHs, now Asian HHs stand apart as by far the least responsive in every
quadrant, and overall, and Afr-Amer HHs stand apart as by far the most responsive to Price rise.
The increment between the Asian total across cells and the second-least responsive Hispanic
total (differences, 5257) is larger than the Hispanic total (4946). Asian Male only HHHs do not
care about Price rises, Afr-Amer Male only HHHs do. Hispanic and White HHs are closer in
behavior by this measure to Afr-Amer HHs than to Asian HHs.

5.5.3.b Prediction – REFINED, Combined Marginal Effects Tables in Sale
Table 21a holds fixed the same variables as 20a (15a, and 10a): HHsize=4, # of Kids=2,
Age of HHHs Fem/Male=40-50, and the constant is added in every cell. Cells again differ by
Income level, Education level, and racial group, depending on their placement in the grid, and
refer to the same reference-group assumptions as before: 5xPvInc, (Fem/Male) Post College,
White, Non-Hispanic, HH Size=1, No Kids, (Fem/Male) Age 50-65. The reference group for
season, “spring” is assumed. The difference between 21a and 20a is that the variable and
variable-interacted-with-marketing-variable (2-value) MEs that are combined to make cell values
use the Sale marketing variable instead of the Price marketing variable.
In 20a, 19 of the 88 cells are over 350 ounces in purchase with Price reaction. Here, 16 of
the 88 cells are over 350 ounces in purchase, and again six different values (including less than
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zero, and one duplicate) are less than 100 ounces. This may suggest that there is more uniformity
in reaction versus the reference sub-group than there was in the Price table (20a). This hypothesis
may be tested. Statistics characterizing the figures in the two tables do not support that the Price
table is more variable. The table-wide span in Sale of 662 is higher than the span in Price (616),
and in Sale the table-wide cell average is 258 (st. dev. 118), not closer to zero than the Price
table-wide average of 253 (st. dev. 112). Sale reactions may be more uniform in parts of the
table, but the claim cannot be generalized. HHs are at least as reactive in response to Sale as in
response to Price, possibly more reactive.
By percentage of cells in (half-)column or (half-)row, the entire Less HS row (6 of 8 cells
over 350 ounces) is the most reactive to Sale. There is further a fairly severe drop in magnitude
in the transition to the HS row, across racial groups in fixed 1x- and 4xPvInc, emphasizing the
extremity of the Less HS reaction. Given the large-magnitude negative MEs on Sale interaction
Less HS variables in Table A-3, this result was not clear before prediction analysis.
HfPvInc in fixed HS (3 of 4) is nearly as strong, but the one value under 350 is less than
100, whereas in Less HS the un-shaded cells were still half-column highs or proximal. For fixed
College Ed, HfPvInc is the high value for White and Afr-Amer HHs (making the full HfPvInc
row 4 of 8). So the least Educated and lowest Income as groups are most responsive to Sale.
The next strongest reaction to Sale by percentage in column or row is Asian in fixed HS
Educ (4 of 6). For this same group there is a strong positive (3x3) income effect, but dropping
down to the lower-left quadrant for Asians with fixed 1xPvInc across Education levels, there is a
strong (2x2) education effect as well, arguably stronger. The income effect in Asian HHs is also
apparent comparing the two lower-education cell values across the two lower quadrants, where
there is a rise to values over 350+, but indeed across all Education levels. The parallel
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comparison of the jump from fixed HS to fixed College across Income levels of Asian HHs also
reveals a strong education effect. Asian HHsize=4 simply display both effects strongly.
Next by percentage in column or row are White HHs, with 5 350+ cells of their 22.
Outside of these high-value cells White HH cells in Income and Education level remain larger
than Afr-Amer and Hispanic HHs across the board, with no sub-100-ounce cells. White HHs
follow lower-educated and higher-income Asian HHs in Sale response. Higher-educated Asian
and Hispanic HHs are least reactive to Sale across racial groups, especially at the lower three
Income levels.
Moving now from the prevalence of exceptional predicted quantities to within- and crossquadrant analysis, in fixed HS Ed & fixed College Ed across Income levels (top half of table) all
sub-groups are less responsive to Sale except White 1xPvInc HHs, indicating a solid education
effect. All racial groups fall in 2x2 comparison of Education levels in fixed 1x- and 4xPvInc,
further cementing an education effect (overall fall in purchase quantity including Sale response).
Discernible income effects are less consistent. White and Afr-Amer HHs fall in bottomthree versus top-three Income level comparison in fixed HS and College, while Asian and
Hispanic HHs rise in both Educ levels. Across Education levels in the lower quadrants the move
from 1x- to 4xPvInc demonstrates mixed, low-magnitude changes for White HHs, falls in AfrAmer and Hispanic HHs, but sharp rises in Asian HHs. There is not a consistent income effect
that applies across racial groups or across Educ levels. Across racial groups, consistency gives
the edge to the education effect over the income effect, but this is a weaker claim for Asian HHs.
Which racial group buys most by quadrant and overall when accounting specifically for
Sale reactivity in the HHsize=4 combination? For the fixed HS Educ and fixed 4xPvInc
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quadrants Asian HHs buy more than White HHs (see Table 21d 34). For the fixed College Educ
and fixed 1xPvInc quadrants White HHs buy more than Asian HHs. Across all four quadrants of
21a, White HHs are the most reactive to Sale, followed by Asian HHs, and Hispanic HHs are the
least reactive. Hispanic HH reaction is second highest at the 1xPvInc level.
Table 21b (as 10b, 15b, and 20b before it) compares the HHsize=3, Two Kids, for
Female ONLY HHHs. There are now only 6 cells over 350 ounces, and subtracting duplicates,
three times as many values under 100 ounces, in addition to twice as many negative-value cells.
The table-wide average in Sale for this configuration is 192 (st. dev. 113), lower and tighter than
for HHsize=4 (258, st. dev. 118) in 21a. Sale reactions are more uniform in Female only HHH
households than in dual-sexed HHH households.
The Less HS Educ level (first row in bottom half) was highest in HHsize=4, and for
nearly every half-column in Female only HHH, the Less HS values remain at or near the highest
value in the half-column. But the large purchase responders to Sale in Female HHH only HHs
are in the HfPvInc level (top row). There are large value drops from the Less HS to the HS row,
and from the HfPvInc to the 1xPvInc row, so these more extreme levels do not reflect end points
on continua of strict rise or fall in either Income or Education. As for 21a, comparing the lower 3
Income levels to the higher 3, White and Afr-Amer HHs fall in average quantity by rising
Income type (a negative income effect), and Asian and Hispanic HHs rise in response
considering Sale effect in the higher Income type (a positive income effect). Across racial groups
and education levels moving from fixed 1xPvInc to 4xPvInc, White and Asian HHs rise in
quantity, demonstrating a positive expected income effect, but Afr-Amer and Hispanic HHs fall
in quantity for this fixed rise in Income. Given these two assessments of an income effect, only
34

Table numbering order built for parallel numbering between Tables 10a,b,&c; 15a,b,&c; etc. The racial group
columns are maintained in the same order as for 20a, set from highest to lowest in total quantity across the table. For
ease of comparison, the 20a column order is maintained across the “d-series” racial group tables.
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Asian HHs clearly demonstrate a positive income effect for CMEs in Sale, with other racial
groups rising in one comparison and falling in the other.
There is a nearly cell-by-cell rise across racial and Income groups moving from fixed HS
to fixed College Education – a reverse education effect perhaps indicating a “common sense”
approach to buying more on Sale of a good to which purchase commitment has already been
made. For 2x2 comparison in the lower half of the table, lower-educated HHs tend to purchase
more than higher-educated HHs, except for Asian Female HHs in 1xPvInc. There is a weak
education effect that is not confirmed by both measures. Neither the income nor the education
effect seems dominant in its expected direction in this configuration.
Female only HHH Asian HHs are exceptional in having much lower reaction to Sale than
the White-5xPvInc-PostCollegeEd reference sub-group across 3 of the 5 Education levels and two
of the lower Income levels in fixed HS Ed, but much higher than average reaction for HfPvInc
and 3xPvInc in fixed College level. The combination of low Income and lower Education level in
female-headed Asian HHs seems to sap responsiveness to Sale. In the lower left quadrant (fixed
1xPvInc), the three lower Education levels for Asian HHs are lower in value than for White HHs,
while at the other end of the spectrum in the Income-education combination, the two higher Ed
levels are much higher relative to any other racial group in fixed 4xPvInc. The positive Sale
reaction arises with higher Education level. The many negative cell values across the Female
ONLY HHH tables in the REFINED model indicate lower purchase overall for this group.
In Table 21d, for Female only HHH, we find the only sub-table of any in the d-series
dominated by Afr-Amer HHs. By table-wide totals, there is a significantly larger preference for
Sale purchase in female-headed Afr-Amer HHs than any other, followed about one-tenth less by
White HHs, about 40% less by Asian HHs, and about 50% less by Hispanic HHs (differences).
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Table 21c (as 10c, 15c, and 20c before it) compares the HHsize=3, Two Kids, for Male
ONLY HHHs. There are now 22 cells over 350 ounces, but all in one racial group, and over 20
values under 100 ounces, in addition to 21 negative-value cells. The table-wide average in Sale
for this configuration is 206 (st. dev. 329), a much wider span than for HHsize=4 (258, st. dev.
118) in 21a. Sale reactions are far less uniform in Male only HHH households than in dual-sexed
HHH households or Female only HHH households.
The striking result is that where before Asian Female HHHs tended to be low-responsive
to Sale outside of certain Income levels in College Education, every Male HHH cell is over 350
ounces, and 17 of the 22 Asian cells are over 550 ounces, with two of these over 1000 ounces.
Asian Male HHHs are extremely reactive to Sale compared to the common base sub-group,
when all other racial groups together tend in any half-column to have some or most values less
than 100 ounces. In the HS Ed and 4xPvInc quadrants every Asian Male HH value is above 550,
with a higher average in HS Ed than in 4xPvInc. The magnitudes are stronger by far at the two
lowest Education levels than the two highest (2x2) for Asian HHs in the bottom half of the table,
and this holds for other racial groups at fixed 1xPvInc and 4xPvInc (except not strongly for AfrAmer HHs at the higher fixed Income level). Except for White HfPvInc HHs, all cell values fall
across racial groups and Income levels from the fixed HS to the fixed College quadrant, so there
is clearly a negative education effect in Male HHH households.
As with Female only HHHs, White and Afr-Amer HH quantities fall from the lowest three
Income levels to the upper three (indicating a negative income effect), whereas Asian and
Hispanic quantities rise in the same 3x3 comparison, for a positive income effect. Comparing the
fixed 1x- to 4xPvInc cells across racial groups and Education levels, White, Afr-Amer, and
Hispanic HHs all fall in quantity at the higher Income level, with only Asian HHs rising, and by a
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substantial amount. So White and Afr-Amer HHs demonstrate negative income effects, Hispanic
is split in the two measures, and Asian HHs have a strong positive income effect. As for Female
only HHHs, only Asian HHs show strong education and income effects, with neither clearly
dominant. For the remaining racial groups, the relatively high values at Less HS tend to push the
result that the general education effect weakly dominates the general negative income effect. The
dominance cannot be more than weak, because in the move from the College to Post College row,
every racial group rises in quantity, as all but White College Ed do from 4xPvInc to 5xPvInc. The
income effect seems to dominate the education effect at the highest transitions in Income and
Education level in Male only HHH households.
Also worthy of note are the particularly negative responses to presence of Sale in fixed
College Ed and fixed 4xPvInc for Afr-Amer and Hispanic HHs relative to reference sub-groups.
This either suggests non-economic behavior, which could indicate strongly habitual purchase, or
a lack of access to shopping venues likely to honor national or DMA-wide sales strategies by
manufacturers.
In Table 21d there is a strong turn from 21a and 21b in which racial group is most
responsive to presence of Sale. These are the most obvious results of this kind. Asian HHs
dominate in every quadrant, followed by White HHs in every quadrant, with Afr-Amers more
responsive than Hispanic HHs in the fixed Education quadrants, and less responsive than
Hispanic HHs in the fixed Income quadrants. For Male only HHHs, Asian HH table totals dwarf
table totals for White HHs by over 14,000 CME ounces (differences), with White HHs more than
900 CME ounces over the Afr-Amer and Hispanic HH totals. Hispanic and Afr-Amer HHs are
least responsive in purchase to presence of Sale, with White HHs far more responsive table-wide,
and Asian HHs in a class by themselves in extremely strong Sale purchase. To re-iterate an
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earlier point, any of these racial groups may buy more or less often than another. These CMEs
are constructed from final OLS-side Heckman regression results on positive purchase.

5.5.3.c

Prediction – REFINED, Combined Marginal Effects Tables in Advertising
Table 22a holds fixed the same variables as 20a (and 10a, 15a): HHsize=4, # of Kids=2,

Age of HHHs Fem/Male=40-50, and the constant is added in every cell. Cells again differ by
Income level, Education level, and racial group, depending on their placement in the grid, and
refer to the same reference-group assumptions as before: 5xPvInc, (Fem/Male) Post College,
White, Non-Hispanic, HH Size=1, No Kids, (Fem/Male) Age 50-65. The reference group for
season, “spring” is assumed. The difference between 22a and 20a (21a) is that the variable and
variable-interacted-with-marketing-variable (2-value) MEs that are combined to make cell values
use the Advertising marketing variable instead of the Price (Sale) marketing variable.
In 20a, 19 of the 88 cells are over 350 ounces in purchase with Price reaction. Here, 21 of
the 88 cells are over 350 ounces in purchase, and again six different values (including one
duplicate) are less than 100 ounces. The table-wide span in Advertising of 655 is higher than the
span in Price (616), and in Advertising the table-wide cell average is 269 (st. dev. 116), not
closer to zero than the Price table-wide average of 253 (st. dev. 112). In this configuration, HHs
are at least as reactive in response to Advertising as in response to Price, possibly more reactive.
This result refutes any original conjecture that this data configuration and method were unlikely
to identify an Advertising response in weekly purchase of interesting magnitude.
By percentage of cells in (half-)column or (half-)row, the entire Less HS row (6 of 8 cells
over 350 ounces) is the most reactive to Advertising, with the lower-Income Hispanic cell over
550 ounces. The lowest Education level is the most responsive in purchase to Advertising versus
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the reference sub-group. In fixed HS Ed, HfPvInc and 2xPvInc both have 3 of 4 cells over 350
ounces. Lower Income levels are more responsive to Advertising (the average for 1xPvInc in this
half-row is 340, versus the 342 for 2xPvInc).
The next strongest reaction to Advertising by percentage in column or row is the lefthand side Hispanic column, covering the lowest Educ and Income levels, fixed HS Ed and fixed
1xPvInc (8 of 11). The 550+ value is where the lowest Educ and Income levels cross in Hispanic.
With 3 of 6 cells over 350 ounces, White HHs with fixed HS Ed across Income levels are also
relatively responsive to Advertising versus other groups in the table.
Moving now from the prevalence of exceptional predicted quantities to within- and crossquadrant analysis, in fixed HS Ed & fixed College Ed across Income levels (top half of table) all
racial group HHs are more Advertising sensitive (have higher average quantities) at the lower
three Incomes than the higher three (3x3), except Asian HHs. The difference is not large for
White and Afr-Amer HHs in fixed College. In Advertising, non-Asian lower-Income HHs
respond more to Advertising than upper-Income HHs. The income effect is negative for all racial
group HHs but Asian HHs. The same effect is weakly corroborated comparing the 1xPvInc bloc
to the 4xPvInc bloc, where cell-by-cell across the same Education-level-Income-group
combinations most but not all values fall from the lower to the higher fixed-Income-level
quadrant. These drops are mixed across Education levels in White and Afr-Amer and Asian HHs,
but are over 200 ounces for each Education level in Hispanic. 1xPvInc Hispanic HHs are much
more responsive to Advertising than 4xPvInc Hispanic HHs, or indeed any other sub-group, by a
significant margin. It is worth noting that this very strong effect strictly falls in rising Education
level for the 1xPvInc Hispanic sub-group, ending at about half the quantity response in Post
College than at Less HS. At 4xPvInc the drop in purchase from Less HS to Post College in
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Hispanic is also over 300 ounces per purchase. As the income effect for this very responsive
group is negative, the education effect dominates any positive income effect.
This same story plays out for 2x2 comparison of Education levels across the fixed
Income quadrants, even for Asian HHs, so the education effect tempering Advertising-associated
purchase quantity dominates any positive income effect across all racial groups. This claim is
weaker for Asian HHs than for others, but numerically, the HS Ed quadrant average is 112
ounces higher than the College Ed quadrant average, while the difference between 1xPvInc and
4xPVInc is -80. Both fixed-Income-level quadrant averages are of the unexpected direction and
are smaller in magnitude than the fixed-Education-level quadrants. Education simply dominates.
Which racial group buys most by quadrant and overall when accounting specifically for
Advertising reactivity in the HHsize=4 combination? For the left quadrants (HS and 1xPvInc)
Hispanic HHs buy more than White HHs (see Table 22d 35). For the right quadrants (College and
4xPvInc): White HHs are more reactive than Hispanic HHs. The most reactive overall are
Hispanic HHs, followed by White HHs, with the least reactive to Advertising being Asian HHs.
This is a direct inversion of the most and least reactive racial groups from the 20d Price Analysis
table.
Table 22b (as 10b, 15b, and 20b before it) compares the HHsize=3, Two Kids, for
Female ONLY HHHs. There are now only 4 cells over 350 ounces, and subtracting duplicates,
three times as many values under 100 ounces (including negatives). The table-wide cell average
in Advertising for this configuration is 169 (st. dev. 100), lower and tighter than for HHsize=4
(269, st. dev. 116) in 22a. Advertising reactions are more uniform in Female only HHH
households than in dual-sexed HHH households.

35

Table numbering order built for parallel numbering between Tables 10a,b,&c; 15a,b,&c; etc.
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The HfPvInc half-row in fixed HS Ed (3 of 4) is the most reactive group, followed by
Hispanics in fixed HS Ed and fixed 1xPvInc (2 of 11). Less HS Educ level (first row in bottom
half) was highest in HHsize=4, and now holds 6 of the 8 highest values in the half-columns in
the bottom half of the table, but does not stand out as it did in 22a. The lowest Income HHs in
the second lowest Education level are the most reactive to Advertising in Female HHH only
HHs. In 3x3 Income level comparison, all racial groups fall in purchase from lower to higher
Income, again except Asian HHs. Except for Hispanic HHs however, the increment between the
lower and upper Income groups tends smaller than in previous tables. Particular to the 1xPvInc
bloc versus the 4xPvInc bloc, all non-Hispanic values except White Post College rise, indicating
a positive income effect. The weak negative income effect from a 3x3 comparison brackets a
specific alternative 1xPvInc-4xPvInc comparison that is positive (rising to 4xPvInc) for White,
Afr-Amer and Asian HHs. For Hispanic Female-headed HHs between fixed 1x- and fixed
4xPvInc, there is a strong negative effect at every level of Education, for a negative income
effect.
There is a clear fall in Advertising-associated quantity in 2x2 comparison across Education
levels. But as for the 1x- versus 4xPvInc comparison, the fixed HS Ed cell-by-cell comparisons
with fixed College Ed are mixed, favoring lower values in College, but with numerous exceptions
in non-White HHs. There are income and education effects in Advertising, and because income
effects tend negative, the education effect still dominates, but both effects are less robust than for
Female Only HH CMEs in Price and Sale.
As in Price and Sale Female HHH only prediction tables, Asian HHs are particularly low
magnitude, and display all the negative cells (less responsive than the reference sub-group).
Asian Female only HHs are extremely resistant to any Advertising effect compared to any group
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in any of the 22-series tables. Given the positive income effect for this group however, the
negative values cluster at 1x- and 2xPvInc in fixed HS. In Table 22d for Female only HHHs, we
see the least variance of any sub-table in the order from highest to lowest total table-wide ounces
by racial group. Whites are more responsive than Hispanics in fixed HS and fixed 4xPvInc
quadrants. Other than that, the final order from highest to lowest purchase HHs is Hispanic,
White, Afr-Amer, and Asian, with a large gap between the last two ranks (differences).
Table 22c (as 10c, 15c, and 20c before it) compares the HHsize=3, Two Kids, for Male
ONLY HHHs. There are now 22 cells over 350 ounces, 80% in Asian, and 20% in Hispanic, and
11 values under 100 ounces, including two duplicates. The table-wide cell average in
Advertising for this configuration is 259 (st. dev. 159), a much less uniform reaction for Male
only HHH households than in dual-sexed HHH households or Female only HHH households.
A striking result is that where before Asian Female HHHs tended to be low-responsive to
Advertising outside of certain Income levels in College Education, every Asian Male HHH cell
in fixed HS Educ and fixed 4xPvInc is over 350 ounces, and 60% of the Asian cells in the other
two quadrants (totaling 18 of 22, with of these 4 unique cells) over 550 ounces. Asian Male
HHHs are extremely reactive to Advertising compared to the common base sub-group, but
display highest response in fixed HS Ed. The Hispanic 350+ cells are in the lowest two Income
and Education levels.
In the bottom half of the table the Less HS and HS rows have the next largest number of
350+ cells (3 of 8), and the high values for the half-columns are found in these cells for every
racial group. There is a clear strong education effect across all racial groups in 2x2 comparison
in education. This is supported by weaker falls in magnitude for cell-by-cell comparison from
fixed HS to fixed College, except for HfPvInc White and Afr-Amer HHs.
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In the upper half of the table, 3x3 level comparison across Income in fixed Education
level shows once again that Asian Male HHHs are the exception to the negative income effect
that other racial groups demonstrate. The negative income effect is particularly strong for
Hispanic HHs, and this also holds for the 1xPvInc versus 4xPvInc cell-by-cell comparison. Asian
HH cells rise from 1x- to 4xPvInc, and White and Afr-Amer HHs are mixed. The education
effect dominates the income effect in Advertising for Male only HHHs, as it has for all Male
only HHHs. For Asian HHs demonstrating a positive income effect that directly counters the
negative education effect, a magnitude comparison of the bottom versus top two levels in Income
((592+710)-(551 + 526)) and Education ((538+526)-(282+361)), shows a magnitude change
larger for Education than for Income, confirming an education effect dominating an income
effect in magnitude.
In Table 22d there is a strong turn from 22a and 22b in which racial group is most
responsive to presence of Advertising. In HHsize=4 Asians were third or last, in Female HHH
only Asian was last by a wide margin, and for Male HHH only, Asian HHs dominate in every
quadrant, with Afr-Amers last in every quadrant. Hispanic HHs are more responsive than White
HHs in the lower Income and lower Education fixed quadrants. Overall, as in the Sale (21d) subtable, Asian HHs break away from the field rather extremely, but the effect is smaller in
Advertising. Asian Male only HHHs have twice the total ounces table-wide that second-place
Hispanic HHs have, with a modest drop to White HHs, and a steeper drop to Afr-Amer HHs
(differences). Asian Male HHs are most reactive to marketing variable changes of any racial
group, or even any identified group, while demonstrating both income and education effects.
Asian Male only HHHs most closely approximate homo economicus in sCSD purchase behavior.
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5.6
5.6.1

Limitations and Future Research
Limitations
Although sCSDs comprise the bulk of all SSBs, my available data is restricted to CSDs.

Full identification of household purchase behavior across SSBs of similar sugar content is not
possible with one category, so the level of definitiveness of this work for SSBs, even based on
the category leader, is not assessable.
Similarly, data is restricted to the HH level, not the individual level. Any attempt to
calculate per capita predictions of consumption by demographic sub-group would necessarily be
suspect to the degree that there are drinkers and non-drinkers of sweetened soft drinks in the
household, spiking the use number up for one unobservable trait, and dipping it for another.
Similar research interests from within the medical/nutrition community often have BMI
or health data as well as SSB consumption reports, and even nutrition beliefs that can be used to
test correlation with level of formal education. There is no such data linking health
characteristics or beliefs to the demographic and purchase data for Nielsen HomeScan
participants, and nonesuch is forthcoming. Creative combinations of databases are beginning to
be explored in the field of food economics, and this is certainly an interesting area for future
research.
Because my estimation strategy masks how often a HH purchases, focusing on purchase
amount given that a purchase is made, comparing HHs that may buy in bulk infrequently versus
those that may purchase less at a time but more frequently requires comparison of estimation
results and predicted values against descriptive statistics. This is necessarily imprecise, but seems
necessary given the sometimes eyebrow-raising quantities that single Asian male HHHs
purchase relative to other single male HHH ethnicities. Descriptive statistics indicate atypically
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high levels of stocking behavior in Asian HHs relative to other ethnic groups. Hispanics tend to
buy more frequently. Failure to appreciate this can draw one toward misleading conclusions
viewing prediction table results alone.
While I selected a reduced-form approach for its strengths and an avoidance of
neoclassical economic assumptions defended in the coming essays here, not using a model
derived from consumer demand theory removes the option to calculate conventional cross-priceelasticities of demand or run counterfactual analyses after the estimation process.

5.6.2

Future Research
The results of this estimation strategy are so rich, that there is much opportunity to further

explore them for other surprising results, or for results useful to particular demographic groups.
For example I intend to at least construct prediction tables to see how single mothers’ household
purchase varies across number of children, the mother’s age range, and by racial group. Beyond
the finding here that single fathers of two kids seem to be more restrictive in purchase than single
mothers of two kids, other aspects of parenting, including further contrasts by gender of HHH
may prove interesting to study.
It is also possible within the existing result set to focus on specific marketing-variable
purchase reactivity for high-purchase groups already identified, by varying in prediction-table
combination related household characteristics such as age and family size. This may identify
lifestyle differences that could be exploited in policy design.
I would like to determine if there are enough households in the available Nielsen database
(at the Zwick Center at the University of Connecticut) that spans the CSD, candy and gum,
ready-to-eat breakfast cereals, and salty snack categories, to find non-purchasers of sCSDs for
whom there is demographic data, to see if cluster analysis or principal-component analysis alone

235

can associate demographic characteristics shared by heavy sCSD-purchasers as distinct from
those of non-purchasers, or from diet CSD drinkers.
There was not time to look for natural experiments in the data such as soft-drink taxes or
local marketing restrictions that came into effect during the 2006 – 2008 period. These are
natural fodder for the study of policy effects.
Subjecting the same or similar data to conventional structural demand estimation and
elasticity calculation, then constructing results to a similar point would allow a comparison of
methods. I am quite interested to discover how much results differ, and infer which estimated
sCSD purchase differences are due to estimation assumptions, which to estimation strategies,
which to methodological or data limitations, and which to robust factors identified by both
methodologies.
I am also interested in simply replicating the method here for diet CSDs and for other
products within the already purchased data categories (listed above) to see if sociodemographically identified high-purchase patterns replicate for non-caloric soft drinks or across
other unhealthful food products that are not generally considered to be candy.
I am currently working with others to estimate demand with a different variant to a
classical structural model. By estimating a mean demand for the population, and characterizing
high purchasers as “inefficient” (as will be defined in Essay Two for sCSD consumers who do
not appreciate long-term health effects from overconsumption), we analyze this inefficiency as a
type of technical inefficiency in the manner of a production frontier (failure to produce adequate
health). This work may be modified in a later work to attempt to identify latent classes of health
producers within demographic groups.
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5.7

SUMMARY OF RESULTS
From the descriptive statistics – data means for variables only, with no regression control

for other factors – a few results may not be intuitive. From Table 1, it is noteworthy that 30.5%
of all sweetened carbonated soft-drink purchases are associated with price promotions (i.e.,
sCSD purchased during price-promotion, or “on sale”). Coupled with the frequency with which
households purchase more than two liters a week (HH mean/yr. = 7.77), it is reasonable to infer
that many households engage in stocking behavior. The following observations are for Table 3,
in which zero-purchase weeks are not considered, and refer to numbers in ounces per household
per purchase week.
Across six income levels for households (HHs) from half the poverty level for a family
of four to five or more times the poverty level for a family of four, highest average purchase is
almost identical for HHs earning 3 and 4 times the poverty level (≈285 oz), perhaps suggesting
that purchase rises with household income, but not in a linear fashion. For both Female and Male
heads-of-household (HHHs) level of terminal education from less-than-high-school to postcollege, the less-than-high-school and high-school (HS) levels stand out as substantially higher
than other levels (≈305-320 oz), and from high-school level drop consistently with rising
education. Racial group is self-identified as White, Asian, African American (Afr-Amer), and
Other Race HHs, with Hispanic being a separately self-identified racial group that requires
identification with one of these four main groups. (The Table 5 correlation matrix shows that
Other Race and Hispanic are correlated at 0.53). From the racial groups, Asian HHs purchase
most (≈286 oz), and African-American HHs the least (≈243 oz). Across age categories for both
Female and Male HHHs, the 40-50 years category is largest (≈295 oz F, ≈298 oz M). Male-Only
HHH HHs average 4 oz./wk higher than Female-Only HHs, across all other features.
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Graphing average weekly sCSD-industry-wide Price across all 16 designated marketing
areas (DMAs are specific urban-suburban-exurban combination markets defined by local
television broadcast range) against estimated sCSD-industry-wide advertising exposure (at the
HH level) across all DMAs indicates some pulsing in industry-wide advertising frequency.
Advertising pulses do not seem to be correlated with industry-average rises in price (a potential
marketing strategy). Quantity purchased often peaks when average price dips. Population wide,
consumers do not buy substantially more in weeks following industry-wide advertising pulses.
Heckman two-step regression model results are generated for three levels of model
(model names are not acronyms): the BASIC model, for which demographic characteristic
variables except for racial group are categoric; the BROAD model for which demographic
categories are divided into levels within each category; 36 and the REFINED model for which
each demographic variable is a combination of an Income level and another demographic
characteristic from the variable levels, or an Education level and another demographic
characteristic from the variable levels. 37 The REFINED model specification allows degrees of

36

Variable levels are so defined: six levels for Income (from half the poverty level for a family of four [HfPvInc], to
1xPvInc, 2xPvInc, etc., to five or more PvInc), five levels of (Fem/Male HHH) Education (Less HS, HS, Some
College, College, Post College); HH Sizes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5+; Number of Kids in HH 1,2,3, and 4+; (Fem/Male
HHH) Age levels under 30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-65, 65+. From each, for the BROAD model, one level must be
dropped. The base group assumptions are: White (for Race= White, Afr-Amer, Asian, or Other Race), non-Hispanic
(for Hispanic), highest-level Income and highest-level (Female or Male HHH) Education, HH Size=1, No Kids,
(F/M HHH) Age 50-65, and spring for season.
37
Reference (base) group assumptions for the REFINED model are constructed so as not to conflict with those of
the BASIC and BROAD models. The REFINED models use the highest Income and Education levels (5xPvInc,
Fem Post Collg Educ, Male Post Collg Educ), White (for Race), Non-Hispanic (for Hispanic), HHsize=1, NoKids,
FemAge50-65, and MaleAge50-65 for reference group demographic variables, (and Spring for season again). As
demographic characteristics are interacted to identify sub-groups, there are in the REFINED model eleven base subgroups (including for example 5xPvIncxFmPostCollgEd and MalePostCollgEdxWhite).
The interaction of demographic categories necessitates a second level of variable drop to avoid the dummyvariable trap. So certain category levels were regressed separately, rather than being interacted with demographic or
marketing variables, or than being dropped entirely, in which case their effects would have been absorbed into the
intercept with other reference-group effects. Thus one group for each category to be interacted with Income or with
Male/Female Education has been dropped, with the binary Hispanic category requiring no further drop, and with the
No Female/Male HHH groups applying as separately-regressed groups for all sex-of-HHH-specific categories.
Choices for these “category level drops” are reasonable given results from previous models and iterations: No Man
HH Head, No Fem HH Head, Other Race, HH size 5Plus, _4KidsPlus, Female Age 65+, Male Age 65+.
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estimated effects to vary across levels within one category while remaining fixed at one level in
another category, rather than being fixed increments independent of another category, as they are
in the BASIC and BROAD models. Thus the REFINED model enables observation of how for
example Whites and Asians may differ in purchase response to rising sCSD Price as HH Income
rises for each level from low to high Income. Each model has a version where every
demographic variable is interacted separately with either the Price, Sale, or Advertising
marketing variable. The dependent variable in all regressions is: weekly purchase of sCSDs at
the HH level, in ounces (for weeks that purchase occurs).
For all regression results, heterogeneity is controlled for, and endogeneity between the
price vector and purchase quantity (dependent variable) vectors is rejected. Standard goodnessof-fit measures to compare models do not apply for the two-step Heckman (“Heckit” model), but
as model sophistication goes up (more explanatory variables in the REFINED than the BROAD
model, and in the BROAD versus the BASIC model), the magnitudes of “catch-all” constants,
binaries, and un-interacted marketing variables (Price, Sale, Advertising) all fall. This provides
some empirical evidence that the most complex models fit the data best. Across the BASIC and
BROAD models with and without marketing-variable interactions, and the REFINED model (run
only including marketing-variable interaction with demographic variable binaries), only one of
the “catch-all” variables common to all five models was of an unexpected sign and statistically
significant, and that variable is not used in isolation for interpretation. The models all fit well
with expectations for simple (un-interacted) variables, indicating a robust overall modeling
structure. While only the REFINED model is suitable for addressing the primary research
questions of interest here, there is compelling evidence that allowing for flexibility in degree of
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effect within levels of a demographic variable category does provide further defensible analytical
insights beyond results inferable from the BASIC and BROAD models.
All results discussed from this point are for models with marketing-variable interactions.
Given the nature of estimation to determine the purchase response associated with a particular
demographic characteristic to a particular sCSD industry marketing-mix variable (Price, Sale, or
Advertising), no single estimation coefficient is used in isolation to infer purchase behavior for a
demographic group or sub-group in any of the three model levels with marketing-variable
interactions. (A sub-group is a slice of a group defined by a particular characteristic, as for
example, lower-educated Asian HHs within Asian HHs or within lower-educated HHs.) Thus,
instead of interpreting the heckman-adjusted marginal effects for any group or sub-group alone, a
group/sub-group marginal effect is combined with a marketing-variable-specific marginal effect.
For example, in the BASIC model, HH Income (HH Inc) is a variable. The combined
marginal effect (CME) must be specific to a marketing variable, for example Price, at a selected
value: CME in Price for HH Inc = δy/δx of HH Inc + (δy/δx of Price x HH Inc* the average of
Wkly Price in the DMA). Rather than individual coefficients (or more accurately, rather than
individual heckman-adjusted marginal effects), CMEs then become the elements for inference
and interpretation. All results discussed from this point are from marketing-variable-specific
CMEs, or from predicted values built from them. Tables for marketing-variable-specific CMEs
by demographic characteristic exist for each model level, as do tables of predicted values by
composite-characteristic HH type built from these CMEs.
For each model level, Prediction Tables are constructed so that each table cell represents
a predicted weekly HH purchase quantity for a single representative HH type, comprised of
estimation results for specific characteristics. (Hundreds of such household-representative
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combinations may be constructed from the regression results of the REFINED model.) Each HH
type must exist in all demographic dimensions upon which regression was conducted: Income,
(Female/Male HHH) Education level, racial group, HH size, # of Kids in HH, (Female/Male
HHH) Age. Thus, with sex of HHH difference, there are seven characteristics that can vary. All
prediction tables reported here are fixed in HHH Age, at 40-50 years, and the reference season
spring is assumed for all cells. One table type has Male and Female HHHs, and two children, for
a HH size=4. There is a single Male or single Female HHH head variant of the HH size=4 table,
with all other characteristics the same (so HH size=3 for each). This isolates sex-of-HHHspecific parenting choices reflected in sCSD purchase for two-child single-parent homes.
Fixing certain demographic characteristics enables analysis according to variation in
other characteristics, particularly variation in the primary variables of interest to the core
research questions here: Income level, Education level, and racial group. Secondarily, the sex of
the HHH is compared for purchase-reactivity to marketing variables. The household types whose
reactions are reported in prediction tables are held the same across the BASIC, BROAD, and
REFINED models for Price-reactive purchases, to allow for direct comparison across estimation
results. In the REFINED model, prediction tables depicting reactions to rising Price for HH
Size=4 show a flexibility in response across Income and Education levels by racial group that
exposes restrictive weaknesses in the BASIC and BROAD models.
In the top half of prediction tables, Income level varies across one of two fixed Education
levels (one low, one high) and across racial groups. In the bottom half of prediction tables,
Education level varies across one of two fixed Income levels (one low, one high) and across
racial groups. It is then possible to determine whether one HH type is predicted to buy more than
a reference group, or to compare a set of HH types to another set. For example one common

241

comparison is whether the two lowest-Income HH types buy more or less than the two highestIncome HH types for a fixed level of education. If they do, I refer to this as HH purchase “rising
in Income.” The result can easily be compared across racial groups, given the construction of the
table. This checks the robustness of any (expected positive) income or (expected negative)
education effect across sub-cultural categorization, similar to the way that breaking the Income
and Education categoric variables into levels allows a check for the robustness of income or
education effects.
Because Income and (Fem/Male) Education are categoric variables in the BASIC model,
assumptions had to be made to break results into levels that approximate levels in the BROAD
and REFINED prediction tables. The effort exposed serious restrictions to the BASIC model’s
category-level analysis, provoking for example the result that in considering HH reaction to
rising Price in a week, the magnitude of a positive income effect dominated the magnitude of a
negative education effect in HH purchase – a result not borne out in the larger models. I will use
the term the “income effect dominated the education effect” to mean that one set of variables’
directions and magnitudes appear to overwhelm another variables’ set of directions and
magnitudes – meaning it more robustly explains more variability in HH purchase. This result can
be weak or strong domination, based on multiple comparisons enabled by the structure of
prediction tables, where levels of one variable (Income or Education) differ while held fixed at a
low or high level of another variable level (Education or Income).

Results by Variable Type
There are many possible ways to report results across HH characteristics and their
responses to individual marketing variables, as well as many possible ways to construct HH
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types for prediction analysis, even for the few HH-type combinations presented here. Every
choice to group results in one way forces a division, and a consequent need to refer back across
dividing lines to a previous variable group. One method follows.

Marketing-Mix Variables:
Based on the magnitudes of responses to marketing-mix variables across demographic
characteristics in the BASIC model, there is evidence that the purchase reactions to Sale are
larger than for Price or Advertising. From BASIC and BROAD model results, and with few
exceptions (such as Hispanic HHs, BROAD) groups tend to either be more responsive to Price
changes or incidence of Sale, but not both. This result is consistent with the theory that
consumers seek lower (average) price for readily available non-credence goods, whether they use
weekly prices or occasional price-promotions to achieve this. In the REFINED model, HHs tend
to respond with purchase to Sale or Advertising incentives in at least the same magnitude as to
Price incentives. It is important to remember that weekly Price and Advertising data are
weighted averages across the entire sCSD industry within the same DMA in which HH-level
observations are collected, so by construction, these cannot be particularly flexible to a weekly
change in price for a particular HH’s preferred brand(s). 38 The magnitude of the response to
changes in weekly Advertising is against my expectation that it might have a small effect on
purchase, given that most of the effects from sCSD-industry advertising may well have
accumulated over many years. Again, there was no visible evidence from graphing Advertising

38

The orientation at the product category rather than product brand level is motivated by medical/nutrition and
decision-theory/behavioral-economic literature, where the influence of caloric sweeteners on choice behavior and
health are not dependent on brand. It is beyond the scope of this work to defend the degree to which positive
consumer associations developed by one product’s advertising campaign may spill over to other brands, but the
effect is documented for soft drinks (Zheng, Yuqing and Kaiser, Harry M. Advertising and U.S. Nonalcoholic
Beverage Demand. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 2008, vol. 37, issue 2, pp. 147-159.)
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exposure against quantity purchased across the entire population that weekly advertising strongly
motivated increased purchase in the same week or the next few weeks, but certain sub-groups
have high purchases correlated with increased exposure to Advertising.

Demographic Variables:
Income
The BASIC model restricts prediction table results to fixed incremental changes, so changes in
response to a marketing variable by Income or Education level are fixed in size. But CME results
show that HHs with lower Income or lower Education respond less to Price incentives, and more
to increases in Sale and Advertising (although Price responsiveness falls in rising Female
Education, and Sale response rises). I suggest that this combination of marketing-variable
reactions – Price-insensitive, Advertising-sensitive, higher Sale purchase – characterizes lowerIncome and lower-educated HHs as likely habitual buyers of sCSDs. The only worse group
would also be insensitive to Sale, and there is some evidence that lower-educated and lowerIncome Female HHHs may fall into this group. The BASIC model predicts an income effect
dominating an education effect, with the racial group third in the magnitudes that determine the
span of differences in purchase between HH types. But given the model’s constraints, these
results are overturned in larger models. Lower HH Sizes respond more to an increase in “Sale”
than larger HHs – an interesting result indicating more regularly-timed (habitual) purchase in
larger households.
In the BROAD model, higher Income HHs are more responsive to Sale than lowerIncome HHs, in contrast to BASIC results, while HHs at all Income levels were more responsive
to Price than the highest-income (base) group. In BROAD prediction tables, purchase does not
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strictly rise in rising Income level, as in the BASIC model, and the education effect dominates
any income effect in magnitude (i.e., the amount that increasing Education decreases purchase in
a rising marketing variable is larger than the amount that increasing Income raises it, if and when
it raises it). If one divides the differences in purchase by HH Size to be per capita, differences in
Educ level also dominate differences in rising HH Size.
In the REFINED model, middle-income HHs (from twice through four times the poverty
level for a family of four) seem most responsive to Price change, while the lowest- and highestincome HHs are least Price-sensitive (have the highest purchase in ounces). This result may be
motivated by a strong habit of regular purchase behavior, such that Price changes do not provoke
much purchase change at these income levels. In addition, the lowest-income HHs may have
reduced access to price-competitive purchase venues, and the highest-income HHs may have
even less concern for the price of sCSDs as a portion of their HH budget than other income
levels. HHs with lower Income in combination with lower Education display a strong pattern of
least response to rising Price, indicative of stronger habit in purchase. Across the four racial
groups (White, Afr-Amer, Asian, Hispanic) in the prediction table, all purchase more in rising
Price at the highest HH income level versus the second highest, indicating an insensitivity to
Price that may be Income- or habit-based. As occurs in most prediction tables constructed here,
Asian HHs present some exceptions to other behavior described.
Because response to Price is lowest at the lowest Income level, is higher in middle
Income, and is low again at the highest level of Income (with HS Education the fixed level
across these Income levels), the income effect is clearly not linear, as determined by the BASIC
model. Extreme differences in purchase reaction between Income levels within a racial group
indicate that the uniform changes across Income levels within a racial group as constrained by
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the BROAD model similarly do not hold. The REFINED model indeed discovers differences in
purchase response that the BASIC and BROAD models are incapable of identifying.
Again for response to Sale, the lowest Income group (with HS Educ or Collg Ed fixed) is
highly responsive to Sale, but less responsive than the combination of lowest Education level and
either (fixed) 1xPvInc or 4xPvInc. Income effects are less clear than education effects in Sale,
and for White and Afr-Amer HHs the income effect is actually negative. For White and AfrAmer HHs the education effect is clearly dominant. For Hispanic HHs, the education effect is
less dominant, and for Asian HHs, it is weakly dominant.
For response in weekly purchase to increased Advertising, lower-income HHs are more
responsive than higher-income HHs. The effect is fairly robust across racial groups except Asian
HHs, being particularly strong in Hispanic HHs.

Income by Sex of HHH (REFINED prediction tables only)
For Female Only HHHs, HHs at HfPvInc are by far the least responsive to rising Price.
The predicted purchase average over the three lower Income levels is higher than the average
over the upper three Income levels (in all but Asian HHs). That lower-Income HHs are less
responsive than upper-Income HHs (except Asian) defines a negative income effect. Despite a
solid education effect, the span in purchase amount across Educ levels is less than the span
across Income levels, so Income level better describes differences in purchase behavior –
although purchase falls less consistently across Income than across Female only HHH Education
levels. Male Only HHHs similarly respond less to rising Price at the three lower Income levels,
except Asian HHs for fixed higher (College) Educ level. For Male Only HHHs there is no clear
domination across Income or Education levels in magnitude, but both tend to fall in rising level
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(except for Male HHH Asian HHs), suggesting either that sCSDs tend to be an inferior good,
and/or that the education effect may be weakly dominant.
For Female Only and Male Only HHHs in rising Sale, White and Afr-Amer lowerIncome HHs respond more to Sale, while for Asian and Hispanic HHs higher-Income HHs
respond more to Sale. The education effect weakly dominates the income effect in sex-of-HHH
response to increased Sale.
For Female Only and Male Only HHHs in rising Advertising, the combination of HS
Educ and lowest level of Income (HfPvInc) is most positive in response, with lower-Income HHs
more responsive generally versus higher Income (in all but Asian HHs), but the differences are
smaller than in Price and Sale prediction tables, suggesting that any positive Advertising effect is
more universal in overall effect than Price or Sale effects.
With exceptions for Male HHH Asian HHs, results comparing the lowest two with the
highest two Income levels in Price, Sale, and Advertising tend to favor a negative income effect.
This offers broad evidence that sCSDs are an inferior good. The strength of this result is
mitigated by the common effect of a rise in purchase from the 4xPvInc to the 5xPvInc(plus) subgroup, which: a) emphasizes the non-linearity in response patterns; and b) undermines
occasional evidence for an income-based “food elite” (who would tend to eschew a
fundamentally unhealthful product). An education-based “food elite” purchase group also fails
to garner general support from this single-product analysis of HHs that actually purchase
sCSDs during the three years of data.
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Education
In the BASIC model the Female HHH education effect is larger than the Male HHH
education effect, across types of analysis. BROAD model combined marginal effects (in Table
14, before prediction table analysis) indicate the education effect dominates the income effect,
and in span from lowest to highest Educ level, tends larger than any difference attributed to
racial grouping. In the BROAD model prediction tables for rising Price, the education effect
clearly dominates the income effect, and as stated in the Income results above, the combination
of one of the lowest Educ levels with one of the lowest Income levels generates the least
response to rising Price, an indicator of habitual purchase. The effect is robust across all racial
groups (except for higher-Income Asian HHs). There are kinked drops in purchase beginning at
Some College for Female only HHHs, but at College for Male only HHHs, indicating that
applied nutrition awareness may kick in for Males at a higher Educ level than for Females.
In rising Price, REFINED model prediction tables demonstrate a clear strong education
effect that dominates any (expected positive) income effect. Fixed HS Educ across Income levels
is dramatically larger than fixed College Educ across Income levels, averaging over 110 oz/week
and often much more, across all racial groups.
In rising Sale, REFINED model prediction tables (HH Size=4) show that HHs with Lessthan-HS Educ are extremely responsive to Sale (followed by lowest Income level), with a
marked drop off even to HS Educ. Beyond this there is a strong education effect favoring higher
Sale response at lower Educ levels.
In rising Advertising, REFINED model prediction tables show that Less HS Educ is
again the most positive in purchase reaction. Once again, the education effect dominates any
positive income effect across all racial groups (although weakly for Asian HHs).
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Education by Sex of HHH (REFINED prediction tables only)
In the Price prediction tables, Male Only HHH HHs have a more consistent education
effect than Female Only HHs, as only White and Hispanic HHs demonstrate a strong education
effect in Female Only HHs. In the Sale prediction tables, neither the education nor the income
effect clearly dominates in its expected direction for Female Only HHs, but education dominates
income in Male HHs. In the Advertising prediction tables, the education effect dominates the
income effect for Female Only HHs, but less robustly than in the Price and Sale tables. For Male
Only HHs responding to Advertising, the education effect again dominates any positive income
effect (even for Asian HHs, which alone demonstrate a clear positive income effect).
Given the strength in direction and magnitude of the fall in sCSD purchase in rising
Education, there appears to be sufficient support for the assumption that the level of formal
education of the HHH can effectively proxy for the critical thinking necessary for nutrition
awareness to apply to actual purchase. The evidence is neither linear nor overwhelming. 39

Racial Group (including by Sex of HHH)
Each of the four racial groups whose behavior is predicted from estimation results reacts
to marketing variable changes in a unique way. From the BASIC prediction table in rising Price,
with its constrained increments of change, racial-group purchasing from highest amount (least
price-insensitive) to lowest amount (most price-sensitive) are: White > Asian > Hispanic > AfrAmer. Lower sensitivity to Sale and Advertising than the White base group also remains fixed
from BASIC model constraints. The BROAD prediction table in rising Price (also HH Size=4),
39

In combination with the weak support for the demonstration of an education-based “food elite,” these results
together may indicate a possible “halo effect,” whereby some people with higher levels of formal education
overestimate the health of their overall diet and exercise regime, and assuming they have compensated for sCSD
health impacts, allow for more sCSD purchase.
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is like the BASIC model also constrained such that a racial group may differ only in a fixed
amount from another across Income or Education levels. From highest to lowest predicted
purchase racial groups change in order: Asian > White > Hispanic > Afr-Amer. So relaxing a
constraint even slightly has important effects for inference and rank order of response. Estimated
marketing-variable reactions for Hispanic HHs are far less dynamic in the BROAD than in the
REFINED model.
For the REFINED prediction table in rising Price (also HH Size=4), some racial group
rankings change with the quadrant of the table, indicating exactly the variability in response by
racial groups at different Education and Income levels that I originally hypothesized. For
example, in the low-(fixed)Education, and low-(fixed)Income quadrants, Hispanic HHs purchase
more than White HHs in rising Price, and Afr-Amer HHs are the most Price reactive; whereas
for the high-(fixed) Education and high-(fixed)Income quadrants, Asian HHs are the most
reactive in high Education, and Afr-Amer HHs are the most reactive in high Income. Across the
REFINED Price prediction table (HH Size=4): Hispanic > White > Afr-Amer > Asian. For
Female Only HHH the order is the same, again suggesting that Asian HHs are the most negative
in responsive to Price rise, and Hispanic HHs the least responsive. For Male Only HHH: Asian >
Hispanic > White > Afr-Amer. These outcomes greatly differ from the BASIC and BROAD
model results immediately above, and from the HH Size = 4 results.
For the REFINED prediction table in rising Sale, HH Size=4 with both sexes of HHHs:
White > Asian > Afr-Amer > Hispanic, indicating a strong Sale preference for White HHs
(although Hispanic HHs are quite high in Sale at 1xPvInc). For Female Only HHHs: Afr-Amer >
White > Asian > Hispanic – the only table-wide dominance of Afr-Amer response to a marketing
variable. Quadrants with fixed lower Educ and Income levels show very low response to Sale by

250

Asian Female HHHs. For Male Only HHHs: Asian (by a vast amount) > White (by a lot) > AfrAmer > Hispanic. While Female HHHs prefer Sale generally to Male HHHs, the favoring of Sale
by Asian Male HHHs is exceptional, as is the degree to which Afr-Amer and Hispanic Male
Only HHHs fail to respond as much as the reference-sub-group does, relative to these other racial
groups.
For the REFINED prediction table in rising Advertising, HH Size=4: Hispanic > White >
Afr-Amer > Asian. This identical ordering to the REFINED Price table represents a direct
inversion to the Price response, such that Hispanic HHs (HH Size=4) are the least responsive in
rising Price, the most responsive in rising Advertising, and the least responsive in rising Sale,
i.e. the least economically rational of any racial group, and most indicative of habitual purchase
behavior. In contrast, Asian HHs (HH Size=4) being nearly the opposite in response and ranking
to Hispanic HHs (edged out by White HHs in high Sale response), are the most economically
rational to marketing variable incentives. The order for Female Only HHHs in rising Advertising
is the same as for HH Size=4, but the Male Only HHH again differs by the extremely strong
Asian HH response, and exceptionally weak Afr-Amer response at higher levels of Education:
Asian > Hispanic > White > Afr-Amer; raising the Asian Male Only HHH ranking to first, from
its HH Size=4 last place.
White
In the REFINED prediction tables for Price, White HHs with fixed HS Educ level are less
Price sensitive than Afr-Amer HHs, and less than Asian HHs at the lower three Income levels. In
Female Only HHHs, the gap between White and Afr-Amer HHs is smaller than in HHsize=4,
indicating a more common Female HHH behavior in single-sex of HHH homes for these two
racial groups.
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Afr-Amer
By descriptive statistics Afr-Amer HHs have the lowest average Income and Education
levels in the panel. In rising Price, Female Only Afr-Amer HHHs are the only group whose
purchase does not drop substantially at both higher Income and higher Education, leading all
other racial groups only at the interaction level including both high Income and Post College. For
this group, there is weak support for the notion that giving them more product or nutrition
information will lower purchase. This may suggest a sub-cultural influence that could make
education-based policy mechanisms insufficient for this sub-group, or that may require specific
education targeting to overcome. Male Only Afr-Amer HHHs have strong Price responses and a
clearly strong education effect, coupled with a negative income effect, so the expected education
effect clearly dominates for them, restricting the scope of the sub-cultural influence that may
demand more specific message targeting. In contrast, Female Only Afr-Amer HHHs have a very
strong net Sale response, while Male Only Afr-Amer HHHs have a very weak or negative
response to Sale (versus the base group) in higher Educ levels and higher Income levels.
Asian
By descriptive statistics Asian HHs have the highest average Incomes and Education
levels in the panel (by a lot). In the REFINED prediction tables for Price (HHsize=4), Asian HHs
are the most responsive in Price (least purchase in rising Price, reversing the conclusion from
BASIC and BROAD models) at the 3 higher Education levels and at the 3 lower Income levels,
but not in the 3 higher Income levels or both lowest Education levels. Positive income and
negative education effects are strong in relative quadrants, but the education effect has the larger
span in ounces (for larger overall effect). The education effect kicks in at Some College for
HHsize=4 and Male Only, and at HS for Female Only HHHs, both inflection points being at

252

lower levels of Education than for Female or Male Only HHHs in other racial groups. For
Female Only HHHs in Price, Asian HHs are by far the most responsive. For Male Only HHHs in
Price, Asian HHs are by far the least responsive (opposite Fem Only). Still for Male Only, there
remain clear education and income effects, and as with Female Only HHHs, the contrast between
the lower and upper three Income levels is maintained.
In the REFINED prediction tables for Sale, despite positive income and negative
education effects across Asian HHs, lower Education has a more positive effect on purchase in
presence of Sale than does lower Income. For Female Only HHHs, lower Education levels are
the least reactive in the table, and lower Income levels tend to be markedly nonreactive in Sale,
but this behavior flips positive in higher Education at fixed higher Income. For Male Only
HHHs, strongly contrasting with Female Only, we find the largest response of any group across
REFINED prediction table sets by far, with 17 of 22 cells higher than 550 ounces above basegroup levels, and with 2 over 1000 ounces/week higher, while all other Male Only HHH racial
groups tend to be fewer than 100 ounces above the base group. There are income and education
effects, but education dominates. Results are similar but less dramatic in the REFINED
prediction tables for Advertising. The education effect that dominates for Male Only may hold
for HH Size=4, and may or may not hold for Female Only HHHs in rising Advertising.
Hispanic
By descriptive statistics Hispanic HHs are second by far in average Incomes and
Education levels to Asian HHs, but are above White HHs. Hispanics demonstrate weak
responsiveness to marketing variables, even resistance to them, in the BASIC and BROAD
models. They are the least sensitive to Price changes in the REFINED prediction tables of any
racial group. There is a pronounced negative education effect, and a negative income effect

253

(which may confirm sCSDs are an inferior good, even for a generally habitual purchaser by
racial characteristic). Female Only HHHs are very unresponsive to Price at lower Income and
Education levels, and even for fixed College Education across lower Income levels. For Male
Only HHHs, lower Education and lower Income also drive very low responses to rising Prices,
again indicating strong habitual purchase. A rise toward higher levels of Income or Education
reverses this lack of response more strongly than for other racial groups at combined high levels.
In the REFINED prediction tables for Sale, the combination of lowest Educ level and
lowest Income level creates very high response, but the effect fades quickly relative to other
racial groups as either Education or Income level rises. Female Only HHHs are particularly
unresponsive to increase in Sale (as for increase in Price), and particularly responsive to
Advertising compared to other racial groups. This defines Female Only Hispanic HHHs
generally as the most likely to be habitual purchasers of any sex-of-HHH-racial-group
combination, and may further imply the least stocking behavior. Hispanic Male Only HHHs are
not far behind, with weak Price and strong Advertising responses at lower Income and Education
levels, and relatively weak Sale response overall. (Asian Male Only HHs, in contrast, seem to
offset their Price insensitivity and high responsiveness to Advertising with extremely high
purchases in increased Sale.) 40 To be clear, single-sex HHH Hispanic HHs are much less Salereactive than dual-sex HHHs Hispanic HHs, but the dual-sex HHHs HHs are more Advertisingreactive and much less Price-reactive in purchase. The drop in average purchase in the Price and
Advertising tables for rising Income, and the strong education effect in these tables for all
Hispanic HHs, with a strong linear (negative) effect in rising education in Advertising for HH
40

The frequency of purchase is not maintained as a direct characteristic in the second stage of the two-step Heckman
estimation. The move for Asian HHs from lowest purchase by racial group in Table 2 to highest by racial group in
Table 3 indicates infrequent purchase that is very high quantity when purchase is made. Asian Male HHs seem to
purchase large amounts infrequently, in which case their cumulative average consumption might be lower than that
of Hispanic HHs.
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Size=4 Hispanic HHs, offers hope that (education) policy intervention may help override subcultural tendencies that are associated with relatively heavy sCSD purchase.

Indicators of Parental Choice by Income or Education Level
The interaction of Income level with # of Kids in HH, and Educ level of HHH-sex with #
of Kids in HH may be analyzed using sets of combined marginal effects (again, CMEs; an
analysis conducted before aggregating to a full-characteristic HH type, as in prediction tables.)
Reactions can be identified for a demographic variable level by fixing either Income (Educ) level
across the range in # of Kids in HH, or also by fixing # of Kids in HH across the range of Income
(Educ) levels. (This was done for all variables in the full results set, but parenting indicators are
intriguing.) There are two ways to identify an income (educ) effect, and these may conflict. For a
fixed # of Kids in HH, say No Kids, the total purchase for the two lowest Income (Educ) levels
may be higher or lower than the total for the two highest levels. If the second sum in this “2x2
comparison” is substantially lower (say greater than a 5% difference) than the first, then
purchase “falls in rising Income” for No Kids. For CMEs including Price-interaction effects
(“CMEs in Price”), this would mean higher-Income HHs are more Price sensitive, i.e. buy less in
rising Price. This would indicate either that lower-Income HHs are not Price sensitive – perhaps
due to habitual purchase or lack of access to price-competitive shopping venues – and/or may
indicate that sCSDs are an inferior good.
For CMEs in Price there is a strong negative income effect suggested by falling purchase
in rising Income for every level of # of Kids, from No Kids, through 3 Kids. 41 A second level of
comparison sets the lower three levels of Income (each fixed Income level ranging across the #
of Kids) versus the higher 3 levels of Income. HHs with Income level Half-, 1x-, or 2xPv4Inc
41

Regarding HHs with 4 or more Kids in HH, see the second footnote in this summary.
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demonstrate rising purchase in rising Price as the # of Kids in HH increases, indicating strongly
habitual purchase favoring sCSD consumption in lower-Income HHs with more children.
However, for the 3x-, 4x-, and 5xPv4Inc (and above) HHs, purchase tends to fall in rising Price
as the # of Kids in HH rises. This may indicate a difference in parenting style by broad HH
income category (having controlled for education and other effects), with higher-Income HHs
less favorable to sCSDs. Notably, the exact pattern repeats for CMEs in Advertising, but is only
modestly reflected in CMEs in Sale. There is no such consistent result for Female/Male Only
HHH Education level and # of Kids in HH for CMEs in Price, Sale, or Advertising, but it seems
that Female Only HHHs buy more in rising Price than do Male Only HHHs when Kids are
present, suggesting higher tolerance of sCSD-drinking in the Female Only HHH HHs. There
seems to be a negative education effect on quantity purchased in Sale for both single-sex HHH
types, with Female Only HHHs buying more in Sale than Male Only HHHs when Kids are in the
HH. There seems to be a stronger positive Advertising effect for Female Only versus Male Only
HHHs with children. Together these results indicate that in response to each of the marketingmix variables tested here, Male Only HHHs tend to purchase less in response to these than
Female Only HHHs do, when children are present in either HH. This effect overrides the general
tendency of Male Only HHHs to purchase more than Female Only HHs. When facing similar
Pricing, Sale, and Advertising incentives, single fathers seem to be more strict against sCSD
purchase than single mothers.

Age, Sex of HHH, HH Size – More Generalized Characteristics
Age is a very general category, although not so general as HH Size, from which little
policy-relevant results may be derived, despite HH Size results conforming closely with
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economic expectations in every version of every model. Larger HHs purchase more and are Price
sensitive, although, perhaps counterintuitively, smaller HH sizes are more Sale sensitive, perhaps
indicating less habitual purchase. The non-linearity of categoric variable values is apparent for
many variables in the move from the BASIC to BROAD to REFINED model, but the restriction
of linear effect on (Fem/Male) Age in BASIC is particularly constraining: because
(Female/Male) Age is positive, this indicates that the 65+ group buys more than the 30-or-under
crowd. In the BROAD model the youngest Male group is much higher in purchase and more
Price and Sale sensitive than the next nearest (and next youngest) group, for a reversal of
estimated behavior from BASIC.
Female HHH Age results (again, a general characteristic) for the REFINED model CMEs
confirm that lower-Income Female Only HHH HHs are less responsive to Price increase and
more responsive to Sale and to Advertising, matching the highly habitual consumer profile of
Hispanic Female HHHs, and are thus appropriate targets for any policy intervention to reduce
consumption. This is exactly the type of effect this empirical approach can identify, despite the
very general and robust effect that Male Only HHHs purchase more sCSDs than Female Only
HHHs. Older Female HHHs buy more when they buy, independent of any Price or Sale effects,
possibly associated with older children.
Male HHHs are, contrary to Female HHHs by Age group, more responsive to Price.
Younger Male HHHs generally tend to be more responsive to Sale (than older Male HHHs),
while lower-Income Male HHHs respond more to Sale in higher Age brackets. Response to
Advertising is mixed across Male HHH Age brackets, but there is weak support for the
contention that lower-Income HHs are more responsive to Advertising (in the same direction but
with a weaker effect than for Female HHHs).
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Clear HHH-sex differences in purchase response to marketing variables present
themselves consistently in the Age CME comparisons and elsewhere. Results from the BROAD
model show that Male Only HHH purchase is higher than Female Only HHH purchase
generally, an effect robust across racial groups. REFINED model raw coefficients (not CMEs)
show many Male HHH averages by Age group purchasing over twice the amounts Female HHHs
do (controlling for other variables), although this is reversed at the highest Age group in both
sexes of HHHs. Still, lower-educated Female Only HHHs buy in volumes closer to what Male
Only HHHs buy at any Educ level. In REFINED model prediction tables, Female Only HHH
behavior demonstrates a smaller span of HH-type purchase reactions than HH Size=4 results,
while Male Only HHHs is more dispersed than dual-sex HHHs results. Female HHHs react to
marketing variables more similarly to each other than do Male HHHs or HHs where both sexes
head the household. This may imply that policies targeting Female HHH shoppers may have
more focused effect toward intended goals than broad campaigns, or campaigns targeting Male
HHHs.

5.7.1

Summary of Results Compared with Related Literature

There are significant differences in consumer HH purchase patterns by HHH-income and HHHeducation level, and by racial grouping, similar to what Variyam, Shim, and Blaylock, among
others, have found. Very few sub-groups display little purchase relative to their reference group.
This seems to support Huston and Finke’s finding that most American diets need improvement.
Results here confirm Beydoun and Wang’s association of lower diet quality with lower
education or lower income. Results here support general findings offered by Thompson et al., but
my method identifies informative levels of variation across the interacted primary characteristic
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variables – education level, income level, and racial group – that Thompson et al. could not
discover with their method.
To the extent that level of formal education for the head of household does proxy for the
ability to retain and apply nutrition knowledge and beliefs in consumption choices, results here
support the findings that Zoellner et al. generated using a constructed health literacy variable.
In the coming policy chapter, I refer to Powell and Chaloupka 2010, and Fletcher,
Frisvold, and Teft 2011, who argue that soft-drink taxes of feasible size are unlikely to reduce
sCSD purchase for most groups. This seems quite true for lower-income HHs here, who often
buy the same or more sCSDs in purchase weeks as HHs earning far more, meaning they spend
three or more times the percentage of their declared income on sCSDs. Small taxes will not
dissuade this level of commitment. 42
I did not anticipate that sCSD-industry-wide advertising in a purchase-week would have
much effect on that week’s purchase, as it seems quite marginal to the stock of advertising
goodwill built over decades, and is persuasive not informative (see Essay Three). Television
advertising for sCSDs does influence purchase in the week in which it broadcasts, in accordance
with findings discussed in Della Vigna and Gentzkow 2010.

42

For White, dual-parents-of-two households with high-school level of education for the HHHs, a family of four at
the poverty level is predicted from empirical estimation results in Chapter 5, Table 20a, to buy 329 ounces per
purchase week, versus 291 ounces for an otherwise similar family earning four times the poverty level. Results are
parallel for African-American households with similar attributes, and the difference is much larger for Hispanic
households.
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5.8

Executive Summary of Results
Effects strongly identified in the BASIC and BROAD models, especially by racial

group, include implausibly narrow differences in purchase. The REFINED model offers some
key reversals of effects identified in simpler models, indeed discovering differences in purchase
response that the BASIC and BROAD models are incapable of identifying. The breadth of
results from the REFINED model enables deep analysis. Incremental changes between levels
within a category and particularly within interacted demographic categories tend not to be linear,
overturning assumptions implicit in models with categoric variables.

Marketing Variables
 At the sCSD product category level, households (HHs) tend to respond with purchase to
Sale or Advertising incentives in at least the same magnitude as to Price incentives.
 Any positive Advertising effect is more universal in overall effect than Price or Sale
effects.

Income
 HHs with lower Income in combination with lower Education display a strong pattern of
least negative response to rising Price, indicative of stronger habit in purchase.
 For response in weekly purchase to increased Advertising, lower-income HHs are more
responsive than higher-income HHs. The effect is fairly robust across racial groups
except Asian HHs, being particularly strong in Hispanic HHs.
 Income effects often tend negative, offering broad but not definitive evidence that sCSDs
are an inferior good.
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Education
 At fixed HS Educ across Income levels, purchase averages are much larger than for fixed
College Educ across Income levels, averaging over 110 oz/week and often much more,
across all racial groups.
 The education effect dominates any income effect across all racial groups (although
weakly for Asian HHs).
 There is a strong education effect favoring higher Sale response at lower Educ levels.
 There appears to be sufficient support for the assumption that the level of formal
education of the head of household (HHH) can effectively proxy for the critical thinking
necessary for nutrition awareness to apply to actual purchase.

Racial Group
 Each of the four racial groups whose behavior is predicted from estimation results reacts
to marketing variable changes in a unique way. For the prediction table in rising Price
(HH Size=4 = Male and Female HHHs + 2 Kids), some racial group rankings change
with the quadrant of the table, indicating exactly the variability in response by racial
groups at different Education and Income levels that I originally hypothesized.
 HHsize=4, Highest to Lowest Purchase Response to an increase in:
Price: Hispanic > White > Afr-Amer > Asian
Sale: White > Asian > Afr-Amer > Hispanic
Advertising: Hispanic > White > Afr-Amer > Asian

and, for example, the same for a Male HH only, also with 2 Kids:
Price: Asian > Hispanic > White > Afr-Amer
Sale: Asian (vastly) > White (by a lot) > Afr-Amer > Hispanic
Advertising: Asian > Hispanic > White > Afr-Amer
 Hispanic HHs (HH Size=4) are the least responsive in rising Price, the most responsive in
rising Advertising, and the least responsive in rising Sale, i.e. appear to be the least
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economically rational of any racial group, and most indicative of habitual purchase
behavior. In contrast, Asian HHs (HH Size=4), being nearly the opposite in response and
ranking to Hispanic HHs, are the most economically rational to marketing variable
incentives. This does not hold for Male only HHHs.

Age / HH Size / Sex of HHH
 Female HHHs react to marketing variables more similarly to each other than do Male
HHHs or HHs where both sexes head the household. This may imply that policies
targeting Female HHH shoppers may have more focused effect toward intended goals
than broad campaigns, or campaigns targeting Male HHHs.
 Female HHH Age results confirm that lower-Income Female Only HHHs are less
responsive to Price increase and more responsive to Sale and to Advertising, matching a
highly habitual consumer. They are excellent targets for policy focus.

Higher-Income Parents Lower sCSD Purchase with More Children
 HHs at the lower three Income levels rise in sCSD purchase in rising Price as the # of
Kids in HH increases, whereas HHs at the upper three Income levels fall in sCSD
purchase in rising Price as the # of Kids in HH rises.
o difference in parenting style(?)

Single Fathers More Strict than Single Mothers
 Male Only HHHs tend to purchase less in response to marketing-mix variables than
Female Only HHHs do, when children are present.
 This effect overrides the general tendency of Male Only HHHs to purchase more than
Female Only HHs, an effect robust across racial groups.
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General Remarks
 Results support dietary-recall-based analyses
o add detail, and prediction tables include implicit checks on the robustness of
effects identified in this analysis
o based on robust modeling of actual consumer behavior
 Education level explains more variability than Income level
o Education-based interventions more likely to affect behavior than tax-based
mechanisms
o Tax-per-ounce revenue could fund education initiatives
 Targeting policy may not be warranted, but lower-income Female HHHs, Hispanics,
young Male HHs, and Asian Male HHHs are good candidates.
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Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics – Variables for BASIC Model†

Variable Mean St. Dev. Min
Max No. of obs.
47.8
163.6
0 12235.6 2,666,124
Wkly HH Purchase Total (oz.)
277.4
302.8
8 12235.6
459,392
Wkly HH Purchase Total (oz.)^
7.77
9.167
0
52 2,666,124
# of Weeks/yr. HH Purchases ≥ 67 ozs.
0.022 0.0025 0.0095 0.0336 2,666,124
Avg Price in $/oz. in a DMA / wk
0 0.4922 2,666,124
2006-8 Real Avg Price, $/oz. in a DMA / wk+ 0.0233 0.0103
872.2
6.2 5841.3 2,666,124
HH Avg. Advert Exposure (GRPs) 1181.4
0.305
0.460
0
1
459,392
On Sale, portion of positive purchases^*
328.5
0.835 326.9
330.1
140,000
On Sale^
5.829
3
27 2,666,124
HH Income 20.848
3.782
1.697
0
6 2,666,124
Female Head of HH Edu
3.149
2.133
0
6 2,666,124
Male Head of HH Edu
0.761
0.426
0
1 2,666,124
White*
0.134
0.341
0
1 2,666,124
African American*
0.046
0.209
0
1 2,666,124
Asian*
0.059
0.235
0
1 2,666,124
Other Race*
0.077
0.266
0
1 2,666,124
Hispanic*
2.416
1.341
1
9 2,666,124
HH Size
0.731
0.443
0
1 2,666,124
No Kids in HH*
0.269
0.443
0
1 2,666,124
Kids in HH*
69.1
0.235
68.6
69.5
716,708
Kids in HH, Wkly HH Purchase Total (oz.)
301.8
0.792 300.2
303.3
164,012
Kids in HH, Wkly HH Purchase Total (oz.)^
5.819
2.814
0
9 2,666,124
Female Head of HH Age
4.908
3.387
0
9 2,666,124
Male Head of HH Age
0.231
0.422
0
1 2,666,124
Ssn1 / Spring*
0.256
0.437
0
1 2,666,124
Ssn2 / Summer*
0.263
0.440
0
1 2,666,124
Ssn 3 / Autumn*
0.250
0.433
0
1 2,666,124
Ssn 4 / Winter*
Race-/Hispanic-Specific Means:
5.826
3
27 2,029,492
White - Income 20.808
5.995
3
27
358,168
African Amer. - Income 20.236
4.742
3
27
121,560
Asian - Income 23.413
5.740
3
27
156,904
Other Race - Income 20.785
21.251
5.690
3
27
204,748
Hispanic - Income
3.46
.
0
6 2,029,492
White - Educ Level (avg Fem & Male)
3.17
.
0
6
358,168
Afr. Amer. - Educ Level (avg Fem & Male)
4.33
.
0
6
121,560
Asian - Educ Level (avg Fem & Male)
3.53
.
0
6
156,904
Other Race - Educ Level (avg Fem & Male)
3.67
.
0
6
204,748
Hispanic - Educ Level (avg Fem & Male)
2.361
1.303
1
9
2,029,492
White – HH Size
2.407
1.434
1
9
358,168
African Amer.– HH Size
2.795
1.298
1
8
121,560
Asian– HH Size
2.858
1.497
1
9
156,904
Other Race– HH Size
2.970
1.433
1
9
204,748
Hispanic– HH Size
†
Default reference quantities are for averages that include all observations, inclusive of zero-purchase weeks.
^ Indicates mean in ounces calculated for positive purchase weeks only; not averaged across zero-purchase weeks.
+
The fifth row is calculated from the data configuration for the BROAD model, and represents inflation-adjusted
statistics. The small number of prices per ounce in the data registering above $0.50/oz, this being over twenty times
the average, were discarded as faulty data entries, generating the $0.492 maximum price per ounce in the inflationadjusted price set. Zero price in this row is possible , given rare and restrictive promotion campaigns.
* Indicates a binary variable (min=0, max=1). Reported means present the portion of this variable (=1) within the
full-sample category.
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Table 2. Decomposition of Demographic Variables to Category Levels – Mean
Value of HH Total Oz Purchased in a Week, Including No-purchase Weeks
mean
Wkly HH
Buy in Oz.
47.422
46.997
48.091
51.606
49.426
40.930

Std.
Err.
0.508
0.333
0.210
0.209
0.228
0.208

Number of
Obs.
96,068
246,108
588,140
678,236
558,688
498,884

Fem Less HS
Fem HS
Fem Some Collg
Fem Collg
Fem Post Collg

78.980
63.941
51.174
42.471
31.329

0.862
0.267
0.192
0.181
0.233

62,220
525,956
742,772
708,292
313,148

Male Less HS
Male HS
Male Some Collg
Male Collg
Male Post Collg

72.246
69.470
57.772
44.895
36.499

0.693
0.325
0.236
0.204
0.259

85,688
405,112
567,212
597,604
294,840

White
African American
Asian
Other Race
Hispanic

48.634
45.089
34.448
53.552
52.354

0.116
0.249
0.447
0.431
0.364

2,029,492
358,168
121,560
156,904
204,748

HH size 1
HH size 2
HH size 3
HH size 4
HH size 5+

23.550
43.872
62.885
70.593
83.217

0.125
0.155
0.294
0.343
0.495

715,416
998,472
399,916
342,452
209,868

No Kids
One Kids
Two Kids
Three Kids
4 Kids+

39.983
66.878
69.342
72.638
80.112

0.106
0.338
0.384
0.714
1.247

1,949,416
331,316
269,064
85,276
31,052

Fem Age <30
Fem Age30-40
Fem Age40-50
Fem Age50-65
Fem Age 65+

49.844
53.231
62.462
47.734
32.015

0.594
0.285
0.252
0.169
0.195

65,444
346,540
601,156
910,540
428,708

Male Age <30
Male Age30-40
Male Age40-50
Male Age50-65
Male Age65+

52.669
56.497
63.744
54.679
36.520

0.831
0.339
0.275
0.204
0.221

37,452
263,212
501,440
768,136
380,216

No Fem HH Hd
No Male HH Hd

35.041
31.784

0.253
0.149

313,736
715,668

Variable
HalfPov4Inc
1xPov4Inc
2xPov4Inc
3xPov4Inc
4xPov4Inc
5xPov4Inc

46.146
0.197
Ssn1 / Spring
0.217
Ssn2 / Summer
52.899
46.877
0.195
Ssn 3 / Autumn
45.070
0.189
Ssn 4 / Winter
Bold numbers indicate highest mean in category.
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615,777
683,449
700,367
666,531

Table 3. Decomposition of Demographic Variables to Category Levels – Mean
Value of HH Total Oz Purchased in a Week, Purchase Observations Only
mean
Wkly HH
Buy in Oz.
262.624
267.300
270.755
285.142
285.759
272.526

Std.
Err.
2.158
1.494
0.904
0.887
1.018
1.040

Number of
Obs.
17,347
43,271
104,465
122,750
96,633
74,926

Fem LessHS
Fem HS
Fem SomCollg
Fem Collg
Fem PostCollg

318.998
307.187
280.665
263.727
246.893

2.676
0.982
0.798
0.864
1.424

15,405
109,477
135,431
114,064
39,736

Male LessHS
Male HS
Male SomCollg
Male Collg
Male PostCollg

312.754
314.752
290.227
266.422
261.029

2.281
1.145
0.898
0.939
1.413

19,794
89,414
112,908
100,703
41,227

White
African American
Asian
Other Race
Hispanic

284.196
242.562
286.717
271.848
263.580

0.520
1.034
2.984
1.693
1.413

347,300
66,578
14,605
30,909
40,668

HH size 1
HH size 2
HH size 3
HH size 4
HH size 5+

214.016
268.090
289.340
308.645
335.663

0.878
0.729
1.037
1.143
1.537

78,724
163,396
86,917
78,325
52,030

No Kids
One Kids
Two Kids
Three Kids
4 Kids+

263.876
294.807
304.538
312.842
319.462

0.536
1.150
1.294
2.382
3.861

295,380
75,160
61,265
19,800
7,787

Fem Age <30
Fem Age30-40
Fem Age40-50
Fem Age50-65
Fem Age 65+

255.002
276.784
295.245
284.038
251.962

2.268
1.123
0.935
0.756
1.160

12,792
66,647
127,181
153,020
54,473

Male Age <30
Male Age30-40
Male Age40-50
Male Age50-65
Male Age65+

259.750
282.056
297.694
293.162
261.554

3.119
1.285
0.998
0.845
1.182

7,594
52,722
107,372
143,269
53,089

No Fem HH Hd
No Male HH Hd

242.799
238.573

1.400
0.856

45,279
95,346

Variable
HalfPov4Inc
1xPov4Inc
2xPov4Inc
3xPov4Inc
4xPov4Inc
5xPov4Inc

264.399
0.857
Ssn1 / Spring
0.938
Ssn2 / Summer
292.589
279.207
0.897
Ssn 3 / Autumn
271.201
0.859
Ssn 4 / Winter
Bold numbers indicate highest mean in category.
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107,472
123,566
117,586
110,768

Table 4 (set).

Frequency Distributions for Demographic Variables
Number of observations: 2,666,124

Income Category Levels
0 to ½ x Pov4Inc (HalfPov4Inc)
½ to 1 x Pov4Inc (1xPov4Inc)
1 to 2 x Pov4Inc (2xPov4Inc)
2 to 3 x Pov4Inc (3xPov4Inc)
3 to 4 x Pov4Inc (4xPov4Inc)
4 or more x Pov4Inc
Total

Household Size Category
Levels
HHsiz1 (HH = 1 member)
Hhsiz2
Hhsiz3
Hhsiz4
Hhsiz5plus
Total

% pop.
0.038
0.098
0.232
0.270
0.206
0.156
1.000

% pop.
0.156
0.332
0.195
0.183
0.135
1.000

Race Category Levels
& Hispanic
White
African American (AfrAm)
Asian
OtherRace
Total
Hispanic (crosses categories)

% pop.
0.761
0.134
0.046
0.059
1.000
0.077

Female Education Levels
Fem Less HS
Fem HS
Fem Some Collg
Fem Collg
Fem Post Collg
Total*

% pop.
0.037
0.246
0.298
0.240
0.080
0.901

Male Education Levels
Male Less HS
Male HS
Male Some Collg
Male Collg
Male Post Collg

% pop.
0.047
0.203
0.249
0.217
0.085
0.801

Total*
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Male Age Categories
MaleAgeL30
MaleAge30L40
MaleAge40L50
MaleAge50L65
MaleAge65plus
Total*
Female Age Categories
FemAgeL30
FemAge30L40
FemAge40L50
FemAge50L65
FemAge65plus
Total*

% pop.
0.018
0.124
0.249
0.308
0.103
0.801
% pop.
0.030
0.154
0.293
0.319
0.104
0.901

*Totals for Male- and Female-headed
households do not total to 1, because “No
Male Head”(=19.9% of all HHs) and “No
Fem Head”(=9.9% of all HHs) are required
options within the Nielsen categories for
gender head-of-household observations.

Wkly HH
Oz
1
Wkly HH Oz
Wkly P DMA -0.0344
0.4038
DiscSale
0.0202
Wkly Advrt
-0.0051
HHinc
-0.0143
FemaleEdu
0.0259
MaleEdu
0.0091
White
-0.0065
AfrAm
-0.0178
Asian
0.0088
OtherRace
0.008
Hispnc
0.1132
HHsize
KidsThereAll 0.0788
-0.0057
FemAge
0.0363
MaleAge
1
-0.0262
-0.0147
-0.017
-0.0048
0.0046
-0.0121
0.0128
0.0327
-0.03
-0.0342
0.011
-0.0019

1
-0.0216
-0.0426
0.029
-0.022
0.0344
-0.0518
-0.0352
0.1207
0.0379
0.022
-0.0432
-0.0338
-0.0211
0.0229
1
0.0138
-0.0017
-0.0019
0.011
0.0059
-0.0018
-0.0102
0.0009
-0.0004
0.0579
0.0397
0.0125
0.0225

Wkly
Advrt

Wkly P
Wkly
DMA Disc/Sale

1
0.2426
0.4185
-0.0124
-0.0414
0.0962
-0.0027
0.0199
0.281
0.1727
-0.0429
0.2603

HHinc

1
-0.1445
-0.0759
0.0477
0.0731
0.0036
0.0106
0.2397
0.1904
0.5464
-0.2373

Fem
Edu
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1
0.0514
-0.1459
0.1192
0.0127
0.0475
0.3187
0.1657
-0.2927
0.7715

Male
Edu

1
-0.7034
-0.3902
-0.4465
-0.2275
-0.0738
-0.0871
0.0549
0.1079

White

1
-0.0861
-0.0985
-0.0703
-0.0026
0.0276
0.0024
-0.1371

AfrAm

1
-0.0547
-0.0102
0.0618
0.0579
-0.0503
0.0242

Asian

1
0.5229
0.0825
0.0665
-0.0582
-0.0182

Other
Race

1
0.1193
1
0.1015 0.7221
1
-0.0529 0.0045 -0.1738
1
0.0108 0.206 -0.0385 -0.0354

1

Number of observations: 2,666,124
Kids in Fem Male
Hispnc HHsize HH
Age Age

Table 5. Correlation Matrix for Dependent Variable, Marketing Variables, and Categoric Demographic Variables in BASIC Model

Table 6.

BASIC Model, No Marketing Variable Interactions‡
Number of obs.: 2,666,124
Coeff.
-1106.018
58.835
0.020
3.028
-5.959
-4.762
-15.755
37.188
19.562
-20.359
25.764
-2.554
3.004
2.798
46.721
45.933
45.678
84.061

Std.
Err.
22.071
1.000
0.001
0.078
0.404
0.430
1.325
2.707
1.793
1.589
0.448
1.397
0.231
0.240
1.254
1.222
1.276
0.704

z
-50.110
58.860
35.060
39.030
-14.760
-11.060
-11.890
13.740
10.910
-12.810
57.570
-1.830
13.000
11.660
37.270
37.590
35.810
119.340

P>z
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.067
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

27.629
0.000
-0.054
-0.005
-0.005
-0.200
-0.205
-0.193
-0.163
-0.057
0.105
-0.069
-0.016
0.161
0.000
-1.055

0.214
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.002
0.008
0.014
0.011
0.010
0.003
0.008
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.002

129.050
-43.380
-123.420
-2.300
-2.160
-25.970
-14.270
-17.690
-16.820
-20.550
12.390
-54.060
-12.130
466.350
-29.230
-488.760

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.021
0.030
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

mills lambda

-52.321

0.409

-127.830

0.000

rho
sigma
lambda

-0.420
124.506
-52.321

0.409

Variable
Wkly Price (DMA)
Disc/Sale
Wkly Advert
HH Inc
Female Edu
Male Edu
Afr Amer
Asian
OtherRace
Hispnc
HHsize
Kids There (All)
Fem Age
Male Age
Ssn2
Ssn3
Ssn4
_cons
Probit y
Wkly P Index
Wkly Advert
HH Inc
Female Edu
Male Edu
Afr Amer
Asian
OtherRace
Hispnc
HHsize
Kids There (All)
Fem Age
Male Age
WksHHTotOz
MovgAvgHHStock
_cons

‡

Reference Groups: White, Non-Hispanic, No Kids
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Table 7.

BASIC Model, No Marketing Variable Interactions‡

ME x X*
ME =
(oz at
variable
dy/dx†
X*
purchase) ††
Wkly Price (DMA)
-1106.018
0.007
-8.192
Disc/Sale
58.835
58.835
Wkly Advert
0.020 374.631
7.424
HH Inc
3.028
Female Edu
-5.959
Male Edu
-4.762
Afr Amer
-15.755
Asian
37.188
OtherRace
19.562
Hispnc
-20.359
HHsize
25.764
Kids in HH
-2.554
Fem Age
3.004
Male Age
2.798
Ssn2
46.721
Ssn3
45.933
Ssn4
45.678
WksHHTotOzGrtr67
0.161
39.359
MovgAvgHHStock6
-0.0003
‡
Reference Groups: White, Non-Hispanic, No Kids.
†
All variables significant to the 1% level, except Kids in HH, p-value=0.067.
* “X” is the average value at which continuous variables are calculated.
††
This column demonstrates the way inference in ounces is done for the marketing-mix
variables. It will not be reproduced in later tables, to conserve presentation space.

271

Table 8.

BASIC Model, With Marketing Variable Interactions‡
Number of obs.: 2,666,124
Censored obs
Uncensored obs

Variable
Wkly Price (DMA)
Disc/Sale
Wkly Advert
Variable
HH Inc
Female Edu
Male Edu
Afr Amer
Asian
OtherRace
Hispnc
HHsize
Kids There (All)
Fem Age
Male Age

Coeff.
-179.840
81.460
0.055
Coeff.
6.168
-9.143
0.523
-23.000
-4.772
15.992
-5.641
29.124
7.050
11.884
3.094

Std. Err.
63.014
3.795
0.002
Std. Err.
0.154
0.819
0.873
2.742
5.801
3.696
3.237
0.907
2.905
0.477
0.504

z
-2.850
21.470
34.150
z
39.940
-11.160
0.600
-8.390
-0.820
4.330
-1.740
32.120
2.430
24.920
6.140

P>|z|
0.004
0.000
0.000
P>z
0.000
0.000
0.549
0.000
0.411
0.000
0.081
0.000
0.015
0.000
0.000

P x HH Inc
P x Female Edu
P x Male Edu
P x Afr Amer
P x Asian
P x OtherRace
P x Hispnc
P x HHsize
P x Kids There (All)
P x Fem Age
P x Male Age
Sale x HH Inc
Sale x Female Edu
Sale x Male Edu
Sale x Afr Amer
Sale x Asian
Sale x OtherRace
Sale x Hispnc
Sale x HHsize
SalexKidsThere(All)
Sale x Fem Age
Sale x Male Age
Adv x HH Inc
Adv x Female Edu
Adv x Male Edu
Adv x Afr Amer
Adv x Asian
Adv x OtherRace
Adv x Hispnc

-47.572
85.187
-34.992
-35.550
217.023
-134.097
289.897
-319.661
63.099
-146.960
-6.345
-0.715
1.768
-2.264
22.006
95.268
1.968
-2.254
-0.495
-23.977
-1.055
-0.814
-0.001
0.000
-0.004
-0.001
0.005
0.006
-0.014

3.277
15.124
16.045
53.779
103.519
66.871
58.864
18.610
56.785
9.662
10.073
0.175
0.844
0.903
2.895
5.440
3.901
3.455
0.950
2.966
0.492
0.505
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.003
0.002
0.002

-14.520
5.630
-2.180
-0.660
2.100
-2.010
4.920
-17.180
1.110
-15.210
-0.630
-4.080
2.100
-2.510
7.600
17.510
0.500
-0.650
-0.520
-8.080
-2.140
-1.610
-12.660
-0.370
-8.250
-0.570
1.590
3.240
-8.740

0.000
0.000
0.029
0.509
0.036
0.045
0.000
0.000
0.266
0.000
0.529
0.000
0.036
0.012
0.000
0.000
0.614
0.514
0.602
0.000
0.032
0.107
0.000
0.713
0.000
0.568
0.113
0.001
0.000
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=
=

2,206,732
459,392
*
X^
P>|z|
δy/δx
0
0.007
826.475
0
81.460
0 374.631
0.050
P>|z|
δy/δx*
0
4.311
0
-9.334
0.333 0.704
0
-30.362
-12.330 0.034
8.871 0.017
0
-11.622
0
27.051
0
10.857
0
9.382
0
2.498
OLS coeff/ME, in oz, by
multiplying avg value ‘X’
-0.352
0.631
-0.259
-0.263
1.607
-0.993
2.147
-2.368
0.467
-1.089
-0.047
-0.715
1.768
-2.264
22.006
95.268
1.968
-2.254
-0.495
-23.977
-1.055
-0.814
-0.403
-0.057
-1.395
-0.301
1.793
2.293
-5.258

Adv x HHsize
AdvxKidsThere(All)
Adv x Fem Age
Adv x Male Age
Ssn2
Ssn3
Ssn4
_cons

0.004
-0.006
-0.003
0.000
32.933
26.677
20.581
69.461

0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
1.263
1.251
1.327
0.734

8.000
-4.110
-12.990
0.970
26.080
21.330
15.510
94.690

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.330
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Probit y
Wkly P DMA
Wkly Advert
HH Inc
Female Edu
Male Edu
Afr Amer
Asian
OtherRace
Hispnc
HHsize
Kids There (All)
Fem Age
Male Age
WksHHTotOzGrtr67
MovgAvgHHStock6
_cons

27.629
0.000
-0.054
-0.005
-0.005
-0.200
-0.205
-0.193
-0.163
-0.057
0.105
-0.069
-0.016
0.161
0.000
-1.055

0.214
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.002
0.008
0.014
0.011
0.010
0.003
0.008
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.002

129.050
-43.380
-123.420
-2.300
-2.160
-25.970
-14.270
-17.690
-16.820
-20.550
12.390
-54.060
-12.130
466.350
-29.230
-488.760

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.021
0.030
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

-45.104

0.420

-107.270

0.000

mills
lambda

1.416
-2.271
-1.192
0.093
32.933
26.677
20.581

-0.370
rho
121.842
sigma
-45.104
0.420
lambda
‡
Reference Groups: White, Non-Hispanic, No Kids
* δy/δx is the marginal effect of the variable, for inference. Lighter-shaded cells are values for
variables regressed on either the OLS-side or the Probit-side equation only, and are therefore
unadjusted from the first numeric column.
^ “X” is the average value at which marketing variables are calculated.
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Reference Groups: White, Non-Hispanic, No Kids

Change
in CME
for
Plus 1
St. Dev.
in Price2
-0.210
0.376
-0.154
-0.157
0.957
-0.591
1.278
-1.410
0.278
-0.648
-0.028
7 of 11
Combined
MEs of
Variable +
Advert. x
Variable1
3.908
-9.391
-1.062
-30.664
-10.537
11.164
-16.879
28.468
8.586
8.191
2.591

Change in
CME for
Plus 1
St. Dev.
in Advert 2
-0.425
-0.060
-1.472
-0.318
1.892
2.419
-5.547
1.494
-2.395
-1.257
0.098
4 of 11

Combined
MEs of
Variable +
Sale x
Variable1
3.596
-7.566
-1.931
-8.356
82.938
10.839
-13.875
26.556
-13.120
8.327
1.684
4 of 11

ME for
same
variables
from
Table 7
3.028
-5.959
-4.762
-15.755
37.188
19.562
-20.359
25.764
-2.554
3.004
2.798
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Given average of: Price or Advert. For Sale, Sale-interaction coefficients added to corresponding variables, no average on a binary, so no standard deviation shock.
2
Means and standard deviations of Price and Advertising are projection-factor weighted, consistent with the data matrix used in estimation: Mean (st. dev.): Price
0.0071 (0.0044); Advert 374.6307 (395.200). If Change in ME value is of expected sign for economic behavior associated with a normal good, value is in bold, ratio
of bold values to all is in last row. For Sale, value is in bold if ME rises versus variable ME alone.
p
Variable has CME in at least one marketing variable with p-value greater than 0.01. See main text for figure.
pp
Variable has CME in at least one marketing variable with p-value greater than 0.05. See main text for figure.
ppp
Variable has CME in at least one marketing variable with p-value greater than 0.10. See main text for figure.

1

‡

Marg.
Effect
4.311
-9.334
0.333
-30.362
-12.330
8.871
-11.622
27.051
10.857
9.382
2.498

Combined
MEs of
Variable +
Price x
Variable1
3.959
-8.703
0.074
-30.626
-10.722
7.878
-9.474
24.684
11.324
8.294
2.451

BASIC Model, With Marketing Variable Interactions – Combined Marginal Effects of Variable and
Variable Interacted with Marketing Variable, and Change in Marginal Effects with Change from
Marketing Variable Averages‡

Variable
Income
Female Edu
Male Eduppp
Afr Amerp
Asianp
OthrRacep
Hispnc
HH Size
Kids In HH
Female Age
Male Age

Table 9.
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Table 10a.

BASIC Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by
Demog. Sub-Group: HHsize=4, Male & Female HHHs, Two Kids^

cell units =
oz./purchase
HfPvInc
1xPvInc
2xPvInc
3xPvInc
4xPvInc
5xPvInc

White*
Afr Am* Asian*
Hispanic White*
Afr Am*
Asian*
Hispanic
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed
224
194
217
210
204
174
197
190
234
204
227
220
214
184
207
199
246
216
239
231
226
196
219
211
270
239
263
255
250
219
243
235
286
255
279
271
266
235
258
251
310
279
302
295
289
259
282
275
1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
233
202
225
218
280
250
273
265
Less HS
223
192
215
208
270
239
263
255
HS
212
182
205
198
260
229
253
245
Sm Collg
202
172
195
188
250
219
243
235
Collg
192
162
185
177
240
209
232
225
Post Collg
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows,
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic.

Table 10b.

BASIC Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by
Demog. Sub-Group: HHsize=3, Female ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^

cell units =
oz./purchase
HfPvInc
1xPvInc
2xPvInc
3xPvInc
4xPvInc
5xPvInc

White*
Afr Am* Asian*
Hispanic White*
Afr Am*
Asian*
Hispanic
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed
187
157
180
173
170
139
163
155
197
167
190
182
180
149
172
165
209
179
202
194
192
161
184
177
233
202
225
218
215
185
208
201
249
218
241
234
231
201
224
216
272
242
265
258
255
224
248
240
1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
206
158
199
191
242
211
234
227
Less HS
197
167
190
182
233
202
225
218
HS
188
158
181
174
224
194
217
209
Sm Collg
180
149
172
165
215
185
208
201
Collg
171
140
164
156
207
176
199
192
Post Collg
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows,
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic.
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Table 10c.

BASIC Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by
Demog. Sub-Group: HHsize=3, Male ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^

cell units =
oz./purchase
HfPvInc
1xPvInc
2xPvInc
3xPvInc
4xPvInc
5xPvInc

White*
Afr Am* Asian*
Hispanic White*
Afr Am*
Asian*
Hispanic
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed
182
152
175
167
179
149
172
165
192
161
185
177
189
159
182
174
204
173
197
189
201
171
194
186
228
197
220
213
225
194
218
210
243
213
236
229
241
210
233
226
267
237
260
252
264
234
257
250
1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
193
163
186
179
229
198
222
214
Less HS
192
161
185
177
228
197
220
213
HS
191
160
183
176
226
196
219
211
Sm Collg
189
159
182
174
225
194
218
210
Collg
188
157
181
173
224
193
216
209
Post Collg
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows,
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic.
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Table 11.

BROAD Model (Demographic Variables Decomposed into Distinct Levels),
No Marketing Variable Interactions‡
Number of obs.: 2,666,124
Censored obs
Uncensored obs

Variable
Wkly Price (DMA)
Disc/Sale
Wkly Advert
HalfPov4Inc
1xPov4Inc
2xPov4Inc
3xPov4Inc
4xPov4Inc
Fem Less HS
Fem HS
Fem Som Collg
Fem Collg
Male Less HS
Male HS
Male Som Collg
Male Collg
Afr Amer
Asian
Other Race
Hispnc
HH size 2
HH size 3
HH size 4
HH size 5+
One Kids
Two Kids
Three Kids
4 Kids+
Fem Age <30
Fem Age30-40
Fem Age40-50
Fem Age 65+
Male Age <30
Male Age30-40
Male Age40-50
Male Age 65+
Ssn2
Ssn3
Ssn4
No Fem HH Hd
No Male HH Hd
_cons

Coeff.
-2622.694
53.248
0.010
-27.143
-39.429
-45.286
-34.326
-16.929
112.697
94.098
65.015
42.582
108.038
105.467
73.975
51.079
-20.412
52.857
19.560
-12.300
68.032
92.918
118.167
165.661
-2.830
-18.734
-46.140
-37.294
16.362
18.471
12.962
0.219
38.687
30.149
20.666
8.747
31.926
25.671
18.944
152.522
133.940
65.367

Std.
Err.
20.296
0.991
0.001
2.249
1.846
1.696
1.586
1.571
2.684
1.950
1.952
2.032
2.586
2.014
2.016
2.048
1.287
2.595
1.700
1.513
1.453
1.807
2.196
2.474
1.521
1.922
2.712
3.636
2.473
1.722
1.441
1.814
3.005
1.770
1.462
1.915
1.258
1.243
1.318
2.116
2.132
0.690

z
-129.220
53.730
18.080
-12.070
-21.360
-26.700
-21.640
-10.770
41.980
48.250
33.300
20.960
41.780
52.360
36.690
24.940
-15.860
20.370
11.500
-8.130
46.810
51.420
53.800
66.970
-1.860
-9.750
-17.020
-10.260
6.620
10.720
9.000
0.120
12.880
17.030
14.130
4.570
25.370
20.650
14.380
72.090
62.830
94.690

Probit y
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P>z
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.063
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.904
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

δy/δx*
-1313.277
53.248
0.011
-23.124
-32.550
-33.765
-24.520
-11.388
90.944
72.320
49.301
29.142
79.871
78.877
56.834
35.426
-18.991
40.670
17.573
-20.989
53.733
77.661
100.894
140.889
-4.170
-19.895
-40.983
-30.922
2.430
7.845
8.758
-8.076
28.695
19.169
15.490
-4.060
31.926
25.671
18.944
95.768
81.109

=
=

2,206,732
459,392
X^
P>|z|
0
0.007
0
0 374.631
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.007
0
0
0
0.335
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.037
0
0
0
0
0

Wkly P DMA
Wkly Advert
HalfPov4Inc
1xPov4Inc
2xPov4Inc
3xPov4Inc
4xPov4Inc
Fem Less HS
Fem HS
Fem Som Collg
Fem Collg
Male Less HS
Male HS
Male Som Collg
Male Collg
Afr Amer
Asian
Other Race
Hispnc
HH size 2
HH size 3
HH size 4
HH size 5+
One Kids
Two Kids
Three Kids
4 Kids+
Fem Age <30
Fem Age30-40
Fem Age40-50
Fem Age 65+
Male Age <30
Male Age30-40
Male Age40-50
Male Age 65+
No Fem HH Hd
No Male HH Hd
WksHHTotOzGrtr67
MovgAvgHHStock6

_cons
mills
lambda

45.988
0.000013
0.143
0.246
0.416
0.352
0.197
-0.733
-0.738
-0.535
-0.457
-0.941
-0.894
-0.584
-0.534
0.050
-0.417
-0.069
-0.300
-0.490
-0.521
-0.588
-0.833
-0.047
-0.041
0.183
0.228
-0.476
-0.366
-0.146
-0.287
-0.344
-0.377
-0.180
-0.439
-1.806
-1.693
0.178
-0.00039
-1.172

0.263
0.000
0.015
0.012
0.011
0.010
0.010
0.017
0.011
0.011
0.011
0.016
0.012
0.011
0.011
0.008
0.015
0.011
0.010
0.009
0.011
0.014
0.017
0.010
0.013
0.018
0.025
0.016
0.011
0.009
0.011
0.020
0.011
0.009
0.011
0.012
0.012
0.000
0.000
0.002

174.980
4.030
9.750
20.950
39.570
36.180
20.700
-42.210
-65.860
-48.890
-40.760
-58.600
-76.950
-51.570
-46.890
6.190
-28.420
-6.150
-29.860
-55.970
-45.610
-41.190
-50.300
-4.680
-3.120
9.990
9.240
-29.580
-33.510
-16.070
-26.510
-17.440
-33.550
-19.430
-38.190
-144.760
-138.670
482.180
-35.820
-558.190

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

-35.164

0.388

-90.700

0.000

-0.294
rho
119.480
sigma
-35.164
0.388
lambda
‡
Reference Groups: 5xPovInc, FemPostCollg (MalePostCollg), White, Non-Hispanic, HHsiz1,
NoKids, FemAge50-65 (MaleAge50-65)
* δy/δx is the marginal effect of the variable, for inference. Lighter-shaded cells are values for
variables regressed on either the OLS-side or the Probit-side equation only, and are therefore
unadjusted from the first numeric column.
^ “X” is the average value at which marketing variables are calculated.
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Table 12.

BROAD Model, No Marketing Variable Interactions‡

ME x X* (oz at purchase) ††
variable
ME =dy/dx†
X*
Wkly Price (DMA)
-1313.277
0.007
-9.727
Disc/Sale
53.248
53.248
Wkly Advert
0.011 374.631
3.958
HalfPov4Inc
-23.124
1xPov4Inc
-32.550
2xPov4Inc
-33.765
3xPov4Inc
-24.520
4xPov4Inc
-11.388
Fem Less HS
90.944
Fem HS
72.320
Fem Som Collg
49.301
Fem Collg
29.142
Male Less HS
79.871
Male HS
78.877
Male Som Collg
56.834
Male Collg
35.426
Afr Amer
-18.991
Asian
40.670
Other Race
17.573
Hispnc
-20.989
HH size 2
53.733
HH size 3
77.661
HH size 4
100.894
HH size 5+
140.889
One Kids
-4.170
Two Kids
-19.895
Three Kids
-40.983
4 Kids+
-30.922
Fem Age <30
2.430
Fem Age30-40
7.845
Fem Age40-50
8.758
Fem Age 65+
-8.076
Male Age <30
28.695
Male Age30-40
19.169
Male Age40-50
15.490
Male Age 65+
-4.060
No Fem HHH
95.768
No Male HHH
81.109
Ssn2
31.926
Ssn3
25.671
Ssn4
18.944
WksHHTotOzGrtr67
0.178
39.359
MovgAvgHHStock6
-0.0004
‡
Reference Groups: 5xPv4Inc, FemPostCollg, MalePostCollg, White and non-Hispanic,
HHsize=1 and No Kids, and Fem/Male Age 50-65
†
All variables significant to the 1% level, except Fem Age <30, p-value=0.335, and Male Age
65+, pval=0.037.
* “X” is the average value at which continuous variables are calculated.
††
This column demonstrates the way inference in ounces is done for the marketing-mix
variables. It will not be reproduced in later tables, to conserve presentation space.
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Table 13.

BROAD Model (Demographic Variables Decomposed into Distinct Levels),
With Marketing Variable Interactions‡
Number of obs.: 2,666,124
Censored obs
Uncensored obs

Variable
HalfPov4Inc
1xPov4Inc
2xPov4Inc
3xPov4Inc
4xPov4Inc
Fem Less HS
Fem HS
Fem Som Collg
Fem Collg
Male Less HS
Male HS
Male Som Collg
Male Collg
Afr Amer
Asian
Other Race
Hispnc
HH size 2
HH size 3
HH size 4
HH size 5+
One Kids
Two Kids
Three Kids
4 Kids+
Fem Age <30
Fem Age30-40
Fem Age40-50
Fem Age 65+
Male Age <30
Male Age30-40
Male Age40-50
Male Age 65+

Coeff.
20.006
-11.456
-17.027
-4.647
5.616
116.677
103.146
61.712
53.872
102.127
90.086
77.077
55.129
-38.435
21.096
2.809
-11.472
90.340
113.846
141.730
186.163
-0.726
-7.848
-40.838
-50.018
-19.409
-7.501
4.596
5.515
66.416
33.429
32.967
-2.424

Std.
Err.
68.004
3.850
0.002
Std.
Err.
4.552
3.652
3.360
3.160
3.225
5.421
3.555
3.529
3.762
4.930
3.477
3.456
3.619
2.789
5.791
3.701
3.254
3.062
3.905
4.785
5.410
3.347
4.242
5.986
7.824
5.186
3.605
3.106
4.067
6.191
3.706
3.074
4.251

P x HfPv4Inc
P x 1Pov4Inc
P x 2Pov4Inc
P x 3Pov4Inc

-884.439
-426.016
-573.776
-455.155

94.466
72.210
64.845
59.266

Variable
Wkly Price (DMA)
Disc/Sale
Wkly Advert

Coeff.
-1160.794
73.207
0.022
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z
-17.070
19.010
12.160

P>|z|
0.000
0.000
0.000

z
4.390
-3.140
-5.070
-1.470
1.740
21.520
29.020
17.490
14.320
20.720
25.910
22.300
15.230
-13.780
3.640
0.760
-3.530
29.500
29.150
29.620
34.410
-0.220
-1.850
-6.820
-6.390
-3.740
-2.080
1.480
1.360
10.730
9.020
10.720
-0.570

P>z
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.141
0.082
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.448
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.828
0.064
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.037
0.139
0.175
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.569

-9.360
-5.900
-8.850
-7.680

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

=
2,206,732
=
459,392
P>|z|
δy/δx*
X^
0.007
103.811 0.129
0
73.207
0 374.631
0.022
P>|z|
δy/δx*
0
23.887
-4.812 0.189
0.08
-5.901
4.824 0.128
10.967 0.001
0
95.667
0
82.113
0
46.535
0
40.890
0
74.921
0
64.402
0
60.520
0
40.010
0
-37.062
9.324 0.108
0.889 0.811
0
-19.864
0
76.527
0
99.109
0
125.046
0
162.236
-2.021 0.547
-8.969 0.035
0
-35.858
0
-31.999
0
-32.867
0
-17.764
0.535 0.864
0.54
-2.497
0
56.765
0
22.824
0
27.968
-14.795 0.001
OLS coeff/ME, in oz, by
multiplying avg value ‘X’
-6.551
-3.155
-4.250
-3.371

P x 4Pov4Inc
P x Fem Less HS
P x Fem HS
P x Fem Som Collg
P x Fem Collg
P x Male Less HS
P x Male HS
P x Male Som Collg
P x Male Collg
P x Afr Amer
P x Asian
P x Other Race
P x Hispnc
P x HHsiz2
P x HHsiz3
P x HHsiz4
P x HHsiz5plus
P x One Kids
P x Two Kids
P x Three Kids
P x 4 Kids+
P x FemAgeL30
P x FemAge30L40
P x FemAge40L50
P x FemAge65+
P x MaleAgeL30
P x MaleAge30L40
P x MaleAge40L50
P x MaleAge65+
Sale x HfPv4Inc
Sale x 1Pov4Inc
Sale x 2Pov4Inc
Sale x 3Pov4Inc
Sale x 4Pov4Inc
Sale x Fem Less HS
Sale x Fem HS
Sale x Fem SomCollg
Sale x Fem Collg
Sale x Male Less HS
Sale x Male HS
Sale x MaleSomCollg
Sale x Male Collg
Sale x Afr Amer
Sale x Asian
Sale x Other Race
Sale x Hispnc
Sale x HHsiz2
Sale x HHsiz3
Sale x HHsiz4
Sale x HHsiz5+
Sale x One Kids
Sale x Two Kids

-630.403
-1116.282
-793.945
-363.988
-646.274
-31.203
55.423
-157.910
-135.778
122.714
59.108
21.364
436.223
-835.257
-1066.309
-1010.427
-1522.518
93.116
-65.866
26.474
-255.021
624.141
481.915
183.085
222.291
-336.826
-76.469
-262.456
-35.811
-29.463
-11.919
2.521
-13.833
4.042
5.979
4.979
17.455
5.666
-20.011
-4.051
-15.739
-11.156
26.881
67.018
12.259
-1.818
-17.906
-10.797
-25.256
-23.815
-8.275
-29.486

60.977
108.146
66.452
62.724
68.765
94.170
63.481
60.449
66.025
54.507
104.351
67.558
60.152
60.434
79.897
99.555
114.855
66.576
87.727
124.464
175.401
87.749
68.508
62.179
91.155
94.800
66.298
58.055
94.774
4.738
3.782
3.311
3.163
3.255
5.302
3.352
3.439
3.747
4.701
3.132
3.275
3.590
2.916
5.463
3.883
3.467
3.368
4.121
4.947
5.567
3.375
4.267
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-10.340
-10.320
-11.950
-5.800
-9.400
-0.330
0.870
-2.610
-2.060
2.250
0.570
0.320
7.250
-13.820
-13.350
-10.150
-13.260
1.400
-0.750
0.210
-1.450
7.110
7.030
2.940
2.440
-3.550
-1.150
-4.520
-0.380
-6.220
-3.150
0.760
-4.370
1.240
1.130
1.490
5.080
1.510
-4.260
-1.290
-4.810
-3.110
9.220
12.270
3.160
-0.520
-5.320
-2.620
-5.100
-4.280
-2.450
-6.910

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.740
0.383
0.009
0.040
0.024
0.571
0.752
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.162
0.453
0.832
0.146
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.015
0.000
0.249
0.000
0.706
0.000
0.002
0.446
0.000
0.214
0.260
0.137
0.000
0.130
0.000
0.196
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.600
0.000
0.009
0.000
0.000
0.014
0.000

-4.669
-8.268
-5.881
-2.696
-4.787
-0.231
0.411
-1.170
-1.006
0.909
0.438
0.158
3.231
-6.187
-7.898
-7.484
-11.277
0.690
-0.488
0.196
-1.889
4.623
3.570
1.356
1.647
-2.495
-0.566
-1.944
-0.265
-29.463
-11.919
2.521
-13.833
4.042
5.979
4.979
17.455
5.666
-20.011
-4.051
-15.739
-11.156
26.881
67.018
12.259
-1.818
-17.906
-10.797
-25.256
-23.815
-8.275
-29.486

Sale x Three Kids
Sale x 4 Kids+
Sale x FemAgeL30
Sale x FemAge30L40
Sale x FemAge40L50
Sale x FemAge65+
Sale x MaleAgeL30
Sale x MaleAge30L40
Sale x MaleAge40L50
Sale x MaleAge65+
Adv x HfPv4Inc
Adv x 1Pov4Inc
Adv x 2Pov4Inc
Adv x 3Pov4Inc
Adv x 4Pov4Inc
Adv x Fem Less HS
Adv x Fem HS
Adv x Fem SomCollg
Adv x Fem Collg
Adv x Male Less HS
Adv x Male HS
Adv x Male SomCollg
Adv x Male Collg
Adv x Afr Amer
Adv x Asian
Adv x Other Race
Adv x Hispnc
Adv x HHsiz2
Adv x HHsiz3
Adv x HHsiz4
Adv x HHsiz5+
Adv x One Kids
Adv x Two Kids
Adv x Three Kids
Adv x 4 Kids+
Adv x FemAgeL30
Adv x FemAge30L40
Adv x FemAge40L50
Adv x FemAge65+
Adv x MaleAgeL30
Adv x MaleAge30L40
Adv x MaleAge40L50
Adv x MaleAge65+
Ssn2
Ssn3
Ssn4
No Fem HH Hd
No Male HH Hd
_cons
Probit y
Wkly P DMA

12.971
22.658
-13.718
-8.436
5.485
-13.129
3.008
5.829
-12.553
5.311
-0.010
-0.008
-0.007
-0.007
-0.004
0.004
-0.006
-0.005
-0.007
-0.005
-0.001
-0.006
-0.008
0.004
0.003
0.009
-0.012
-0.003
0.000
-0.001
0.009
-0.002
0.000
-0.003
0.017
0.011
0.007
-0.001
-0.008
-0.019
-0.006
-0.004
0.005
28.911
21.420
13.604
118.783
106.585
59.823

5.983
8.506
5.923
3.743
3.087
3.754
7.381
3.921
3.114
4.041
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.003
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.001
0.003
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.003
0.002
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.003
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.003
0.002
0.002
0.002
1.260
1.251
1.330
2.471
2.355
0.718

2.170
2.660
-2.320
-2.250
1.780
-3.500
0.410
1.490
-4.030
1.310
-4.390
-4.390
-4.000
-4.560
-2.280
1.710
-3.550
-2.900
-3.830
-2.020
-0.810
-3.630
-4.480
2.980
0.900
4.580
-7.340
-1.770
0.090
-0.510
3.360
-1.170
0.230
-1.150
4.060
4.100
3.790
-0.770
-4.060
-5.700
-3.260
-2.350
2.400
22.940
17.120
10.230
48.060
45.270
83.300

0.030
0.008
0.021
0.024
0.076
0.000
0.684
0.137
0.000
0.189
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.023
0.088
0.000
0.004
0.000
0.044
0.417
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.366
0.000
0.000
0.077
0.928
0.612
0.001
0.243
0.820
0.250
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.444
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.019
0.016
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

45.988

0.263

174.980

0.000
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12.971
22.658
-13.718
-8.436
5.485
-13.129
3.008
5.829
-12.553
5.311
-3.846
-3.045
-2.471
-2.712
-1.412
1.676
-2.251
-1.874
-2.725
-1.798
-0.486
-2.253
-3.043
1.589
1.022
3.243
-4.430
-1.100
0.070
-0.470
3.483
-0.736
0.182
-1.303
6.477
4.271
2.606
-0.444
-2.981
-7.127
-2.335
-1.370
1.882
28.911
21.420
13.604
65.244
56.842

0
0

Wkly Advrt
HalfPov4Inc
1xPov4Inc
2xPov4Inc
3xPov4Inc
4xPov4Inc
Fem Less HS
Fem HS
Fem Som Collg
Fem Collg
Male Less HS
Male HS
Male Som Collg
Male Collg
AfrAm
Asian
Other Race
Hispnc
HH size 2
HH size 3
HH size 4
HH size 5+
One Kids
Two Kids
Three Kids
4 Kids+
Fem Age <30
Fem Age30-40
Fem Age40-50
Fem Age 65+
Male Age <30
Male Age30-40
Male Age40-50
Male Age 65+
No Fem HH Hd
No Male HH Hd
WksHHTotOzGrtr67
MovgAvgHHStock6
_cons
mills
lambda

0.000
0.143
0.246
0.416
0.352
0.197
-0.733
-0.738
-0.535
-0.457
-0.941
-0.894
-0.584
-0.534
0.050
-0.417
-0.069
-0.300
-0.490
-0.521
-0.588
-0.833
-0.047
-0.041
0.183
0.228
-0.476
-0.366
-0.146
-0.287
-0.344
-0.377
-0.180
-0.439
-1.806
-1.693
0.178
0.000
-1.172

0.000
0.015
0.012
0.011
0.010
0.010
0.017
0.011
0.011
0.011
0.016
0.012
0.011
0.011
0.008
0.015
0.011
0.010
0.009
0.011
0.014
0.017
0.010
0.013
0.018
0.025
0.016
0.011
0.009
0.011
0.020
0.011
0.009
0.011
0.012
0.012
0.000
0.000
0.002

4.030
9.750
20.950
39.570
36.180
20.700
-42.210
-65.860
-48.890
-40.760
-58.600
-76.950
-51.570
-46.890
6.190
-28.420
-6.150
-29.860
-55.970
-45.610
-41.190
-50.300
-4.680
-3.120
9.990
9.240
-29.580
-33.510
-16.070
-26.510
-17.440
-33.550
-19.430
-38.190
-144.76
-138.67
482.180
-35.820
-558.19

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

-33.966

0.389

-87.220

0.000

-0.286
rho
118.925
sigma
-33.966
0.389
lambda
‡
Reference Groups: 5xPovInc, FemPostCollg (MalePostCollg), White, Non-Hispanic,
HHsiz1, NoKids, FemAge50-65 (MaleAge50-65)
* δy/δx is the marginal effect of the variable, for inference. Lighter-shaded cells are
values for variables regressed on either the OLS-side or the Probit-side equation
only, and are therefore unadjusted from the first numeric column.
^ “X” is the average value at which marketing variables are calculated.
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Table 14.

BROAD Model With Marketing Variable Interactions – Combined Marginal
Effects of Variable and Variable Interacted with Marketing Variable, and
Change in Marginal Effects with Change from Marketing Variable Averages‡
Combined
MEs of
Variable +
Price x
Variable1
17.336
-7.968
-10.151
1.452
6.298
87.399
76.232
43.839
36.103
74.690
64.812
59.350
39.004
-36.153
9.762
1.048
-16.633
70.341
91.211
117.561
150.959
-1.331
-9.457
-35.662
-33.888
-28.244
-14.194
1.892
-0.850
54.270
22.257
26.024
-15.060

CME
Combined CME
Combined
ME for
Change, MEs of
Change, MEs of
same
Plus 1
Variable + Plus 1
Variable + variables
Marg.
St. Dev. Sale x
St. Dev. Advert. x
from
Variable
Effect
in Price2 Variable1
Advert 2 Variable1
Table 12
23.887
20.041
-4.057
-5.576
-23.124
HalfPov4Inc
-3.900
p
-4.812
-7.857
-3.212
-16.731
-32.550
1xPov4Inc
-1.879
-5.901
-8.373
-2.607
-33.765
2xPov4Incppp
-2.530
-3.380
4.824
2.112
-2.861
-9.009
-24.520
3xPov4Incppp
-2.007
10.967
9.555
-1.489
-11.388
4xPov4Incppp
-2.780
15.009
95.667
97.344
90.944
Fem Less HS
-4.923
1.768
101.646
82.113
79.862
-2.375
72.320
Fem HS
-3.501
87.092
46.535
44.661
-1.977
49.301
Fem Som Collg
-1.605
63.991
40.890
38.165
-2.875
29.142
Fem Collg
-2.850
46.556
74.921
73.123
-1.896
54.909
79.871
Male Less HS
-0.138
64.402
0.244
63.916
-0.512
60.351
78.877
Male HS
60.520
58.267
-2.377
44.780
56.834
Male Som Collg
-0.696
40.010
36.967
-3.210
28.854
35.426
Male Collg
-0.599
-37.062
0.541
-35.473
-18.991
Afr Amer
1.676
-10.181
9.324
0.261
10.346
40.670
Asianpp
1.078
76.343
0.889
0.094
4.132
17.573
Other Race
3.421
13.148
-19.864
1.924
-24.294
-4.673
-21.682
-20.989
Hispnc
76.527
75.427
-1.161
58.621
53.733
HH size 2
-3.683
99.109
99.179
88.312
77.661
HH size 3
-4.702
0.074
125.046
124.575
-0.496
99.790
100.894
HH size 4
-4.456
162.236
165.718
138.421
140.889
HH size 5+
-6.714
3.674
-2.021
0.411
-2.756
-0.776
-10.296
-4.170
One Kidsppp
-8.969
-8.788
-38.455
-19.895
Two Kidsp
-0.290
0.192
-35.858
0.117
-37.161
-1.375
-40.983
Three Kids
-22.887
-31.999
-25.522
-30.922
4 Kids+
-1.125
6.832
-9.341
-32.867
2.752
-28.596
-46.585
2.430
Fem Age <30
4.505
-17.764
2.125
-15.158
-26.200
7.845
Fem Age30-40
2.749
0.535
0.807
0.092
-0.468
8.758
Fem Age40-50ppp
6.021
ppp
-2.497
0.980
-5.478
-3.145
-15.626
-8.076
Fem Age 65+
56.765
49.638
-7.518
28.695
Male Age <30
-1.485
59.773
22.824
20.489
-2.463
19.169
Male Age30-40
-0.337
28.652
27.968
26.598
-1.445
15.415
15.490
Male Age40-50
-1.157
-14.795
-12.912
-4.060
Male Age 65+
-0.158
1.986
-9.484
22 of 33
11 of 33
15 of 33
‡
Reference Groups: 5xPovInc, FmPostCollg (MalePostCollg), White, Non-Hispanic, HH size=1, NoKids,
FemAge50-65 (MaleAge50-65)
1
Given average of: Price or Advert. For Sale, Sale-interaction coefficients added to corresponding variables, no average
on a binary, so no standard deviation shock.
2
Means and standard deviations of Price and Advertising are projection-factor weighted, consistent with the data
matrix used in estimation: Mean (st. dev.): Price 0.0071 (0.0044); Advert 374.6307 (395.200). If Change in ME value
is of expected sign for economic behavior associated with a normal good, value is in bold, ratio of bold values to all is
in last row. For Sale, value is in bold if ME rises versus variable ME alone.
p
Variable has CME in at least one marketing variable with p-value greater than 0.01. See main text for figure.
pp
Variable has CME in at least one marketing variable with p-value greater than 0.05. See main text for figure.
ppp
Variable has CME in at least one marketing variable with p-value greater than 0.10. See main text for figure.
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Table 15a.

BROAD Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by
Demog. Sub-Group: HHsize=4, Male & Female HHHs, Two Kids^

cell units =
oz./purchase
HfPvInc
1xPvInc
2xPvInc
3xPvInc
4xPvInc
5xPvInc

White*
Afr Am* Asian*
Hispanic White*
Afr Am*
Asian*
Hispanic
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed
354
318
364
338
288
252
298
272
329
293
339
312
263
227
273
246
327
291
336
310
261
225
271
244
338
302
348
322
272
236
282
256
343
307
353
327
277
241
287
261
337
301
347
320
271
235
281
254
1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
350
314
360
333
364
328
374
348
Less HS
329
293
339
312
343
307
353
327
HS
291
255
301
274
305
269
315
289
Sm Collg
263
227
273
246
277
241
287
261
Collg
188
152
198
171
202
166
212
186
Post Collg
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows,
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic.

Table 15b.

BROAD Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by
Demog. Sub-Group: HHsize=3, Female ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^

cell units =
oz./purchase
HfPvInc
1xPvInc
2xPvInc
3xPvInc
4xPvInc
5xPvInc

White*
Afr Am* Asian*
Hispanic White*
Afr Am*
Asian*
Hispanic
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed
263
227
273
247
223
187
233
207
238
202
248
221
198
162
208
181
236
200
246
219
196
160
206
179
248
211
257
231
207
171
217
191
252
216
262
236
212
176
222
196
246
210
256
229
206
170
216
189
1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
249
213
259
233
264
227
273
247
Less HS
238
202
248
221
252
216
262
236
HS
206
170
215
189
220
184
230
203
Sm Collg
198
162
208
181
212
176
222
196
Collg
162
126
172
145
176
140
186
159
Post Collg
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows,
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic.
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Table 15c.

BROAD Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by
Demog. Sub-Group: HHsize=3, Male ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^

cell units =
oz./purchase
HfPvInc
1xPvInc
2xPvInc
3xPvInc
4xPvInc
5xPvInc

White*
Afr Am* Asian*
Hispanic White*
Afr Am*
Asian*
Hispanic
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed
276
240
286
259
250
214
260
234
251
215
261
234
225
189
235
208
249
212
258
232
223
187
233
206
260
224
270
244
234
198
244
218
265
229
275
248
239
203
249
223
259
223
269
242
233
197
243
216
1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
261
225
270
244
275
239
285
258
Less HS
251
215
261
234
265
229
275
248
HS
245
209
255
229
260
223
269
243
Sm Collg
225
189
235
208
239
203
249
223
Collg
186
150
196
169
200
164
210
184
Post Collg
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows,
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic.
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Table 16.

REFINED Model P-value Significance Patterns of Marketing-Variable Interaction
MEs, by Demographic-Demographic Set

Demog-Demog Set

#signf. %
/ Set
signf.

Income x Fem HHH Education

27/29

93.1% strong magnitude

Income x Male HHH Education

24/29

82.8% Almost all are pos.; very consistent in P

Income x Race (/Hispanic)

20/28

71.4% consistent in P; often pos. in lower Incs, neg. in higher

Income x HH Size

17/22

77.3% consistent in P; trend down from 2xPvInc

Income x # of Kids in HH

15/22

68.2% less consistent in P; trend up in rising Inc from low to high

Price x Income x Fem HHH Age

13/23

56.5% not consistent in P, least at lower Incs, lowest Age levels

Income x Male HHH Age

13/23

56.5% not consistent in P, least at middle Incs, higher Age levels

Fem HHH Educ x # of Kids in HH

15/19

78.9% Almost all are pos.; consistent in P; strong magnitude

Comments
Almost all are neg.; most consistent of any reaction in P;

Male HHH Educ x # of Kids in HH 17/19

Sale x

89.5% Almost all are neg.; very consistent in P; strong magnitude

Fem HHH Educ x Race (/Hispnc)

10/20

50.0% not consistent in P, except Asian HHs

Male HHH Educ x Race (/Hispnc)

9/20

45.0% not consistent in P, except Afr-Amer & Less HS Educ HHs

Income x Fem HHH Education

16/29

55.2% not consistent in Sale, except at Less HS, flip pos in high Educ

Income x Male HHH Education

12/29

41.4% not consistent in Sale, except College, flip pos in high Educ

Income x Race (/Hispanic)

25/29

86.2% very consistent in Sale, except Hisp.; all pos, Asian very high

Income x HH Size

11/22

50.0% not consistent in Sale, worst for small HHs; not responsive

Income x # of Kids in HH

19/22

86.4% very consistent in Sale; very responsive, most at HfPvInc

Income x Fem HHH Age

13/23

56.5% not consistent in Sale

Income x Male HHH Age

14/23

60.9% not consistent in Sale, except Age <30 mixed pos & neg

Fem HHH Educ x # of Kids in HH

11/15

73.3% consistent in Sale, all pos, very strong in Less HS

Male HHH Educ x # of Kids in HH 7/15

46.7% not consistent in Sale

Fem HHH Educ x Race (/Hispnc)

15/20

75.0% consistent in Sale, esp. Asian, all neg

Male HHH Educ x Race (/Hispnc)

7/20

35.0% very inconsistent in Sale; bi-modal responses throughout set?

Income x Fem HHH Education

12/29

41.4% relatively pos for HfPvInc before Post College

Income x Male HHH Education

12/29

41.4% College

Income x Race (/Hispanic)

14/29

48.3% large magnitude, Hispnc mixed small magnitude

Income x HH Size

15/22

68.2% less consistent in Adv, all signif. neg above HfPvInc

Income x # of Kids in HH

10/22

45.5% not consistent in Adv, except for ThreeKids strongly neg

Adv. x Income x Fem HHH Age

18/23

73.9% consistent in Adv, signif.s are mixed, except <30 50-65 pos

Income x Male HHH Age

13/23

60.9% less consistent in Adv, , signif.s are neg, strong at HfPvInc

Fem HHH Educ x # of Kids in HH

10/15

66.7% pos

not consistent in Adv, except Less HS, all but 1 signf is neg;
not consistent in Adv, except HS, all signif.s are pos but
not consistent in Adv; mixed pos & neg, Asian signif.s neg

less consistent in Adv, except Less HS & ThreeKids strong
Male HHH Educ x # of Kids in HH 4/15

26.7% least consistent in Adv, except HS signif. & strong neg

Fem HHH Educ x Race (/Hispnc)

13/20

65.0% less consistent in Adv, except Asian signif. & strong pos

Male HHH Educ x Race (/Hispnc)

12/20

60.0% less consistent in Adv, except Asian neg & Hispnc mixed
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Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
122.054
0.451
-62.930
-125.876
-151.374
256.367
116.740
142.138
113.315
109.741
192.609
41.331
62.342
37.210
-5.958
247.306
62.421
109.023
91.465
41.183
315.760
140.380
197.954
148.512
126.755
153.088
51.830
82.466
6.503

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

291

HfPvIncFmLHSEd
HfPvIncFmLHSEd
1xPvIncFmLHSEd
378.421
HfPvIncFmHSEd
122.505
-217.675
2xPvIncFmLHSEd
rises in Inc
23.896
HfPvIncFmSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
326.317
1287.184
3xPvIncFmLHSEd
468.848
HfPvIncFmCollgEd
-277.250
4xPvIncFmLHSEd
HfPvIncFmPostCollgEd
-43.535
5xPvIncFmLHSEd
214.531
1xPvIncFmLHSEd
HfPvIncFmHSEd
1xPvIncFmHSEd
373.107
738.301
1xPvIncFmHSEd
117.192
1xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
40.217
2xPvIncFmHSEd
64.013
1xPvIncFmCollgEd
223.056
413.153 rises in Inc
3xPvIncFmHSEd
192.210
1xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
147.660
4xPvIncFmHSEd
2xPvIncFmLHSEd
5xPvIncFmHSEd
68.859
2xPvIncFmHSEd
233.940
327.534
HfPvIncFmSomCollgEd
2xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
86.641
1xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
79.207
2xPvIncFmCollgEd
31.252
2xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
254.033
2xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
65.507
530.993 rises in Inc
3xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
280.421
3xPvIncFmLHSEd
4xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
3xPvIncFmHSEd
309.727
551.398
5xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
88.499
3xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
57.173
HfPvIncFmCollgEd
3xPvIncFmCollgEd
132.648
1xPvIncFmCollgEd
-12.561
3xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
110.280
2xPvIncFmCollgEd
1334.117
4xPvIncFmLHSEd
271.130 rises in Inc
3xPvIncFmCollgEd
155.015
4xPvIncFmHSEd
456.140
929.361
4xPvIncFmCollgEd
4xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
39.653
5xPvIncFmCollgEd
45.188
4xPvIncFmCollgEd
275.267
HfPvIncFmPostCollgEd
4xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
185.872
1xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
-41.633
5xPvIncFmLHSEd
120.347
2xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
(5)
rises in Inc
503.378
5xPvIncFmHSEd
204.918
293.887
3xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
167.938
5xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
(4)
falls in Ed
56.583
4xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
24.069
5xPvIncFmCollgEd
73.472
88.969
X
X
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Price, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Price. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + PCoeff*(avg)P.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are fewer
values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
122.054
256.367
192.609
247.306
315.760
153.088
0.451
116.740
41.331
62.421
140.380
51.830
-62.930
142.138
62.342
109.023
197.954
82.466
-125.876
113.315
37.210
91.465
148.512
6.503
-151.374
109.741
-5.958
41.183
126.755

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Price – Income-Level, & Level of Female Education HHH

MFX Variable

Table 17a.

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
-20.824
-125.119
-36.822
-99.005
-51.950
63.381
-52.602
14.257
-81.735
-43.750
73.706
-55.489
28.722
-75.192
-57.722
-48.845
-29.327
39.810
-70.165
-17.716
-100.629
-142.853
-37.952
-149.324
-121.184
92.708
-58.099
58.044
-50.790

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

292

HfPvIncMLHSEd
HfPvIncMLHSEd
1xPvIncMLHSEd
42.557
HfPvIncMHSEd
-145.943
-333.720
2xPvIncMLHSEd
118.612
HfPvIncMSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
3.435
59.497 falls in Inc
3xPvIncMLHSEd
-7.921
HfPvIncMCollgEd
-150.956
4xPvIncMLHSEd
HfPvIncMPostCollgEd
-66.744
5xPvIncMLHSEd
9.916
1xPvIncMLHSEd
HfPvIncMHSEd
1xPvIncMHSEd
10.779
-100.449
1xPvIncMHSEd
-177.721
1xPvIncMSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
1264.170
2xPvIncMHSEd
13.072
1xPvIncMCollgEd
-125.485
-463.490 falls in Inc
3xPvIncMHSEd
-200.952
1xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-20.090
4xPvIncMHSEd
2xPvIncMLHSEd
5xPvIncMHSEd
-77.248
2xPvIncMHSEd
18.216
-85.976
HfPvIncMSomCollgEd
2xPvIncMSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
829.643
1xPvIncMSomCollgEd
-22.566
2xPvIncMCollgEd
-132.914
2xPvIncMSomCollgEd
189.037
2xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-17.195
66.058 rises in Inc
3xPvIncMSomCollgEd
20.092
3xPvIncMLHSEd
4xPvIncMSomCollgEd
3xPvIncMHSEd
-78.172
-126.242
5xPvIncMSomCollgEd
11.010
3xPvIncMSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
12.419
HfPvIncMCollgEd
3xPvIncMCollgEd
-87.880
1xPvIncMCollgEd
-180.740
3xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-25.248
2xPvIncMCollgEd
10.719
4xPvIncMLHSEd
-526.210 falls in Inc
3xPvIncMCollgEd
-200.113
4xPvIncMHSEd
-243.482
-551.941
4xPvIncMCollgEd
4xPvIncMSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
11.100
5xPvIncMCollgEd
-87.702
4xPvIncMCollgEd
-270.507
HfPvIncMPostCollgEd
4xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-110.388
1xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-95.700
5xPvIncMLHSEd
-292.322
2xPvIncMPostCollgEd
(5)
falls in Inc
45.140
5xPvIncMHSEd
34.608
41.863
3xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-138.899
5xPvIncMSomCollgEd
(4)
falls in Ed
79.038
4xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-58.464
5xPvIncMCollgEd
10.466
7.254
X
X
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Price, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Price. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + PCoeff*(avg)P.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are fewer
values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
-20.824
63.381
73.706
-48.845
-100.629
92.708
-125.119
-52.602
-55.489
-29.327
-142.853
-58.099
-36.822
14.257
28.722
39.810
-37.952
58.044
-99.005
-81.735
-75.192
-70.165
-149.324
-50.790
-51.950
-43.750
-57.722
-17.716
-121.184

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Price – Income-Level, & Level of Male Education HHH

MFX Variable

Table 17b.

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
-58.855
-59.280
43.886
-174.960
-38.517
-192.357
-229.695
-17.141
-259.505
-58.866
-62.487
-45.650
81.776
-132.574
-41.826
36.683
20.037

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

293

HfPvIncWhite
HfPvIncWhite
Inappropriate for Race
1xPvIncWhite
-251.212
HfPvIncAfrAm
-256.673
-287.727
2xPvIncWhite
(5)
rises in Inc
122.700
HfPvIncAsian
3xPvIncWhite
57.025
HfPvIncOthRace
4xPvIncWhite
-51.335
HfPvIncHspnc
-57.545
X
1xPvIncWhite
HfPvIncAfrAm
-59.280
1xPvIncAfrAm
-757.563
1xPvIncAfrAm
-229.695
-288.975
1xPvIncAsian
2xPvIncAfrAm
-45.650
93.523
1xPvIncOthRace
-333.306 rises in Inc
3xPvIncAfrAm
20.037
-18.717
1xPvIncHspnc
-151.513
4xPvIncAfrAm
-11.146
2xPvIncWhite
5xPvIncAfrAm
-7.571
-55.551
2xPvIncAfrAm
-200.761
HfPvIncAsian
43.886
2xPvIncAsian
1xPvIncAsian
-17.141
26.745
2xPvIncOthRace
2xPvIncAsian
81.776
2056.419
2xPvIncHspnc
-40.152
1132.091 rises in Inc
3xPvIncAsian
446.840
576.730
3xPvIncWhite
4xPvIncAsian
256.129
3xPvIncAfrAm
490.591
†
X
5xPvIncAsian
320.601
188.682
HfPvIncOthRace
-174.960
3xPvIncAsian
446.840 (4)
1xPvIncOthRace
-259.505
-434.465
3xPvIncHspnc
-12.969
122.648
-641.440
2xPvIncOthRace
-132.574
rises in Inc
75.853
4xPvIncWhite
20.342
X†
-104.911
4xPvIncAfrAm
-11.146
212.415
4xPvIncOthRace
-8.008 (4)
4xPvIncAsian
256.129
5xPvIncOthRace
-66.394
-128.288
4xPvIncOthRace
-8.008
HfPvIncHspnc
-38.517
4xPvIncHspnc
-44.902
42.483
1xPvIncHspnc
-58.866
-97.384
X
2xPvIncHspnc
-41.826
34.004
5xPvIncAfrAm
-7.571
-216.448 rises in Inc
3xPvIncHspnc
-12.969
-64.269
5xPvIncAsian
320.601
227.269
4xPvIncHspnc
-44.902
5xPvIncOthRace
-66.394 (4)
5xPvIncHspnc
-19.367
-36.075
5xPvIncHspnc
-19.367
56.817
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Price, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Price. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff +PCoeff*(avg)P.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are fewer
values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
-58.855
-192.357
-62.487
36.683
20.342

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Price – Income-Level, & Race / Hispanic

MFX Variable

Table 17c.

Marg. Eff.s*

Combined

Level
Total
Level

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ

%
Change
in 22x
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX
Variable

Marg. Eff.s*

Combined

Level
Total
Level

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Price – Income-Level, & Household Size
%
Change
in 22x

294

Avg**
Avg**
Level
values
Level
values
in Price
in Price
HfPvIncHHsiz1
-2.496
HfPvIncHHsiz1
-2.496
1xPvIncHHsiz1
104.089
101.592
HfPvIncHHsiz2
43.119
40.622
103.018
70.656
2xPvIncHHsiz1
58.023 (5)
falls in Inc
155.711
HfPvIncHHsiz3
24.119 (4)
falls in HHsize
26.066
3xPvIncHHsiz1
-25.294
-56.598
HfPvIncHHsiz4
5.915
17.664
30.034
4xPvIncHHsiz1
-31.304
20.604
1xPvIncHHsiz1
104.089
X
1xPvIncHHsiz2
99.630
203.718
489.112
HfPvIncHHsiz2
43.119
1xPvIncHHsiz3
137.455 (4)
rises in HHsize
40.093
1xPvIncHHsiz2
99.630
142.748
1xPvIncHHsiz4
147.939
122.278
285.394
2xPvIncHHsiz2
96.569
11.576
2xPvIncHHsiz1
58.023
412.099 falls in Inc
3xPvIncHHsiz2
46.559
126.223
2xPvIncHHsiz2
96.569
154.592
362.062
4xPvIncHHsiz2
5.679
2xPvIncHHsiz3
98.798 (4)
rises in HHsize
34.204
5xPvIncHHsiz2
120.545
68.683
2xPvIncHHsiz4
108.672
90.515
207.470
HfPvIncHHsiz3
24.119
3xPvIncHHsiz1
-25.294
1xPvIncHHsiz3
137.455
161.574
3xPvIncHHsiz2
46.559
21.265
222.553
2xPvIncHHsiz3
98.798
2.575
3xPvIncHHsiz3
67.558 (4)
rises in HHsize
846.574
493.665 flat in Inc
3xPvIncHHsiz3
67.558
165.734
3xPvIncHHsiz4
133.730
55.638
201.288
4xPvIncHHsiz3
49.870
4xPvIncHHsiz1
-31.304
5xPvIncHHsiz3
115.865
82.277
4xPvIncHHsiz2
5.679
-25.626
74.597
HfPvIncHHsiz4
5.915
4xPvIncHHsiz3
49.870 (4)
rises in HHsize
491.105
1xPvIncHHsiz4
147.939
153.854
4xPvIncHHsiz4
50.353
18.649
100.223
2xPvIncHHsiz4
108.672
24.179
X
587.309 rises in Inc
3xPvIncHHsiz4
133.730
191.054
5xPvIncHHsiz2
120.545
236.409
377.110
4xPvIncHHsiz4
50.353
5xPvIncHHsiz3
115.865 (3)
rises in HHsize
8.526
5xPvIncHHsiz4
140.701
97.885
5xPvIncHHsiz4
140.701
125.703
256.565
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Price, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Price. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + PCoeff*(avg)P.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are fewer
values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be included.

MFX
Variable

Table 17d.

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
174.361
167.208
242.591
171.451
71.607
39.465
81.837
141.171
2.657
-71.078
18.151
-69.205
-18.777
-105.652
-91.372
-95.633
28.006
-35.573
-1.230
-47.288

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

295

HfPvIncNoKids
HfPvIncNoKids
1xPvIncNoKids
245.968
HfPvIncOneKids
341.569
755.612
2xPvIncNoKids
96.248
HfPvIncTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
21.218
257.854 falls in Inc
3xPvIncNoKids
(5)
9.229
HfPvInc3Kids
188.903
414.042
4xPvIncNoKids
1xPvIncNoKids
X
51.571
1xPvIncOneKids
111.072
334.081
HfPvIncOneKids
167.208
1xPvIncTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
100.778
1xPvIncOneKids
39.465
206.673
1xPvInc3Kids
83.520
223.009
2xPvIncOneKids
-71.078
136.786
2xPvIncNoKids
-46.083 falls in Inc
3xPvIncOneKids
-105.652
-76.026
2xPvIncOneKids
-68.421
-119.475
4xPvIncOneKids
-35.573
2xPvIncTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
25.382
5xPvIncOneKids
-40.453
-7.680
2xPvInc3Kids
-29.869
-51.054
HfPvIncTwoKids
242.591
3xPvIncNoKids
1xPvIncTwoKids
81.837
324.429
3xPvIncOneKids
-124.429
-311.433
2xPvIncTwoKids
18.151
103.555
3xPvIncTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
50.291
239.673 falls in Inc
3xPvIncTwoKids
-91.372
-11.534
3xPvInc3Kids
-77.858
-187.005
4xPvIncTwoKids
-1.230
4xPvIncNoKids
5xPvIncTwoKids
-10.304
39.945
4xPvIncOneKids
-7.568
-56.086
HfPvInc3Kids
171.451
4xPvIncTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
541.137
1xPvInc3Kids
141.171
312.622
4xPvInc3Kids
-14.022
-48.519
2xPvInc3Kids
-69.205
132.009
X
-50.757
47.717 falls in Inc
-103.537
3xPvInc3Kids
-95.633
-100.068
5xPvIncOneKids
-40.453 (3)
falls in #Kids
24.286
4xPvInc3Kids
-47.288
5xPvIncTwoKids
-10.304
-34.512
-63.084
5xPvInc3Kids
-52.780
7.953
5xPvInc3Kids
-52.780
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Price, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Price. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + PCoeff*(avg)P.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are fewer
values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
174.361
71.607
2.657
-18.777
28.006

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Price – Income-Level, & Number of Kids in HH

MFX Variable

Table 17e.

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
2.732
32.460
112.396
75.099
6.492
9.768
-28.873
25.147
19.981
52.482
70.886
51.667
-7.751
-23.869
-14.353
-9.196
-105.727
-88.818
-75.116
-32.997
20.326
3.954
26.425

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

296

HfPvIncFmAgeL30
HfPvIncFmAgeL30
1xPvIncFmAgeL30
9.224
HfPvIncFmAge30L40
35.192
222.687
2xPvIncFmAgeL30
1025.853
HfPvIncFmAge40L50
(4)
rises in Fm Age
432.778
-63.947 falls in Inc
3xPvIncFmAgeL30
-85.401
HfPvIncFmAge50L65
55.672
187.495
4xPvIncFmAgeL30
1xPvIncFmAgeL30
5xPvIncFmAgeL30
-10.658
1xPvIncFmAge30L40
16.260
12.535
HfPvIncFmAge30L40
1xPvIncFmAge40L50
(4)
falls in Fm Age
122.910
1xPvIncFmAge30L40
42.228
1xPvIncFmAge50L65
3.134
-3.725
2xPvIncFmAge30L40
300.965
2xPvIncFmAgeL30
-14.022 falls in Inc
3xPvIncFmAge30L40
-84.864
2xPvIncFmAge30L40
72.464
195.017
4xPvIncFmAge30L40
2xPvIncFmAge40L50
(4)
rises in Fm Age
69.124
5xPvIncFmAge30L40
-2.337
2xPvIncFmAge50L65
48.754
122.554
HfPvIncFmAge40L50
3xPvIncFmAgeL30
1xPvIncFmAge40L50
83.523
3xPvIncFmAge30L40
-31.620
-55.168
2xPvIncFmAge40L50
158.297
3xPvIncFmAge40L50
(4)
rises in Fm Age
25.526
91.365 falls in Inc
3xPvIncFmAge40L50
-48.692
3xPvIncFmAge50L65
-13.792
-23.548
4xPvIncFmAge40L50
4xPvIncFmAgeL30
5xPvIncFmAge40L50
15.227
4xPvIncFmAge30L40
-194.545
-302.658
HfPvIncFmAge50L65
4xPvIncFmAge40L50
(4)
rises in Fm Age
44.428
1xPvIncFmAge50L65
100.247
4xPvIncFmAge50L65
-75.664
-108.113
109.721
2xPvIncFmAge50L65
(5)
falls in Inc
142.089
5xPvIncFmAgeL30
24.280
50.705
3xPvIncFmAge50L65
-42.193
5xPvIncFmAge30L40
(3)
rises in Fm Age
25.119
4xPvIncFmAge50L65
21.944
5xPvIncFmAge40L50
16.902
30.379
X
X
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Price, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Price. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + PCoeff*(avg)P.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are fewer
values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
2.732
6.492
19.981
-7.751
-105.727
20.326
32.460
9.768
52.482
-23.869
-88.818
3.954
112.396
-28.873
70.886
-14.353
-75.116
26.425
75.099
25.147
51.667
-9.196
-32.997

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Price – Income-Level, & Female Age Level of HHH

MFX Variable

Table 17f.

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
131.247
96.123
49.770
-3.005
-3.253
48.836
56.199
51.248
153.744
33.352
48.517
17.160
-11.524
26.002
27.752
25.751
184.150
97.562
98.407
84.389
-13.770
5.883
11.600

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

297

HfPvIncMAgeL30
HfPvIncMAgeL30
1xPvIncMAgeL30
348.241
HfPvIncMAge30L40
227.370
274.134
2xPvIncMAgeL30
33.116
HfPvIncMAge40L50
(4)
falls in M Age
79.432
440.593 rises in Inc
3xPvIncMAgeL30
430.086
HfPvIncMAge50L65
68.534
46.764
4xPvIncMAgeL30
1xPvIncMAgeL30
5xPvIncMAgeL30
73.432
1xPvIncMAge30L40
45.582
153.030
HfPvIncMAge30L40
1xPvIncMAge40L50
(4)
rises in M Age
135.721
1xPvIncMAge30L40
121.023
1xPvIncMAge50L65
38.257
107.447
2xPvIncMAge30L40
28.638
2xPvIncMAgeL30
307.758 rises in Inc
3xPvIncMAge30L40
189.645
2xPvIncMAge30L40
187.095
252.773
4xPvIncMAge30L40
2xPvIncMAge40L50
(4)
falls in M Age
64.896
5xPvIncMAge30L40
51.293
2xPvIncMAge50L65
63.193
65.678
HfPvIncMAge40L50
3xPvIncMAgeL30
1xPvIncMAge40L50
67.345
3xPvIncMAge30L40
14.478
67.981
2xPvIncMAge40L50
3.810
3xPvIncMAge40L50
(4)
rises in M Age
269.548
292.245 rises in Inc
3xPvIncMAge40L50
260.592
3xPvIncMAge50L65
16.995
53.503
4xPvIncMAge40L50
4xPvIncMAgeL30
5xPvIncMAge40L50
48.708
4xPvIncMAge30L40
281.712
464.508
HfPvIncMAge50L65
4xPvIncMAge40L50
(4)
falls in M Age
35.113
1xPvIncMAge50L65
-31.552
4xPvIncMAge50L65
116.127
182.796
175.543
2xPvIncMAge50L65
(5)
rises in Inc
128.302
5xPvIncMAgeL30
-7.887
3.713
3xPvIncMAge50L65
130.390
5xPvIncMAge30L40
(3)
rises in M Age
321.669
4xPvIncMAge50L65
35.109
5xPvIncMAge40L50
1.238
17.483
X
X
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Price, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Price. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + PCoeff*(avg)P.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are fewer
values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
131.247
-3.253
153.744
-11.524
184.150
-13.770
96.123
48.836
33.352
26.002
97.562
5.883
49.770
56.199
48.517
27.752
98.407
11.600
-3.005
51.248
17.160
25.751
84.389

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Price – Income-Level, & Male Age Level of HHH

MFX Variable

Table 17g.

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
-115.496
-3.186
-99.499
25.823
-35.575
39.530
-22.673
-30.408
-78.656
-9.764
-65.813
-34.661
-65.369
-26.664
-66.336
-15.259
27.183
-36.466
45.775

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

298

FmLHSNoKids
FmLHSNoKids
FmHSNoKids
-151.071
FmLHSOneKids
-118.682
-295.096
-192.358
FmSmColgNoKids
(4)
flat in Ed
4.664
FmLHSTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
37.921
FmColgNoKids
-73.774
-144.025
FmLHS3Kids
-48.090
-73.676
X
FmHSNoKids
FmLHSOneKids
-3.186
FmHSOneKids
3.955
-49.126
FmHSOneKids
39.530
36.344
FmHSTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
1442.109
27.099
FmSmColgOneKids
-9.764
falls in Ed
98.572
FmHS3Kids
-12.281
-53.081
FmColgOneKids
-26.664
0.519
FmSmColgNoKids
FmPostColgOneKids
27.183
5.420
FmSmColgOneKids
-88.420
-188.894
FmLHSTwoKids
-99.499
FmSmColgTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
13.633
FmHSTwoKids
-22.673
-122.172
FmSmColg3Kids
-47.224
-100.474
-290.787
FmSmColgTwoKids
-65.813
rises in Ed
15.855
FmColgNoKids
FmColgTwoKids
-66.336
-102.802
FmColgOneKids
-92.033
-173.628
FmPostColgTwoKids
-36.466
-58.157
FmColgTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
11.342
FmLHS3Kids
25.823
FmColg3Kids
-43.407
-81.595
FmHS3Kids
-30.408
-4.585
FmPostColgOneKids
-9.283
-8.730
36.492
FmSmColg3Kids
-34.661
rises in Ed
765.603
FmPostColgTwoKids
(3)
rises in #Kids
200.282
FmColg3Kids
-15.259
30.516
FmPostColg3Kids
12.164
9.309
FmPostColg3Kids
45.775
-1.746
X
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Price, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Price. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + PCoeff*(avg)P.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are fewer
values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
-115.496
-35.575
-78.656
-65.369

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Price – Level of Female Education HHH & Number of Kids in HH

MFX Variable

Table 17h.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
81.113
144.198
77.393
109.967

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
81.113
71.147
177.612
7.076
144.198
164.121
170.624
113.968
77.393
52.727
53.841
64.140
109.967
118.599
124.724
129.471

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

299

MLHSEdNoKids
MLHSEdNoKids
MHSEdNoKids
225.311
MLHSEdOneKids
152.260
412.671
336.948
MSmColgEdNoKids
(4)
falls in Ed
19.616
MLHSEdTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
21.298
MColgEdNoKids
103.168
181.114
MLHSEd3Kids
84.237
184.688
X
MHSEdNoKids
MLHSEdOneKids
71.147
MHSEdOneKids
308.319
592.911
MHSEdOneKids
164.121
235.268
MHSEdTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
7.696
458.624
MSmColgEdOneKids
52.727
falls in Ed
27.475
MHSEd3Kids
148.228
284.592
MColgEdOneKids
118.599
170.629
MSmColgEdNoKids
MPostColgEdOneKids
52.029
91.725
MSmColgEdOneKids
130.120
248.101
MLHSEdTwoKids
177.612
MSmColgEdTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
9.329
MHSEdTwoKids
170.624
348.237
MSmColgEd3Kids
62.025
117.981
549.680
MSmColgEdTwoKids
53.841
falls in Ed
57.614
MColgEdNoKids
MColgEdTwoKids
124.724
147.602
MColgEdOneKids
228.566
482.762
MPostColgEdTwoKids
22.878
109.936
MColgEdTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
11.213
MLHSEd3Kids
7.076
MColgEd3Kids
120.690
254.195
MHSEd3Kids
113.968
121.044
X
346.467
MSmColgEd3Kids
64.140
rises in Ed
33.243
MPostColgEdOneKids
52.029
74.907
106.719
MColgEd3Kids
129.471
161.283
MPostColgEdTwoKids
22.878 (3)
falls in #Kids
26.990
MPostColgEd3Kids
31.812
69.293
MPostColgEd3Kids
31.812
35.573
54.690
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Price, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Price. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + PCoeff*(avg)P.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are fewer
values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be included.

MFX Variable

Combined

Table 17i. Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Price – Level of Male Education HHH & Number of Kids in HH

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
-13.354
-114.402
-330.464
3.234
54.271
40.356
-382.135
20.546
17.977
15.677
-314.429
40.990
51.292
59.470
-245.988
72.598

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

300

FmLHSEdWhite
FmLHSEdWhite
Inappropriate for Race
FmHSEdWhite
40.917
FmLHSEdAfrAm
110.187
-454.987
FmSmColgEdWhite
(4)
rises in Ed
69.291
FmLHSEdAsian
(4)
FmColgEdWhite
27.547
69.270
FmLHSEdHspnc
-113.747
X
FmHSEdWhite
FmLHSEdAfrAm
-114.402
FmHSEdAfrAm
-266.961
FmHSEdAfrAm
40.356
-74.046
FmHSEdAsian
(4)
41.789
FmSomColgEdAfrAm
15.677
rises in Ed
235.264
FmHSEdHspnc
-66.740
FmColgEdAfrAm
59.470
100.158
FmSmColgEdWhite
FmPostColgEdAfrAm
40.688
8.358
FmSomColgEdAfrAm
-239.785
FmLHSEdAsian
-330.464
FmSomColgEdAsian
(4)
FmHSEdAsian
-382.135 -1595.941
-712.599
FmSomColgEdHspnc
-59.946
FmSomColgEdAsian
-314.429
rises in Ed
20.164
FmColgEdWhite
FmColgEdAsian
-245.988
-568.913
FmColgEdAfrAm
-62.628
FmPostColgEdAsian
-322.925
-319.188
FmColgEdAsian
(4)
FmPostColgEdOthRace
-29.266
FmColgEdHspnc
-15.657
FmLHSEdHspnc
3.234
X
FmHSEdHspnc
20.546
23.780
FmPostColgEdAfrAm
40.688
141.230
FmSomColgEdHspnc
40.990
rises in Ed
221.534
FmPostColgEdAsian
-322.925
-307.641
FmColgEdHspnc
72.598
76.461
! FmPostColgEdOthRace
-29.266 (4)
FmPostColgEdHspnc
3.863
28.246
FmPostColgEdHspnc
3.863
-76.910
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Price, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Price. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + PCoeff*(avg)P.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are fewer
values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
-13.354
54.271
17.977
51.292

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Price – Level of Female Education HHH & Race / Hispanic

MFX Variable

Table 17j.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
-89.033
-51.790
-59.914
-13.643

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Price
-89.033
-130.396
16.119
-21.091
-51.790
-95.495
106.851
-6.420
-59.914
-104.961
-69.088
-29.755
-13.643
-68.428
-79.492
-50.912

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

301

MLHSEdWhite
MLHSEdWhite
Inappropriate for Race
MHSEdWhite
-140.822
MLHSEdAfrAm
-214.379
-224.401
MSmColgEdWhite
(4)
flat in Ed
2.284
MLHSEdAsian
(4)
MColgEdWhite
-53.595
-144.038
MLHSEdHspnc
-56.100
X
MHSEdWhite
MLHSEdAfrAm
-130.396
MHSEdAfrAm
-46.854
MHSEdAfrAm
-95.495
-225.890
MHSEdAsian
(4)
-411.782
MSmColgEdAfrAm
-104.961
rises in Ed
64.173
MHSEdHspnc
-11.713
MColgEdAfrAm
-68.428
-80.931
MSmColgEdWhite
MPostColgEdAfrAm
-12.502
-82.356
MSmColgEdAfrAm
-263.718
MLHSEdAsian
16.119
MSmColgEdAsian
(4)
MHSEdAsian
106.851
122.970
MSmColgEdHspnc
-65.929
45.175
MSmColgEdAsian
-69.088
falls in Ed
107.080
MColgEdWhite
MColgEdAsian
-79.492
-8.707
MColgEdAfrAm
-212.476
MPostColgEdAsian
70.786
9.035
MColgEdAsian
(4)
MPostColgEdOthRace
22.112
MColgEdHspnc
-53.119
MLHSEdHspnc
-21.091
X
MHSEdHspnc
-6.420
-27.511
MPostColgEdAfrAm
-12.502
-123.667
MSmColgEdHspnc
-29.755
falls in Ed
141.356
MPostColgEdAsian
70.786
64.907
MColgEdHspnc
-50.912
-66.400
! MPostColgEdOthRace
22.112 (4)
MPostColgEdHspnc
-15.488
-24.733
MPostColgEdHspnc
-15.488
16.227
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Price, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Price. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + PCoeff*(avg)P.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are fewer
values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be included.

MFX Variable

Combined

Table 17k. Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Price – Level of Male Education HHH & Race / Hispanic

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
-34.101
-36.208
-63.147
-99.051
-127.761
107.767
58.773
131.134
55.013
69.550
176.055
35.854
86.789
19.323
33.271
-16.536
-30.645
51.244
-45.292
58.724
187.142
151.336
226.591
92.964
161.162
-54.513
55.756
105.888
-43.870

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

302

HfPvIncFmLHSEd
HfPvIncFmLHSEd
1xPvIncFmLHSEd
73.666
HfPvIncFmHSEd
-70.309
-360.269
2xPvIncFmLHSEd
80.040
HfPvIncFmSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
222.592
365.814 rises in Inc
3xPvIncFmLHSEd
132.629
HfPvIncFmCollgEd
-226.812
4xPvIncFmLHSEd
HfPvIncFmPostCollgEd
-72.054
5xPvIncFmLHSEd
60.969
1xPvIncFmLHSEd
HfPvIncFmHSEd
1xPvIncFmHSEd
166.541
422.238
1xPvIncFmHSEd
22.565
1xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
25.205
2xPvIncFmHSEd
817.760
1xPvIncFmCollgEd
124.563
234.865 rises in Inc
3xPvIncFmHSEd
207.092
1xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
84.448
4xPvIncFmHSEd
2xPvIncFmLHSEd
5xPvIncFmHSEd
39.144
2xPvIncFmHSEd
211.909
351.291
HfPvIncFmSomCollgEd
2xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
75.181
1xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
67.987
2xPvIncFmCollgEd
52.593
2xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
389.034
2xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
70.258
538.499 rises in Inc
3xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
332.479
3xPvIncFmLHSEd
4xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
3xPvIncFmHSEd
-47.182
17.495
5xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
89.750
3xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
rises in Ed
128.468
HfPvIncFmCollgEd
3xPvIncFmCollgEd
13.432
1xPvIncFmCollgEd
-44.038
3xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
3.499
2xPvIncFmCollgEd
211.481
4xPvIncFmLHSEd
-20.913 rises in Inc
3xPvIncFmCollgEd
49.094
4xPvIncFmHSEd
338.478
819.196
4xPvIncFmCollgEd
4xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
24.921
5xPvIncFmCollgEd
-3.486
4xPvIncFmCollgEd
254.126
HfPvIncFmPostCollgEd
4xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
163.839
1xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
-58.211
5xPvIncFmLHSEd
194.946
2xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
(5)
rises in Inc
477.740
5xPvIncFmHSEd
1.243
63.260
3xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
219.886
5xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
(4)
rises in Ed
4891.106
4xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
38.989
5xPvIncFmCollgEd
15.815
62.017
X
X
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Sale, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Sale. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular demographicdemographic variable combination: Coeff + SaleCoeff*(avg)Sale.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are fewer
values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
-34.101
107.767
176.055
-16.536
187.142
-54.513
-36.208
58.773
35.854
-30.645
151.336
55.756
-63.147
131.134
86.789
51.244
226.591
105.888
-99.051
55.013
19.323
-45.292
92.964
-43.870
-127.761
69.550
33.271
58.724
161.162

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Sale – Income-Level, & Level of Female Education HHH

MFX Variable

Table 18a.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
-54.921
99.564
65.288
-60.889
-59.251
18.371
-190.934
-88.232
-52.416
-82.634
-139.019
-101.645
-216.365
-57.016
-6.728
-70.610
-95.560
-18.334
-23.651
43.398
69.139
26.646
16.470
34.079
1.272
-67.463
21.907
-29.000
-85.160

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
-54.921
-190.934
-216.365
-23.651
1.272
99.564
-88.232
-57.016
43.398
-67.463
65.288
-52.416
-6.728
69.139
21.907
-60.889
-82.634
-70.610
26.646
-29.000
-59.251
-139.019
-95.560
16.470
-85.160
18.371
-101.645
-18.334
34.079

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Sale – Income-Level, & Level of Male Education HHH
%
Change
in 22x
values

303

HfPvIncMLHSEd
HfPvIncMLHSEd
1xPvIncMLHSEd
44.643
HfPvIncMHSEd
-245.855
-484.599
2xPvIncMLHSEd
191.571
HfPvIncMSomCollgEd
rises in Ed
90.898
8.161 falls in Inc
3xPvIncMLHSEd
-40.880
HfPvIncMCollgEd
-22.379
4xPvIncMLHSEd
HfPvIncMPostCollgEd
-96.920
5xPvIncMLHSEd
1.360
1xPvIncMLHSEd
HfPvIncMHSEd
1xPvIncMHSEd
11.332
-69.749
1xPvIncMHSEd
-279.166
1xPvIncMSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
312.362
2xPvIncMHSEd
13.791
1xPvIncMCollgEd
-24.065
-654.881 rises in Inc
3xPvIncMHSEd
-240.665
1xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-13.950
4xPvIncMHSEd
2xPvIncMLHSEd
5xPvIncMHSEd
-109.147
2xPvIncMHSEd
12.872
97.190
HfPvIncMSomCollgEd
2xPvIncMSomCollgEd
rises in Ed
607.343
1xPvIncMSomCollgEd
-273.381
2xPvIncMCollgEd
91.047
2xPvIncMSomCollgEd
58.338
2xPvIncMPostCollgEd
19.438
-464.613 rises in Inc
3xPvIncMSomCollgEd
-113.895
3xPvIncMLHSEd
4xPvIncMSomCollgEd
3xPvIncMHSEd
-143.523
-216.486
5xPvIncMSomCollgEd
-77.436
3xPvIncMSomCollgEd
rises in Ed
98.360
HfPvIncMCollgEd
3xPvIncMCollgEd
-2.354
1xPvIncMCollgEd
19.747
3xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-43.297
2xPvIncMCollgEd
155.976
4xPvIncMLHSEd
166.081 rises in Inc
3xPvIncMCollgEd
50.549
4xPvIncMHSEd
-198.271
-362.521
4xPvIncMCollgEd
4xPvIncMSomCollgEd
rises in Ed
65.355
5xPvIncMCollgEd
27.680
4xPvIncMCollgEd
-68.690
HfPvIncMPostCollgEd
4xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-72.504
1xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-66.191
5xPvIncMLHSEd
-158.443
2xPvIncMPostCollgEd
(5)
falls in Inc
72.470
5xPvIncMHSEd
-83.274
-67.530
3xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-114.160
5xPvIncMSomCollgEd
(4)
rises in Ed
118.907
4xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-31.689
5xPvIncMCollgEd
-16.882
15.745
X
X
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Sale, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Sale. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + SaleCoeff*(avg)Sale.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

MFX Variable

Table 18b.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
243.500
-48.192
152.474
124.051
104.836

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
243.500
311.355
825.280
147.090
-63.560
-48.192
24.070
438.915
-85.090
-52.518
152.474
170.079
677.475
100.340
-44.446
124.051
156.565

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Sale – Income-Level, & Race / Hispanic
First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

304

HfPvIncWhite
HfPvIncWhite
Inappropriate for Race
1xPvIncWhite
195.308
HfPvIncAfrAm
576.670
1463.666
2xPvIncWhite
(5)
rises in Inc
17.193
HfPvIncAsian
3xPvIncWhite
228.887
HfPvIncOthRace
4xPvIncWhite
115.334
HfPvIncHspnc
292.733
X
1xPvIncWhite
HfPvIncAfrAm
311.355
1xPvIncAfrAm
277.185
1xPvIncAfrAm
24.070
1xPvIncAsian
2xPvIncAfrAm
170.079
335.426
1xPvIncOthRace
884.907
3xPvIncAfrAm
156.565
falls in Inc
33.566
1xPvIncHspnc
55.437
4xPvIncAfrAm
127.540
222.837
2xPvIncWhite
5xPvIncAfrAm
95.297
147.484
2xPvIncAfrAm
1055.923
HfPvIncAsian
825.280
2xPvIncAsian
1xPvIncAsian
438.915
1264.195
2xPvIncOthRace
2xPvIncAsian
677.475
25.980
2xPvIncHspnc
211.185
4485.523 rises in Inc
3xPvIncAsian
951.215
1592.638
3xPvIncWhite
4xPvIncAsian
808.539
3xPvIncAfrAm
1303.885
5xPvIncAsian
784.099
747.587
X†
HfPvIncOthRace
147.090
3xPvIncAsian
951.215 (4)
1xPvIncOthRace
-85.090
62.000
3xPvIncHspnc
72.054
325.971
137.286
2xPvIncOthRace
100.340 (4)
falls in Inc
336.069
4xPvIncWhite
104.836
X†
-146.363
4xPvIncAfrAm
127.540
1149.604
4xPvIncOthRace
57.749
4xPvIncAsian
808.539
5xPvIncOthRace
-82.803
27.457
4xPvIncOthRace
57.749
HfPvIncHspnc
-63.560
4xPvIncHspnc
50.941
229.921
1xPvIncHspnc
-52.518
-116.078
X
26.039
2xPvIncHspnc
-44.446
rises in Inc
198.648
5xPvIncAfrAm
95.297
3xPvIncHspnc
72.054
114.509
5xPvIncAsian
784.099
860.161
4xPvIncHspnc
50.941
5xPvIncOthRace
-82.803 (4)
5xPvIncHspnc
63.568
4.340
5xPvIncHspnc
63.568
215.040
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Sale, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Sale. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + SaleCoeff*(avg)Sale.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

MFX Variable

Table 18c.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
104.903
86.144
63.646
-23.574
24.237

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
104.903
43.956
83.082
39.255
86.144
90.974
129.055
183.913
63.646
74.406
91.618
113.459
-23.574
89.501
113.087
86.167
24.237
24.761
84.009
71.550

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Sale – Income-Level, & Household Size
First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

305

HfPvIncHHsiz1
HfPvIncHHsiz1
1xPvIncHHsiz1
191.047
HfPvIncHHsiz2
148.859
255.357
271.196
2xPvIncHHsiz1
(5)
falls in Inc
99.653
HfPvIncHHsiz3
(4)
falls in HHsize
17.817
3xPvIncHHsiz1
0.663
HfPvIncHHsiz4
67.799
122.337
4xPvIncHHsiz1
51.071
1xPvIncHHsiz1
X
1xPvIncHHsiz2
177.118
490.086
HfPvIncHHsiz2
43.956
1xPvIncHHsiz3
(4)
rises in HHsize
76.701
1xPvIncHHsiz2
90.974
134.929
1xPvIncHHsiz4
122.521
312.968
2xPvIncHHsiz2
74.406
19.787
2xPvIncHHsiz1
460.465 rises in Inc
3xPvIncHHsiz2
89.501
161.628
2xPvIncHHsiz2
138.053
343.129
4xPvIncHHsiz2
24.761
2xPvIncHHsiz3
(4)
rises in HHsize
48.550
5xPvIncHHsiz2
136.867
76.744
2xPvIncHHsiz4
85.782
205.077
HfPvIncHHsiz3
83.082
3xPvIncHHsiz1
1xPvIncHHsiz3
129.055
212.137
3xPvIncHHsiz2
65.927
265.181
2xPvIncHHsiz3
91.618
7.902
3xPvIncHHsiz3
(4)
rises in HHsize
202.233
612.216 falls in Inc
3xPvIncHHsiz3
113.087
195.374
3xPvIncHHsiz4
66.295
199.254
4xPvIncHHsiz3
84.009
4xPvIncHHsiz1
5xPvIncHHsiz3
111.366
102.036
4xPvIncHHsiz2
48.999
204.558
HfPvIncHHsiz4
39.255
4xPvIncHHsiz3
(4)
rises in HHsize
217.474
1xPvIncHHsiz4
183.913
223.167
4xPvIncHHsiz4
51.139
155.559
2xPvIncHHsiz4
113.459
2.200
X
650.870 flat in Inc
3xPvIncHHsiz4
86.167
228.076
5xPvIncHHsiz2
136.867
248.232
404.758
4xPvIncHHsiz4
71.550
5xPvIncHHsiz3
111.366 (3)
rises in HHsize
7.920
5xPvIncHHsiz4
156.526
108.478
5xPvIncHHsiz4
156.526
134.919
267.891
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Sale, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Sale. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + SaleCoeff*(avg)Sale.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

MFX Variable

Table 18d.

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
-37.359
-158.180
-206.971
-77.544
-14.033
-88.631
-102.905
37.779
-179.726
-283.959
-321.383
-171.706
-63.047
-187.470
-244.708
-112.557
-92.206
-195.832
-308.993
-95.982

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

306

HfPvIncNoKids
HfPvIncNoKids
1xPvIncNoKids
-51.392
HfPvIncOneKids
-195.539
-386.370
-480.054
2xPvIncNoKids
falls in Inc
202.099
HfPvIncTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
45.503
(5)
3xPvIncNoKids
-155.253
HfPvInc3Kids
-120.013
-284.515
4xPvIncNoKids
-77.274
1xPvIncNoKids
X
1xPvIncOneKids
-102.664
-167.790
HfPvIncOneKids
-158.180
1xPvIncTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
36.564
1xPvIncOneKids
-88.631
-246.811
1xPvInc3Kids
-41.948
-65.126
2xPvIncOneKids
-283.959
3.467
2xPvIncNoKids
-973.608 flat in Inc
3xPvIncOneKids
-187.470
-255.368
2xPvIncOneKids
-463.685
-956.774
4xPvIncOneKids
-195.832
2xPvIncTwoKids
(4)
flat in #Kids
6.342
5xPvIncOneKids
-59.536
-162.268
2xPvInc3Kids
-239.194
-493.089
HfPvIncTwoKids
-206.971
3xPvIncNoKids
1xPvIncTwoKids
-102.905
-309.876
3xPvIncOneKids
-250.517
-607.782
2xPvIncTwoKids
-321.383 -1377.429 falls in Inc
61.827
3xPvIncTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
42.611
3xPvIncTwoKids
-244.708
-501.462
3xPvInc3Kids
-151.946
-357.265
4xPvIncTwoKids
-308.993
4xPvIncNoKids
5xPvIncTwoKids
-192.469
-229.571
4xPvIncOneKids
-288.038
-693.013
HfPvInc3Kids
-77.544
4xPvIncTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
40.598
1xPvInc3Kids
37.779
-39.766
4xPvInc3Kids
-173.253
-404.975
2xPvInc3Kids
-171.706
33.788
X
-377.231 falls in Inc
3xPvInc3Kids
-112.557
-53.201
5xPvIncOneKids
-59.536
-252.004
-209.224
4xPvInc3Kids
-95.982
5xPvIncTwoKids
-192.469 (3)
rises in #Kids
40.601
5xPvInc3Kids
42.780
-62.872
5xPvInc3Kids
42.780
-69.741
-149.688
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Sale, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Sale. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + SaleCoeff*(avg)Sale.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
-37.359
-14.033
-179.726
-63.047
-92.206

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Sale – Income-Level, & Number of Kids in HH

MFX Variable

Table 18e.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
-38.263
-10.925
-29.998
29.677
-104.424
22.038
38.413
-48.756
4.756
37.121
-91.327
12.451
130.601
-83.958
84.277
25.352
-51.916
16.826
16.139
23.190
54.586
49.185
-14.871

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
-38.263
38.413
130.601
16.139
-10.925
-48.756
-83.958
23.190
-29.998
4.756
84.277
54.586
29.677
37.121
25.352
49.185
-104.424
-91.327
-51.916
-14.871
22.038
12.451
16.826

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Sale – Income-Level, & Female Age Level of HHH
%
Change
in 22x
values

307

HfPvIncFmAgeL30
HfPvIncFmAgeL30
1xPvIncFmAgeL30
-49.188
HfPvIncFmAge30L40
0.150
146.889
2xPvIncFmAgeL30
67.489
HfPvIncFmAge40L50
(4)
rises in FmAge
98003.24
-131.894 falls in Inc
3xPvIncFmAgeL30
-82.385
HfPvIncFmAge50L65
36.722
146.740
4xPvIncFmAgeL30
1xPvIncFmAgeL30
5xPvIncFmAgeL30
-21.982
1xPvIncFmAge30L40
-59.682
-120.449
HfPvIncFmAge30L40
1xPvIncFmAge40L50
(4)
flat in FemAge
1.820
1xPvIncFmAge30L40
-10.344
1xPvIncFmAge50L65
-30.112
-60.768
2xPvIncFmAge30L40
662.555
2xPvIncFmAgeL30
-47.342 falls in Inc
3xPvIncFmAge30L40
-78.876
2xPvIncFmAge30L40
-25.242
113.622
4xPvIncFmAge30L40
2xPvIncFmAge40L50
(4)
rises in FmAge
650.139
5xPvIncFmAge30L40
-7.890
2xPvIncFmAge50L65
28.405
138.863
HfPvIncFmAge40L50
3xPvIncFmAgeL30
1xPvIncFmAge40L50
46.643
3xPvIncFmAge30L40
66.799
141.336
2xPvIncFmAge40L50
175.231
3xPvIncFmAge40L50
(4)
rises in FmAge
11.585
121.182 falls in Inc
3xPvIncFmAge40L50
-35.090
3xPvIncFmAge50L65
35.334
74.537
4xPvIncFmAge40L50
4xPvIncFmAgeL30
5xPvIncFmAge40L50
20.197
4xPvIncFmAge30L40
-195.751
-262.538
HfPvIncFmAge50L65
4xPvIncFmAge40L50
(4)
rises in FmAge
65.882
1xPvIncFmAge50L65
39.329
4xPvIncFmAge50L65
-65.634
-66.787
128.230
2xPvIncFmAge50L65
(5)
falls in Inc
12.751
5xPvIncFmAgeL30
34.490
51.316
3xPvIncFmAge50L65
34.315
5xPvIncFmAge30L40
(3)
falls in FmAge
15.112
4xPvIncFmAge50L65
25.646
5xPvIncFmAge40L50
17.105
29.278
X
X
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Sale, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Sale. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular demographicdemographic variable combination: Coeff + SaleCoeff*(avg)Sale.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are fewer
values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be included.

MFX Variable

Table 18f.

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
47.703
50.653
56.035
-7.865
16.561
66.569
-7.147
41.735
101.161
9.730
-19.921
-6.829
102.512
24.279
27.204
10.196
120.020
99.973
81.164
60.377
-58.238
0.790
28.320

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

308

HfPvIncMAgeL30
HfPvIncMAgeL30
1xPvIncMAgeL30
64.264
HfPvIncMAge30L40
98.357
146.526
2xPvIncMAgeL30
3.863
HfPvIncMAge40L50
(4)
falls in MAge
51.026
329.718 flat in Inc
3xPvIncMAgeL30
61.782
HfPvIncMAge50L65
36.632
48.170
4xPvIncMAgeL30
1xPvIncMAgeL30
5xPvIncMAgeL30
54.953
1xPvIncMAge30L40
83.129
117.717
HfPvIncMAge30L40
1xPvIncMAge40L50
(4)
falls in MAge
58.393
1xPvIncMAge30L40
117.222
1xPvIncMAge50L65
29.429
34.587
2xPvIncMAge30L40
14.041
2xPvIncMAgeL30
251.994 falls in Inc
3xPvIncMAge30L40
100.763
2xPvIncMAge30L40
110.891
84.141
4xPvIncMAge30L40
2xPvIncMAge40L50
(4)
falls in MAge
124.123
5xPvIncMAge30L40
41.999
2xPvIncMAge50L65
21.035
-26.750
HfPvIncMAge40L50
3xPvIncMAgeL30
1xPvIncMAge40L50
48.887
3xPvIncMAge30L40
126.791
164.191
2xPvIncMAge40L50
123.952
3xPvIncMAge40L50
(4)
falls in MAge
70.503
165.656 rises in Inc
3xPvIncMAge40L50
109.485
3xPvIncMAge50L65
41.048
37.400
4xPvIncMAge40L50
4xPvIncMAgeL30
5xPvIncMAge40L50
27.609
4xPvIncMAge30L40
219.993
361.534
HfPvIncMAge50L65
4xPvIncMAge40L50
(4)
falls in MAge
35.661
1xPvIncMAge50L65
33.870
4xPvIncMAge50L65
90.384
141.542
97.614
2xPvIncMAge50L65
(5)
rises in Inc
108.367
5xPvIncMAgeL30
-57.448
-29.128
3xPvIncMAge50L65
70.573
5xPvIncMAge30L40
(3)
rises in MAge
150.673
4xPvIncMAge50L65
19.523
5xPvIncMAge40L50
-9.709
29.110
X
X
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Sale, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Sale. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + SaleCoeff*(avg)Sale.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
47.703
16.561
101.161
102.512
120.020
-58.238
50.653
66.569
9.730
24.279
99.973
0.790
56.035
-7.147
-19.921
27.204
81.164
28.320
-7.865
41.735
-6.829
10.196
60.377

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Sale – Income-Level, & Male Age Level of HHH

MFX Variable

Table 18g.

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
64.719
182.141
297.013
117.597
32.380
141.070
150.739
-13.452
-32.922
54.237
124.516
-7.442
5.591
78.667
160.042
15.870
84.074
154.467
22.646

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

309

FmLHSNoKids
FmLHSNoKids
FmHSNoKids
97.099
FmLHSOneKids
246.860
69.767
661.471
FmSmColgNoKids
(4)
falls in Ed
128.148
FmLHSTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
67.954
FmColgNoKids
17.442
-27.331
FmLHS3Kids
165.368
414.610
X
FmHSNoKids
FmLHSOneKids
182.141
FmHSOneKids
173.450
310.737
FmHSOneKids
141.070
323.211
FmHSTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
20.849
540.189
FmSmColgOneKids
54.237
falls in Ed
49.649
FmHS3Kids
77.684
137.287
FmColgOneKids
78.667
162.741
FmSmColgNoKids
FmPostColgOneKids
84.074
108.038
FmSmColgOneKids
21.314
138.388
FmLHSTwoKids
297.013
FmSmColgTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
449.274
FmHSTwoKids
150.739
447.752
FmSmColg3Kids
34.597
117.074
886.776
FmSmColgTwoKids
124.516
falls in Ed
29.758
FmColgNoKids
FmColgTwoKids
160.042
314.509
FmColgOneKids
84.258
260.170
FmPostColgTwoKids
154.467
177.355
FmColgTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
108.779
FmLHS3Kids
117.597
FmColg3Kids
65.042
175.912
FmHS3Kids
-13.452
104.145
FmPostColgOneKids
238.541
135.219
261.187
FmSmColg3Kids
-7.442
falls in Ed
63.017
FmPostColgTwoKids
(3)
falls in #Kids
25.752
FmColg3Kids
15.870
38.516
FmPostColg3Kids
87.062
177.112
FmPostColg3Kids
22.646
27.044
X
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Sale, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Sale. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + SaleCoeff*(avg)Sale.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
64.719
32.380
-32.922
5.591

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Sale – Level of Female Education HHH & Number of Kids in HH

MFX Variable

Table 18h.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
148.685
202.106
119.796
6.348

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
148.685
202.830
227.504
84.189
202.106
229.054
211.825
202.888
119.796
94.777
126.397
77.517
6.348
18.548
-3.975
-11.558

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

310

MLHSEdNoKids
MLHSEdNoKids
MHSEdNoKids
350.791
MLHSEdOneKids
351.515
476.935
663.208
MSmColgEdNoKids
(4)
falls in Ed
40.370
MLHSEdTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
11.329
MColgEdNoKids
119.234
209.177
MLHSEd3Kids
165.802
311.692
X
MHSEdNoKids
MLHSEdOneKids
202.830
MHSEdOneKids
431.160
845.872
MHSEdOneKids
229.054
431.884
MHSEdTwoKids
(4)
flat in #Kids
3.815
618.138
MSmColgEdOneKids
94.777
falls in Ed
78.819
MHSEd3Kids
211.468
414.712
MColgEdOneKids
18.548
91.477
MSmColgEdNoKids
MPostColgEdOneKids
72.929
123.628
MSmColgEdOneKids
214.573
418.487
MLHSEdTwoKids
227.504
MSmColgEdTwoKids
(4)
flat in #Kids
4.968
MHSEdTwoKids
211.825
439.328
MSmColgEd3Kids
104.622
203.914
655.988
MSmColgEdTwoKids
126.397
falls in Ed
79.454
MColgEdNoKids
MColgEdTwoKids
-3.975
90.263
MColgEdOneKids
24.895
9.362
MPostColgEdTwoKids
94.237
131.198
MColgEdTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
162.393
MLHSEd3Kids
84.189
MColgEd3Kids
2.341
-15.533
MHSEd3Kids
202.888
287.076
X
331.295
MSmColgEd3Kids
77.517
falls in Ed
111.599
MPostColgEdOneKids
72.929
167.166
145.426
MColgEd3Kids
-11.558
-33.299
MPostColgEdTwoKids
94.237 (3)
falls in #Kids
56.632
MPostColgEd3Kids
-21.740
66.259
MPostColgEd3Kids
-21.740
48.475
72.497
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that variable's
interaction with Sale, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Sale. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular demographic-demographic
variable combination: Coeff + SaleCoeff*(avg)Sale.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are fewer
values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be included.

MFX Variable

Combined

Table 18i. Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Sale – Level of Male Education HHH & Number of Kids in HH

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
-88.261
-165.423
-819.163
-3.214
30.410
6.548
-773.220
-38.536
-8.766
-31.615
-721.124
-36.161
53.573
38.985
-577.402
9.561

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

311

FmLHSEdWhite
FmLHSEdWhite
Inappropriate for Race
FmHSEdWhite
-57.851
FmLHSEdAfrAm
-13.045
-1076.061
FmSmColgEdWhite
(4)
rises in Ed
177.451
FmLHSEdAsian
(4)
FmColgEdWhite
-3.261
44.806
FmLHSEdHspnc
-269.015
X
FmHSEdWhite
FmLHSEdAfrAm
-165.423
FmHSEdAfrAm
-774.798
FmHSEdAfrAm
6.548
-158.875
FmHSEdAsian
(4)
-185.472
FmSomColgEdAfrAm
-31.615
rises in Ed
103.159
FmHSEdHspnc
-193.700
FmColgEdAfrAm
38.985
5.019
FmSmColgEdWhite
FmPostColgEdAfrAm
-33.967
-37.094
FmSomColgEdAfrAm
-797.666
FmLHSEdAsian
-819.163
FmSomColgEdAsian
(4)
FmHSEdAsian
-773.220 -3558.976
-1592.383
FmSomColgEdHspnc
-199.416
FmSomColgEdAsian
-721.124
rises in Ed
21.786
FmColgEdWhite
FmColgEdAsian
-577.402
-1245.469
FmColgEdAfrAm
-475.283
FmPostColgEdAsian
-668.067
-711.795
FmColgEdAsian
(4)
FmPostColgEdOthRace
-26.621
FmColgEdHspnc
-118.821
FmLHSEdHspnc
-3.214
X
FmHSEdHspnc
-38.536
-41.750
FmPostColgEdAfrAm
-33.967
-106.088
FmSomColgEdHspnc
-36.161
rises in Ed
32.507
FmPostColgEdAsian
-668.067
-766.394
FmColgEdHspnc
9.561
-28.178
! FmPostColgEdOthRace
-26.621 (4)
FmPostColgEdHspnc
-37.739
-21.218
FmPostColgEdHspnc
-37.739
-191.598
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that variable's
interaction with Sale, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Sale. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular demographicdemographic variable combination: Coeff + SaleCoeff*(avg)Sale.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are fewer
values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
-88.261
30.410
-8.766
53.573

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Sale – Level of Female Education HHH & Race / Hispanic

MFX Variable

Table 18j.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
-121.978
-76.324
-16.616
-13.833

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Sale
-121.978
-214.353
-43.817
-74.006
-76.324
-150.398
145.108
-8.260
-16.616
-98.075
-93.865
1.819
-13.833
-145.433
-104.364
-49.621

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

312

MLHSEdWhite
MLHSEdWhite
Inappropriate for Race
MHSEdWhite
-198.302
MLHSEdAfrAm
-228.751
-454.154
MSmColgEdWhite
(4)
rises in Ed
15.070
MLHSEdAsian
(4)
MColgEdWhite
-57.188
-228.186
MLHSEdHspnc
-113.539
X
MHSEdWhite
MLHSEdAfrAm
-214.353
MHSEdAfrAm
-89.874
MHSEdAfrAm
-150.398
-364.751
MHSEdAsian
(4)
-622.307
MSmColgEdAfrAm
-98.075
rises in Ed
56.277
MHSEdHspnc
-22.468
MColgEdAfrAm
-145.433
-159.481
MSmColgEdWhite
MPostColgEdAfrAm
-14.048
-124.461
MSmColgEdAfrAm
-206.737
MLHSEdAsian
-43.817
MSmColgEdAsian
(4)
MHSEdAsian
145.108
101.291
MSmColgEdHspnc
-51.684
-180.237
MSmColgEdAsian
-93.865
falls in Ed
285.272
MColgEdWhite
MColgEdAsian
-104.364
-187.663
MColgEdAfrAm
-313.251
MPostColgEdAsian
-83.299
-36.047
MColgEdAsian
(4)
MPostColgEdOthRace
-7.988
MColgEdHspnc
-78.313
MLHSEdHspnc
-74.006
X
MHSEdHspnc
-8.260
-82.266
MPostColgEdAfrAm
-14.048
-133.310
MSmColgEdHspnc
1.819
rises in Ed
35.741
MPostColgEdAsian
-83.299
-108.577
MColgEdHspnc
-49.621
-52.863
! MPostColgEdOthRace
-7.988 (4)
MPostColgEdHspnc
-3.243
-26.662
MPostColgEdHspnc
-3.243
-27.144
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Sale, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Sale. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + SaleCoeff*(avg)Sale.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

MFX Variable

Combined

Table 18k. Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Sale – Level of Male Education HHH & Race / Hispanic

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
147.854
44.836
-33.373
-104.710
-179.783
272.881
158.218
167.142
127.220
117.429
204.208
75.070
84.910
59.063
-8.450
248.536
96.416
132.039
113.740
43.266
330.987
177.972
224.304
168.091
123.718
156.557
89.786
111.134
27.259

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

313

HfPvIncFmLHSEd
HfPvIncFmLHSEd
1xPvIncFmLHSEd
420.735
HfPvIncFmHSEd
192.690
-125.176
2xPvIncFmLHSEd
15.879
HfPvIncFmSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
247.643
1361.023 rises in Inc
3xPvIncFmLHSEd
487.544
HfPvIncFmCollgEd
-284.493
4xPvIncFmLHSEd
HfPvIncFmPostCollgEd
-25.035
5xPvIncFmLHSEd
226.837
1xPvIncFmLHSEd
HfPvIncFmHSEd
1xPvIncFmHSEd
431.099
842.890
1xPvIncFmHSEd
203.054
1xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
43.250
2xPvIncFmHSEd
31.865
1xPvIncFmCollgEd
244.649
642.298 rises in Inc
3xPvIncFmHSEd
267.758
1xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
168.578
4xPvIncFmHSEd
2xPvIncFmLHSEd
5xPvIncFmHSEd
107.050
2xPvIncFmHSEd
279.278
414.800
HfPvIncFmSomCollgEd
2xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
81.877
1xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
133.769
2xPvIncFmCollgEd
50.613
2xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
150.760
2xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
82.960
686.155 rises in Inc
3xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
335.438
3xPvIncFmLHSEd
4xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
3xPvIncFmHSEd
344.952
633.998
5xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
114.359
3xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
54.485
HfPvIncFmCollgEd
3xPvIncFmCollgEd
157.006
1xPvIncFmCollgEd
22.510
3xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
126.800
2xPvIncFmCollgEd
767.841
4xPvIncFmLHSEd
390.663 rises in Inc
3xPvIncFmCollgEd
195.350
4xPvIncFmHSEd
508.958
1025.072
4xPvIncFmCollgEd
4xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
42.665
5xPvIncFmCollgEd
65.111
4xPvIncFmCollgEd
291.810
HfPvIncFmPostCollgEd
4xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
205.014
1xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
-62.354
5xPvIncFmLHSEd
96.180
2xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
(5)
rises in Inc
367.800
5xPvIncFmHSEd
246.343
384.736
3xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
166.984
5xPvIncFmSomCollgEd
(4)
falls in Ed
43.821
4xPvIncFmPostCollgEd
19.236
5xPvIncFmCollgEd
96.184
138.393
X
X
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Adv, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Adv. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + AdvCoeff*(avg)Adv.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
147.854
272.881
204.208
248.536
330.987
156.557
44.836
158.218
75.070
96.416
177.972
89.786
-33.373
167.142
84.910
132.039
224.304
111.134
-104.710
127.220
59.063
113.740
168.091
27.259
-179.783
117.429
-8.450
43.266
123.718

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Advertising – Income-Level, & Level of Female Education HHH

MFX Variable

Table 19a.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
-26.771
45.855
75.894
-62.005
-94.654
79.750
-122.410
-49.360
-37.143
-17.561
-123.842
-44.634
-44.657
-7.541
14.934
27.597
-56.199
42.584
-116.579
-98.390
-107.946
-85.575
-163.829
-73.122
-42.631
-40.764
-69.802
-19.587
-122.056

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
-26.771
-122.410
-44.657
-116.579
-42.631
45.855
-49.360
-7.541
-98.390
-40.764
75.894
-37.143
14.934
-107.946
-69.802
-62.005
-17.561
27.597
-85.575
-19.587
-94.654
-123.842
-56.199
-163.829
-122.056
79.750
-44.634
42.584
-73.122

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Advertising – Income-Level, & Level of Male Education HHH

314

HfPvIncMLHSEd
HfPvIncMLHSEd
1xPvIncMLHSEd
19.084
HfPvIncMHSEd
-149.181
-353.049
2xPvIncMLHSEd
178.097
HfPvIncMSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
6.723
18.068 falls in Inc
3xPvIncMLHSEd
-14.904
HfPvIncMCollgEd
-159.211
4xPvIncMLHSEd
HfPvIncMPostCollgEd
-70.610
5xPvIncMLHSEd
3.011
1xPvIncMLHSEd
HfPvIncMHSEd
1xPvIncMHSEd
-3.506
-150.201
1xPvIncMHSEd
-171.770
1xPvIncMSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
3869.431
2xPvIncMHSEd
1.918
1xPvIncMCollgEd
-139.154
-394.950 flat in Inc
3xPvIncMHSEd
-168.476
1xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-30.040
4xPvIncMHSEd
2xPvIncMLHSEd
5xPvIncMHSEd
-65.825
2xPvIncMHSEd
38.751
-124.063
HfPvIncMSomCollgEd
2xPvIncMSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
558.691
1xPvIncMSomCollgEd
-52.198
2xPvIncMCollgEd
-177.748
2xPvIncMSomCollgEd
73.916
2xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-24.813
-23.282 rises in Inc
3xPvIncMSomCollgEd
-13.615
3xPvIncMLHSEd
4xPvIncMSomCollgEd
3xPvIncMHSEd
-79.566
-157.132
5xPvIncMSomCollgEd
-3.880
3xPvIncMSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
32.170
HfPvIncMCollgEd
3xPvIncMCollgEd
-105.162
1xPvIncMCollgEd
-214.969
3xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-31.426
2xPvIncMCollgEd
10.225
4xPvIncMLHSEd
-645.441 falls in Inc
3xPvIncMCollgEd
-236.951
4xPvIncMHSEd
-218.496
-560.580
4xPvIncMCollgEd
4xPvIncMSomCollgEd
falls in Ed
30.842
5xPvIncMCollgEd
-107.574
4xPvIncMCollgEd
-285.885
HfPvIncMPostCollgEd
4xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-112.116
1xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-83.396
5xPvIncMLHSEd
-294.841
2xPvIncMPostCollgEd
(5)
falls in Inc
69.845
5xPvIncMHSEd
35.117
4.579
3xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-141.643
5xPvIncMSomCollgEd
(4)
falls in Ed
186.962
4xPvIncMPostCollgEd
-58.968
5xPvIncMCollgEd
1.145
-30.538
X
X
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Adv, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Adv. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + AdvCoeff*(avg)Adv.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

MFX Variable

Table 19b.

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
-94.163
-85.070
21.799
-222.403
-45.672
-212.512
-244.120
-41.914
-276.979
-61.106
-43.728
-21.361
113.847
-105.951
-48.558
35.137
20.006

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

315

HfPvIncWhite
HfPvIncWhite
Inappropriate for Race
1xPvIncWhite
-306.675
HfPvIncAfrAm
-289.1917
-425.508
2xPvIncWhite
(5)
rises in Inc
119.960
HfPvIncAsian
3xPvIncWhite
61.211
HfPvIncOthRace
4xPvIncWhite
-57.838
HfPvIncHspnc
-85.102
X
1xPvIncWhite
HfPvIncAfrAm
-85.070
1xPvIncAfrAm
-836.632
1xPvIncAfrAm
-244.120
-329.190
1xPvIncAsian
2xPvIncAfrAm
-21.361
102.052
1xPvIncOthRace
-323.789 rises in Inc
3xPvIncAfrAm
20.006
6.756
1xPvIncHspnc
-167.326
4xPvIncAfrAm
6.239
2xPvIncWhite
5xPvIncAfrAm
0.517
-53.965
2xPvIncAfrAm
-105.751
HfPvIncAsian
21.799
2xPvIncAsian
1xPvIncAsian
-41.914
-20.115
2xPvIncOthRace
2xPvIncAsian
113.847
3021.944
2xPvIncHspnc
-21.150
1133.398 rises in Inc
3xPvIncAsian
451.908
587.759
3xPvIncWhite
4xPvIncAsian
263.909
3xPvIncAfrAm
482.223
5xPvIncAsian
323.850
188.900
X†
HfPvIncOthRace
-222.403
3xPvIncAsian
451.908 (4)
1xPvIncOthRace
-276.979
-499.382
3xPvIncHspnc
-24.828
120.556
2xPvIncOthRace
-105.951
78.482
4xPvIncWhite
26.075
-661.256 rises in Inc
X†
-107.457
4xPvIncAfrAm
6.239
248.686
4xPvIncOthRace
5.863 (4)
4xPvIncAsian
263.909
5xPvIncOthRace
-61.786
-132.251
4xPvIncOthRace
5.863
HfPvIncHspnc
-45.672
4xPvIncHspnc
-53.399
49.737
1xPvIncHspnc
-61.106
-106.778
X
2xPvIncHspnc
-48.558
23.658
5xPvIncAfrAm
0.517
-261.681 rises in Inc
3xPvIncHspnc
-24.828
-81.517
5xPvIncAsian
323.850
234.464
4xPvIncHspnc
-53.399
5xPvIncOthRace
-61.786 (4)
5xPvIncHspnc
-28.117
-43.613
5xPvIncHspnc
-28.117
58.616
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Adv, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Adv. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff +AdvCoeff*(avg)Adv.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
-94.163
-212.512
-43.728
35.137
26.075

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Advertising – Income-Level, & Race / Hispanic

MFX Variable

Table 19c.

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
-6.380
46.848
18.656
19.856
87.860
82.757
131.537
149.478
40.781
81.868
83.544
94.480
-44.062
34.058
55.425
127.483
-44.910
-4.069
39.543
44.012

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

316

HfPvIncHHsiz1
HfPvIncHHsiz1
1xPvIncHHsiz1
81.479
HfPvIncHHsiz2
40.468
33.288
78.979
2xPvIncHHsiz1
(5)
falls in Inc
209.195
HfPvIncHHsiz3
(4)
flat in HHsize
4.834
3xPvIncHHsiz1
-88.972
HfPvIncHHsiz4
19.745
38.511
4xPvIncHHsiz1
6.658
1xPvIncHHsiz1
X
1xPvIncHHsiz2
170.616
451.632
HfPvIncHHsiz2
46.848
129.605
1xPvIncHHsiz3
(4)
rises in HHsize
64.706
1xPvIncHHsiz2
82.757
falls in Inc
6.872
1xPvIncHHsiz4
112.908
281.016
2xPvIncHHsiz2
81.868
120.699
2xPvIncHHsiz1
366.229
3xPvIncHHsiz2
34.058
2xPvIncHHsiz2
122.648
300.672
4xPvIncHHsiz2
-4.069
2xPvIncHHsiz3
(4)
rises in HHsize
45.150
5xPvIncHHsiz2
124.768
61.038
2xPvIncHHsiz4
75.168
178.024
HfPvIncHHsiz3
18.656
150.193
3xPvIncHHsiz1
1xPvIncHHsiz3
131.537
rises in Inc
7.457
3xPvIncHHsiz2
-10.004
172.904
2xPvIncHHsiz3
83.544
161.393
3xPvIncHHsiz3
(4)
rises in HHsize
1928.324
450.555
3xPvIncHHsiz3
55.425
3xPvIncHHsiz4
43.226
182.908
4xPvIncHHsiz3
39.543
4xPvIncHHsiz1
5xPvIncHHsiz3
121.850
75.092
4xPvIncHHsiz2
-48.979
34.576
HfPvIncHHsiz4
19.856
169.334
4xPvIncHHsiz3
(4)
rises in HHsize
270.594
1xPvIncHHsiz4
149.478
rises in Inc
7.695
4xPvIncHHsiz4
8.644
83.555
2xPvIncHHsiz4
94.480
182.363
X
573.661
3xPvIncHHsiz4
127.483
81.479
5xPvIncHHsiz2
124.768
246.618
384.969
4xPvIncHHsiz4
44.012
5xPvIncHHsiz3
121.850 (3)
rises in HHsize
5.508
5xPvIncHHsiz4
138.351
95.610
5xPvIncHHsiz4
138.351
128.323
260.201
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Adv, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Adv. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + AdvCoeff*(avg)Adv.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
-6.380
87.860
40.781
-44.062
-44.910

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Advertising – Income-Level, & Household Size

MFX Variable

Table 19d.

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
206.512
196.379
274.959
176.655
104.479
64.627
115.288
123.712
3.342
-81.822
23.760
-91.678
0.572
-103.920
-81.219
-119.181
40.445
-33.957
10.659
-69.623

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

317

HfPvIncNoKids
HfPvIncNoKids
1xPvIncNoKids
310.991
HfPvIncOneKids
402.890
854.505
2xPvIncNoKids
86.811
HfPvIncTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
12.094
355.350 falls in Inc
3xPvIncNoKids
(5)
41.017
HfPvInc3Kids
213.626
451.615
4xPvIncNoKids
1xPvIncNoKids
X
71.070
1xPvIncOneKids
169.106
408.106
HfPvIncOneKids
196.379
1xPvIncTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
41.331
1xPvIncOneKids
64.627
261.006
1xPvInc3Kids
102.027
239.000
2xPvIncOneKids
-81.822
134.134
2xPvIncNoKids
-13.829 falls in Inc
3xPvIncOneKids
-103.920
-89.092
2xPvIncOneKids
-78.480
-146.398
4xPvIncOneKids
-33.957
2xPvIncTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
13.458
5xPvIncOneKids
-55.136
-2.305
2xPvInc3Kids
-36.600
-67.918
HfPvIncTwoKids
274.959
3xPvIncNoKids
1xPvIncTwoKids
115.288
390.247
3xPvIncOneKids
-103.348
-303.748
2xPvIncTwoKids
23.760
99.815
3xPvIncTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
93.909
333.510 falls in Inc
3xPvIncTwoKids
-81.219
0.722
3xPvInc3Kids
-75.937
-200.400
4xPvIncTwoKids
10.659
4xPvIncNoKids
5xPvIncTwoKids
-9.937
55.585
4xPvIncOneKids
6.488
-52.476
HfPvInc3Kids
176.655
4xPvIncTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
1008.865
1xPvInc3Kids
123.712
300.367
4xPvInc3Kids
-13.119
-58.964
2xPvInc3Kids
-91.678
149.645
X
-59.609 falls in Inc
3xPvInc3Kids
-119.181
-149.117
5xPvIncOneKids
-55.136
-65.072
-144.566
4xPvInc3Kids
-69.623
5xPvIncTwoKids
-9.937 (3)
falls in #Kids
37.433
5xPvInc3Kids
-79.494
-9.935
5xPvInc3Kids
-79.494
-48.189
-89.431
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Adv, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Adv. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + AdvCoeff*(avg)Adv.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
206.512
104.479
3.342
0.572
40.445

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Advertising – Income-Level, & Number of Kids in HH

MFX Variable

Table 19e.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
24.927
27.840
11.686
-9.729
-111.018
14.985
45.210
8.184
45.970
-20.801
-86.799
-1.449
109.333
-23.547
72.159
-5.570
-80.164
27.826
85.179
30.756
53.011
-2.160
-34.379

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
24.927
45.210
109.333
85.179
27.840
8.184
-23.547
30.756
11.686
45.970
72.159
53.011
-9.729
-20.801
-5.570
-2.160
-111.018
-86.799
-80.164
-34.379
14.985
-1.449
27.826

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Advertising – Income-Level, & Female Age Level of HHH
%
Change
in 22x
values

318

HfPvIncFmAgeL30
HfPvIncFmAgeL30
1xPvIncFmAgeL30
52.767
HfPvIncFmAge30L40
70.137
264.649
2xPvIncFmAgeL30
281.995
HfPvIncFmAge40L50
(4)
rises in FmAge
177.330
-41.310 falls in Inc
3xPvIncFmAgeL30
-96.034
HfPvIncFmAge50L65
66.162
194.512
4xPvIncFmAgeL30
1xPvIncFmAgeL30
5xPvIncFmAgeL30
-6.885
1xPvIncFmAge30L40
36.024
43.233
HfPvIncFmAge30L40
1xPvIncFmAge40L50
(4)
falls in FmAge
79.988
1xPvIncFmAge30L40
53.394
1xPvIncFmAge50L65
10.808
7.209
2xPvIncFmAge30L40
265.278
2xPvIncFmAgeL30
-9.685 falls in Inc
3xPvIncFmAge30L40
-88.248
2xPvIncFmAge30L40
57.656
182.826
4xPvIncFmAge30L40
2xPvIncFmAge40L50
(4)
rises in FmAge
117.096
5xPvIncFmAge30L40
-1.614
2xPvIncFmAge50L65
45.707
125.170
HfPvIncFmAge40L50
3xPvIncFmAgeL30
1xPvIncFmAge40L50
85.786
3xPvIncFmAge30L40
-30.530
-38.261
2xPvIncFmAge40L50
161.010
3xPvIncFmAge40L50
(4)
rises in FmAge
74.680
100.036 falls in Inc
3xPvIncFmAge40L50
-52.338
3xPvIncFmAge50L65
-9.565
-7.730
4xPvIncFmAge40L50
4xPvIncFmAgeL30
5xPvIncFmAge40L50
16.673
4xPvIncFmAge30L40
-197.818
-312.361
HfPvIncFmAge50L65
4xPvIncFmAge40L50
(4)
rises in FmAge
42.096
1xPvIncFmAge50L65
115.935
4xPvIncFmAge50L65
-78.090
-114.543
132.407
2xPvIncFmAge50L65
(5)
falls in Inc
131.517
5xPvIncFmAgeL30
13.535
41.361
3xPvIncFmAge50L65
-36.539
5xPvIncFmAge30L40
(3)
rises in FmAge
94.870
4xPvIncFmAge50L65
26.481
5xPvIncFmAge40L50
13.787
26.377
X
X
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Adv, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Adv. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + AdvCoeff*(avg)Adv.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

MFX Variable

Table 19f.

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
125.162
77.005
48.783
-4.854
-18.321
52.574
62.040
44.361
158.130
23.980
45.773
13.185
-12.406
21.918
24.660
25.315
179.368
86.902
93.396
75.131
-32.875
11.444
10.552

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

319

HfPvIncMAgeL30
HfPvIncMAgeL30
1xPvIncMAgeL30
106.841
HfPvIncMAge30L40
202.167
246.096
2xPvIncMAgeL30
37.113
HfPvIncMAge40L50
(4)
falls in MAge
78.271
399.059 rises in Inc
3xPvIncMAgeL30
146.494
HfPvIncMAge50L65
61.524
43.929
4xPvIncMAgeL30
1xPvIncMAgeL30
5xPvIncMAgeL30
66.510
1xPvIncMAge30L40
34.254
140.655
HfPvIncMAge30L40
1xPvIncMAge40L50
(4)
rises in MAge
210.629
1xPvIncMAge30L40
129.579
1xPvIncMAge50L65
35.164
106.401
2xPvIncMAge30L40
24.103
2xPvIncMAgeL30
273.824 falls in Inc
3xPvIncMAge30L40
98.346
2xPvIncMAge30L40
182.110
241.068
4xPvIncMAge30L40
2xPvIncMAge40L50
(4)
falls in MAge
67.625
5xPvIncMAge30L40
45.637
2xPvIncMAge50L65
60.267
58.958
HfPvIncMAge40L50
3xPvIncMAgeL30
1xPvIncMAge40L50
110.823
3xPvIncMAge30L40
9.512
59.487
2xPvIncMAge40L50
6.203
3xPvIncMAge40L50
(4)
rises in MAge
425.362
285.205 falls in Inc
3xPvIncMAge40L50
103.948
3xPvIncMAge50L65
14.872
49.974
4xPvIncMAge40L50
4xPvIncMAgeL30
5xPvIncMAge40L50
47.534
4xPvIncMAge30L40
266.271
434.797
HfPvIncMAge50L65
4xPvIncMAge40L50
(4)
falls in MAge
36.708
1xPvIncMAge50L65
39.507
4xPvIncMAge50L65
108.699
168.527
153.137
2xPvIncMAge50L65
(5)
rises in Inc
154.245
5xPvIncMAgeL30
-21.431
-10.878
3xPvIncMAge50L65
100.445
5xPvIncMAge30L40
(3)
rises in MAge
202.639
4xPvIncMAge50L65
30.627
5xPvIncMAge40L50
-3.626
21.996
X
X
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Adv, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Adv. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + AdvCoeff*(avg)Adv.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
125.162
-18.321
158.130
-12.406
179.368
-32.875
77.005
52.574
23.980
21.918
86.902
11.444
48.783
62.040
45.773
24.660
93.396
10.552
-4.854
44.361
13.185
25.315
75.131

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Advertising – Income-Level, & Male Age Level of HHH

MFX Variable

Table 19g.

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
-115.381
6.009
-82.577
70.851
-74.564
11.319
-61.650
-33.654
-108.908
-27.272
-93.726
-25.067
-92.750
-40.445
-90.039
-7.935
35.766
-29.852
70.937

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

320

FmLHSNoKids
FmLHSNoKids
FmHSNoKids
-189.945
FmLHSOneKids
-109.372
-391.604
-121.098
FmSmColgNoKids
(4)
falls in Ed
6.167
FmLHSTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
89.279
FmColgNoKids
-97.901
-201.659
FmLHS3Kids
-30.275
-11.726
X
FmHSNoKids
FmLHSOneKids
6.009
17.328
FmHSOneKids
-63.245
-158.549
FmHSOneKids
11.319
127.004
FmHSTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
50.691
-14.623 falls in Ed
FmSmColgOneKids
-27.272
-4.679
FmHS3Kids
-39.637
-95.304
FmColgOneKids
-40.445
FmSmColgNoKids
FmPostColgOneKids
35.766
-2.925
FmSmColgOneKids
-136.180
-254.974
FmLHSTwoKids
-82.577
-144.227
FmSmColgTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
12.768
FmHSTwoKids
-61.650
16.873
FmSmColg3Kids
-63.743
-118.793
-357.844 rises in Ed
FmSmColgTwoKids
-93.726
-119.891
FmColgNoKids
FmColgTwoKids
-90.039
FmColgOneKids
-133.196
-231.169
FmPostColgTwoKids
-29.852
-71.569
FmColgTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
26.444
FmLHS3Kids
70.851
FmColg3Kids
-57.792
-97.974
FmHS3Kids
-33.654
37.196
FmPostColgOneKids
5.914
75.131
76.850
FmSmColg3Kids
-25.067
rises in Ed
69.376
FmPostColgTwoKids
(3)
rises in #Kids
594.728
FmColg3Kids
-7.935
63.001
FmPostColg3Kids
25.617
41.084
FmPostColg3Kids
70.937
15.026
X
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Adv, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Adv. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + AdvCoeff*(avg)Adv.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
-115.381
-74.564
-108.908
-92.750

Combined

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Advertising – Level of Female Educ. HHH & Number of Kids in HH

MFX Variable

Table 19h.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
98.937
138.796
95.939
127.502

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
98.937
93.559
198.491
25.480
138.796
160.102
161.396
103.844
95.939
72.319
77.812
83.949
127.502
135.607
136.979
146.169

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

321

MLHSEdNoKids
MLHSEdNoKids
MHSEdNoKids
237.733
MLHSEdOneKids
192.497
461.174
416.468
MSmColgEdNoKids
(4)
falls in Ed
7.013
MLHSEdTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
16.351
MColgEdNoKids
115.294
221.062
MLHSEd3Kids
104.117
223.971
X
MHSEdNoKids
MLHSEdOneKids
93.559
MHSEdOneKids
298.898
564.139
MHSEdOneKids
160.102
253.662
MHSEdTwoKids
(4)
falls in #Kids
11.261
522.152
MSmColgEdOneKids
72.319
falls in Ed
22.665
MHSEd3Kids
141.035
265.240
MColgEdOneKids
135.607
196.170
MSmColgEdNoKids
MPostColgEdOneKids
60.564
104.430
MSmColgEdOneKids
168.258
330.020
MLHSEdTwoKids
198.491
MSmColgEdTwoKids
(4)
flat in #Kids
3.861
MHSEdTwoKids
161.396
359.888
MSmColgEd3Kids
82.505
161.762
601.985
MSmColgEdTwoKids
77.812
falls in Ed
54.351
MColgEdNoKids
MColgEdTwoKids
136.979
164.285
MColgEdOneKids
263.109
546.257
MPostColgEdTwoKids
27.307
120.397
MColgEdTwoKids
(4)
rises in #Kids
7.616
MLHSEd3Kids
25.480
MColgEd3Kids
136.564
283.148
MHSEd3Kids
103.844
129.324
X
398.407
MSmColgEd3Kids
83.949
rises in Ed
43.155
MPostColgEdOneKids
60.564
87.870
126.834
MColgEd3Kids
146.169
185.133
MPostColgEdTwoKids
27.307 (3)
falls in #Kids
24.581
MPostColgEd3Kids
38.964
79.681
MPostColgEd3Kids
38.964
42.278
66.271
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Adv, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Adv. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + AdvCoeff*(avg)Adv.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

MFX Variable

Combined

Table 19i. Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Advertising – Level of Male Education HHH & Number of Kids in HH

Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
-20.097
57.966
20.558
57.343

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
-20.097
-132.849
-326.276
-5.500
57.966
46.550
-389.532
15.994
20.558
13.977
-305.485
41.328
57.343
60.284
-234.875
77.154

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values

Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Advertising – Level of Female Education HHH & Race / Hispanic

322

FmLHSEdWhite
FmLHSEdWhite
Inappropriate for Race
FmHSEdWhite
37.869
FmLHSEdAfrAm
115.770
-484.722
FmSmColgEdWhite
(4)
rises in Ed
105.713
FmLHSEdAsian
(4)
FmColgEdWhite
28.942
77.901
FmLHSEdHspnc
-121.181
X
FmHSEdWhite
FmLHSEdAfrAm
-132.849
FmHSEdAfrAm
-269.022
FmHSEdAfrAm
46.550
-86.300
FmHSEdAsian
(4)
18.716
FmSomColgEdAfrAm
13.977
rises in Ed
205.491
FmHSEdHspnc
-67.256
FmColgEdAfrAm
60.284
91.039
FmSmColgEdWhite
FmPostColgEdAfrAm
30.755
3.743
FmSomColgEdAfrAm
-229.622
FmLHSEdAsian
-326.276
FmSomColgEdAsian
(4)
FmHSEdAsian
-389.532 -1565.431
-715.808
FmSomColgEdHspnc
-57.405
FmSomColgEdAsian
-305.485
rises in Ed
23.983
FmColgEdWhite
FmColgEdAsian
-234.875
-544.139
FmColgEdAfrAm
-40.093
FmPostColgEdAsian
-309.264
-313.086
FmColgEdAsian
(4)
FmPostColgEdOthRace
-30.073
FmColgEdHspnc
-10.023
FmLHSEdHspnc
-5.500
X
FmHSEdHspnc
15.994
10.495
FmPostColgEdAfrAm
30.755
135.433
FmSomColgEdHspnc
41.328
rises in Ed
696.705
FmPostColgEdAsian
-309.264
-302.127
FmColgEdHspnc
77.154
83.61043
! FmPostColgEdOthRace
-30.073 (4)
FmPostColgEdHspnc
6.456
27.087
FmPostColgEdHspnc
6.456
-75.532
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Adv, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Adv. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + AdvCoeff*(avg)Adv.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

MFX Variable

Table 19j.

Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
-98.743
-58.548
-56.716
-7.164

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Educ
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
(Re-grouping
of same)
MFX Variable
Marg. Eff.s*
in Adv
-98.743
-145.694
-23.216
-24.076
-58.548
-95.885
97.565
-2.913
-56.716
-108.597
-78.758
-32.355
-7.164
-70.166
-73.315
-40.533

Combined

Level
Total
Level
Avg**

First 2
vs. last 2
@ Inc
Level

%
Change
in 22x
values
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MLHSEdWhite
MLHSEdWhite
Inappropriate for Race
MHSEdWhite
-157.291
MLHSEdAfrAm
-221.172
-291.729
MSmColgEdWhite
(4)
flat in Ed
2.819
MLHSEdAsian
(4)
MColgEdWhite
-55.293
-152.858
MLHSEdHspnc
-72.932
X
MHSEdWhite
MLHSEdAfrAm
-145.694
MHSEdAfrAm
-59.782
MHSEdAfrAm
-95.885
-241.579
MHSEdAsian
(4)
-433.903
MSmColgEdAfrAm
-108.597
rises in Ed
65.342
MHSEdHspnc
-14.945
MColgEdAfrAm
-70.166
-83.726
MSmColgEdWhite
MPostColgEdAfrAm
-13.560
-86.781
MSmColgEdAfrAm
-276.427
MLHSEdAsian
-23.216
MSmColgEdAsian
(4)
MHSEdAsian
97.565
74.349
MSmColgEdHspnc
-69.107
-20.425
MSmColgEdAsian
-78.758
falls in Ed
121.541
MColgEdWhite
MColgEdAsian
-73.315
-16.016
MColgEdAfrAm
-191.179
MPostColgEdAsian
57.300
-4.085
MColgEdAsian
(4)
MPostColgEdOthRace
10.044
MColgEdHspnc
-47.795
MLHSEdHspnc
-24.076
X
MHSEdHspnc
-2.913
-26.989
MPostColgEdAfrAm
-13.560
-105.076
MSmColgEdHspnc
-32.355
falls in Ed
69.446
MPostColgEdAsian
57.300
48.585
MColgEdHspnc
-40.533
-45.7316
! MPostColgEdOthRace
10.044 (4)
MPostColgEdHspnc
-5.199
-21.015
MPostColgEdHspnc
-5.199
12.146
*"Combined Marginal Effects" include two values: the variable's dy/dx (ME) from necessary corrections to Heckman OLS-side estimation results, and the ME from that
variable's interaction with Adv, as multiplied by the data-wide average for Adv. Together these yield a standard linear combination of estimators for any particular
demographic-demographic variable combination: Coeff + AdvCoeff*(avg)Adv.
**Level total (bold) is total of all values at level in block to left; Level Average is average of all values at level in block to left. Numbers in parentheses note that there are
fewer values at this level than other levels, due to a base–group drop against the dummy-variable trap. “X” denotes where the dropped base group would be, if it could be
included.

MFX Variable

Combined

Table 19k. Sub-group Combined Marginal Effects in Advertising – Level of Male Education HHH & Race / Hispanic

Table 20a.

REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by
Demog. Sub-Group: HHsize=4, Male & Female HHHs, Two Kids^

cell units =
oz./purchase
HfPvInc
1xPvInc
2xPvInc
3xPvInc
4xPvInc
5xPvInc

White*
Afr Am* Asian*
Hispanic White*
Afr Am*
Asian*
Hispanic
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed
427
369
252
459
273
226
12
277
329
234
227
474
242
158
54
360
370
329
236
402
292
262
73
296
326
252
458
288
260
196
307
194
291
201
249
237
238
160
110
157
362
297
405
355
270
216
227
235
1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
410
230
373
628
333
160
357
353
Less HS
329
234
227
474
291
201
249
237
HS
217
132
51
404
249
170
143
237
Sm Collg
242
158
54
360
238
160
110
157
Collg
167
158
90
289
135
131
118
58
Post Collg
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows,
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic.

Table 20b.
cell units =
oz./purchase
HfPvInc
1xPvInc
2xPvInc
3xPvInc
4xPvInc
5xPvInc
Less HS
HS
Sm Collg
Collg
Post Collg

REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by
Demog. Sub-Group: HHsize=3, Female ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^
White*
HS Ed
402
196
248
142
216
265
1xPvInc
191
196
142
146
121

Afr Am*
HS Ed
388
145
251
112
170
244
1xPvInc
53
145
103
117
125

Asian*
HS Ed
68
-65
-44
116
15
149
1xPvInc
50
-65
-15
24
-27

Hispanic
HS Ed
389
296
235
59
117
212
1xPvInc
341
296
299
301
259

White*
Collg Ed
229
146
197
125
177
173
4xPvInc
247
216
194
177
134

Afr Am*
Collg Ed
237
117
222
116
154
174
4xPvInc
114
170
160
154
143

Asian*
Collg Ed
35
24
44
238
116
197
4xPvInc
165
15
97
84
47

Hispanic
Collg Ed
271
301
239
96
133
175
4xPvInc
198
117
152
133
73

^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of income. HH
size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar tables to allow
comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, columns, and half-columns.
40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded
totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic.
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Table 20c.
cell units =
oz./purchase
HfPvInc
1xPvInc
2xPvInc
3xPvInc
4xPvInc
5xPvInc
Less HS
HS
Sm Collg
Collg
Post Collg

REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by
Demog. Sub-Group: HHsize=3, Male ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^
White*
HS Ed
301
199
216
180
193
228
1xPvInc
285
199
141
162
112

Afr Am*
HS Ed
257
118
189
120
118
176
1xPvInc
206
118
59
70
62

Asian*
HS Ed
563
533
519
749
588
707
1xPvInc
565
533
307
272
358

Hispanic
HS Ed
367
378
282
176
173
254
1xPvInc
486
378
305
259
230

White*
Collg Ed
320
162
189
131
179
227
4xPvInc
205
193
173
179
119

Afr Am*
Collg Ed
264
70
151
60
93
165
4xPvInc
132
118
97
93
75

Asian*
Collg Ed
356
272
267
476
349
482
4xPvInc
546
588
400
349
425

Hispanic
Collg Ed
303
259
172
44
76
171
4xPvInc
208
173
138
76
38

^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of income. HH
size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar tables to allow
comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, columns, and half-columns.
40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded
totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic.

325

Table 20d. REFINED CMEs in Price Analysis – Half-Column Totals in Race, by
Table Levels of Education and Income
Male & Fem
HHHs:
Hispnc White
AfrAm Asian
Order within Row, HiLo
2215
2105
1683
1827 Hisp, White, Asian, AfrAm
HS ED:
1518
1574
1218
784 White, Hisp, AfrAm, Asian
Collg Ed:
2155
1365
913
795 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian
1xPvInc
1041
1245
822
977 White, Hisp, Asian, AfrAm
4xPvInc
6929
6290
4635
4384 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian
639
1654
252
differences
total purchase
rank
1
2
3
4
Fem HHH ONLY:
Hispnc White
AfrAm Asian
1308
1470
1310
240
HS ED:
1216
1048
1020
653
Collg Ed:
1496
797
542
-33
1xPvInc
672
967
741
408
4xPvInc
4691
4282
3613
1268
409
669
2345
differences
total purchase
rank
1
2
3
4

Order within Row, HiLo
Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian
Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian
Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian
White, Hisp, AfrAm, Asian
Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian

Male HHH ONLY:
Hispnc White
AfrAm Asian
1630
1317
979
3658
HS ED:
1025
1208
803
2202
Collg Ed:
1658
900
516
2035
1xPvInc
634
869
515
2308
4xPvInc
4946
4295
2811
10203
5257
652
1483
differences
total purchase
rank
2
3
4
1

Order within Row, HiLo
Asian, Hisp, White, AfrAm
Asian, White, Hisp, AfrAm
Asian, Hisp, White, AfrAm
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Asian, White, Hisp, AfrAm
Asian, Hisp, White, AfrAm

Table 21a.
cell units =
oz./purchase
HfPvInc
1xPvInc
2xPvInc
3xPvInc
4xPvInc
5xPvInc
Less HS
HS
Sm Collg
Collg
Post Collg

REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to SALE, by
Demog. Sub-Group: HHsize=4, Male & Female HHHs, Two Kids^
White*
HS Ed
402
279
359
271
275
330
1xPvInc
513
279
291
286
242

Afr Am*
HS Ed
372
253
278
206
200
327
1xPvInc
416
253
259
212
267

Asian*
HS Ed
401
184
302
516
397
532
1xPvInc
348
184
-11
51
-22

Hispanic
HS Ed
94
274
161
218
221
392
1xPvInc
642
274
278
202
197

White*
Collg Ed
385
286
343
245
252
245
4xPvInc
389
275
303
252
271

Afr Am*
Collg Ed
307
212
214
131
128
194
4xPvInc
242
200
221
128
246

Asian*
Collg Ed
246
51
146
351
234
308
4xPvInc
440
397
217
234
224

Hispanic
Collg Ed
-2
202
66
113
118
229
4xPvInc
468
221
240
118
176

^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of income. HH
size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar tables to allow
comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, columns, and half-columns.
40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded
totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic.

Table 21b.
cell units =
oz./purchase
HfPvInc
1xPvInc
2xPvInc
3xPvInc
4xPvInc
5xPvInc
Less HS
HS
Sm Collg
Collg
Post Collg

REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to SALE, by
Demog. Sub-Group: HHsize=3, Female ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^
White*
HS Ed
445
184
274
218
210
222
1xPvInc
260
184
191
212
168

Afr Am*
HS Ed
489
232
268
227
209
294
1xPvInc
255
232
240
270
206

Asian*
HS Ed
223
-133
-5
242
110
203
1xPvInc
17
-133
-35
69
-13

Hispanic
HS Ed
69
110
8
97
87
217
1xPvInc
341
110
159
164
126

White*
Collg Ed
415
212
290
236
184
155
4xPvInc
274
210
220
184
193

Afr Am*
Collg Ed
468
270
293
254
192
236
4xPvInc
219
209
220
192
182

Asian*
Collg Ed
365
69
184
432
257
308
4xPvInc
246
110
211
223
229

Hispanic
Collg Ed
64
164
49
140
86
175
4xPvInc
305
87
139
86
102

^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of income. HH
size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar tables to allow
comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, columns, and half-columns.
40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded
totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic.
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Table 21c.

REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to SALE, by
Demog. Sub-Group: HHsize=3, Male ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^

cell units =
oz./purchase
HfPvInc
1xPvInc
2xPvInc
3xPvInc
4xPvInc
5xPvInc

White*
Afr Am* Asian*
Hispanic White*
Afr Am*
Asian*
Hispanic
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed
170
164
973
184
120
675
-69
-159
68
66
776
132
46
443
6
-13
36
782
4
438
-21
-93
-110
-229
122
81
1171
138
78
815
-21
-9
7
932
21
10
623
-44
-99
-80
31
52
1036
163
13
707
41
-23
1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
226
206
791
269
57
839
51
Less HS
-13
68
66
776
132
7
932
21
HS
-44
73
64
483
88
25
652
Sm Collg
-34
-10
46
443
6
10
623
Collg
-13
-99
-80
47
106
451
40
20
29
640
Post Collg
-37
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows,
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic.
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Table 21d. REFINED CMEs in Sale Analysis – Half-Column Totals in Race, by Table
Levels of Education and Income
Male & Fem
HHHs:
Hispnc White
AfrAm Asian
Order within Row, HiLo
1360
1916
1636
2331 Asian, White, AfrAm, Hisp
HS ED:
726
1756
1187
1336 White, Asian, AfrAm, Hisp
Collg Ed:
1592
1611
1406
549 White, Hisp, AfrAm, Asian
1xPvInc
1223
1490
1038
1511 Asian, White, Hisp, AfrAm
4xPvInc
4901
6773
5267
5727 White, Asian, AfrAm, Hisp
366
460
1045
differences
total purchase
rank
4
1
3
2

Fem HHH ONLY:
Hispnc White
AfrAm Asian
589
1553
1718
640
HS ED:
678
1492
1713
1615
Collg Ed:
900
1015
1204
-95
1xPvInc
719
1082
1023
1020
4xPvInc
2886
5143
5658
3181
294
516
1962
differences
total purchase
rank
4
2
1
3
Male HHH ONLY:
Hispnc White
AfrAm Asian
292
434
298
5672
HS ED:
-430
335
-146
3701
Collg Ed:
534
461
428
2945
1xPvInc
-55
119
-161
3686
4xPvInc
341
1349
419
16003
78
14654
930
differences
total purchase
rank
4
2
3
1
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AfrAm, White, Asian, Hisp
AfrAm, Asian, White, Hisp
AfrAm, White, Hisp, Asian
White, Hisp, AfrAm, Asian
AfrAm, White, Asian, Hisp

Asian, White, Afr Am, Hisp
Asian, White, Afr Am, Hisp
Asian, White, Hisp, Afr Am
Asian, White, Hisp, Afr Am
Asian, White, Afr Am, Hisp

Table 22a. REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to ADVERTISING,
by Demog. Sub-Group: HHsize=4, Male & Female HHHs, Two Kids^
cell units =
oz./purchase
HfPvInc
1xPvInc
2xPvInc
3xPvInc
4xPvInc
5xPvInc

White*
Afr Am* Asian*
Hispanic White*
Afr Am*
Asian*
Hispanic
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed
430
391
255
492
284
233
42
319
349
268
228
514
267
175
79
404
379
353
246
388
291
253
90
272
328
264
454
282
276
200
334
202
297
229
244
231
245
165
125
152
361
313
393
346
268
208
233
226
1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
456
265
396
697
377
198
384
387
Less HS
349
268
228
514
297
229
244
231
HS
248
158
71
445
260
182
150
225
Sm Collg
267
175
79
404
245
165
125
152
Collg
215
200
133
367
143
140
129
65
Post Collg
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows,
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic.

Table 22b. REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to ADVERTISING,
by Demog. Sub-Group: HHsize=3, Female ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^
cell units =
oz./purchase
HfPvInc
1xPvInc
2xPvInc
3xPvInc
4xPvInc
5xPvInc

White*
Afr Am* Asian*
Hispanic White*
Afr Am*
Asian*
Hispanic
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed
400
397
68
406
221
233
45
290
215
172
325
155
126
33
326
-62
257
268
210
212
237
77
227
-33
146
120
116
44
135
122
259
94
220
189
11
99
181
164
127
122
276
265
152
206
184
188
216
176
1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
231
86
95
397
274
142
206
209
Less HS
215
172
325
220
189
11
99
HS
-62
155
116
327
197
171
109
138
Sm Collg
-1
155
126
33
326
181
164
117
122
Collg
148
147
9
306
140
151
68
67
Post Collg
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows,
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic.
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Table 22c. REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to ADVERTISING,
by Demog. Sub-Group: HHsize=3, Male ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^
cell units =
oz./purchase
HfPvInc
1xPvInc
2xPvInc
3xPvInc
4xPvInc
5xPvInc

White*
Afr Am* Asian*
Hispanic White*
Afr Am*
Asian*
Hispanic
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
HS Ed
Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed
278
250
551
383
311
257
361
326
200
131
526
407
178
83
282
296
225
210
539
276
181
140
272
143
169
117
742
165
128
50
479
35
199
141
592
175
185
103
357
73
231
194
710
258
229
166
487
167
1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
4xPvInc
292
213
538
518
225
158
538
220
Less HS
200
131
526
407
199
141
592
175
HS
160
76
308
335
184
113
400
129
Sm Collg
178
83
282
296
185
103
357
73
Collg
133
88
361
279
125
91
420
40
Post Collg
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows,
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative.
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic.
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Table 22d. REFINED CMEs in Advertising Analysis – Half-Column Totals in Race,
by Table Levels of Education and Income
Male & Fem
HHHs:
Hispnc White
AfrAm Asian
Order within Row, HiLo
2254
2144
1817
1819 Hisp, White, Asian, AfrAm
HS ED:
1576
1630
1235
902 White, Hisp, AfrAm, Asian
Collg Ed:
2427
1534
1066
907 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian
1xPvInc
1061
1322
913
1031 White, Hisp, Asian, AfrAm
4xPvInc
7318
6631
5032
4659 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian
687
1599
373
differences
total purchase
rank
1
2
3
4
Fem HHH ONLY:
Hispnc White
AfrAm Asian
1290
1514
1411
252
HS ED:
1235
1088
1071
758
Collg Ed:
1680
904
649
76
1xPvInc
635
1013
816
511
4xPvInc
4840
4519
3947
1596
321
571
2352
differences
total purchase
rank
1
2
3
4
Male HHH ONLY:
Hispnc White
AfrAm Asian
1662
1301
1043
3660
HS ED:
1040
1212
800
2238
Collg Ed:
1835
961
591
2015
1xPvInc
636
918
606
2308
4xPvInc
5173
4393
3039
10221
5048
780
1354
differences
total purchase
rank
2
3
4
1
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Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian
Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian
Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian
White, Hisp, AfrAm, Asian
Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian

Asian, Hisp, White, AfrAm
Asian, White, Hisp, AfrAm
Asian, Hisp, White, AfrAm
Asian, White, Hisp, AfrAm
Asian, Hisp, White, AfrAm

1,056
600
352
0
3,512 1,260
11,912 5,696
26,744 8,712
34,544 10,416
26,564 9,572
16,676 5,220
12,468 5,128
3,392 1,768

8

0
0
204
504
708
608
708
456
308
104

9

313,736
7,776
57,668
133,108
213,432
268,828
332,328
343,128
567,412
428,708

Total

6,032 3,600 2,666,124

52
52
0
100
504
196
1,508
708
2,736 1,064
912
2,892
3,100 1,212
1,364
464
1,980 1,016
508
308

7

715,416 998,472 399,916 342,452 137,220 48,372 14,644

4,408
948
10,272
32,192
63,368
73,260
76,352
42,424
29,512
9,716

6
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Table units are number of observations in total sCSD dataset. Dividing by 152 will give number of HHs in the sub-group. Highest
number of observations by HH Size for Female Age grouping with Female HHH are shaded for boxes with relatively large break to next
highest level, and with the highest two values in bold (highest three if the third is more than one-third higher than the fourth value).

†

Total

Female Age
1
2
3
No Female
244,392 50,528 12,648
Head
1,096
3,708 1,572
Under 25 Years
8,232 20,244 13,244
25-29 Years
13,844 36,976 29,768
30-34 Years
24,232 46,664 39,204
35-39 Years
33,852 59,636 52,708
40-44 Years
44,140 99,768 70,912
45-49 Years
50-54 Years
66,452 139,048 71,024
55-64 Years
128,468 311,768 76,764
65+ Years
150,708 230,132 32,072

Household
Size
4
5

Table A-1a. Nielsen FEMALE Age Grouping and Household Size†

Tables A-1a – A-1d.

Chapter 5 Appendix Tables

Table A-1b.

Number of Observations, Percent of Households, and
Cumulative Percentage of Households With Children
ONLY, By Nielsen FEMALE Age Grouping†*
Female Age
No Female Head
Under 25 Years
25-29 Years
30-34 Years
35-39 Years
40-44 Years
45-49 Years
50-54 Years
55-64 Years
65+ Years

Number Percent
of obs. of HHs Cum. %
14,420
2.11
2.11
2,572
0.38
2.49
28,368
4.15
6.64
81,060
11.86
18.5
39.14
141,016
20.64
63.14
164,064
24.01
83.42
138,564
20.28
66,144
9.68
93.1
37,872
5.54
98.64
9,276
1.36
100

Total

683,356

†

100

Table units are number of observations in total sCSD dataset.
Dividing by 152 will give number of HHs in the sub-group.
Highest number of observations by HH Size for Female Age
grouping with Female HHH are shaded for boxes with
relatively large break to next highest level, and with the
highest two values in bold (highest three if the third is more
than one-third higher than the fourth value).
*
Any positive number of children under 18 years.
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3,684

260
48
1,736
556
20,952 4,308
50,300 7,148
68,544 8,492
67,392 10,288
52,020 6,144
38,684 6,028
12,688 1,676

9,824

6

8

0
0
156
100
964
608
2,164
656
3,096 1,060
2,564 1,068
2,196
508
1,624
668
508
100

1,372 1,264

7

0
52
100
408
596
764
716
452
460
52

9

4,096
33,356
90,812
172,400
231,956
269,484
290,404
477,732
380,216

715,668

Total

715,416 998,472 399,916 342,452 137,220 48,372 14,644 6,032 3,600 2,666,124

560
5,444
21,292
32,072
44,032
50,612
63,672
79,640
38,648

600
1,776 800
3,184 14,468 7,612
8,328 26,268 29,768
14,204 43,840 39,204
25,800 52,868 52,708
33,444 74,528 70,912
39,868 103,332 71,024
65,148 271,356 76,764
53,816 268,940 32,072

3
25,868

2

471,024 141,096 61,536

1
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Table units are number of observations in total sCSD dataset. Highest number of observations by HH Size for Male Age grouping
with Female HHH are shaded for boxes with relatively large break to next highest level, and with the highest two values in bold
(highest three if the third is more than one-third higher than the fourth value).

†

Total

Male Age
No Male
Head
Under 25
Years
25-29 Years
30-34 Years
35-39 Years
40-44 Years
45-49 Years
50-54 Years
55-64 Years
65+ Years

Household Size
4
5

Table A-1c. Nielsen MALE Age Grouping and Household Size†

Table A-1d. Number of Observations, Percent of Households, and
Cumulative Percentage of Households With Children
ONLY, By Nielsen MALE Age Grouping†*
Number Percent
Male Age
of obs. of HHs Cum. %
93,152
13.63
13.63
No Male Head
Under 25
1,412
0.21
13.84
Years
14,652
2.14
15.98
25-29 Years
53,208
7.79
23.77
30-34 Years
108,956
15.94
39.71
35-39 Years
60.43
40-44 Years
141,568
20.72
78.8
45-49 Years
125,512
18.37
84,988
12.44
91.23
50-54 Years
49,164
7.19
98.43
55-64 Years
10,744
1.57
100
65+ Years
Total

683,356

†

100

Table units are number of observations in total sCSD
dataset. Highest number of observations by HH Size for
Male Age grouping with Female HHH are shaded for
boxes with relatively large break to next highest level,
and with the highest two values in bold (highest three if
the third is more than one-third higher than the fourth
value).
*
Any positive number of children under 18 years.
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Table A-2.

Top Soft-Drink Brands, Sugared and Diet, By 2006–2009 U.S.
Purchase By Nielsen HomeScan Participants across 16 DMAs

Freq. of
purchase
94,369
88,954
87,575
83,101
78,882
57,555
30,224
29,132
29,123
24,049
22,747
21,177
18,260
16,590
15,593
15,548
13,943
13,377
13,230
13,154
12,981
12,640
12,468
10,990
9,753
9,018
8,421
8,211
7,862

Percent
8.29
7.81
7.69
7.30
6.93
5.05
2.65
2.56
2.56
2.11
2.00
1.86
1.60
1.46
1.37
1.37
1.22
1.17
1.16
1.16
1.14
1.11
1.09
0.97
0.86
0.79
0.74
0.72
0.69

Cumul.%
8.29
16.10
23.79
31.09
38.01
43.07
45.72
48.28
50.84
52.95
54.94
56.80
58.41
59.86
61.23
62.60
63.82
65.00
66.16
67.31
68.45
69.56
70.66
71.62
72.48
73.27
74.01
74.73
75.42

BRAND
(R=Regular, DT=Diet)
COCA-COLA CLASSIC R
CTL BR R
(CTL BR = Private Label)
COCA-COLA DT
CTL BR DT
(CTL BR = Private Label)
PEPSI R
PEPSI DT
COCA-COLA CAFFEINE FREE DT
SPRITE R
DR PEPPER R
MOUNTAIN DEW R
PEPSI CAFFEINE FREE DT
DR PEPPER DT
CANADA DRY R
COCA-COLA ZERO DT
A&WR
SEVEN UP R
SPRITE ZERO DT
SIERRA MIST R
A & W DT
SCHWEPPES R
MOUNTAIN DEW DT
SEVEN UP DT
SUNKIST R
PEPSI CAFFEINE FREE R
FRESCA DT
COCA-COLA CHERRY R
PEPSI WILD CHERRY DT
VINTAGE R
SHASTA R
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Table A-3.

REFINED Model (Demographic Variables Decomposed into Distinct
Levels, Each Interacted with Income Level, and Some Groups Also with
Education Level), With Marketing Variable Interactions‡
Number of obs.: 2,666,124

Variable
Wkly Price (DMA)
Disc/Sale
Wkly Advert
Variable
HfPvIncFmLHS
1xPvIncFmLHS
2xPvIncFmLHS
3xPvIncFmLHS
4xPvIncFmLHS
5xPvIncFmLHS
HfPvIncFmHS
1xPvIncFmHS
2xPvIncFmHS
3xPvIncFmHS
4xPvIncFmHS
5xPvIncFmHS
HfPvIncFmSomCollg
1xPvIncFmSomCollg
2xPvIncFmSomCollg
3xPvIncFmSomCollg
4xPvIncFmSomCollg
5xPvIncFmSomCollg
HfPvIncFmCollg
1xPvIncFmCollg
2xPvIncFmCollg
3xPvIncFmCollg
4xPvIncFmCollg
5xPvIncFmCollg
HfPvIncFmPostCollg
1xPvIncFmPostCollg
2xPvIncFmPostCollg
3xPvIncFmPostCollg
4xPvIncFmPostCollg
HfPvIncMLHS
1xPvIncMLHS
2xPvIncMLHS
3xPvIncMLHS
4xPvIncMLHS
5xPvIncMLHS
HfPvIncMHS
1xPvIncMHS
2xPvIncMHS
3xPvIncMHS

Coeff.
-1590.242
12.424
0.015

Coeff.
209.058
347.027
280.177
320.569
418.484
208.379
33.638
211.179
125.551
142.945
249.660
106.916
5.437
223.277
137.671
177.690
297.739
127.387
-74.187
179.972
105.878
151.790
233.320
37.600
-124.317
166.237
44.594
86.293
195.401
-12.759
81.607
100.255
-9.352
-87.406
95.792
-159.435
-45.505
-33.586
-14.906

Std.Err.

z

128.786
7.283
0.003

Std.Err.
48.740
44.768
44.023
44.474
47.386
47.609
36.835
31.509
31.046
30.496
32.809
29.339
37.516
32.271
31.619
30.899
33.357
29.483
39.887
34.354
33.236
32.131
34.529
30.645
47.766
26.489
19.632
17.904
18.977
38.122
33.982
33.283
33.555
36.011
34.620
29.578
25.736
25.021
24.808
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Censored obs
= 2,206,732
Uncensored obs =
459,392
X^
P>z
P>|z|
δy/δx*
-12.35
1.71
4.55

z

0
0.088
0

P>z
4.29
7.75
6.36
7.21
8.83
4.38
0.91
6.7
4.04
4.69
7.61
3.64
0.14
6.92
4.35
5.75
8.93
4.32
-1.86
5.24
3.19
4.72
6.76
1.23
-2.6
6.28
2.27
4.82
10.3
-0.33
2.4
3.01
-0.28
-2.43
2.77
-5.39
-1.77
-1.34
-0.6

0
0
0
0
0
0
0.361
0
0
0
0
0
0.885
0
0
0
0
0
0.063
0
0.001
0
0
0.22
0.009
0
0.023
0
0
0.738
0.016
0.003
0.78
0.015
0.006
0
0.077
0.179
0.548

-82.331
12.424
0.017

0.523
0.088
0

δy/δx*
153.020
291.635
217.992
262.024
346.961
172.813
33.638
162.653
71.252
91.365
185.511
83.762
-38.850
183.192
89.727
135.912
242.383
112.505
-107.316
147.397
64.529
117.943
187.366
29.774
-171.019
126.020
-6.292
42.671
141.715
-51.206
50.421
66.857
-67.896
-116.486
77.900
-159.435
-72.816
-66.325
-43.967

P>|z|
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0.361
0
0.022
0.003
0
0.004
0.3
0
0.005
0
0
0
0.007
0
0.052
0
0
0.331
0
0
0.749
0.017
0
0.179
0.138
0.045
0.043
0.001
0.024
0
0.005
0.008
0.076

0.007
374.631

4xPvIncMHS
5xPvIncMHS
HfPvIncMSomCollg
1xPvIncMSomCollg
2xPvIncMSomCollg
3xPvIncMSomCollg
4xPvIncMSomCollg
5xPvIncMSomCollg
HfPvIncMCollg
1xPvIncMCollg
2xPvIncMCollg
3xPvIncMCollg
4xPvIncMCollg
5xPvIncMCollg
HfPvIncMPostCollg
1xPvIncMPostCollg
2xPvIncMPostCollg
3xPvIncMPostCollg
4xPvIncMPostCollg
HfPvIncWhite
1xPvIncWhite
2xPvIncWhite
3xPvIncWhite
4xPvIncWhite
HfPvIncAfrAm
1xPvIncAfrAm
2xPvIncAfrAm
3xPvIncAfrAm
4xPvIncAfrAm
5xPvIncAfrAm
HfPvIncAsian
1xPvIncAsian
2xPvIncAsian
3xPvIncAsian
4xPvIncAsian
5xPvIncAsian
HfPvIncOthRace
1xPvIncOthRace
2xPvIncOthRace
4xPvIncOthRace
5xPvIncOthRace
HfPvIncHspnc
1xPvIncHspnc
2xPvIncHspnc
3xPvIncHspnc
4xPvIncHspnc
5xPvIncHspnc
HfPvIncHHsiz1
1xPvIncHHsiz1
2xPvIncHHsiz1
3xPvIncHHsiz1

-133.132
-55.351
-18.958
23.098
46.016
53.926
-30.474
65.332
-88.109
-67.858
-72.211
-55.643
-144.100
-49.779
-34.156
-13.706
-39.337
-0.099
-109.299
-102.154
-251.832
-95.660
5.874
-12.647
-106.356
-288.638
-77.690
-13.250
-45.408
-6.568
21.818
-70.690
58.046
435.889
227.507
322.981
-199.455
-289.414
-133.585
0.316
-21.228
-40.588
-69.733
-49.640
-20.120
-60.174
-29.926
35.501
141.229
106.578
21.934

26.664
23.578
31.251
26.133
24.995
24.534
26.221
23.185
36.669
30.637
28.863
28.403
29.629
26.198
47.711
29.114
22.111
15.735
16.498
38.189
33.615
26.533
17.338
25.135
38.370
35.148
27.891
20.203
27.525
14.611
65.964
46.919
39.336
31.172
38.295
27.226
40.360
34.173
26.567
26.672
20.522
16.589
15.682
14.065
14.082
15.743
16.707
27.803
18.157
15.100
14.156
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-4.99
-2.35
-0.61
0.88
1.84
2.2
-1.16
2.82
-2.4
-2.21
-2.5
-1.96
-4.86
-1.9
-0.72
-0.47
-1.78
-0.01
-6.63
-2.67
-7.49
-3.61
0.34
-0.5
-2.77
-8.21
-2.79
-0.66
-1.65
-0.45
0.33
-1.51
1.48
13.98
5.94
11.86
-4.94
-8.47
-5.03
0.01
-1.03
-2.45
-4.45
-3.53
-1.43
-3.82
-1.79
1.28
7.78
7.06
1.55

0
0.019
0.544
0.377
0.066
0.028
0.245
0.005
0.016
0.027
0.012
0.05
0
0.057
0.474
0.638
0.075
0.995
0
0.007
0
0
0.735
0.615
0.006
0
0.005
0.512
0.099
0.653
0.741
0.132
0.14
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.991
0.301
0.014
0
0
0.153
0
0.073
0.202
0
0
0.121

-158.744
-75.375
-60.669
-3.655
13.145
24.349
-58.397
41.869
-117.184
-87.505
-96.386
-81.085
-165.078
-66.166
-57.400
-38.726
-65.765
-20.330
-126.470
-67.151
-206.988
-53.541
39.734
26.505
-63.173
-241.733
-31.116
27.011
0.175
-1.308
61.088
-22.001
104.754
477.766
274.473
336.397
-199.139
-274.063
-123.619
3.084
-66.633
-41.371
-67.722
-46.498
-19.088
-50.640
-21.496
-15.262
95.642
49.214
-40.721

0
0.001
0.052
0.889
0.599
0.321
0.026
0.071
0.001
0.004
0.001
0.004
0
0.012
0.229
0.183
0.003
0.196
0
0.079
0
0.044
0.022
0.292
0.1
0
0.265
0.181
0.995
0.929
0.354
0.639
0.008
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.908
0.001
0.013
0
0.001
0.175
0.001
0.198
0.583
0
0.001
0.004

4xPvIncHHsiz1
HfPvIncHHsiz2
1xPvIncHHsiz2
2xPvIncHHsiz2
3xPvIncHHsiz2
4xPvIncHHsiz2
5xPvIncHHsiz2
HfPvIncHHsiz3
1xPvIncHHsiz3
2xPvIncHHsiz3
3xPvIncHHsiz3
4xPvIncHHsiz3
5xPvIncHHsiz3
HfPvIncHHsiz4
1xPvIncHHsiz4
2xPvIncHHsiz4
3xPvIncHHsiz4
4xPvIncHHsiz4
5xPvIncHHsiz4
HfPvIncNoKids
1xPvIncNoKids
2xPvIncNoKids
3xPvIncNoKids
4xPvIncNoKids
HfPvIncOneKids
1xPvIncOneKids
2xPvIncOneKids
3xPvIncOneKids
4xPvIncOneKids
5xPvIncOneKids
HfPvIncTwoKids
1xPvIncTwoKids
2xPvIncTwoKids
3xPvIncTwoKids
4xPvIncTwoKids
5xPvIncTwoKids
HfPvInc3Kids
1xPvInc3Kids
2xPvInc3Kids
3xPvInc3Kids
4xPvInc3Kids
5xPvInc3Kids
HfPvIncFmAgeL30
1xPvIncFmAgeL30
2xPvIncFmAgeL30
3xPvIncFmAgeL30
4xPvIncFmAgeL30
5xPvIncFmAgeL30
HfPvIncFmAge30L40
1xPvIncFmAge30L40
2xPvIncFmAge30L40

23.022
89.456
134.730
137.307
94.546
51.136
171.677
60.701
176.825
137.164
109.757
95.643
168.263
44.763
203.970
146.358
180.519
91.495
187.893
191.009
98.138
2.423
-19.085
24.261
187.651
65.188
-79.328
-116.255
-48.081
-51.591
266.678
114.884
23.378
-91.535
-2.890
-6.840
192.375
153.689
-76.979
-106.249
-58.675
-62.252
5.509
9.376
14.073
-12.068
-129.242
25.159
36.395
-2.631
45.286

15.436
25.863
16.649
13.401
11.870
12.629
6.545
24.917
15.800
12.472
11.033
11.534
7.587
24.257
15.611
11.646
10.171
10.779
8.249
38.242
34.596
26.445
19.383
23.983
37.804
35.659
27.892
21.121
26.229
15.770
38.423
35.991
29.177
23.078
27.375
18.897
43.759
40.727
34.659
30.115
33.173
28.543
25.039
16.104
12.857
14.326
18.769
16.133
19.254
12.737
11.242
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1.49
3.46
8.09
10.25
7.96
4.05
26.23
2.44
11.19
11
9.95
8.29
22.18
1.85
13.07
12.57
17.75
8.49
22.78
4.99
2.84
0.09
-0.98
1.01
4.96
1.83
-2.84
-5.5
-1.83
-3.27
6.94
3.19
0.8
-3.97
-0.11
-0.36
4.4
3.77
-2.22
-3.53
-1.77
-2.18
0.22
0.58
1.09
-0.84
-6.89
1.56
1.89
-0.21
4.03

0.136
0.001
0
0
0
0
0
0.015
0
0
0
0
0
0.065
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.005
0.927
0.325
0.312
0
0.068
0.004
0
0.067
0.001
0
0.001
0.423
0
0.916
0.717
0
0
0.026
0
0.077
0.029
0.826
0.56
0.274
0.4
0
0.119
0.059
0.836
0

-36.420
37.992
86.047
87.079
37.683
0.998
128.166
7.873
129.857
89.539
59.483
47.186
121.483
1.839
150.800
98.164
130.120
46.122
141.882
202.723
90.984
7.479
-4.574
30.683
195.285
59.130
-73.501
-102.381
-37.160
-44.242
273.525
110.371
31.344
-80.853
7.153
0.764
191.238
154.276
-71.166
-96.977
-49.099
-52.799
7.728
7.226
15.701
-9.070
-123.631
20.060
36.395
2.989
49.816

0.018
0.142
0
0
0.002
0.937
0
0.752
0
0
0
0
0
0.94
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.009
0.777
0.813
0.201
0
0.097
0.008
0
0.157
0.005
0
0.002
0.283
0
0.794
0.968
0
0
0.04
0.001
0.139
0.064
0.758
0.654
0.222
0.527
0
0.214
0.059
0.814
0

3xPvIncFmAge30L40
4xPvIncFmAge30L40
5xPvIncFmAge30L40
HfPvIncFmAge40L50
1xPvIncFmAge40L50
2xPvIncFmAge40L50
3xPvIncFmAge40L50
4xPvIncFmAge40L50
5xPvIncFmAge40L50
HfPvIncFmAge50L65
1xPvIncFmAge50L65
2xPvIncFmAge50L65
3xPvIncFmAge50L65
4xPvIncFmAge50L65
HfPvIncMAgeL30
1xPvIncMAgeL30
2xPvIncMAgeL30
3xPvIncMAgeL30
4xPvIncMAgeL30
5xPvIncMAgeL30
HfPvIncMAge30L40
1xPvIncMAge30L40
2xPvIncMAge30L40
3xPvIncMAge30L40
4xPvIncMAge30L40
5xPvIncMAge30L40
HfPvIncMAge40L50
1xPvIncMAge40L50
2xPvIncMAge40L50
3xPvIncMAge40L50
4xPvIncMAge40L50
5xPvIncMAge40L50
HfPvIncMAge50L65
1xPvIncMAge50L65
2xPvIncMAge50L65
3xPvIncMAge50L65
4xPvIncMAge50L65
FmLHSNoKids
FmHSNoKids
FmSmColgNoKids
FmColgNoKids
FmLHSOneKids
FmHSOneKids
FmSmColgOneKids
FmColgOneKids
FmPostColgOneKids
FmLHSTwoKids
FmHSTwoKids
FmSmColgTwoKids
FmColgTwoKids
FmPostColgTwoKids

-26.346
-111.639
7.401
116.573
0.035
67.443
-17.963
-98.951
32.960
80.064
21.403
46.254
-9.733
-47.155
148.001
0.304
179.723
-16.423
205.749
-7.087
98.804
72.272
44.060
34.821
118.288
12.335
62.300
76.653
53.829
34.496
118.043
14.814
11.329
64.194
24.410
33.384
96.308
-130.018
-63.749
-100.028
-77.914
-7.142
20.138
-23.540
-39.099
32.108
-103.590
-49.252
-84.434
-85.326
-33.619

12.108
15.272
8.854
16.720
11.730
10.657
11.594
14.646
6.502
16.003
10.547
10.120
11.045
13.920
30.743
19.226
14.301
15.957
20.717
20.293
24.224
15.084
11.653
11.659
14.462
8.553
20.162
12.900
11.143
11.132
13.569
6.002
19.345
12.370
10.636
10.670
13.087
41.378
27.530
27.647
28.312
43.216
29.211
29.276
30.057
14.098
43.985
30.661
30.678
31.478
17.500
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-2.18
-7.31
0.84
6.97
0
6.33
-1.55
-6.76
5.07
5
2.03
4.57
-0.88
-3.39
4.81
0.02
12.57
-1.03
9.93
-0.35
4.08
4.79
3.78
2.99
8.18
1.44
3.09
5.94
4.83
3.1
8.7
2.47
0.59
5.19
2.3
3.13
7.36
-3.14
-2.32
-3.62
-2.75
-0.17
0.69
-0.8
-1.3
2.28
-2.36
-1.61
-2.75
-2.71
-1.92

0.03
0
0.403
0
0.998
0
0.121
0
0
0
0.042
0
0.378
0.001
0
0.987
0
0.303
0
0.727
0
0
0
0.003
0
0.149
0.002
0
0
0.002
0
0.014
0.558
0
0.022
0.002
0
0.002
0.021
0
0.006
0.869
0.491
0.421
0.193
0.023
0.019
0.108
0.006
0.007
0.055

-22.245
-103.637
-1.456
115.313
-32.551
76.231
-11.007
-87.702
27.741
78.334
26.385
54.290
-5.767
-40.057
143.865
-8.733
167.784
-13.426
192.129
-22.669
98.804
52.562
30.014
24.282
100.140
9.994
57.821
58.788
46.884
27.991
103.255
12.609
3.825
49.633
15.818
26.567
83.844
-129.364
-66.928
-109.555
-92.665
-10.915
14.349
-32.039
-46.465
29.165
-105.459
-57.933
-96.119
-96.559
-42.693

0.066
0
0.869
0
0.006
0
0.342
0
0
0
0.012
0
0.602
0.004
0
0.65
0
0.4
0
0.264
0
0
0.01
0.037
0
0.243
0.004
0
0
0.012
0
0.036
0.843
0
0.137
0.013
0
0.002
0.015
0
0.001
0.801
0.623
0.274
0.122
0.039
0.017
0.059
0.002
0.002
0.015

FmLHS3Kids
FmHS3Kids
FmSmColg3Kids
FmColg3Kids
FmPostColg3Kids
MLHSNoKids
MHSNoKids
MSmColgNoKids
MColgNoKids
MLHSOneKids
MHSOneKids
MSmColgOneKids
MColgOneKids
MPostColgOneKids
MLHSTwoKids
MHSTwoKids
MSmColgTwoKids
MColgTwoKids
MPostColgTwoKids
MLHS3Kids
MHS3Kids
MSmColg3Kids
MColg3Kids
MPostColg3Kids
FmLHSWhite
FmHSWhite
FmSmColgWhite
FmColgWhite
FmLHSAfrAm
FmHSAfrAm
FmSomColgAfrAm
FmColgAfrAm
FmPostColgAfrAm
FmLHSAsian
FmHSAsian
FmSomColgAsian
FmColgAsian
FmPostColgAsian
FmPostColgOthRace
FmLHSHspnc
FmHSHspnc
FmSomColgHspnc
FmColgHspnc
FmPostColgHspnc
MLHSWhite
MHSWhite
MSmColgWhite
MColgWhite
MLHSAfrAm
MHSAfrAm
MSmColgAfrAm

31.171
-47.782
-44.464
-20.888
65.844
100.437
166.260
91.723
131.749
99.649
195.803
68.922
142.593
74.827
203.343
194.119
70.135
141.152
37.493
29.642
131.199
79.220
142.962
44.667
-24.662
50.721
10.229
52.324
-135.099
38.832
5.832
56.322
45.394
-361.868
-407.953
-330.665
-252.371
-321.835
-21.376
3.753
22.850
48.439
84.897
15.761
-98.074
-60.686
-59.131
-16.758
-142.510
-98.028
-108.532

49.160
35.403
35.428
36.405
27.871
28.580
20.256
19.483
22.188
29.638
20.955
20.341
23.299
13.018
29.588
21.268
20.602
23.690
13.954
32.560
24.025
23.558
26.982
23.596
17.013
13.349
13.398
14.625
22.616
15.985
15.669
17.365
14.161
38.317
26.736
25.946
25.329
24.663
19.238
15.584
11.808
11.927
13.160
15.881
16.035
11.453
12.015
13.696
20.002
13.348
14.137
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0.63
-1.35
-1.26
-0.57
2.36
3.51
8.21
4.71
5.94
3.36
9.34
3.39
6.12
5.75
6.87
9.13
3.4
5.96
2.69
0.91
5.46
3.36
5.3
1.89
-1.45
3.8
0.76
3.58
-5.97
2.43
0.37
3.24
3.21
-9.44
-15.26
-12.74
-9.96
-13.05
-1.11
0.24
1.94
4.06
6.45
0.99
-6.12
-5.3
-4.92
-1.22
-7.12
-7.34
-7.68

0.526
0.177
0.209
0.566
0.018
0
0
0
0
0.001
0
0.001
0
0
0
0
0.001
0
0.007
0.363
0
0.001
0
0.058
0.147
0
0.445
0
0
0.015
0.71
0.001
0.001
0
0
0
0
0
0.267
0.81
0.053
0
0
0.321
0
0
0
0.221
0
0
0

31.416
-50.145
-51.977
-30.482
55.498
103.288
165.855
98.608
127.087
92.698
186.453
70.502
134.534
58.881
203.328
188.378
72.429
136.503
24.522
21.438
126.586
79.348
142.821
34.748
-15.755
57.931
17.806
54.547
-128.627
44.003
11.538
59.051
38.217
-351.455
-408.734
-331.524
-257.818
-337.795
-30.666
-0.767
18.172
41.691
77.390
3.755
-97.134
-57.742
-58.532
-12.266
-142.041
-101.403
-110.054

0.523
0.157
0.142
0.402
0.046
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0.001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.079
0.51
0
0.001
0
0.141
0.354
0
0.184
0
0
0.006
0.461
0.001
0.007
0
0
0
0
0
0.111
0.961
0.124
0
0
0.813
0
0
0
0.37
0
0
0

MColgAfrAm
MPostColgAfrAm
MLHSAsian
MHSAsian
MSmColgAsian
MColgAsian
MPostColgAsian
MPostColgOthRace
MLHSHspnc
MHSHspnc
MSmColgHspnc
MColgHspnc
MPostColgHspnc
NoManHd
NoFemHd
_4KidsPlus
FemAge65plus
MaleAge65plus
OtherRace
HHsiz5plus

-75.237
-4.163
-2.314
116.758
-62.811
-72.579
96.476
24.811
-15.043
2.853
-23.840
-46.602
-5.578
92.108
138.110
10.594
17.796
25.874
6.135
197.405

16.380
16.341
43.964
23.944
22.816
23.074
23.387
20.025
14.704
10.415
10.940
12.103
16.905
4.826
4.769
19.642
5.485
5.159
14.911
5.765

-4.59
-0.25
-0.05
4.88
-2.75
-3.15
4.13
1.24
-1.02
0.27
-2.18
-3.85
-0.33
19.09
28.96
0.54
3.24
5.02
0.41
34.24

0
0.799
0.958
0
0.006
0.002
0
0.215
0.306
0.784
0.029
0
0.741
0
0
0.59
0.001
0
0.681
0

P2HfPvIncFmLHS
P21xPvIncFmLHS
P22xPvIncFmLHS
P23xPvIncFmLHS
P24xPvIncFmLHS
P25xPvIncFmLHS
P2HfPvIncFmHS
P21xPvIncFmHS
P22xPvIncFmHS
P23xPvIncFmHS
P24xPvIncFmHS
P25xPvIncFmHS
P2HfPvIncFmSomCollg
P21xPvIncFmSomCollg
P22xPvIncFmSomCollg
P23xPvIncFmSomCollg
P24xPvIncFmSomCollg
P25xPvIncFmSomCollg
P2HfPvIncFmCollg
P21xPvIncFmCollg
P22xPvIncFmCollg
P23xPvIncFmCollg
P24xPvIncFmCollg
P25xPvIncFmCollg
P2HfPvIncFmPostCollg
P21xPvIncFmPostCollg
P22xPvIncFmPostCollg
P23xPvIncFmPostCollg
P24xPvIncFmPostCollg
P2HfPvIncMLHS

-4180.648
-4761.465
-3426.944
-1987.048
-4212.343
-2662.957
-4480.407
-6198.597
-4039.567
-3907.662
-6093.031
-4311.087
-3251.096
-5542.659
-3697.118
-3630.159
-5998.180
-4055.494
-2505.782
-4601.347
-3688.285
-3574.781
-5245.536
-3141.785
2652.199
-2197.853
45.095
-200.903
-2019.743
4101.857

1084.196
982.171
974.442
954.352
1025.066
1047.597
769.427
612.867
590.915
573.940
639.665
566.262
768.806
630.144
600.717
585.121
650.444
569.215
768.674
612.409
577.080
547.639
619.588
531.916
1084.002
528.704
360.871
324.807
378.389
895.057

-3.86
-4.85
-3.52
-2.08
-4.11
-2.54
-5.82
-10.11
-6.84
-6.81
-9.53
-7.61
-4.23
-8.8
-6.15
-6.2
-9.22
-7.12
-3.26
-7.51
-6.39
-6.53
-8.47
-5.91
2.45
-4.16
0.12
-0.62
-5.34
4.58

0
0
0
0.037
0
0.011
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.001
0
0
0
0
0
0.014
0
0.901
0.536
0
0
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0
-77.478
-15.421 0.345
-7.006 0.873
0
110.756
0.002
-69.054
-78.597 0.001
72.101 0.002
17.484 0.383
-18.397 0.211
-2.207 0.832
0.01
-28.349
0
-49.281
-11.644 0.491
41.066
0
84.123
0
10.825 0.582
19.804
0
9.314 0.071
46.809 0.002
145.970
0
OLS coeff/ME, in oz, by
multiplying avg value ‘X’
-30.966
-35.268
-25.383
-14.718
-31.201
-19.725
-33.186
-45.913
-29.921
-28.944
-45.131
-31.932
-24.081
-41.054
-27.385
-26.889
-44.429
-30.039
-18.560
-34.082
-27.319
-26.478
-38.854
-23.271
19.645
-16.279
0.334
-1.488
-14.960
30.382

P21xPvIncMLHS
P22xPvIncMLHS
P23xPvIncMLHS
P24xPvIncMLHS
P25xPvIncMLHS
P2HfPvIncMHS
P21xPvIncMHS
P22xPvIncMHS
P23xPvIncMHS
P24xPvIncMHS
P25xPvIncMHS
P2HfPvIncMSomCollg
P21xPvIncMSomCollg
P22xPvIncMSomCollg
P23xPvIncMSomCollg
P24xPvIncMSomCollg
P25xPvIncMSomCollg
P2HfPvIncMCollg
P21xPvIncMCollg
P22xPvIncMCollg
P23xPvIncMCollg
P24xPvIncMCollg
P25xPvIncMCollg
P2HfPvIncMPostCollg
P21xPvIncMPostCollg
P22xPvIncMPostCollg
P23xPvIncMPostCollg
P24xPvIncMPostCollg
P2HfPvIncWhite
P21xPvIncWhite
P22xPvIncWhite
P23xPvIncWhite
P24xPvIncWhite
P2HfPvIncAfrAm
P21xPvIncAfrAm
P22xPvIncAfrAm
P23xPvIncAfrAm
P24xPvIncAfrAm
P25xPvIncAfrAm
P2HfPvIncAsian
P21xPvIncAsian
P22xPvIncAsian
P23xPvIncAsian
P24xPvIncAsian
P25xPvIncAsian
P2HfPvIncOthRace
P21xPvIncOthRace
P22xPvIncOthRace
P24xPvIncOthRace
P25xPvIncOthRace
P2HfPvIncHspnc

1749.742
924.578
2572.051
2140.885
1999.129
4632.977
2728.957
1462.837
1976.577
2145.377
2332.392
3219.425
2418.256
2103.039
2087.436
2760.221
2183.760
2454.311
779.079
2861.371
1474.383
2127.006
2075.859
735.688
-678.255
1085.838
352.926
713.694
1120.011
1975.311
-1207.735
-411.912
-832.031
525.544
1625.311
-1962.262
-941.477
-1528.489
-845.597
-2322.450
656.107
-3102.271
-4175.245
-2476.629
-2132.549
3264.434
1965.416
-1208.964
-1497.447
32.334
385.228

841.855
823.030
819.012
857.028
863.807
714.924
617.125
591.113
582.308
620.740
565.968
718.053
604.795
572.235
554.597
587.531
538.945
799.051
656.405
611.771
602.293
632.925
569.947
1080.014
621.075
353.226
273.804
333.995
909.002
892.029
604.491
272.247
494.692
891.560
918.920
627.898
332.996
547.409
293.186
1505.026
1050.295
782.821
534.856
687.718
510.602
944.393
911.065
615.126
538.273
362.696
372.726
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2.08
1.12
3.14
2.5
2.31
6.48
4.42
2.47
3.39
3.46
4.12
4.48
4
3.68
3.76
4.7
4.05
3.07
1.19
4.68
2.45
3.36
3.64
0.68
-1.09
3.07
1.29
2.14
1.23
2.21
-2
-1.51
-1.68
0.59
1.77
-3.13
-2.83
-2.79
-2.88
-1.54
0.62
-3.96
-7.81
-3.6
-4.18
3.46
2.16
-1.97
-2.78
0.09
1.03

0.038
0.261
0.002
0.012
0.021
0
0
0.013
0.001
0.001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0.235
0
0.014
0.001
0
0.496
0.275
0.002
0.197
0.033
0.218
0.027
0.046
0.13
0.093
0.556
0.077
0.002
0.005
0.005
0.004
0.123
0.532
0
0
0
0
0.001
0.031
0.049
0.005
0.929
0.301

12.960
6.848
19.051
15.858
14.808
34.316
20.213
10.835
14.641
15.891
17.276
23.846
17.912
15.577
15.462
20.445
16.175
18.179
5.771
21.194
10.921
15.755
15.376
5.449
-5.024
8.043
2.614
5.286
8.296
14.631
-8.946
-3.051
-6.163
3.893
12.039
-14.534
-6.974
-11.322
-6.263
-17.202
4.860
-22.979
-30.926
-18.344
-15.796
24.180
14.558
-8.955
-11.092
0.239
2.853

P21xPvIncHspnc
P22xPvIncHspnc
P23xPvIncHspnc
P24xPvIncHspnc
P25xPvIncHspnc
P2HfPvIncHHsiz1
P21xPvIncHHsiz1
P22xPvIncHHsiz1
P23xPvIncHHsiz1
P24xPvIncHHsiz1
P2HfPvIncHHsiz2
P21xPvIncHHsiz2
P22xPvIncHHsiz2
P23xPvIncHHsiz2
P24xPvIncHHsiz2
P25xPvIncHHsiz2
P2HfPvIncHHsiz3
P21xPvIncHHsiz3
P22xPvIncHHsiz3
P23xPvIncHHsiz3
P24xPvIncHHsiz3
P25xPvIncHHsiz3
P2HfPvIncHHsiz4
P21xPvIncHHsiz4
P22xPvIncHHsiz4
P23xPvIncHHsiz4
P24xPvIncHHsiz4
P25xPvIncHHsiz4
P2HfPvIncNoKids
P21xPvIncNoKids
P22xPvIncNoKids
P23xPvIncNoKids
P24xPvIncNoKids
P2HfPvIncOneKids
P21xPvIncOneKids
P22xPvIncOneKids
P23xPvIncOneKids
P24xPvIncOneKids
P25xPvIncOneKids
P2HfPvIncTwoKids
P21xPvIncTwoKids
P22xPvIncTwoKids
P23xPvIncTwoKids
P24xPvIncTwoKids
P25xPvIncTwoKids
P2HfPvInc3Kids
P21xPvInc3Kids
P22xPvInc3Kids
P23xPvInc3Kids
P24xPvInc3Kids
P25xPvInc3Kids

1195.629
630.663
826.068
774.765
287.366
1723.434
1140.323
1189.262
2082.830
690.712
692.185
1833.721
1281.281
1198.308
631.859
-1028.901
2193.310
1025.831
1250.063
1090.213
362.347
-758.473
550.250
-386.244
1418.532
487.357
571.152
-159.441
-3829.116
-2616.043
-651.044
-1917.441
-361.488
-3790.538
-2654.865
327.080
-441.626
214.298
511.529
-4176.223
-3852.239
-1781.137
-1420.099
-1131.832
-1494.185
-2671.341
-1769.256
264.735
181.470
244.466
2.625

292.596
260.165
255.390
289.369
321.436
721.477
404.924
318.274
251.485
302.410
681.140
374.086
287.300
210.514
259.729
137.271
640.807
350.136
262.780
187.324
228.493
153.325
573.045
351.488
248.792
167.035
211.273
148.809
856.574
928.837
623.997
361.201
516.943
834.782
935.366
634.653
368.914
537.586
295.894
782.320
935.493
658.256
435.423
566.079
378.493
942.284
981.303
726.162
553.724
626.967
540.853
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4.09
2.42
3.23
2.68
0.89
2.39
2.82
3.74
8.28
2.28
1.02
4.9
4.46
5.69
2.43
-7.5
3.42
2.93
4.76
5.82
1.59
-4.95
0.96
-1.1
5.7
2.92
2.7
-1.07
-4.47
-2.82
-1.04
-5.31
-0.7
-4.54
-2.84
0.52
-1.2
0.4
1.73
-5.34
-4.12
-2.71
-3.26
-2
-3.95
-2.83
-1.8
0.36
0.33
0.39
0

0
0.015
0.001
0.007
0.371
0.017
0.005
0
0
0.022
0.31
0
0
0
0.015
0
0.001
0.003
0
0
0.113
0
0.337
0.272
0
0.004
0.007
0.284
0
0.005
0.297
0
0.484
0
0.005
0.606
0.231
0.69
0.084
0
0
0.007
0.001
0.046
0
0.005
0.071
0.715
0.743
0.697
0.996

8.856
4.671
6.119
5.739
2.129
12.765
8.446
8.809
15.428
5.116
5.127
13.582
9.490
8.876
4.680
-7.621
16.246
7.598
9.259
8.075
2.684
-5.618
4.076
-2.861
10.507
3.610
4.231
-1.181
-28.362
-19.377
-4.822
-14.202
-2.678
-28.077
-19.665
2.423
-3.271
1.587
3.789
-30.933
-28.534
-13.193
-10.519
-8.383
-11.067
-19.787
-13.105
1.961
1.344
1.811
0.019

P2HfPvIncFmAgeL30
P21xPvIncFmAgeL30
P22xPvIncFmAgeL30
P23xPvIncFmAgeL30
P24xPvIncFmAgeL30
P25xPvIncFmAgeL30
P2HfPvIncFmAge30L40
P21xPvIncFmAge30L40
P22xPvIncFmAge30L40
P23xPvIncFmAge30L40
P24xPvIncFmAge30L40
P25xPvIncFmAge30L40
P2HfPvIncFmAge40L50
P21xPvIncFmAge40L50
P22xPvIncFmAge40L50
P23xPvIncFmAge40L50
P24xPvIncFmAge40L50
P25xPvIncFmAge40L50
P2HfPvIncFmAge50L65
P21xPvIncFmAge50L65
P22xPvIncFmAge50L65
P23xPvIncFmAge50L65
P24xPvIncFmAge50L65
P2HfPvIncMAgeL30
P21xPvIncMAgeL30
P22xPvIncMAgeL30
P23xPvIncMAgeL30
P24xPvIncMAgeL30
P25xPvIncMAgeL30
P2HfPvIncMAge30L40
P21xPvIncMAge30L40
P22xPvIncMAge30L40
P23xPvIncMAge30L40
P24xPvIncMAge30L40
P25xPvIncMAge30L40
P2HfPvIncMAge40L50
P21xPvIncMAge40L50
P22xPvIncMAge40L50
P23xPvIncMAge40L50
P24xPvIncMAge40L50
P25xPvIncMAge40L50
P2HfPvIncMAge50L65
P21xPvIncMAge50L65
P22xPvIncMAge50L65
P23xPvIncMAge50L65
P24xPvIncMAge50L65
P2FmLHSNoKids
P2FmHSNoKids
P2FmSmColgNoKids
P2FmColgNoKids
P2FmLHSOneKids

-674.553
-99.117
577.853
178.031
2417.120
35.896
-531.259
915.210
359.948
-219.161
2000.701
730.359
-393.838
496.567
-721.568
-451.642
1699.113
-177.743
-436.689
-167.128
-354.153
-462.949
953.162
-1703.535
739.806
-1895.485
256.683
-1077.287
1201.482
-362.009
-503.066
450.585
232.262
-348.062
-554.975
-1086.948
-349.488
220.568
-32.224
-654.596
-136.235
-922.124
218.145
181.153
-110.251
73.558
1872.274
4232.920
4171.573
3685.246
1043.483

469.145
290.073
232.108
256.420
373.019
265.263
407.814
252.175
208.462
225.175
319.789
163.640
355.340
241.757
194.590
218.658
310.679
120.558
356.455
229.193
189.266
209.679
297.606
636.152
307.696
287.565
264.310
400.335
340.653
533.819
325.819
232.209
222.310
288.953
156.480
456.827
288.422
229.494
218.455
272.527
107.395
440.464
277.592
219.576
208.432
260.532
919.516
530.462
533.091
487.047
955.294
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-1.44
-0.34
2.49
0.69
6.48
0.14
-1.3
3.63
1.73
-0.97
6.26
4.46
-1.11
2.05
-3.71
-2.07
5.47
-1.47
-1.23
-0.73
-1.87
-2.21
3.2
-2.68
2.4
-6.59
0.97
-2.69
3.53
-0.68
-1.54
1.94
1.04
-1.2
-3.55
-2.38
-1.21
0.96
-0.15
-2.4
-1.27
-2.09
0.79
0.83
-0.53
0.28
2.04
7.98
7.83
7.57
1.09

0.15
0.733
0.013
0.487
0
0.892
0.193
0
0.084
0.33
0
0
0.268
0.04
0
0.039
0
0.14
0.221
0.466
0.061
0.027
0.001
0.007
0.016
0
0.331
0.007
0
0.498
0.123
0.052
0.296
0.228
0
0.017
0.226
0.336
0.883
0.016
0.205
0.036
0.432
0.409
0.597
0.778
0.042
0
0
0
0.275

-4.996
-0.734
4.280
1.319
17.904
0.266
-3.935
6.779
2.666
-1.623
14.819
5.410
-2.917
3.678
-5.345
-3.345
12.585
-1.317
-3.235
-1.238
-2.623
-3.429
7.060
-12.618
5.480
-14.040
1.901
-7.979
8.899
-2.681
-3.726
3.337
1.720
-2.578
-4.111
-8.051
-2.589
1.634
-0.239
-4.849
-1.009
-6.830
1.616
1.342
-0.817
0.545
13.868
31.353
30.899
27.297
7.729

P2FmHSOneKids
P2FmSmColgOneKids
P2FmColgOneKids
P2FmPostColgOneKids
P2FmLHSTwoKids
P2FmHSTwoKids
P2FmSmColgTwoKids
P2FmColgTwoKids
P2FmPostColgTwoKids
P2FmLHS3Kids
P2FmHS3Kids
P2FmSmColg3Kids
P2FmColg3Kids
P2FmPostColg3Kids
P2MLHSNoKids
P2MHSNoKids
P2MSmColgNoKids
P2MColgNoKids
P2MLHSOneKids
P2MHSOneKids
P2MSmColgOneKids
P2MColgOneKids
P2MPostColgOneKids
P2MLHSTwoKids
P2MHSTwoKids
P2MSmColgTwoKids
P2MColgTwoKids
P2MPostColgTwoKids
P2MLHS3Kids
P2MHS3Kids
P2MSmColg3Kids
P2MColg3Kids
P2MPostColg3Kids
P2FmLHSWhite
P2FmHSWhite
P2FmSmColgWhite
P2FmColgWhite
P2FmLHSAfrAm
P2FmHSAfrAm
P2FmSomColgAfrAm
P2FmColgAfrAm
P2FmPostColgAfrAm
P2FmLHSAsian
P2FmHSAsian
P2FmSomColgAsian
P2FmColgAsian
P2FmPostColgAsian
P2FmPostColgOthRace
P2FmLHSHspnc
P2FmHSHspnc
P2FmSomColgHspnc

3399.675
3007.247
2673.239
-267.580
804.519
4760.356
4091.501
4080.356
840.712
-755.101
2664.614
2337.782
2055.240
-1312.565
-2993.870
-2923.832
-2864.257
-2311.321
-2909.542
-3014.995
-2399.726
-2151.283
-925.071
-3471.735
-2396.918
-2509.461
-1590.273
-221.935
-1939.023
-1703.585
-2053.144
-1802.362
-396.389
324.167
-494.124
23.116
-439.400
1920.406
-492.353
558.756
56.561
333.586
2833.867
3591.092
2307.969
1597.106
2007.504
188.939
540.147
320.588
-94.670

553.426
553.112
513.251
249.899
967.657
585.367
585.122
552.736
335.792
1062.541
665.268
655.194
638.834
523.632
729.409
505.556
488.610
502.104
745.514
517.069
499.558
520.592
254.248
748.784
526.458
507.892
532.837
281.694
808.907
578.091
556.903
598.410
481.830
330.618
247.456
247.821
269.475
452.962
310.260
294.204
325.805
271.977
678.927
481.601
457.639
452.949
434.119
344.460
308.463
215.613
218.270
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6.14
5.44
5.21
-1.07
0.83
8.13
6.99
7.38
2.5
-0.71
4.01
3.57
3.22
-2.51
-4.1
-5.78
-5.86
-4.6
-3.9
-5.83
-4.8
-4.13
-3.64
-4.64
-4.55
-4.94
-2.98
-0.79
-2.4
-2.95
-3.69
-3.01
-0.82
0.98
-2
0.09
-1.63
4.24
-1.59
1.9
0.17
1.23
4.17
7.46
5.04
3.53
4.62
0.55
1.75
1.49
-0.43

0
0
0
0.284
0.406
0
0
0
0.012
0.477
0
0
0.001
0.012
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.003
0.431
0.017
0.003
0
0.003
0.411
0.327
0.046
0.926
0.103
0
0.113
0.058
0.862
0.22
0
0
0
0
0
0.583
0.08
0.137
0.664

25.181
22.275
19.801
-1.982
5.959
35.260
30.306
30.223
6.227
-5.593
19.737
17.316
15.223
-9.722
-22.176
-21.657
-21.216
-17.120
-21.551
-22.332
-17.775
-15.935
-6.852
-25.715
-17.754
-18.588
-11.779
-1.644
-14.362
-12.618
-15.208
-13.350
-2.936
2.401
-3.660
0.171
-3.255
14.224
-3.647
4.139
0.419
2.471
20.990
26.599
17.095
11.830
14.870
1.399
4.001
2.375
-0.701

P2FmColgHspnc
P2FmPostColgHspnc
P2MLHSWhite
P2MHSWhite
P2MSmColgWhite
P2MColgWhite
P2MLHSAfrAm
P2MHSAfrAm
P2MSmColgAfrAm
P2MColgAfrAm
P2MPostColgAfrAm
P2MLHSAsian
P2MHSAsian
P2MSmColgAsian
P2MColgAsian
P2MPostColgAsian
P2MPostColgOthRace
P2MLHSHspnc
P2MHSHspnc
P2MSmColgHspnc
P2MColgHspnc
P2MPostColgHspnc
SaleHfPvIncFmLHS
Sale1xPvIncFmLHS
Sale2xPvIncFmLHS
Sale3xPvIncFmLHS
Sale4xPvIncFmLHS
Sale5xPvIncFmLHS
SaleHfPvIncFmHS
Sale1xPvIncFmHS
Sale2xPvIncFmHS
Sale3xPvIncFmHS
Sale4xPvIncFmHS
Sale5xPvIncFmHS
SaleHfPvIncFmSomCollg
Sale1xPvIncFmSomCollg
Sale2xPvIncFmSomCollg
Sale3xPvIncFmSomCollg
Sale4xPvIncFmSomCollg
Sale5xPvIncFmSomCollg
SaleHfPvIncFmCollg
Sale1xPvIncFmCollg
Sale2xPvIncFmCollg
Sale3xPvIncFmCollg
Sale4xPvIncFmCollg
Sale5xPvIncFmCollg
SaleHfPvIncFmPostCollg
Sale1xPvIncFmPostCollg
Sale2xPvIncFmPostCollg
Sale3xPvIncFmPostCollg
Sale4xPvIncFmPostCollg

-646.994
14.669
1093.711
803.603
-186.491
-185.869
1572.267
797.653
687.639
1221.805
394.118
3122.033
-527.261
-4.696
-120.878
-177.609
624.786
-363.809
-568.801
-189.736
-220.194
-519.088
-187.121
-183.868
-41.937
-278.560
-159.819
-227.326
-69.846
-103.880
-35.398
-122.010
-34.175
-28.006
-24.298
-52.058
-2.938
-84.667
-15.792
-6.618
8.264
-92.384
-45.207
-163.235
-94.401
-73.645
43.258
-56.470
39.563
16.053
19.447

247.900
318.675
346.068
235.477
230.934
264.323
431.762
277.793
277.119
315.171
305.082
774.599
487.306
418.949
442.600
424.762
365.454
317.454
212.986
215.559
237.347
310.248
49.267
45.997
44.932
45.576
48.391
48.404
34.227
29.570
29.116
27.849
30.774
28.101
35.235
30.183
29.584
27.982
31.035
28.055
37.268
31.813
30.475
28.987
31.460
28.429
43.471
30.804
18.030
17.260
17.561
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-2.61
0.05
3.16
3.41
-0.81
-0.7
3.64
2.87
2.48
3.88
1.29
4.03
-1.08
-0.01
-0.27
-0.42
1.71
-1.15
-2.67
-0.88
-0.93
-1.67
-3.8
-4
-0.93
-6.11
-3.3
-4.7
-2.04
-3.51
-1.22
-4.38
-1.11
-1
-0.69
-1.72
-0.1
-3.03
-0.51
-0.24
0.22
-2.9
-1.48
-5.63
-3
-2.59
1
-1.83
2.19
0.93
1.11

0.009
0.963
0.002
0.001
0.419
0.482
0
0.004
0.013
0
0.196
0
0.279
0.991
0.785
0.676
0.087
0.252
0.008
0.379
0.354
0.094
0
0
0.351
0
0.001
0
0.041
0
0.224
0
0.267
0.319
0.49
0.085
0.921
0.002
0.611
0.814
0.825
0.004
0.138
0
0.003
0.01
0.32
0.067
0.028
0.352
0.268

-4.792
0.109
8.101
5.952
-1.381
-1.377
11.646
5.908
5.093
9.050
2.919
23.125
-3.905
-0.035
-0.895
-1.316
4.628
-2.695
-4.213
-1.405
-1.631
-3.845
-187.121
-183.868
-41.937
-278.560
-159.819
-227.326
-69.846
-103.880
-35.398
-122.010
-34.175
-28.006
-24.298
-52.058
-2.938
-84.667
-15.792
-6.618
8.264
-92.384
-45.207
-163.235
-94.401
-73.645
43.258
-56.470
39.563
16.053
19.447

SaleHfPvIncMLHS
Sale1xPvIncMLHS
Sale2xPvIncMLHS
Sale3xPvIncMLHS
Sale4xPvIncMLHS
Sale5xPvIncMLHS
SaleHfPvIncMHS
Sale1xPvIncMHS
Sale2xPvIncMHS
Sale3xPvIncMHS
Sale4xPvIncMHS
Sale5xPvIncMHS
SaleHfPvIncMSomCollg
Sale1xPvIncMSomCollg
Sale2xPvIncMSomCollg
Sale3xPvIncMSomCollg
Sale4xPvIncMSomCollg
Sale5xPvIncMSomCollg
SaleHfPvIncMCollg
Sale1xPvIncMCollg
Sale2xPvIncMCollg
Sale3xPvIncMCollg
Sale4xPvIncMCollg
Sale5xPvIncMCollg
SaleHfPvIncMPostCollg
Sale1xPvIncMPostCollg
Sale2xPvIncMPostCollg
Sale3xPvIncMPostCollg
Sale4xPvIncMPostCollg
SaleHfPvIncWhite
Sale1xPvIncWhite
Sale2xPvIncWhite
Sale3xPvIncWhite
Sale4xPvIncWhite
SaleHfPvIncAfrAm
Sale1xPvIncAfrAm
Sale2xPvIncAfrAm
Sale3xPvIncAfrAm
Sale4xPvIncAfrAm
Sale5xPvIncAfrAm
SaleHfPvIncAsian
Sale1xPvIncAsian
Sale2xPvIncAsian
Sale3xPvIncAsian
Sale4xPvIncAsian
Sale5xPvIncAsian
SaleHfPvIncOthRace
Sale1xPvIncOthRace
Sale2xPvIncOthRace
Sale4xPvIncOthRace
Sale5xPvIncOthRace

-3.715
49.143
-1.570
7.007
57.235
-59.529
-31.499
-15.416
13.909
-38.667
19.724
-26.270
-155.696
-53.361
-19.873
-94.958
-37.163
-60.203
93.533
130.904
165.525
107.731
181.548
100.244
58.672
-28.737
87.673
-8.670
41.310
310.651
158.796
206.015
84.317
78.331
374.529
265.804
201.195
129.554
127.365
96.605
764.192
460.916
572.720
473.449
534.066
447.702
346.229
188.973
223.959
54.665
-16.170

42.520
37.362
36.034
36.734
38.276
37.828
29.886
27.498
26.488
26.562
28.049
26.154
32.758
27.879
26.320
26.328
27.682
25.651
38.986
33.841
32.045
31.550
32.521
30.320
38.968
26.226
22.619
15.114
14.577
49.912
38.936
26.508
15.639
26.620
50.117
40.396
28.124
19.209
29.035
15.939
72.443
51.638
38.124
27.398
37.727
25.079
53.072
40.166
27.330
28.917
18.661
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-0.09
1.32
-0.04
0.19
1.5
-1.57
-1.05
-0.56
0.53
-1.46
0.7
-1
-4.75
-1.91
-0.76
-3.61
-1.34
-2.35
2.4
3.87
5.17
3.41
5.58
3.31
1.51
-1.1
3.88
-0.57
2.83
6.22
4.08
7.77
5.39
2.94
7.47
6.58
7.15
6.74
4.39
6.06
10.55
8.93
15.02
17.28
14.16
17.85
6.52
4.7
8.19
1.89
-0.87

0.93
0.188
0.965
0.849
0.135
0.116
0.292
0.575
0.6
0.145
0.482
0.315
0
0.056
0.45
0
0.179
0.019
0.016
0
0
0.001
0
0.001
0.132
0.273
0
0.566
0.005
0
0
0
0
0.003
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.059
0.386

-3.715
49.143
-1.570
7.007
57.235
-59.529
-31.499
-15.416
13.909
-38.667
19.724
-26.270
-155.696
-53.361
-19.873
-94.958
-37.163
-60.203
93.533
130.904
165.525
107.731
181.548
100.244
58.672
-28.737
87.673
-8.670
41.310
310.651
158.796
206.015
84.317
78.331
374.529
265.804
201.195
129.554
127.365
96.605
764.192
460.916
572.720
473.449
534.066
447.702
346.229
188.973
223.959
54.665
-16.170

SaleHfPvIncHspnc
Sale1xPvIncHspnc
Sale2xPvIncHspnc
Sale3xPvIncHspnc
Sale4xPvIncHspnc
Sale5xPvIncHspnc
SaleHfPvIncHHsiz1
Sale1xPvIncHHsiz1
Sale2xPvIncHHsiz1
Sale3xPvIncHHsiz1
Sale4xPvIncHHsiz1
SaleHfPvIncHHsiz2
Sale1xPvIncHHsiz2
Sale2xPvIncHHsiz2
Sale3xPvIncHHsiz2
Sale4xPvIncHHsiz2
Sale5xPvIncHHsiz2
SaleHfPvIncHHsiz3
Sale1xPvIncHHsiz3
Sale2xPvIncHHsiz3
Sale3xPvIncHHsiz3
Sale4xPvIncHHsiz3
Sale5xPvIncHHsiz3
SaleHfPvIncHHsiz4
Sale1xPvIncHHsiz4
Sale2xPvIncHHsiz4
Sale3xPvIncHHsiz4
Sale4xPvIncHHsiz4
Sale5xPvIncHHsiz4
SaleHfPvIncNoKids
Sale1xPvIncNoKids
Sale2xPvIncNoKids
Sale3xPvIncNoKids
Sale4xPvIncNoKids
SaleHfPvIncOneKids
Sale1xPvIncOneKids
Sale2xPvIncOneKids
Sale3xPvIncOneKids
Sale4xPvIncOneKids
Sale5xPvIncOneKids
SaleHfPvIncTwoKids
Sale1xPvIncTwoKids
Sale2xPvIncTwoKids
Sale3xPvIncTwoKids
Sale4xPvIncTwoKids
Sale5xPvIncTwoKids
SaleHfPvInc3Kids
Sale1xPvInc3Kids
Sale2xPvInc3Kids
Sale3xPvInc3Kids
Sale4xPvInc3Kids

-22.189
15.204
2.052
91.142
101.581
85.064
120.165
-9.498
14.432
17.147
60.658
5.964
4.926
-12.672
51.818
23.763
8.701
75.209
-0.802
2.079
53.604
36.823
-10.117
37.415
33.113
15.295
-43.953
25.428
14.644
-240.082
-105.017
-187.205
-58.473
-122.890
-353.464
-147.761
-210.459
-85.089
-158.672
-15.294
-480.496
-213.276
-352.727
-163.855
-316.146
-193.232
-268.782
-116.498
-100.541
-15.581
-46.883

19.476
17.382
16.255
16.909
17.629
18.618
117.986
17.881
13.616
13.202
13.716
42.982
16.227
11.887
10.573
10.463
7.321
15.977
15.880
10.998
9.830
9.515
7.438
17.873
15.344
10.118
8.719
8.801
7.292
44.867
39.791
26.970
19.946
25.451
47.226
41.238
29.274
23.166
28.706
17.307
50.302
41.433
30.104
24.394
29.518
19.785
53.843
46.800
35.942
30.918
36.639
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-1.14
0.87
0.13
5.39
5.76
4.57
1.02
-0.53
1.06
1.3
4.42
0.14
0.3
-1.07
4.9
2.27
1.19
4.71
-0.05
0.19
5.45
3.87
-1.36
2.09
2.16
1.51
-5.04
2.89
2.01
-5.35
-2.64
-6.94
-2.93
-4.83
-7.48
-3.58
-7.19
-3.67
-5.53
-0.88
-9.55
-5.15
-11.72
-6.72
-10.71
-9.77
-4.99
-2.49
-2.8
-0.5
-1.28

0.255
0.382
0.9
0
0
0
0.308
0.595
0.289
0.194
0
0.89
0.761
0.286
0
0.023
0.235
0
0.96
0.85
0
0
0.174
0.036
0.031
0.131
0
0.004
0.045
0
0.008
0
0.003
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.377
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.013
0.005
0.614
0.201

-22.189
15.204
2.052
91.142
101.581
85.064
120.165
-9.498
14.432
17.147
60.658
5.964
4.926
-12.672
51.818
23.763
8.701
75.209
-0.802
2.079
53.604
36.823
-10.117
37.415
33.113
15.295
-43.953
25.428
14.644
-240.082
-105.017
-187.205
-58.473
-122.890
-353.464
-147.761
-210.459
-85.089
-158.672
-15.294
-480.496
-213.276
-352.727
-163.855
-316.146
-193.232
-268.782
-116.498
-100.541
-15.581
-46.883

Sale5xPvInc3Kids
SaleHfPvIncFmAgeL30
Sale1xPvIncFmAgeL30
Sale2xPvIncFmAgeL30
Sale3xPvIncFmAgeL30
Sale4xPvIncFmAgeL30
Sale5xPvIncFmAgeL30
SaleHfPvIncFmLAge30L40
Sale1xPvIncFmAge30L40
Sale2xPvIncFmAge30L40
Sale3xPvIncFmAge30L40
Sale4xPvIncFmAge30L40
Sale5xPvIncFmAge30L40
SaleHfPvIncFmLAge40L50
Sale1xPvIncFmAge40L50
Sale2xPvIncFmAge40L50
Sale3xPvIncFmAge40L50
Sale4xPvIncFmAge40L50
Sale5xPvIncFmAge40L50
SaleHfPvIncFmAge50L65
Sale1xPvIncFmAge50L65
Sale2xPvIncFmAge50L65
Sale3xPvIncFmAge50L65
Sale4xPvIncFmAge50L65
SaleHfPvIncMAgeL30
Sale1xPvIncMAgeL30
Sale2xPvIncMAgeL30
Sale3xPvIncMAgeL30
Sale4xPvIncMAgeL30
Sale5xPvIncMAgeL30
SaleHfPvIncMLAge30L40
Sale1xPvIncMAge30L40
Sale2xPvIncMAge30L40
Sale3xPvIncMAge30L40
Sale4xPvIncMAge30L40
Sale5xPvIncMAge30L40
SaleHfPvIncMAge40L50
Sale1xPvIncMAge40L50
Sale2xPvIncMAge40L50
Sale3xPvIncMAge40L50
Sale4xPvIncMAge40L50
Sale5xPvIncMAge40L50
SaleHfPvIncMAge50L65
Sale1xPvIncMAge50L65
Sale2xPvIncMAge50L65
Sale3xPvIncMAge50L65
Sale4xPvIncMAge50L65
SalexFmLHSNoKids
SalexFmHSNoKids
SalexFmSmColgNoKids
SalexFmColgNoKids

95.580
-45.991
-18.152
-45.699
38.747
19.207
1.978
2.018
-51.745
-45.060
59.367
12.310
13.907
15.288
-51.408
8.046
36.359
35.786
-10.915
-62.195
-3.195
0.296
54.952
25.186
-96.162
25.294
-66.623
115.937
-72.109
-35.569
-48.151
14.006
-20.284
-0.003
-0.167
-9.204
-1.786
-65.935
-66.804
-0.787
-22.091
15.712
-11.690
-7.898
-22.648
-16.372
-23.467
194.083
99.308
76.633
98.256

30.893
25.041
18.555
12.727
13.977
19.041
17.532
19.417
12.825
9.863
10.586
13.725
8.873
15.146
10.195
8.818
9.872
12.765
6.356
13.757
8.340
7.793
8.988
11.798
43.058
23.182
15.202
16.545
22.571
19.683
24.931
15.411
10.648
10.874
13.095
8.609
19.498
11.607
9.348
10.070
11.855
6.025
19.497
10.967
8.635
9.291
11.047
42.990
26.005
26.151
25.373

351

3.09
-1.84
-0.98
-3.59
2.77
1.01
0.11
0.1
-4.03
-4.57
5.61
0.9
1.57
1.01
-5.04
0.91
3.68
2.8
-1.72
-4.52
-0.38
0.04
6.11
2.13
-2.23
1.09
-4.38
7.01
-3.19
-1.81
-1.93
0.91
-1.9
0
-0.01
-1.07
-0.09
-5.68
-7.15
-0.08
-1.86
2.61
-0.6
-0.72
-2.62
-1.76
-2.12
4.51
3.82
2.93
3.87

0.002
0.066
0.328
0
0.006
0.313
0.91
0.917
0
0
0
0.37
0.117
0.313
0
0.362
0
0.005
0.086
0
0.702
0.97
0
0.033
0.026
0.275
0
0
0.001
0.071
0.053
0.363
0.057
1
0.99
0.285
0.927
0
0
0.938
0.062
0.009
0.549
0.471
0.009
0.078
0.034
0
0
0.003
0

95.580
-45.991
-18.152
-45.699
38.747
19.207
1.978
2.018
-51.745
-45.060
59.367
12.310
13.907
15.288
-51.408
8.046
36.359
35.786
-10.915
-62.195
-3.195
0.296
54.952
25.186
-96.162
25.294
-66.623
115.937
-72.109
-35.569
-48.151
14.006
-20.284
-0.003
-0.167
-9.204
-1.786
-65.935
-66.804
-0.787
-22.091
15.712
-11.690
-7.898
-22.648
-16.372
-23.467
194.083
99.308
76.633
98.256

SalexFmLHSOneKids
SalexFmHSOneKids
SalexFmSmColgOneKids
SalexFmColgOneKids
SalexFmPostColgOneKids
SalexFmLHSTwoKids
SalexFmHSTwoKids
SalexFmSmColgTwoKids
SalexFmColgTwoKids
SalexFmPostColgTwoKids
SalexFmLHS3Kids
SalexFmHS3Kids
SalexFmSmColg3Kids
SalexFmColg3Kids
SalexFmPostColg3Kids
SalexMLHSNoKids
SalexMHSNoKids
SalexMSmColgNoKids
SalexMColgNoKids
SalexMLHSOneKids
SalexMHSOneKids
SalexMSmColgOneKids
SalexMColgOneKids
SalexMPostColgOneKids
SalexMLHSTwoKids
SalexMHSTwoKids
SalexMSmColgTwoKids
SalexMColgTwoKids
SalexMPostColgTwoKids
SalexMLHS3Kids
SalexMHS3Kids
SalexMSmColg3Kids
SalexMColg3Kids
SalexMPostColg3Kids
SalexFmLHSWhite
SalexFmHSWhite
SalexFmSmColgWhite
SalexFmColgWhite
SalexFmLHSAfrAm
SalexFmHSAfrAm
SalexFmSmColgAfrAm
SalexFmColgAfrAm
SalexFmPostColgAfrAm
SalexFmLHSAsian
SalexFmHSAsian
SalexFmSmColgAsian
SalexFmColgAsian
SalexFmPostColgAsian
SalexFmPostColgOthRace
SalexFmLHSHspnc
SalexFmHSHspnc

193.056
126.722
86.275
125.132
54.909
402.472
208.672
220.634
256.601
197.160
86.181
36.693
44.535
46.352
-32.852
45.397
36.250
21.188
-120.740
110.132
42.602
24.275
-115.986
14.048
24.176
23.446
53.968
-140.478
69.716
62.750
76.301
-1.830
-154.380
-56.488
-72.506
-27.521
-26.572
-0.974
-36.796
-37.455
-43.153
-20.066
-72.184
-467.709
-364.486
-389.600
-319.584
-330.272
4.045
-2.447
-56.707

45.723
28.751
28.862
28.362
16.080
46.075
29.883
29.855
29.297
17.962
50.440
35.058
35.191
35.206
29.565
32.846
23.216
22.014
27.019
34.420
23.825
22.821
28.037
12.932
34.163
24.178
23.272
28.433
13.861
36.238
27.016
26.297
31.785
23.105
18.023
13.890
13.903
15.333
23.797
17.092
16.800
18.615
15.644
38.815
25.578
25.663
24.744
23.852
21.635
17.326
13.832
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4.22
4.41
2.99
4.41
3.41
8.74
6.98
7.39
8.76
10.98
1.71
1.05
1.27
1.32
-1.11
1.38
1.56
0.96
-4.47
3.2
1.79
1.06
-4.14
1.09
0.71
0.97
2.32
-4.94
5.03
1.73
2.82
-0.07
-4.86
-2.44
-4.02
-1.98
-1.91
-0.06
-1.55
-2.19
-2.57
-1.08
-4.61
-12.05
-14.25
-15.18
-12.92
-13.85
0.19
-0.14
-4.1

0
0
0.003
0
0.001
0
0
0
0
0
0.088
0.295
0.206
0.188
0.266
0.167
0.118
0.336
0
0.001
0.074
0.287
0
0.277
0.479
0.332
0.02
0
0
0.083
0.005
0.945
0
0.014
0
0.048
0.056
0.949
0.122
0.028
0.01
0.281
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.852
0.888
0

193.056
126.722
86.275
125.132
54.909
402.472
208.672
220.634
256.601
197.160
86.181
36.693
44.535
46.352
-32.852
45.397
36.250
21.188
-120.740
110.132
42.602
24.275
-115.986
14.048
24.176
23.446
53.968
-140.478
69.716
62.750
76.301
-1.830
-154.380
-56.488
-72.506
-27.521
-26.572
-0.974
-36.796
-37.455
-43.153
-20.066
-72.184
-467.709
-364.486
-389.600
-319.584
-330.272
4.045
-2.447
-56.707

SalexFmSmColgHspnc
SalexFmColgHspnc
SalexFmPostColgHspnc
SalexMLHSWhite
SalexMHSWhite
SalexMSmColgWhite
SalexMColgWhite
SalexMLHSAfrAm
SalexMHSAfrAm
SalexMSmColgAfrAm
SalexMColgAfrAm
SalexMPostColgAfrAm
SalexMLHSAsian
SalexMHSAsian
SalexMSmColgAsian
SalexMColgAsian
SalexMPostColgAsian
SalexMPostColgOthRace
SalexMLHSHspnc
SalexMHSHspnc
SalexMSmColgHspnc
SalexMColgHspnc
SalexMPostColgHspnc
AdvHfPvIncFmLHS
Adv1xPvIncFmLHS
Adv2xPvIncFmLHS
Adv3xPvIncFmLHS
Adv4xPvIncFmLHS
Adv5xPvIncFmLHS
AdvHfPvIncFmHS
Adv1xPvIncFmHS
Adv2xPvIncFmHS
Adv3xPvIncFmHS
Adv4xPvIncFmHS
Adv5xPvIncFmHS
AdvHfPvIncFmSomCollg
Adv1xPvIncFmSomCollg
Adv2xPvIncFmSomCollg
Adv3xPvIncFmSomCollg
Adv4xPvIncFmSomCollg
Adv5xPvIncFmSomCollg
AdvHfPvIncFmCollg
Adv1xPvIncFmCollg
Adv2xPvIncFmCollg
Adv3xPvIncFmCollg
Adv4xPvIncFmCollg
Adv5xPvIncFmCollg
AdvHfPvIncFmPostCollg
Adv1xPvIncFmPostCollg
Adv2xPvIncFmPostCollg
Adv3xPvIncFmPostCollg

-77.852
-67.829
-41.493
-24.845
-18.582
41.916
-1.567
-72.312
-48.995
11.979
-67.955
1.374
-36.811
34.352
-24.811
-25.767
-155.400
-25.472
-55.609
-6.053
30.168
-0.339
8.401
-0.014
-0.050
-0.037
-0.036
-0.043
-0.043
0.030
-0.012
0.010
0.013
-0.020
0.016
0.015
-0.043
-0.013
-0.010
-0.048
-0.004
0.007
-0.054
-0.015
-0.011
-0.051
-0.007
-0.023
-0.023
-0.006
0.002

13.977
15.160
19.558
16.346
12.048
12.665
14.384
20.984
14.317
14.972
17.477
17.253
44.673
22.568
21.619
21.941
21.487
21.602
14.774
11.045
11.834
13.100
18.836
0.022
0.020
0.019
0.020
0.021
0.021
0.017
0.014
0.014
0.013
0.015
0.013
0.017
0.014
0.014
0.013
0.015
0.013
0.019
0.016
0.015
0.014
0.016
0.014
0.022
0.013
0.009
0.008
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-5.57
-4.47
-2.12
-1.52
-1.54
3.31
-0.11
-3.45
-3.42
0.8
-3.89
0.08
-0.82
1.52
-1.15
-1.17
-7.23
-1.18
-3.76
-0.55
2.55
-0.03
0.45
-0.62
-2.5
-1.9
-1.83
-2.02
-2.04
1.79
-0.85
0.75
1.04
-1.38
1.23
0.86
-3.05
-0.94
-0.8
-3.31
-0.28
0.37
-3.4
-0.96
-0.78
-3.25
-0.48
-1.05
-1.81
-0.64
0.19

0
0
0.034
0.129
0.123
0.001
0.913
0.001
0.001
0.424
0
0.937
0.41
0.128
0.251
0.24
0
0.238
0
0.584
0.011
0.979
0.656
0.532
0.012
0.058
0.067
0.044
0.041
0.073
0.396
0.452
0.297
0.166
0.22
0.387
0.002
0.346
0.424
0.001
0.776
0.713
0.001
0.335
0.436
0.001
0.634
0.294
0.071
0.524
0.851

-77.852
-67.829
-41.493
-24.845
-18.582
41.916
-1.567
-72.312
-48.995
11.979
-67.955
1.374
-36.811
34.352
-24.811
-25.767
-155.400
-25.472
-55.609
-6.053
30.168
-0.339
8.401
-5.166
-18.754
-13.785
-13.488
-15.974
-16.255
11.199
-4.436
3.818
5.051
-7.539
6.024
5.476
-16.051
-4.817
-3.872
-18.079
-1.371
2.605
-20.177
-5.467
-4.203
-19.274
-2.516
-8.764
-8.591
-2.158
0.594

Adv4xPvIncFmPostCollg
AdvHfPvIncMLHS
Adv1xPvIncMLHS
Adv2xPvIncMLHS
Adv3xPvIncMLHS
Adv4xPvIncMLHS
Adv5xPvIncMLHS
AdvHfPvIncMHS
Adv1xPvIncMHS
Adv2xPvIncMHS
Adv3xPvIncMHS
Adv4xPvIncMHS
Adv5xPvIncMHS
AdvHfPvIncMSomCollg
Adv1xPvIncMSomCollg
Adv2xPvIncMSomCollg
Adv3xPvIncMSomCollg
Adv4xPvIncMSomCollg
Adv5xPvIncMSomCollg
AdvHfPvIncMCollg
Adv1xPvIncMCollg
Adv2xPvIncMCollg
Adv3xPvIncMCollg
Adv4xPvIncMCollg
Adv5xPvIncMCollg
AdvHfPvIncMPostCollg
Adv1xPvIncMPostCollg
Adv2xPvIncMPostCollg
Adv3xPvIncMPostCollg
Adv4xPvIncMPostCollg
AdvHfPvIncWhite
Adv1xPvIncWhite
Adv2xPvIncWhite
Adv3xPvIncWhite
Adv4xPvIncWhite
AdvHfPvIncAfrAm
Adv1xPvIncAfrAm
Adv2xPvIncAfrAm
Adv3xPvIncAfrAm
Adv4xPvIncAfrAm
Adv5xPvIncAfrAm
AdvHfPvIncAsian
Adv1xPvIncAsian
Adv2xPvIncAsian
Adv3xPvIncAsian
Adv4xPvIncAsian
Adv5xPvIncAsian
AdvHfPvIncOthRace
Adv1xPvIncOthRace
Adv2xPvIncOthRace
Adv4xPvIncOthRace

-0.048
0.065
-0.012
0.024
0.016
0.058
0.005
0.099
0.063
0.078
0.070
0.093
0.082
0.043
-0.010
0.005
0.009
0.006
0.002
0.002
-0.029
-0.031
-0.012
0.003
-0.019
0.039
-0.005
-0.011
0.002
0.012
-0.072
-0.015
0.026
-0.012
-0.001
-0.058
-0.006
0.026
-0.019
0.016
0.005
-0.105
-0.053
0.024
-0.069
-0.028
-0.033
-0.062
-0.008
0.047
0.007

0.009
0.020
0.018
0.017
0.018
0.019
0.018
0.016
0.014
0.013
0.013
0.014
0.013
0.017
0.014
0.013
0.013
0.014
0.013
0.020
0.016
0.016
0.016
0.016
0.015
0.021
0.013
0.011
0.008
0.008
0.020
0.018
0.014
0.007
0.014
0.020
0.019
0.015
0.009
0.015
0.007
0.035
0.024
0.020
0.014
0.020
0.014
0.022
0.018
0.014
0.015
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-5.42
3.25
-0.68
1.39
0.89
3.13
0.27
6.33
4.53
5.8
5.24
6.55
6.18
2.58
-0.76
0.36
0.67
0.43
0.15
0.08
-1.77
-1.98
-0.77
0.21
-1.26
1.88
-0.43
-1
0.25
1.55
-3.55
-0.82
1.88
-1.64
-0.08
-2.86
-0.34
1.79
-2.06
1.08
0.66
-2.98
-2.18
1.23
-4.88
-1.38
-2.47
-2.85
-0.42
3.37
0.5

0
0.001
0.494
0.164
0.374
0.002
0.786
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0.449
0.716
0.503
0.669
0.881
0.934
0.078
0.048
0.441
0.835
0.208
0.06
0.669
0.319
0.805
0.121
0
0.415
0.061
0.101
0.935
0.004
0.733
0.073
0.039
0.281
0.507
0.003
0.029
0.22
0
0.166
0.014
0.004
0.671
0.001
0.618

-17.997
24.435
-4.566
9.037
5.891
21.832
1.850
37.025
23.455
29.182
26.406
34.902
30.742
16.012
-3.886
1.789
3.248
2.198
0.715
0.605
-10.885
-11.560
-4.490
1.250
-6.956
14.768
-2.038
-4.037
0.743
4.414
-27.012
-5.524
9.813
-4.597
-0.431
-21.897
-2.387
9.755
-7.005
6.064
1.825
-39.289
-19.914
9.093
-25.858
-10.564
-12.547
-23.264
-2.916
17.668
2.779

Adv5xPvIncOthRace
AdvHfPvIncHspnc
Adv1xPvIncHspnc
Adv2xPvIncHspnc
Adv3xPvIncHspnc
Adv4xPvIncHspnc
Adv5xPvIncHspnc
AdvHfPvIncHHsiz1
Adv1xPvIncHHsiz1
Adv2xPvIncHHsiz1
Adv3xPvIncHHsiz1
Adv4xPvIncHHsiz1
AdvHfPvIncHHsiz2
Adv1xPvIncHHsiz2
Adv2xPvIncHHsiz2
Adv3xPvIncHHsiz2
Adv4xPvIncHHsiz2
Adv5xPvIncHHsiz2
AdvHfPvIncHHsiz3
Adv1xPvIncHHsiz3
Adv2xPvIncHHsiz3
Adv3xPvIncHHsiz3
Adv4xPvIncHHsiz3
Adv5xPvIncHHsiz3
AdvHfPvIncHHsiz4
Adv1xPvIncHHsiz4
Adv2xPvIncHHsiz4
Adv3xPvIncHHsiz4
Adv4xPvIncHHsiz4
Adv5xPvIncHHsiz4
AdvHfPvIncNoKids
Adv1xPvIncNoKids
Adv2xPvIncNoKids
Adv3xPvIncNoKids
Adv4xPvIncNoKids
AdvHfPvIncOneKids
Adv1xPvIncOneKids
Adv2xPvIncOneKids
Adv3xPvIncOneKids
Adv4xPvIncOneKids
Adv5xPvIncOneKids
AdvHfPvIncTwoKids
Adv1xPvIncTwoKids
Adv2xPvIncTwoKids
Adv3xPvIncTwoKids
Adv4xPvIncTwoKids
Adv5xPvIncTwoKids
AdvHfPvInc3Kids
Adv1xPvInc3Kids
Adv2xPvInc3Kids
Adv3xPvInc3Kids

0.013
-0.011
0.018
-0.005
-0.015
-0.007
-0.018
0.024
-0.021
-0.023
-0.009
-0.023
0.024
-0.009
-0.014
-0.010
-0.014
-0.009
0.029
0.004
-0.016
-0.011
-0.020
0.001
0.048
-0.004
-0.010
-0.007
-0.006
-0.009
0.010
0.036
-0.011
0.014
0.026
0.003
0.015
-0.022
-0.004
0.009
-0.029
0.004
0.013
-0.020
-0.001
0.009
-0.029
-0.039
-0.082
-0.055
-0.059

0.009
0.008
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.008
0.014
0.008
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.012
0.007
0.006
0.005
0.005
0.004
0.012
0.007
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.004
0.012
0.007
0.005
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.021
0.019
0.014
0.010
0.014
0.021
0.019
0.015
0.011
0.015
0.008
0.021
0.019
0.015
0.012
0.015
0.010
0.023
0.021
0.018
0.014
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1.42
-1.43
2.36
-0.82
-2.25
-1
-2.22
1.75
-2.52
-3.36
-1.35
-3.31
1.93
-1.19
-2.41
-1.83
-2.55
-2.54
2.43
0.64
-3.03
-2.24
-4.24
0.26
4.12
-0.52
-2.04
-1.6
-1.27
-2.55
0.48
1.94
-0.78
1.4
1.91
0.14
0.77
-1.5
-0.39
0.58
-3.67
0.18
0.68
-1.32
-0.08
0.61
-2.99
-1.67
-3.88
-3.11
-4.12

0.157
0.151
0.018
0.413
0.025
0.318
0.026
0.081
0.012
0.001
0.177
0.001
0.054
0.234
0.016
0.067
0.011
0.011
0.015
0.522
0.002
0.025
0
0.795
0
0.602
0.041
0.109
0.206
0.011
0.632
0.053
0.434
0.163
0.056
0.888
0.44
0.134
0.7
0.56
0
0.857
0.493
0.185
0.933
0.539
0.003
0.095
0
0.002
0

4.847
-4.301
6.616
-2.060
-5.740
-2.759
-6.622
8.881
-7.783
-8.434
-3.340
-8.490
8.856
-3.290
-5.211
-3.625
-5.068
-3.398
10.783
1.680
-5.995
-4.058
-7.643
0.368
18.017
-1.321
-3.684
-2.637
-2.110
-3.531
3.788
13.495
-4.137
5.146
9.761
1.094
5.498
-8.322
-1.539
3.204
-10.894
1.435
4.917
-7.583
-0.366
3.506
-10.700
-14.582
-30.564
-20.513
-22.204

Adv4xPvInc3Kids
Adv5xPvInc3Kids
AdvHfPvIncFmAgeL30
Adv1xPvIncFmAgeL30
Adv2xPvIncFmAgeL30
Adv3xPvIncFmAgeL30
Adv4xPvIncFmAgeL30
Adv5xPvIncFmAgeL30
AdvHfPvIncFmLAge30L40
Adv1xPvIncFmAge30L40
Adv2xPvIncFmAge30L40
Adv3xPvIncFmAge30L40
Adv4xPvIncFmAge30L40
Adv5xPvIncFmAge30L40
AdvHfPvIncFmLAge40L50
Adv1xPvIncFmAge40L50
Adv2xPvIncFmAge40L50
Adv3xPvIncFmAge40L50
Adv4xPvIncFmAge40L50
Adv5xPvIncFmAge40L50
AdvHfPvIncFmAge50L65
Adv1xPvIncFmAge50L65
Adv2xPvIncFmAge50L65
Adv3xPvIncFmAge50L65
Adv4xPvIncFmAge50L65
AdvHfPvIncMAgeL30
Adv1xPvIncMAgeL30
Adv2xPvIncMAgeL30
Adv3xPvIncMAgeL30
Adv4xPvIncMAgeL30
Adv5xPvIncMAgeL30
AdvHfPvIncMLAge30L40
Adv1xPvIncMAge30L40
Adv2xPvIncMAge30L40
Adv3xPvIncMAge30L40
Adv4xPvIncMAge30L40
Adv5xPvIncMAge30L40
AdvHfPvIncMAge40L50
Adv1xPvIncMAge40L50
Adv2xPvIncMAge40L50
Adv3xPvIncMAge40L50
Adv4xPvIncMAge40L50
Adv5xPvIncMAge40L50
AdvHfPvIncMAge50L65
Adv1xPvIncMAge50L65
Adv2xPvIncMAge50L65
Adv3xPvIncMAge50L65
Adv4xPvIncMAge50L65
AdvxFmLHSNoKids
AdvxFmHSNoKids
AdvxFmSmColgNoKids

-0.055
-0.071
0.046
0.055
-0.011
-0.002
0.034
-0.014
0.024
0.014
-0.010
0.004
0.045
0.000
-0.016
0.024
-0.011
0.015
0.020
0.000
0.018
0.012
-0.003
0.010
0.015
-0.050
-0.026
-0.026
0.003
-0.034
-0.027
-0.058
0.000
-0.016
-0.006
-0.035
0.004
-0.024
0.009
-0.003
-0.009
-0.026
-0.005
-0.023
-0.014
-0.007
-0.003
-0.023
0.037
-0.020
0.002

0.018
0.014
0.012
0.008
0.006
0.007
0.009
0.008
0.009
0.006
0.005
0.005
0.007
0.005
0.008
0.005
0.004
0.005
0.007
0.003
0.007
0.004
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.014
0.010
0.007
0.008
0.011
0.010
0.013
0.007
0.005
0.005
0.007
0.004
0.010
0.006
0.005
0.005
0.006
0.003
0.009
0.005
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.018
0.012
0.012
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-3.08
-5.01
3.75
7.12
-1.76
-0.26
3.59
-1.61
2.61
2.43
-2.11
0.73
6.45
0
-2.03
4.9
-2.47
2.91
3.07
0.07
2.55
2.78
-0.84
2.06
2.49
-3.51
-2.69
-3.8
0.35
-3.18
-2.61
-4.57
0
-3.18
-1.18
-5.31
0.9
-2.49
1.52
-0.64
-1.77
-4.31
-1.82
-2.49
-2.62
-1.62
-0.7
-4
2.02
-1.65
0.14

0.002
0
0
0
0.078
0.794
0
0.108
0.009
0.015
0.035
0.468
0
0.997
0.043
0
0.014
0.004
0.002
0.943
0.011
0.005
0.401
0.039
0.013
0
0.007
0
0.727
0.001
0.009
0
0.996
0.001
0.239
0
0.37
0.013
0.128
0.525
0.077
0
0.069
0.013
0.009
0.106
0.482
0
0.043
0.1
0.887

-20.524
-26.695
17.198
20.614
-4.015
-0.659
12.612
-5.075
8.816
5.194
-3.846
1.444
16.838
0.006
-5.980
9.004
-4.072
5.437
7.538
0.085
6.845
4.371
-1.279
3.607
5.677
-18.703
-9.588
-9.653
1.019
-12.761
-10.205
-21.799
0.012
-6.034
-2.363
-13.238
1.450
-9.037
3.252
-1.110
-3.331
-9.859
-2.056
-8.679
-5.271
-2.634
-1.253
-8.713
13.983
-7.635
0.647

AdvxFmColgNoKids
AdvxFmLHSOneKids
AdvxFmHSOneKids
AdvxFmSmColgOneKids
AdvxFmColgOneKids
AdvxFmPostColgOneKids
AdvxFmLHSTwoKids
AdvxFmHSTwoKids
AdvxFmSmColgTwoKids
AdvxFmColgTwoKids
AdvxFmPostColgTwoKids
AdvxFmLHS3Kids
AdvxFmHS3Kids
AdvxFmSmColg3Kids
AdvxFmColg3Kids
AdvxFmPostColg3Kids
AdvxMLHSNoKids
AdvxMHSNoKids
AdvxMSmColgNoKids
AdvxMColgNoKids
AdvxMLHSOneKids
AdvxMHSOneKids
AdvxMSmColgOneKids
AdvxMColgOneKids
AdvxMPostColgOneKids
AdvxMLHSTwoKids
AdvxMHSTwoKids
AdvxMSmColgTwoKids
AdvxMColgTwoKids
AdvxMPostColgTwoKids
AdvxMLHS3Kids
AdvxMHS3Kids
AdvxMSmColg3Kids
AdvxMColg3Kids
AdvxMPostColg3Kids
AdvxFmLHSWhite
AdvxFmHSWhite
AdvxFmSmColgWhite
AdvxFmColgWhite
AdvxFmLHSAfrAm
AdvxFmHSAfrAm
AdvxFmSmColgAfrAm
AdvxFmColgAfrAm
AdvxFmPostColgAfrAm
AdvxFmLHSAsian
AdvxFmHSAsian
AdvxFmSmColgAsian
AdvxFmColgAsian
AdvxFmPostColgAsian
AdvxFmPostColgOthRace
AdvxFmLHSHspnc

0.000
0.045
-0.008
0.013
0.016
0.018
0.061
-0.010
0.006
0.017
0.034
0.105
0.044
0.072
0.060
0.041
-0.012
-0.072
-0.007
0.001
0.002
-0.070
0.005
0.003
0.004
-0.013
-0.072
0.014
0.001
0.007
0.011
-0.061
0.012
0.009
0.011
-0.012
0.000
0.007
0.007
-0.011
0.007
0.007
0.003
-0.020
0.067
0.051
0.070
0.061
0.076
0.002
-0.013

0.013
0.019
0.013
0.013
0.014
0.007
0.020
0.014
0.014
0.015
0.009
0.023
0.016
0.016
0.017
0.014
0.016
0.012
0.011
0.013
0.016
0.012
0.011
0.013
0.006
0.016
0.012
0.012
0.014
0.007
0.018
0.014
0.013
0.015
0.012
0.009
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.011
0.008
0.008
0.009
0.007
0.020
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.010
0.007
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-0.02
2.32
-0.61
0.97
1.14
2.4
3.09
-0.71
0.47
1.19
3.86
4.66
2.74
4.51
3.55
2.89
-0.74
-6.09
-0.65
0.09
0.14
-5.79
0.43
0.21
0.7
-0.8
-5.84
1.24
0.09
1.05
0.61
-4.47
0.94
0.58
0.91
-1.35
0.01
1.1
1.02
-1.01
0.85
0.82
0.38
-2.77
3.38
3.89
5.38
4.86
6.01
0.16
-1.69

0.986
0.02
0.545
0.331
0.252
0.016
0.002
0.48
0.642
0.236
0
0
0.006
0
0
0.004
0.457
0
0.518
0.932
0.887
0
0.67
0.831
0.486
0.423
0
0.215
0.926
0.293
0.542
0
0.346
0.56
0.362
0.176
0.989
0.27
0.306
0.312
0.396
0.411
0.707
0.006
0.001
0
0
0
0
0.871
0.092

-0.085
16.924
-3.030
4.767
6.020
6.601
22.882
-3.717
2.392
6.521
12.841
39.434
16.490
26.910
22.547
15.439
-4.351
-27.059
-2.670
0.415
0.861
-26.350
1.817
1.073
1.682
-4.836
-26.982
5.383
0.475
2.785
4.041
-22.742
4.602
3.348
4.216
-4.342
0.035
2.752
2.796
-4.223
2.547
2.439
1.233
-7.462
25.178
19.203
26.039
22.943
28.531
0.592
-4.733

AdvxFmHSHspnc
AdvxFmSmColgHspnc
AdvxFmColgHspnc
AdvxFmPostColgHspnc
AdvxMLHSWhite
AdvxMHSWhite
AdvxMSmColgWhite
AdvxMColgWhite
AdvxMLHSAfrAm
AdvxMHSAfrAm
AdvxMSmColgAfrAm
AdvxMColgAfrAm
AdvxMPostColgAfrAm
AdvxMLHSAsian
AdvxMHSAsian
AdvxMSmColgAsian
AdvxMColgAsian
AdvxMPostColgAsian
AdvxMPostColgOthRace
AdvxMLHSHspnc
AdvxMHSHspnc
AdvxMSmColgHspnc
AdvxMColgHspnc
AdvxMPostColgHspnc
Ssn2
Ssn3
Ssn4
_cons

-0.006
-0.001
-0.001
0.007
-0.004
-0.002
0.005
0.014
-0.010
0.015
0.004
0.020
0.005
-0.043
-0.035
-0.026
0.014
-0.040
-0.020
-0.015
-0.002
-0.011
0.023
0.017
26.791
18.524
9.776
49.824

0.006
0.006
0.006
0.010
0.008
0.006
0.006
0.007
0.010
0.007
0.007
0.008
0.008
0.026
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.010
0.007
0.005
0.005
0.006
0.008
1.246
1.243
1.325
0.713

-1.04
-0.17
-0.1
0.69
-0.55
-0.37
0.79
1.99
-0.98
2.18
0.53
2.35
0.6
-1.67
-2.99
-2.24
1.21
-3.3
-1.91
-2.15
-0.37
-2
3.95
2.06
21.49
14.91
7.38
69.9

0.299
0.864
0.92
0.491
0.583
0.709
0.429
0.046
0.328
0.029
0.593
0.019
0.55
0.094
0.003
0.025
0.226
0.001
0.057
0.031
0.709
0.046
0
0.04
0
0
0
0

Probity
Wkly P DMA
Wkly Advert
HfPvIncFmLHS
1xPvIncFmLHS
2xPvIncFmLHS
3xPvIncFmLHS
4xPvIncFmLHS
5xPvIncFmLHS
HfPvIncFmHS
1xPvIncFmHS
2xPvIncFmHS
3xPvIncFmHS
4xPvIncFmHS
5xPvIncFmHS
HfPvIncFmSomCollg
1xPvIncFmSomCollg
2xPvIncFmSomCollg
3xPvIncFmSomCollg
4xPvIncFmSomCollg
5xPvIncFmSomCollg
HfPvIncFmCollg

55.198
0.000
-1.931
-1.910
-2.134
-2.014
-2.441
-1.245
-1.576
-1.683
-1.876
-1.786
-2.201
-0.821
-1.539
-1.399
-1.664
-1.457
-1.911
-0.533
-1.162

0.289
0.000
0.180
0.172
0.169
0.172
0.176
0.173
0.135
0.125
0.123
0.124
0.126
0.115
0.135
0.124
0.122
0.123
0.125
0.113
0.139

191.3
22.66
-10.72
-11.1
-12.6
-11.71
-13.84
-7.22
-11.7
-13.5
-15.24
-14.43
-17.46
-7.16
-11.43
-11.28
-13.58
-11.85
-15.25
-4.73
-8.33

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

358

-2.177
-0.363
-0.235
2.702
-1.609
-0.806
1.816
5.102
-3.653
5.518
1.457
7.312
1.862
-16.210
-13.191
-9.705
5.282
-14.802
-7.441
-5.679
-0.706
-4.006
8.748
6.445
26.791
18.524
9.776

1xPvIncFmCollg
2xPvIncFmCollg
3xPvIncFmCollg
4xPvIncFmCollg
5xPvIncFmCollg
HfPvIncFmPostCollg
1xPvIncFmPostCollg
2xPvIncFmPostCollg
3xPvIncFmPostCollg
4xPvIncFmPostCollg
HfPvIncMLHS
1xPvIncMLHS
2xPvIncMLHS
3xPvIncMLHS
4xPvIncMLHS
5xPvIncMLHS
HfPvIncMHS
1xPvIncMHS
2xPvIncMHS
3xPvIncMHS
4xPvIncMHS
5xPvIncMHS
HfPvIncMSomCollg
1xPvIncMSomCollg
2xPvIncMSomCollg
3xPvIncMSomCollg
4xPvIncMSomCollg
5xPvIncMSomCollg
HfPvIncMCollg
1xPvIncMCollg
2xPvIncMCollg
3xPvIncMCollg
4xPvIncMCollg
5xPvIncMCollg
HfPvIncMPostCollg
1xPvIncMPostCollg
2xPvIncMPostCollg
3xPvIncMPostCollg
4xPvIncMPostCollg
HfPvIncWhite
1xPvIncWhite
2xPvIncWhite
3xPvIncWhite
4xPvIncWhite
HfPvIncAfrAm
1xPvIncAfrAm
2xPvIncAfrAm
3xPvIncAfrAm
4xPvIncAfrAm
5xPvIncAfrAm
HfPvIncAsian
1xPvIncAsian

-1.144
-1.441
-1.188
-1.597
-0.283
-1.620
-1.402
-1.760
-1.517
-1.854
-1.343
-1.096
-1.172
-1.124
-1.024
-0.638
-1.325
-0.964
-1.150
-1.025
-0.923
-0.713
-1.453
-0.937
-1.155
-1.042
-0.972
-0.832
-1.024
-0.699
-0.856
-0.900
-0.746
-0.593
-0.824
-0.885
-0.934
-0.720
-0.601
1.411
1.897
1.740
1.345
1.611
1.828
2.040
2.017
1.668
1.979
0.194
1.624
2.160

0.127
0.125
0.124
0.127
0.114
0.125
0.079
0.061
0.058
0.060
0.123
0.108
0.105
0.106
0.112
0.103
0.098
0.085
0.083
0.084
0.087
0.075
0.102
0.086
0.083
0.083
0.085
0.073
0.115
0.097
0.092
0.091
0.093
0.080
0.108
0.078
0.065
0.053
0.052
0.127
0.104
0.087
0.080
0.084
0.128
0.109
0.092
0.085
0.091
0.042
0.183
0.136
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-8.98
-11.56
-9.55
-12.6
-2.48
-12.98
-17.82
-28.81
-26.25
-31.15
-10.91
-10.17
-11.18
-10.59
-9.17
-6.17
-13.48
-11.29
-13.8
-12.25
-10.61
-9.53
-14.22
-10.88
-13.93
-12.6
-11.39
-11.39
-8.94
-7.18
-9.3
-9.89
-8
-7.4
-7.62
-11.29
-14.39
-13.6
-11.49
11.12
18.15
19.96
16.83
19.07
14.26
18.75
22.01
19.51
21.74
4.58
8.88
15.92

0
0
0
0
0.013
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2xPvIncAsian
3xPvIncAsian
4xPvIncAsian
5xPvIncAsian
HfPvIncOthRace
1xPvIncOthRace
2xPvIncOthRace
4xPvIncOthRace
5xPvIncOthRace
HfPvIncHspnc
1xPvIncHspnc
2xPvIncHspnc
3xPvIncHspnc
4xPvIncHspnc
5xPvIncHspnc
HfPvIncHHsiz1
1xPvIncHHsiz1
2xPvIncHHsiz1
3xPvIncHHsiz1
4xPvIncHHsiz1
HfPvIncHHsiz2
1xPvIncHHsiz2
2xPvIncHHsiz2
3xPvIncHHsiz2
4xPvIncHHsiz2
5xPvIncHHsiz2
HfPvIncHHsiz3
1xPvIncHHsiz3
2xPvIncHHsiz3
3xPvIncHHsiz3
4xPvIncHHsiz3
5xPvIncHHsiz3
HfPvIncHHsiz4
1xPvIncHHsiz4
2xPvIncHHsiz4
3xPvIncHHsiz4
4xPvIncHHsiz4
5xPvIncHHsiz4
HfPvIncNoKids
1xPvIncNoKids
2xPvIncNoKids
3xPvIncNoKids
4xPvIncNoKids
HfPvIncOneKids
1xPvIncOneKids
2xPvIncOneKids
3xPvIncOneKids
4xPvIncOneKids
5xPvIncOneKids
HfPvIncTwoKids
1xPvIncTwoKids
2xPvIncTwoKids

2.035
1.758
2.068
0.505
0.012
0.579
0.374
0.115
-1.577
-0.029
0.075
0.118
0.038
0.369
0.314
-1.757
-1.584
-1.977
-2.153
-2.033
-1.779
-1.687
-1.739
-1.963
-1.726
-1.516
-1.824
-1.628
-1.650
-1.741
-1.668
-1.624
-1.493
-1.835
-1.669
-1.745
-1.579
-1.599
0.439
-0.258
0.189
0.546
0.251
0.284
-0.219
0.217
0.522
0.422
0.273
0.254
-0.163
0.298

0.112
0.103
0.111
0.067
0.132
0.105
0.085
0.086
0.087
0.053
0.050
0.046
0.047
0.049
0.053
0.089
0.064
0.052
0.052
0.053
0.083
0.061
0.048
0.047
0.047
0.020
0.082
0.059
0.047
0.045
0.045
0.026
0.078
0.057
0.045
0.043
0.043
0.030
0.128
0.107
0.085
0.077
0.080
0.128
0.112
0.092
0.085
0.089
0.049
0.131
0.112
0.095
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18.18
17
18.65
7.54
0.09
5.52
4.42
1.34
-18.2
-0.54
1.5
2.56
0.8
7.52
5.92
-19.74
-24.72
-37.78
-41.62
-38.53
-21.47
-27.8
-35.99
-41.86
-36.67
-74.69
-22.18
-27.65
-35.31
-38.44
-37.1
-63.57
-19.12
-31.97
-37.31
-40.32
-36.58
-53.71
3.41
-2.42
2.21
7.08
3.12
2.21
-1.96
2.37
6.15
4.75
5.52
1.93
-1.46
3.14

0
0
0
0
0.93
0
0
0.18
0
0.59
0.133
0.011
0.421
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.001
0.016
0.027
0
0.002
0.027
0.051
0.018
0
0
0
0.053
0.144
0.002

3xPvIncTwoKids
4xPvIncTwoKids
5xPvIncTwoKids
HfPvInc3Kids
1xPvInc3Kids
2xPvInc3Kids
3xPvInc3Kids
4xPvInc3Kids
5xPvInc3Kids
HfPvIncFmAgeL30
1xPvIncFmAgeL30
2xPvIncFmAgeL30
3xPvIncFmAgeL30
4xPvIncFmAgeL30
5xPvIncFmAgeL30
HfPvIncFmAge30L40
1xPvIncFmAge30L40
2xPvIncFmAge30L40
3xPvIncFmAge30L40
4xPvIncFmAge30L40
5xPvIncFmAge30L40
HfPvIncFmAge40L50
1xPvIncFmAge40L50
2xPvIncFmAge40L50
3xPvIncFmAge40L50
4xPvIncFmAge40L50
5xPvIncFmAge40L50
HfPvIncFmAge50L65
1xPvIncFmAge50L65
2xPvIncFmAge50L65
3xPvIncFmAge50L65
4xPvIncFmAge50L65
HfPvIncMAgeL30
1xPvIncMAgeL30
2xPvIncMAgeL30
3xPvIncMAgeL30
4xPvIncMAgeL30
5xPvIncMAgeL30
HfPvIncMAge30L40
1xPvIncMAge30L40
2xPvIncMAge30L40
3xPvIncMAge30L40
4xPvIncMAge30L40
5xPvIncMAge30L40
HfPvIncMAge40L50
1xPvIncMAge40L50
2xPvIncMAge40L50
3xPvIncMAge40L50
4xPvIncMAge40L50
5xPvIncMAge40L50
HfPvIncMAge50L65
1xPvIncMAge50L65

0.399
0.392
0.282
-0.042
0.022
0.217
0.346
0.371
0.352
0.082
-0.078
0.060
0.110
0.208
-0.185
0.164
0.206
0.172
0.151
0.297
-0.320
-0.046
0.093
0.327
0.258
0.421
-0.189
-0.062
0.189
0.299
0.146
0.263
-0.150
-0.326
-0.429
-0.389
-0.488
-0.557
-0.110
-0.701
-0.503
-0.380
-0.637
-0.085
-0.163
-0.637
-0.251
-0.229
-0.530
-0.080
-0.271
-0.522

0.088
0.092
0.060
0.146
0.130
0.115
0.110
0.114
0.096
0.078
0.057
0.049
0.050
0.061
0.044
0.061
0.048
0.044
0.045
0.051
0.025
0.055
0.045
0.042
0.044
0.049
0.019
0.052
0.041
0.040
0.042
0.047
0.100
0.068
0.049
0.054
0.064
0.056
0.077
0.052
0.042
0.042
0.046
0.024
0.066
0.046
0.040
0.041
0.044
0.018
0.064
0.043
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4.51
4.26
4.71
-0.29
0.17
1.88
3.13
3.26
3.68
1.04
-1.37
1.22
2.19
3.42
-4.24
2.67
4.3
3.94
3.38
5.84
-12.9
-0.83
2.08
7.83
5.93
8.62
-10.17
-1.2
4.61
7.47
3.49
5.61
-1.51
-4.8
-8.68
-7.16
-7.6
-9.98
-1.42
-13.43
-11.85
-8.97
-13.74
-3.55
-2.45
-13.83
-6.23
-5.61
-12.02
-4.56
-4.27
-12.12

0
0
0
0.776
0.863
0.06
0.002
0.001
0
0.296
0.172
0.221
0.029
0.001
0
0.008
0
0
0.001
0
0
0.406
0.037
0
0
0
0
0.23
0
0
0
0
0.131
0
0
0
0
0
0.156
0
0
0
0
0
0.014
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2xPvIncMAge50L65
3xPvIncMAge50L65
4xPvIncMAge50L65
FmLHSNoKids
FmHSNoKids
FmSmColgNoKids
FmColgNoKids
FmLHSOneKids
FmHSOneKids
FmSmColgOneKids
FmColgOneKids
FmPostColgOneKids
FmLHSTwoKids
FmHSTwoKids
FmSmColgTwoKids
FmColgTwoKids
FmPostColgTwoKids
FmLHS3Kids
FmHS3Kids
FmSmColg3Kids
FmColg3Kids
FmPostColg3Kids
MLHSNoKids
MHSNoKids
MSmColgNoKids
MColgNoKids
MLHSOneKids
MHSOneKids
MSmColgOneKids
MColgOneKids
MPostColgOneKids
MLHSTwoKids
MHSTwoKids
MSmColgTwoKids
MColgTwoKids
MPostColgTwoKids
MLHS3Kids
MHS3Kids
MSmColg3Kids
MColg3Kids
MPostColg3Kids
FmLHSWhite
FmHSWhite
FmSmColgWhite
FmColgWhite
FmLHSAfrAm
FmHSAfrAm
FmSomColgAfrAm
FmColgAfrAm
FmPostColgAfrAm
FmLHSAsian
FmHSAsian

-0.310
-0.247
-0.432
0.025
-0.114
-0.344
-0.516
-0.137
-0.209
-0.305
-0.267
-0.094
-0.068
-0.313
-0.418
-0.404
-0.315
0.009
-0.085
-0.270
-0.346
-0.360
0.106
-0.013
0.255
-0.157
-0.252
-0.337
0.060
-0.291
-0.558
-0.323
-0.207
0.086
-0.169
-0.453
-0.296
-0.167
0.007
-0.005
-0.345
0.332
0.269
0.281
0.095
0.240
0.192
0.213
0.100
-0.247
0.389
-0.028

0.039
0.039
0.042
0.156
0.107
0.106
0.106
0.162
0.113
0.111
0.112
0.043
0.164
0.115
0.114
0.115
0.051
0.181
0.132
0.130
0.132
0.088
0.088
0.064
0.061
0.069
0.092
0.067
0.064
0.072
0.037
0.092
0.068
0.066
0.074
0.040
0.101
0.076
0.074
0.082
0.063
0.057
0.042
0.042
0.044
0.071
0.050
0.048
0.052
0.039
0.102
0.073
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-8.01
-6.27
-10.19
0.16
-1.07
-3.26
-4.86
-0.85
-1.86
-2.75
-2.38
-2.21
-0.42
-2.71
-3.68
-3.53
-6.15
0.05
-0.65
-2.07
-2.63
-4.09
1.2
-0.2
4.16
-2.27
-2.72
-5.04
0.93
-4.03
-15.2
-3.5
-3.05
1.31
-2.29
-11.34
-2.92
-2.2
0.09
-0.06
-5.43
5.88
6.33
6.75
2.14
3.35
3.85
4.43
1.93
-6.28
3.83
-0.38

0
0
0
0.874
0.287
0.001
0
0.396
0.063
0.006
0.017
0.027
0.677
0.007
0
0
0
0.96
0.517
0.038
0.009
0
0.229
0.84
0
0.023
0.007
0
0.351
0
0
0
0.002
0.189
0.022
0
0.003
0.028
0.93
0.95
0
0
0
0
0.033
0.001
0
0
0.053
0
0
0.702

FmSomColgAsian
FmColgAsian
FmPostColgAsian
FmPostColgOthRace
FmLHSHspnc
FmHSHspnc
FmSomColgHspnc
FmColgHspnc
FmPostColgHspnc
MLHSWhite
MHSWhite
MSmColgWhite
MColgWhite
MLHSAfrAm
MHSAfrAm
MSmColgAfrAm
MColgAfrAm
MPostColgAfrAm
MLHSAsian
MHSAsian
MSmColgAsian
MColgAsian
MPostColgAsian
MPostColgOthRace
MLHSHspnc
MHSHspnc
MSmColgHspnc
MColgHspnc
MPostColgHspnc
NoManHd
NoFemHd
_4KidsPlus
FemAge65plus
MaleAge65plus
OtherRace
HHsiz5plus
WksHHTotOzGrtr67
MovgAvgHHStock6
_cons
mills
lambda

-0.030
-0.198
-0.558
-0.322
-0.164
-0.168
-0.243
-0.272
-0.419
0.035
0.116
0.022
0.179
0.017
-0.122
-0.057
-0.083
-0.392
-0.171
-0.217
-0.224
-0.218
-0.852
-0.252
-0.122
-0.183
-0.162
-0.098
-0.207
-1.780
-1.871
0.009
0.075
-0.592
1.680
-1.782

0.181
0.000
-1.018

0.069
0.066
0.058
0.058
0.052
0.039
0.038
0.041
0.050
0.049
0.036
0.038
0.042
0.060
0.042
0.043
0.049
0.045
0.112
0.067
0.061
0.061
0.055
0.056
0.045
0.033
0.034
0.037
0.048
0.025
0.022
0.102
0.033
0.029
0.093
0.033
0.000
0.000
0.002

-0.43
-3.02
-9.66
-5.58
-3.18
-4.36
-6.4
-6.7
-8.37
0.72
3.19
0.58
4.24
0.28
-2.93
-1.33
-1.69
-8.72
-1.53
-3.23
-3.67
-3.55
-15.53
-4.49
-2.73
-5.6
-4.78
-2.65
-4.32
-70.6
-85.15
0.09
2.26
-20.18
18.02
-53.79
484.2
-39.65
-407.4

0.67
0.003
0
0
0.001
0
0
0
0
0.47
0.001
0.561
0
0.78
0.003
0.184
0.091
0
0.126
0.001
0
0
0
0
0.006
0
0
0.008
0
0
0
0.927
0.024
0
0
0
0
0
0

-32.014

0.387

-82.82

0

-0.274
rho
116.639
sigma
-32.014
0.387
lambda
‡
Reference Groups: 5xPvIncxFmPostCollg (5xPvIncxMalePostCollg), 5xPvIncxWhite, Non-Hispanic,
5xPvIncxHHsiz1, 5xPvIncxNoKids, 5xPvIncxFemAge50-65 (5xPvIncxMaleAge50-65),
FmPostCollgxNoKids (MalePostCollgxNoKids), FmPostCollgxWhite (MalePostCollgxWhite),
* δy/δx is the marginal effect of the variable, for inference. Lighter-shaded cells are values in δy/δx column
for variables regressed on either the OLS-side or the Probit-side equation only, and are therefore unadjusted
from the first numeric column.
^ “X” is the average value at which marketing variables are calculated.
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Essay Two

When Regular Soft-Drink Consumption Fails to Maximize Utility:
A Dynamic Theoretical Model Flexible to Failures of Rationality
Chapter 6

Cross-Disciplinary Science and A Dynamic Theoretical Model
Flexible to Failures of Rationality

Abstract
Sweetened carbonated soft drinks (sCSDs) are an exceptional product type, given the
degree to which they are accepted, cheap, ubiquitous, marketed, and yet unhealthful in
commonly packaged quantities. Aspects of this exceptionalism make the regular consumption of
sCSDs a poor fit for the neoclassical theory of utility maximization as it characterizes individual
choice. I respect findings and insights from medical/nutrition literature, behavioral economics,
neuroeconomics, psychology, and social psychology in my analysis. From this analysis I
construct a dynamic graphic and a dynamic theoretical model that accommodate both rational
choice and choice that fails to maximize lifetime utility.

6.1

Overview
In section 1.2, I assert that contributions from the medical, psychological,

neuroeconomic, and behavioral economic literatures expose mechanisms by which the individual
choice to regularly consume sugar-sweetened beverages may be influenced by factors preceding
and following the decision to consume. Thus as these literatures apply, the choice to regularly
consume sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) may not be as discrete, rational, or utility
maximizing as economic theory ascribes to products such as steel, refrigerators, or reusable food
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containers, whose uses are not reputed to have explicit negative biological effects. This chapter
questions the assumptions and limitations of rational choice theory, supporting these arguments
with theoretical constructs and empirical evidence from these other fields, and providing deeper
context for the original empirical work in Essay One and for the policy analysis in Essay Three.
References include works by Herbert Simon (bounded rationality and satisficing), Kahneman
and Tversky (decision heuristics, prospect theory, inconsistent time preferences), as well as other
contributors to consumer psychology (Baumeister et al.) and decision theory (Loewenstein,
Ellsberg, Peters), including evidence particular to decisions to consume food (Wansink et al.).
Neuroeconomics “seeks to ground microeconomic theory in details about how the brain works
(Camerer 2007, p C26). Insights from the neuroeconomics literature will largely be embedded in
other primary literature sections, but will weigh in on policy recommendations. “Neuroscientists
have gained considerable insight into the specific processes that appear responsible for decisionmaking malfunctions involving addictive substances, and into the conditions under which these
malfunctions occur” (Bernheim and Rangel 2005, p 99), and this insight informs the economic
debate concerning individual preference, choice, and consumption patterns.
I will refer to the rational choice theory literature only enough to help establish the
theoretical constructs (sections 6.4 – 6.6), then turn to empirical evidence from
medicine/nutrition (6.7), as it appears that Americans overdose themselves with sugar out of
some ignorance of strongly correlated health effects, and perhaps due to sugar’s effect on
dopamine reward pathways in the brain. Before returning to my theoretical models in 6.9, I offer
evidence from psychology, decision theory, and behavioral economics in section 6.8. In brief, the
ways in which rationality is bounded and the stress of modern environments support with
medical evidence, all suggesting that habitual drinkers of sCSDs may not gather relevant health
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information and (with full decision-making resources) rationally decide their sCSD consumption
habits. This divergence of actual behavior from assumptions implicit in neoclassical theory and
in much quantitative modeling challenges the validity of structural model estimations to some
degree, while more firmly bringing to doubt any policy analysis that assumes that all sCSD
consumers are rational, utility maximizing, and that their purchases reflect a consistent long-term
utility maximizing preference set. 6.10 summarizes the logic and arguments.

6.2

Research Objectives for Theoretical Essay
The cultural context of the sCSD product category including national consumption and

health trends is presented in Chapter 1. Essay One focuses on who buys sCSDs (in grocery
markets or general merchandisers, and brings them home to stock for in-home consumption or
possibly outside the home). The theoretical work in Essay Two attempts to understand and
model why habitual drinkers of this profoundly unhealthful product (section 6.7) continue to
drink sCSDs habitually. There is an implicit conflict between current thirst and affinity for sweet
taste versus long-term health. Medical experts, public health specialists, and economists are all
confused as to why this conflict continues: “Poor diets and rising obesity rates among Americans
have persisted despite increased awareness and publicity regarding the benefits of a healthy
lifestyle” (Mancino and Kinsey 2008, p i). What are the mechanisms by which individuals
choose or reject regular consumption of SSBs? Why do so many laypeople ignore in their
behavior the dietary information that experts have generated and distributed, information that
provides overwhelming evidence that consistently poor dietary choices are strongly associated
with poor health outcomes?
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Formally: if habitual sCSD consumption breaks from economic assumptions of rational
utility maximization, in what ways would it, for what reasons would it, and can such “failures”
be modeled without completely abandoning the neoclassical framework upon which most
modern empirical economic analysis is grounded?
The theoretical work in Essay Two draws on psychology (especially consumer decision
theory) literature, nutrition/medical literature, behavioral economic, and neuroeconomic
literature. As with the empirical work here, I answer provocative ancillary questions. Is there a
point at which ignorance of the effects of consuming a product becomes large enough to bring
into question whether regular consumption of the product can be a rational choice for a typical
individual? Should economists ignore data from clinical trials in other academic fields if this data
challenges assumptions about rational decision theory and utility maximization that economists
are trained to accept almost axiomatically? If neoclassical economic assumptions do not stand up
to empirical testing in a way that strongly associates with a particular product (say, SSBs), how
will this affect the models economists use to approximate purchase/consumption behavior?

6.3

Overview of Research Design and Results
Essay Two (here) briefly summarizes conventional economic rational choice theory

(section 6.4) before exploring limitations to that theory suggested theoretically and empirically
(6.5 on). I model rational choice using conventional assumptions, then expand the model to
accommodate viable criticisms. The resulting model and equations are dynamic, and apply to
conventional theory while being flexible to primary criticisms of that theory. A substantial
review of literature exogenous to standard economic assumptions and analysis is presented. I
conclude that habitual consumption of SSBs or sCSDs over time is unlikely to be utility
maximizing or even rational for a typical consumer, without rejecting the possibility that a
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particular individual’s behavior may be both. The final version of the dynamic model reflects
conclusions drawn in related academic fields.

6.4

Classical Rational Choice Theory
Economic theory posits that rational choice, the foundation of consumer theory, is built

from preference relations internal to the decision maker, or by consistently revealed preferences.
By preference relations, economists mean that a decision maker strictly prefers one choice to
another, symbolically x  y, or is indifferent to choice between the two, x ~ y. Both conditions
together can be characterized as x ~
 y, where the choice of x is at least as good as y to this
decision maker. Preference relations are rational if they manifest completeness and transitivity.
Thus for all x or y in a given choice set, x ~
 y, or y ~
 x, or both. In this way, completeness
means that all preference relations are known, and not only capable of being ranked, but are
ranked. Completeness holds that an individual must have a well-defined preference between any
two choices in a given set. Transitivity holds that for all x or y in a given choice set, if x ~
 y,
and y ~
 z. In the language of game theory, the “dominance” of
 z, then it must also hold that x ~
choice x over y and of y over z must strictly imply dominance of x over z, or the transitivity
property fails. “As compared to the completeness property…(transitivity is) more fundamental in
the sense that substantial portions of economic theory would not survive if economic agents
could not be assumed to have transitive preferences” (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995, 67). 1
1

Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green note particular exceptions that can lead to failure of the transitivity property: 1)
the inability to distinguish between “just perceptible differences”; 2) problems in which the presentation of the
choice affects preference, citing Kahneman and Tversky’s classic “framing” problem in which how a choice of
trade-off is worded leads to different choices in an explicit experimental setting; 3) the Condorcet paradox of group
decision making where majority rule or the sequence of preference disqualification within a majority-rule setting can
lead to a transitivity violation; and 4) “change of tastes” discussed in the main text. At least three of these come to
bear in some form in the following discussion (leaving aside the Condorcet paradox).
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Consistency of choice is one of the assumptions that allows revealed preferences
(observable from actual individual choices) to serve as a proxy foundation from the theoretic and
unobservable full preference relation set. If given any conceivable budget set from which to
purchase choices x or y, and x is ever chosen over y (that is, y was not chosen when both were
affordable), then there is no possible budget set that contains x and y from which y will be
chosen when x is not (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, p 10). 2 Having demonstrated a choice
structure that prefers x if only one choice can be made, there is no budget set where y will be
chosen and x will not be. Thus the marginal preference for x will be consistently maintained.
A violation of consistency of choice equivalently reduces in consequence to a violation of
transitivity. Because the individual is not consistent in their choices, monotonicity of preference
relations cannot be assumed. Without monotonicity of preferences, the existence of a stable
utility function cannot be proved from rational preference relations, in the manner that it
routinely is (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, p 47). Utility theory and the consumer theory
derived from utility theory in the textbook manner can no longer be constructed and trusted, if
transitivity and/or consistency of revealed preferences are violated. 3 Without violating the law of
diminishing marginal returns, if utility and consumer demand theory are not descriptive of
decision making in an economic situation, then a structural model derived from these theories
cannot be assumed to effectively describe decision making. It is plausible that the degree to
which reality deviates from theoretical assumptions may influence the degree to which actual
consumer behavior deviates from textbook predictions of consumer behavior where consumers
maximize utility in a (socially) Pareto optimal fashion. If these deviations exist in practice, and
2

Citing chapter 5, in Samuelson, P. (1947). Foundations of Economic Analysis. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
3
I do not endeavor to prove the possibility or impossibility of a valid alternative theoretic construction here, nor do I
attempt to find either proof from another’s work. I have simply demonstrated the conditions under which classical
utility and consumer theory based on utility maximization do not necessarily hold.
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market outcomes are therefore not efficient, policy intervention may result in a second-best
improvement in social welfare.
Less rigorously and more stylistically, Becker and Murphy (1988) operationally define
rationality: (1)“rational consumers maximize utility from stable preferences as they try to
anticipate the future consequences of their choices” (p 675); (2) “A rational person recognizes
that consumption of a harmful good…has adverse effects on future utility and earnings” (p 678).
From these definitions, they claim that even strongly addicted people employ forward-looking
maximization with stable preferences: “much behavior would be excluded from the rational
choice framework if addictions have to be explained another way” (p 676). I do not dispute
Becker and Murphy’s definitions, but contest through evidence provided in this essay that the
habitual consumption of sCSDs can at least mimic addiction, and that whether or not habitual
consumption of sCSDs meets a rigorous definition of addiction, that such use is unlikely to prove
rational in any dynamic long-term framework by either the textbook or Becker and Murphy
definitions provided here. While Becker and Murphy assume time-consistent, stable preferences,
and explain rational behavior as arising from unstable equilibria, I cite evidence from
experimental studies across a range of fields, but especially behavioral economics, psychology,
and decision theory that indicate time inconsistency, and preferences changing within a short
enough period to violate one of the rational properties described by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and
Green. I further support that the decision to consume sCSDs is typically low enough on the
personal hierarchy of priorities that it is likely to recur without implementation of full rational
decision-making resources. Habits arising without full consideration of their effects may then
demonstrate behavior that the individual would not discretely choose if consciously and carefully
deciding.
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The simplest textbook model of economic choice or consumer choice involves the
maximization of utility given individual preferences that are either fully known to the consumer
or fully inferable by actual choice, when the consumer has a choice set with options that fit the
consumer’s budget and information set, as in Figure 2:
Figure 2. Neoclassical Economic Model of Rational Utility-Maximizing Choice
unobserved
preferences
of individual
(complete and
transitive)

feasible / attainable
choice set
for individual
(from info set &
budget)

economically
rational
decision criteria
(maximize utility,
given constraints)

individual’s
utility maximizing
discrete choice

buy / consume

do not
buy / consume

From computer flowchart symbology, preferences are “direct access storage”; information,
choice, and budget sets are “data”; economically rational decision criteria are a “process”; and
the utility-maximizing discrete choice is the “decision.” This is straightforward, and the logical
axioms and proofs of the posits involved ensure a mathematically tractable structure from which
economists build structural models of consumer demand. The resulting choice occurs as if the
individual knows and has discretely weighed all the costs of the decision, and maximized his or

372

her utility by exercising the choice. This maximization appreciates all future states, assuming a
stable internal preference structure (exactly the precept Becker and Murphy 1988 defend).

6.5

Assumptions and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory
As with Socratic logic, wherein agreeing with seemingly true premises can lead to valid

conclusions that are nonetheless absurd (due to overgeneralizations within the premises), 4 much
is invisible in this model of utility maximizing choice. The orthodox economic model of rational
choice is straightforward to the point of being mechanistic – “actions are predetermined by the
characteristics of the environment and by the given structure of preferences. …(I)n fact choices
do not really exist as such; all that remains is a stimulus and response” (Fernandez-Huerga 2008,
p 720). This rational choice model stresses the role of exogenous factors in decision making and
tends to ignore that internal processes may not be mechanistically uniform. In essence the
idiosyncrasies of human psychology have been removed. Of course exogenous factors are easier
to measure, so this assumption structure facilitates quantitative modeling derived from decision
theory. There is certainly a problem with the stable preferences assumption if preferences are
contextually formed, and particularly if they are formed under the influence of advertising or
false or incomplete information. Kapteyn and Wansbeek (1982) claim that empirical evidence
from psychology and sociology and their own work in economics provides “unambiguous”
evidence for the theory of preference formation (p 151). Trenton Smith (2004) argues
specifically that dietary preferences are endogenously determined through culture, taste, and
aftereffects (experience) of consumption, in contrast to the “given preference structures” that
Fernandez-Huerga criticizes as the “mechanistic” standard economic decision model.

4

Plato’s Republic demonstrates a number of such conundrums.
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6.5.1

Neurobiology Shines Light into the Neoclassical Black Box of Decision-Making
Arguing for the validity and implications of the emerging field of neuroeconomics,

Camerer (2007) hits a bit harder. Camerer cites evidence that around a century ago, people we
now consider to be titans of neoclassical economics after much frustration gave up on learning
how the mind works and gave in to the pessimism that man would ever learn how the mind
works. He cites Pareto explicitly giving up on psychology, and Pareto and others turning to the
“as if” model of rational choice, by which it is assumed that people behave as if they are
maximizing utility, or at least conforming precisely to their inherent preference structure.
“Models of this sort posit individual behaviour which is consistent with logical principles, but do
not put any evidentiary weight on direct tests of whether those principles are followed” (p C27).
The frustration of a century ago should not direct us, implicitly or explicitly, to ignore scientific
evidence that has accumulated in the interim.
Camerer points out, for example, that Milton Friedman’s ‘positive economics’ judges the
quality of assumptions by the accuracy of predictions that they make (which is a reasonable
standard), but also judges false assumptions to be acceptable if they lead to accurate predictions.
Camerer explains that a false assumption can only predict well if it includes a hidden “repair
condition,” and isolating this should be the goal of the researcher, not defending a false premise.
Where psychological and neuroscientific facts can help us to predict better, they should be
employed, especially if this means overturning false or provisionally binding assumptions. While
we may never reach Edgeworth’s, Ramsey’s, or Fisher’s dream of inventing devices capable of
direct measure of utility on a cardinal scale rooted in human biology (p C40), evidence now
available from active brain imaging devices can inform our understanding of decision theory and
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choice such that we are not constrained to dogmatically follow the assumptions creatively borne
from the frustration of economists five generations ago (and Milton Friedman).
Camerer argues that neuroscience technology allows us to open a black box to gain more
economic insight, just as happened when the field of organizational economics evolved to
supplant a simplistic and poorly understood mixing of labor and capital as the ‘theory of the
firm’ – now we have components of firms in hierarchies and networks, some subject to principalagent problems. “The neuroeconomic theory of the individual replaces the (perennially useful)
fiction of a utility-maximizing individual which has a single goal, with a more detailed account of
how components of the individual – brain regions, cognitive control, and neural circuits –
interact and communicate to determine individual behaviour” (p C28, his emphasis).
This endeavor can prove useful without veering into the fully biologically deterministic
framework criticized by Gul and Pesendorfer as “mindless economics” (p C40). Camerer
dismisses Gul and Pesendorfer’s characterization by quoting them: “Populating economicTM
models with ‘flesh-and-blood human beings’ was never the objective of economistsTM” (p C40).
As the concern here is with the behavior of human beings who eat, drink, and endure health
effects from choices, I will not be so quickly dismissing neuroeconomics as Gul and Pesendorfer
do. When Camerer shows brain images depicting different active areas when a subject in a
strategic economic game has reached a belief, versus when the same subject is making a choice –
“being in equilibrium is not merely a mathematical restriction on equality of choices and beliefs,
it is also a ‘state of mind’ identifiable by brain imaging” (p C35) – there seems no way to dispute
that this brain-imaging technique may assist the accuracy of decision theory, and by implication
the theory of consumer choice and consumer behavior.
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6.5.2

Bounded Decision-Making Resources – The Small Economic Scale and Biological

Effects of Banal Food Choices May Resist Rational Decision Processing
For the economic choice whether to consume a food item, most items are a small enough
portion of the overall individual budget so that price-comparison/budget considerations may not
enter one’s calculus in the foreground, unlike decisions to buy or rent a house or car, or for a
financial investment. Large discrete choices also tend not to be “secondary behaviors” done more
passively while performing primary behaviors, the way eating can be when working or watching
television (Bertrand and Schanzenbach 2009). Each incident of food consumption also has an
unavoidable aspect of biological internalization that renting or investing does not, which
manifests consequences in later periods that may affect future utility. There is a biofeedback to
the decision, given the organic nature of the choice commodity. The model in Figure 2
necessarily assumes that the decision-maker is human. Economically active humans must at least
have working brains capable of rational thought, be conscious, and for neoclassical consumer
theory, on a relevant level must understand what the costs associated with each choice are, and
be capable not only of a utility maximizing decision process, but must actively employ one.
Figure 3 proposes elements precedent to or required for the capacity to make an
economic decision, and for the rational execution of this utility-maximizing decision capacity
(for now ignoring the other elements of Figure 2):

376

Figure 3. Model of Internal and External Influences Affecting Choice Behavior
Knowledge, beliefs,
experience, and training
pertinent to these decision
criteria or this decision

Internal influences (dashed boxes):
Biological
capacity and
biological
mechanisms
affecting neurobiological
capacity

Neuro-biological
decision-making
capacity

Psychological
decision-making
capacity

Current devotion
of psychological
decision-making
capacity

economically
rational
decision criteria

External influences:
- sociological context
of consumption
- context of consumption
environment
- advertising and pricing
cues for candidate and
alternatives

Italics indicate “information set” contents,
as classically understood

The dashed boxes depicting three biological stages precedent to the current capacity to make a
choice may now seem pointless in their detail, but using sugar-sweetened beverages as our case,
literature relevant to SSB consumption will redeem their placement here.
Decision criteria for SSB consumption are not in-born, because humans evolved without
the option. These decision criteria are constructed, as a subset of our general critical abilities.
This subset draws on our cultural and familial upbringing, our nutrition and medical knowledge,
our experiences with the same or similar products, and our beliefs about these factors – beliefs
that will shape probability weighting in any formal calculation of expected utility under
conditions of uncertainty.
External influences include the social context of SSB consumption, including whether
drinking them is considered socially acceptable (heroin consumption is generally not), whether
they are easy to find, whether the individual has been familiar with their existence and
consumption and for how long, and whether the individual knows and respects others who
partake of SSBs. The role of advertising and product availability in their potential to shape these
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perceptions must not be overlooked. The context of the consumption environment includes who
else may or may not be drinking, the ambient temperature, ease of purchase and use, length of
time since last consumption, etc. These contextual factors extend well past the advertising, price,
and any discounting we conventionally measure as the standard economic factors affecting the
decision to consume sCSDs, at home or away from home.
Understanding the costs and benefits of a choice and weighting one’s expected utility
under uncertainty is assumed in the neoclassical model. Individuals are objective utility
maximizers. But understanding all relevant costs and benefits of a choice and properly weighting
one’s expected utility under uncertainty cannot be taken for granted, given decades of
psychological literature exposing and modeling how people do not do this. People with imperfect
information, limited time or attention to devote to decisions, and whose choices may make tradeoffs with later periods, trade-offs whose full costs may not be apparent ex ante or at the time of
choice, are susceptible to failures to maximize their utility. As far back as 1955, Herbert Simon
proposed that economists consider replacing “the global rationality of economic man with a kind
of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the computational
capacities that are actually possessed by organisms” (p 99), giving us the concept of bounded
rationality. 5 A year later he coined the term satisfice to proxy for something adequately optimal
given the conditions and objectives of the decision, arguing that this organic adaptation would
favor decisions whose efficiency would be compromised by the cost of gathering information to
accumulate a perfect information set. When optimality may not be an achievable goal, then
satisfaction to a target level is enough.

5

From a 1993 speech by Simon: “Maximizing utility bears no resemblance whatsoever to what we human beings
actually do. The idea that we even have a conception of what would be optimal behavior in the complex situations of
life is unbelievable from the beginning” (Simon 1993, p 396).
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We expect trained professionals to make more informed decisions than laypeople.
Surgeons and lawyers need licenses to practice, as do dieticians. Is there a realm where the gap
between the specialist and the layperson is so large that laypeople may not have the information
or critical skills to responsibly evaluate their own utility when making a private choice – which is
to argue, are so ignorant of the full costs and benefits of their options and how to evaluate them
accurately, that the maximization of their utility over time cannot be assumed?
The rational decision a fully informed individual trained in nutrition might routinely
make may deviate from the decision an individual who does not know much about consequences
of unhealthful eating might routinely make. Both the information set and the decision criteria
would then fail to be uniform. Indeed the nutrition information set and decision criteria for
Americans’ food choices are far from uniform, as demonstrated by dietary knowledge and
dietary recall surveys. There is a distribution of information and training in food choice
identified in the literature, including differences identified by socio-demographic characteristics
(Variyam, Shim, and Blaylock 2001). The correlation between an individual’s nutrition
knowledge – sometimes scored on a standardized 100-point Healthy Eating Index (HEI) 6 – and a
healthful diet, has also been demonstrated (numerous references, including Variyam and Golan
2002, Britten et al. 2000, and Marriott et al. 2010). Not all consumers use a full and relevant
information set or full and relevant decision-making criteria in their food choices, meaning their
dietary profiles are defined as unhealthful by nutrition authorities and the USDA, but occur
nonetheless (Krebs-Smith 2001, Variyam, Shim, and Blaylock 2001, amongst others).
If the information set an individual actually uses is so incomplete that the decision criteria
would be altered or the decision reversed if the individual had access to or employed a (relevant)
6

HEI was developed by the Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion (CNPP) in 1995, and revised in 2006 by the
CNPP, National Cancer Institute, and USDA Food and Nutrition Service to conform to 2005 Dietary Guidelines for
Americans.
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factual information set, then the completeness, transitivity, and rationality of the informationconstrained decision comes into question. 7 Conceding for now to the neoclassical conception
that individuals attempt to maximize utility based on their knowledge set when they decide, a
problem remains. If the individual has not accounted for readily knowable real or probable costs
in their calculation, and such costs actually come to bear, the individual may have failed to
maximize utility. 8 If the realized costs are large relative to the utility from consumption, utility
over time will not have been maximized. The “rational choice” made under a relatively severe
information restriction (or poor or underutilized decision criteria) may lead to a “utility
maximizing choice” that while within the rational subset given the information restriction, fails
the larger test of actually maximizing utility experientially.
Imagine a traveling consumer sees a Coke machine and chooses to pay $1.75 and enjoy a
20-ounce cola, but did not read the sign next to the machine noting that customers cannot leave
with the bottle, and there is a $5 bottle disposal fee. The consumer rationally chose given his
information set at the time of choice, but his decision criteria allowed him to neglect knowable
information that would have changed the cost-benefit figures in his internal utility-maximizing
calculus, a change that may have led to a decision not to purchase (while his taste for Coke and
for a fair price as he understands it have not changed). In the case that the consumer would have
chosen differently, or experiences a diminishment of utility from paying the $5 that is larger than
the increase in utility from drinking the cola, then there is a problem with rational choice or
utility maximization.
7

If this were to occur and the factual information set is costly for the individual to obtain relative to the costs that
the ignorant individual miscalculates to be the ultimate costs of the choice to consume, this is a classic case for
public investment in the dissemination of the useful information. Public investment can reduce the information
gathering costs for so many individuals that the social welfare benefit over the cost of education is clear.
8
For information gathering costs to be prohibitive in this context, they must be large enough to outweigh the
realized costs that come to bear. In the case of consistent SSB consumption, whose later costs tend to include weight
gain and morbidity, it is not clear that information gathering costs could be defended as prohibitive over a period of
time, even if they might appear prohibitive while standing at a concession stand or in a supermarket aisle.
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The critical elements are: 1) that available knowledge was not employed in the decision
calculus or the decision calculus was flawed because his experience had not taught him to look
for a hidden fee (we will explore both cases below); and 2) that the added cost of diminished
utility occurs after the choice to purchase/consume (i.e., in a future period). This introduces a
time element that is critical in real-world cases. The individual attempting to maximize lifetime
utility has made a decision based on costs in period 1, when there exist additional costs in period
2 that are inescapable but unknown, or improperly applied or ignored in expected utility
calculations for period 1. While the traveler’s underlying preferences between having a coke and
not spending cash have not changed, his evaluation of the cost may make his preferred choice as
retroactively evaluated in period 2 differ from his actual selection in period 1, a time
inconsistency. Even while the decision to purchase was rational in period 1 given the limited
information set in period 1, ignoring knowable costs is not utility maximizing over both periods.
The health consequences of consistent SSB consumption are incremental and cumulative
(details in section 6.7), which may aggravate the prospect for present bias and hyperbolic
discounting as an individual weighs costs and benefits under uncertainty.
There is a third factor that may affect the choice to regularly consume sCSDs that is not
presented in the bottle-disposal-fee example. The biologically active tools by which an
individual chooses to consume SSBs themselves may be influenced by the sugar in them. This
process may display characteristics of chemical addiction (details in section 6.7).
If there is an element of addiction, or any change of tastes, then a classically noted break
from rational economic behavior may occur. If tastes are not consistent over time, preferences
are not consistent, and a choice in one time period assuming similar tastes in a later time period
will prove invalid as a utility-maximizing device when tastes in a later period have changed.
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Hold in mind a textbook example of a change of tastes as occurs with addictive
consumables like tobacco, or perhaps alcohol. If light consumption of a consumable (y) is
preferred to no consumption (x), but light consumption leads one to heavy consumption (z),
which to the same consumer would ex ante be ranked inferior to no consumption, then behavior
z, which follows from preferring y to x, violates transitivity [y  x, x  z, but choice y over x
invokes outcome z, which is inferior to x]. “A rational decision maker will anticipate the induced
change of tastes and will therefore attempt to tie her hand to her initial decision (Ulysses had
himself tied to the mast when approaching the island of the Sirens)” (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and
Green, p 8, on which the preference notation above is also based). If people with this preference
set are not acting like Ulysses and constraining their choices to maximize utility now and across
all future states, they are not behaving rationally.
From evidence presented in Chapter 1, the particular role of SSBs in the obesity epidemic
is inferable. Either many Americans have made an error similar to our traveler who failed to
appreciate the utility-undermining costs of a later period, or they consciously and with full
knowledge of the medical implications, chose to become overweight or obese, trading immediate
gastronomic pleasures over future health. Some may have. I argue that experimental and
laboratory evidence presented in this chapter from psychologists, behavioral scientists, and the
medical community introduces factors that undermine the neoclassical case for rational choice
and resulting utility maximization precisely for the case of regular consumption of SSBs.
Foregoing long-term health for current sugar therefore may for some consumers routinely fail to
be an informed or optimal choice, as the orthodox neoclassical theory of utility maximization
suggests it is for all consumers who made the choice.
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I do not attempt to construct here a new and definitive model of consumer choice, but to
argue that a particular exception to the neoclassical model may exist for some food types given
their particular characteristics, and that if true for any food, SSBs make an excellent case. My
intent in this dissertation is not to question whether individuals can be rational in choice, but to
formally consider factors that may impede or undermine rationality of the choice to regularly
consume SSBs (including long-term effects of that choice), to identify the highest consumers of
sCSDs, and to offer policy options that may help generally rational people make decisions more
likely to maximize lifetime utility.

6.6

A Theoretic Model of Endogenously Time-Inconsistent Food Choice – Modeling

Common Behaviors That Break From Economic Assumptions
To some degree people expect that what they eat will impact their health. Regardless of
their expectations, what they eat will impact their health. For simplicity, let’s focus the model to
food choice and leave nonfood items (or a composite representation of nonfood items) out.
Formalized, with q as a food item, with h as the (true biological) health effects from eating q (net
positive or negative), and with Hs as personal state or stock of health, the choice to eat q is the
choice to maximize utility given both current enjoyment from consumption, and given eventual
health effects from eating q, where these health effects are a function of one’s overall state or
stock of health. 9 Let x represent all other factors affecting one’s state or stock of health. So
loosely formed, we may conceive:

9

Without compromising the generality of my approach, “stock of health” may be conceived exactly as Huston and
Finke (2003) define it in the health economics literature, that is in financial terms:
Health is a stock of capital (part of one’s human capital) which provides inputs (service flows) into commodities which are
consumed for utility in the present and saved, or invested, for future consumption. [These commodities are later explained
to include “diet, exercise, medical care utilization, sleep, recreation,” and use or abstinence from drugs including tobacco.]
There is a production aspect in that health is produced for both current and future consumption, as well as an investment
aspect, where stock of health is accumulated to provide service flows in future periods. Just as income is used to afford
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(Utility | eat q)max = u[enjoy q now] + u[later health effects of q | health state and health drivers] ,

which may be tightened to:
(Utility | q)max (t→∞) = ut[q ] + ut++[h(Hs(q,x))],

(a)

where t is for the current period, t++ is for relevant future periods, and utility is maximized over
all relevant periods. (Infinity is an exaggeration, because a single milkshake consumed at the age
of nine is not a continuing health driver for a 40-year-old.) Note that h being a function of Hs
depicts the nutrition reality that the same nutritional components in a given q may affect different
people differently, depending on their state of health. A high-fat meal for a starving child may
prove highly nutritious, while the same meal for an overweight adult may mildly aggravate
already atherosclerotic veins. An un-medicated diabetic will have a different health outcome
consuming the same chocolate bar than will an individual with a normally functioning pancreatic
response to the glycemic load.
The time subscripts (equation a) are cumbersome, so will be dropped in exchange for the
general understanding that the individual’s utility will be maximized or fail to be maximized
over an appropriately infinite time period. Now the first right-hand-side term concerns present
utility for the choice to consume or not consume q (the “now” term), and the last term concerns
health effects from the consumption of q, dependent on other factors, but certainly extending into
time periods past the original consumption (the “later” term):
(Utility | q)max = u0[q ] + u1[h(Hs(q,x))].

(b)

utility in both the present (current consumption) and future (investment), health flows can also be used to afford utility in
both the present…and future… (p 144).

Below, when discussing the implicit iterative nature of dietary choice over time, the relation of h and H as current
consumption of and future investment in health stock will be made clearer.
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If one is protein starved and q is a large portion of protein-rich food, both terms are likely to be
high, even if Hs is low – utility is maximized because both terms are strongly positive given the
health condition and the particular qi.
In standard rational choice theory the right-hand-side terms are not separate, as healthassociated utility maximizing choices are assumed. The focus of choice is on comparisons of
price and other visible economic signals and the external physical environment within which
consumers choose. Separating the terms between current utility return and all future return from
consuming q is a device to depict behavior that while rational given the information actually
considered at the time of choice, may fail to maximize utility given inescapable health
consequences that were not actively considered or properly weighted at the time of choice to
consume. Individuals may fail to consider the internal physical environment and effects of a
food choice, and may therefore routinely violate assumptions of rational choice theory. Some
authors characterize the effect foisted on a future self by a present self an internality (versus an
externality), and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) refer to current consumption negatively
affecting future wealth as a negative internality. 10 Individuals do this with imperfect (or ignored)
nutritional information and decision-making criteria, and a time inconsistency in their utility
realization results in part from their ignorance. 11
Equation (b) is general and flexible. Let qi ∈ Qt, where Qt are all food/drink options
available at a given time (including the option to consume nothing). The choice to consume q,
any part of q, or not, is binary. Then, comparing any qi to any other option from the Qt set as part
10

O’Donoghue and Rabin acknowledge that the term is borrowed from others, to mean a “within-person
externality.”
11
This may be characterized in Figure 3 as a failure to fully apply the “knowledge, beliefs...decision criteria” dashed
box to the “economically rational decision criteria” box, perhaps due to the former being filtered first through the
“current devotion of psychological decision-making capacity” box, as psychologists (including Nobel prize in
Economics recipients Simon and Kahneman) claim. This argument will be covered in the literature review to follow,
but would be represented by the arrow from the “knowledge/criteria” box going into the “current devotion” box
rather than directly to the “rational decision” box as it is depicted in Figure 3 above.
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of the current consumption decision still reduces to a binary choice to consume or not for each qi.
Without diminishing this model’s descriptive power, the composition of the “food/drink item” qi
may be generalized to any of the choices in a sequence, or to a composite set, where q could
represent the nutritional profile of a whole meal or string of snacks, or embody a predominant
characteristic that is not offset by other characteristics, such as lean protein, or “empty”
carbohydrates. 12 The biological consequence of the choice may also be considered binary. Either
qi was consumed in all or part and affects the body chemically, or it was not consumed, and does
not affect the body. For simplicity in the following equations qi will be represented simply as q.
Equation (b) may be viewed from two perspectives. Cleaving to the neoclassical model,
equation (b) is a proactive decision-making model, where selection of qi from Q equals a
maximal utility return for the choice under consideration. The neoclassical assumption of perfect
or at least adequate information implies that the utility from consuming qi cannot generate a
negative utility in a later period, because the individual would know this and account for it
before consuming qi. The other perspective, from which I proceed, is that equation (b) represents
realized utility, 13 being the sum total of actual experience of all effects over all periods that
derive from the already determined (single) choice to eat qi. Realized utility may prove higher or
lower than the utility expected before consumption. If realized utility ends up being higher than
expected, utility is maximized at a higher than calculated level. When realized utility is lower
than expected, the utility maximizing hypothesis of conventional theory comes more sharply into
question. Life is tough, and full of surprises – apples are mushy, the Coke in the fridge is flat
because someone left the screw cap loose.

12

Huston and Finke (2003) point out that reducing foods to characteristics that are important for choosing the diet
and its effects necessarily references Lancaster’s (1966) “characteristic theory.”
13
Realized utility may be seen as approximating Kahneman’s “experienced utility,” as he differentiates it from
“remembered utility,” and “predicted utility,” the latter distinction also being one I make (Kahneman 1991).
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In a sense, the neoclassicalist assumes equality, reading equation (b) from left to right,
and I propose reading equation (b) from right to left, with a question mark over the equal sign. If
the utility value of the “later” term is negative and of sufficient magnitude to significantly
degrade the utility from the “now” term, utility maximization becomes a questionable
conclusion. From the second perspective, the “max” on (Util | q) may be dropped, or with the
question mark over the equal sign, left as a reminder that the individual may have been trying to
maximize utility at the time of the choice to consume q, although the equation actually depicts
the utility effects from that choice. If over time an individual does not adjust their choice criteria
to account for information known from their own experience, then the rational utility
maximization (RUMax) behavior in conventional theory does not model all actual behavior.
Equation (b) is a device to describe cases where conventional rational-choice theory does not
strictly apply because individuals do not follow its precepts. Either half of all Americans planned
on becoming overweight or obese, or exceptions to RUMax behavior are occurring often enough
to merit separate modeling. The appearance of Brian Wansink’s (with Just and Payne 2009) and
Bertrand and Schanzenbach’s (2009) work in the American Economic Review suggests the latter
is true: “People are often surprised by how much they consume. This indicates they may be
influenced at a basic level of which they are not aware” (p 168). If they are unaware, at what
point did rational choice enter, at what point did it leave? If RUMax behavior stops being
employed at some point, what drives consumption?
The neoclassical assumption is that individuals make the best choices for themselves
(they do in fact what they should do), whereas evidence testing this assumption as it pertains to
food (Wansink, Just, and Payne) and even to money (Kahneman and Tversky; multiple
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publications) concludes that people often do not in fact do what an informed objective judge
would determine they should do in their own best interest.
What people can do (capability), should do (appropriate maximizing decision and action),
and in fact do (actual consumption choices) are three separate aspects of decision making that are
artificially unified by economic rational choice theory in part to enable the researcher’s capacity
to conduct deterministic modeling. As evidence begins to expose cracks in this maximizing
trinity – and the cracks in utility-maximizing food choice may well be large – the questions arise:
“how/why do people fail to maximize?”, and “can we tell who seems to be doing this, and under
what circumstances?” The flowcharts and realized utility concept are initial attempts to frame an
answer space for these questions, and the empirical work in Essay One attempts for a particular
food product to answer the “who is doing this?” question.
Observing equation (b) from the realized utility perspective, there are two places from
which the individual may draw experiential information that may pertain to future food choices:
the consumption experience, and the delayed experience of health effects. (This may be easier to
conceive if one imagines qi as six strong mixed drinks at a sitting – a perfectly acceptable qi
under the described generalized conditions.) To simplify the conceptualization of utility
calculation here, all neoclassical considerations preceding a choice to consume that do not
pertain to the biological effects of having digested qi are in the first term, the “now” term. These
include economic factors including price, sense of getting a bargain, the individual’s
psychological association with the advertised image of the brand, cost of gathering more
nutrition information rather than “grab-and-go-with-what-you-know,” etc.; external
environmental factors including sense of time constraint, consumption convenience of food in
this form, perishability and access to adequate storage of oversized portion; and sense
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experiences such as smell, taste, mouthfeel, hunger or thirst satiation, ability to enjoy sharing the
food with others, etc. 14 Thus all realized utility from the direct experience of consuming q is
either in the “now” term, or in the “later” term as cumulative health effects.
For a known food or a reasonable expectation of the eating experience, the magnitude
of the first term is likely to be fairly certain. To simplify, let us assume that the expected
utility of consuming q now equals the actual utility derived from consumption as depicted in
the first term on the right hand side. However, when nutrition knowledge is low (meaning not
well-correlated with dietary guidelines or nutrition literature), there is uncertainty as to the
magnitude of the second term. Zimmerman (2011) claims that “consumers are largely
unaware of their own daily calorie intake/expenditure balance, but they are also largely
uninformed about the broader costs and benefits” (p 291). Even when nutrition knowledge is
high, there is uncertainty as to the magnitude of the second term. Did eating that whole
grapefruit at lunch keep you from getting the cold going around the office, or was it your
health stock alone, or pure luck? So the individual must make an assessment, a guess, and an
expectation must be placed on the second term on the right hand side:
Exp[Utility | q]max = u0[q] + Exp{u1[h(Hs(q,x))]}.

(c)

Thus if q is a “superfood” imbued by the consumer with the expectation that a high antioxidant
profile will generate positive health effects and that it will be enjoyable to eat, the expected
utility is high. This may or may not be the ultimate effect, especially if it is a new food, and
violates the individual’s assumption that it is enjoyable to eat, or if the positive health effects are
little more than marketing hype. Note that the magnitude of the expected utility may not be fixed,
but change over time, probably with changes in relevant information, and possibly with
assessments influenced by moods or “visceral factors” (a term explored below in 6.8.3; “visceral
14

Factors included in this set are in part informed by Blaylock et al. (1999), and Huston and Finke (2003).
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factors play a critical role in intertemporal choice,” Loewenstein 2000, p 430). For now it is
enough to reflect that in certain states of mind, a person may behave less responsibly in their
dietary choices than in other states of mind – say on vacation, under stress, when extremely
thirsty or when intoxicated. These are recognizable vicissitudes demonstrated in the “visceral
factor” literature that may affect how one calculates expectations, often pushing valuation of the
present over the future.
Introducing the expectation function serves to highlight both the lack of knowledge that
defines decision-making uncertainty, and the temporal break between the first and second righthand-side terms. A food type may impact one’s health to a larger degree than one understands or
believes when one chooses whether to consume a food in the current period, but one cannot
escape the biological effect in a later period represented by the h. The degree to which one’s
nutrition knowledge is accurate and the degree to which that knowledge is actually applied when
choosing a food both affect how close the expectation employed at the time of decision will be to
the actual health effect. For any combination of nutrition knowledge and a particular food (qi),
the expectation function may be decomposed into an element that is a multiple of the health
effect, and an element describing one’s level of responsible decision-making at the time of
choice. Call the first element k, a function of nutrition knowledge applied to qi. Positive or
negative personal inferences as to the health effects of eating qi will influence k, which may be
larger or smaller than one. The impermanent moods, tendencies, or “visceral factors” that may
affect the value one places on the future will enter the function as an a and re-enforce an element
of endogeneity in the potential time-inconsistency of preferences when choosing certain foods to
eat (regularly). Together these variables replace the expectation function on the right-hand side,
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maintaining the concept that a, and to a lesser extent k, are more likely to be variables described
by a distribution than constants:
Exp[Utility | q]max = u0[q] + k · a· u1[h(Hs(q,x))].

(d)

Equation (d) demonstrates how an individual’s ill-informed assessment of k in deciding
whether to eat q can lead to an inequality between Exp[Utility | q]max from (d) and (Utility | q)max
from (b). The values of k and a affect the expected utility of consuming q, but not the realized
utility depicted by equation (b). Thus behavior divergent from utility maximization must follow
if the right hand side in (d) is less than the right hand side in (b). The “correctness” of the last
term in (d) is a function of nutrition awareness and its application in decision making in
accordance with biological facts specific to the individual decision maker, because for a daily
food, the consumption utility (first term) is well-known.
If an individual’s knowledge is so incomplete as to break with reality, so their beliefs are
scientifically wrong, their choice can still meet economist’s definition of rational, if it is
consistent (complete and transitive) with preferences, budget, and the information set. If the
knowledge gap and unrealistic belief set leads to consumption choice that imposes costs on a later
self that would not be preferred, then consistency of preferences is broken, and rationality of the
original choice cannot be assumed without risk of modeling error. A temporal trade-off may occur
favoring present consumption over future discomfort, but it is rational only if the future self
genuinely agrees with the earlier self’s choice. Genuine here means, without cognitive
dissonance, by which one claims a preference merely to justify a choice that has already been
made, or that is prohibited by an insuperable constraint that unexpectedly binds one from a
desirable option.
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A utility cannot be wrong, but an expected utility can be under- or mis-informed to a
degree that demonstrably affects the choice one makes under uncertainty. Temporary mental
states depicted by a may corrupt one’s capacity for rational expected utility calculation. An
expected utility that is maintained in repeated choice sets despite evidence that the same
expected utility has repeatedly failed to match one’s realized utility cannot be assumed to be
unerringly rational. In the case of eating the same q daily, the health effects are inescapable, but
they may be subtle, and accumulate slowly enough to avoid notice (a situation excluded by
assumption in neoclassical utility maximization theory). For example, as one’s weight rises from
consuming more calories than one expends over time, there is proof that the expected utility
(enjoying consumption with no significant negative health effects) does not match realized
utility. This defines irrational behavior – just as soon as one becomes aware that the expectation
does not match the reality. If something blocks conscious detection of this break, or encourages
one to notice this break without changing behavior, then utility-maximizing choice will not
occur, even while choice remains rational given one’s limited – even faulty – information set. I
present literature below explaining mechanisms by which these failures are likely to occur for at
least some portion of the population who regularly consume SSBs.
It is reasonable, rational, to assume that consumption of a particular commonly eaten q
will not greatly affect one’s x, or by implication Hs. Everyone turns off their internal “later” term
alarm now and again, and indulges. Any healthy active adult with a nutritionally responsible diet
can eat a quart of caramel-nut ice cream at one sitting, once, without expecting to become obese
or to thereby contract ischemic heart disease. The issue of policy relevance is identifying who is
making unhealthful choices consistently, and why? Imagine someone who’s a seems to go
haywire each afternoon a few hours after lunch in the form of a cookie craving, as described in
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Charles Duhigg’s self-help bestseller The Power of Habit: Why We Do What We Do in Life and
Business – habitual “lapses” may then drive a. Of particular interest here, are people consistently
making unhealthful choices happy with their own behavior? If they are not, there is an implicit
inefficiency that on a broad scale represents a lower social welfare than may be achievable if
appropriate policy can be constructed to induce individual choices that result in higher realized
utility over the long term.
Food-choice utility decisions are made explicitly or implicitly dozens of times a day
(Wansink and Sobal 2007), and may create patterns over time that strongly impact x and
therefore one’s state and stock of health. Daily eating choices may be represented as a dynamic
iteration of the simple utility model in equation (d), and one’s effectuated choices cumulatively
raise, lower, or leave stable Hs. This must be true because in dynamic iteration the health effect
of consuming q, h(Hs(q,x)) solves to h(q). This h(q) then becomes an element of x before the
next day’s food choices are made. A positive h(q) tends to raise Hs on a later day, and a negative
h(q) tends to lower Hs on a later day – certainly incrementally, perhaps almost imperceptibly, but
as people adhere to certain eating habits, these effects may accumulate and manifest, perhaps as
higher percentage of lean muscle mass, or perhaps as extra pounds that raise one’s BMI.
Eating patterns reinforce health effects, and we may further distend our timeframe for
equations (b) and (d), so that q is a food (or nutritional characteristic) eaten regularly over a
week, month, or even years. Then the impact on h as a function of Hs(q,x), and of Hs as an
iterative function of h(q) may become evident even to the layperson. It is precisely this
conception that I refer to when using terms such as consistent, regular, or habitual when referring
to daily or near-daily consumers of SSBs/sCSDs. The incidents of dietary choice are additive
over time in their health effects (although not linear in their effects on body weight; Katan and
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Ludwig 2010, Hall et al. 2011), unless behavioral control is used to breaks patterns or is used to
offset these effects. (“Habit” and “habitual behavior” are explored in 6.8 in the context of
literature that defines the terms.)
I have not yet discussed the control variables by which the individual may maximize
utility. Of course the choice to consume or refrain from consuming q is one, but those elements
of x represented by the individual’s diet, exercise, and general health regimen 15 also make x a
control variable that determines whether consuming q will maximize realized utility over time. 16
An individual cannot control every aspect of x, but can if attention is paid and energy spent,
control enough aspects to consciously impact Hs. Imagine that Olympic swimmer Michael
Phelps and U.S. President Bill Clinton would both prefer to eat five large whole wheat pancakes
as part of their daily breakfast. Phelp’s control of his x would accommodate this choice without
degrading his Hs, whereas Clinton’s daily caloric demand being thousands of kilocalories less,
would likely gain weight from the daily choice of q, to a degree that would iteratively make the
utility from the “later” term in his equation (b) negative, and Clinton’s regret for the previous
month’s choices would depict an ultimate failure to maximize realized utility.
15

Those components of x that are not pre-determined by genetics or extreme constraints in environment like being
in prison, or a food shortage area, etc.
16
The fact that x represents a dynamic state influenced by factors that themselves change over time and have
different effects according to context (e.g., you can eat more calories without weight gain when exercising more, so
a nutritionally marginally poor food could become an acceptable option) makes equations (a), (b), (c), and (d)
different from a value-maximizing Bellman equation, despite the superficial similarity. “Dynamic programming
seeks a time-invariant policy function…mapping the state [variable]…into the control [variable]…,” so that the
infinite sequence of control variables that change according to the policy function and the transition law for the
equation solve the maximization problem (Ljungqvist and Sargent 2004, p85-6). Because the x in the above
equations is comprised of a time-variant policy function, i.e., the mapping function may change over time given the
dynamic nexus of health-generating inputs, there is a dynamic element exogenous to the Bellman dynamic
programming construction. For this reason the above equations fail to satisfy the condition that there be a unique and
time-invariant optimal policy mapping the state to the control (ibid. p 87). A similar argument may be made for the
a variable. Thus the equations I propose are likely destined in this form to be primarily theoretical, that is,
empirically intractable, except perhaps for consistent food profiles over significant periods of time. (Stanhope et al.
2011 may well have set the current lower bound for determining significant effects, at two weeks.) The equations
here are proposed to demonstrate the mechanisms by which rational choice of a consumable with immediate and
longer-term utility impacts may fail to maximize utility. They are not currently intended to represent a prescriptive
hypothesis subject to empirical testing. Loewenstein (1996) claims that aspects of elements I group into a follow a
predictable distribution.
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Similarly some people may build the discipline to recognize and control their a factor,
and even spend the time to inform their k assessment, making these each at least theoretically
also control variables. (Policy recommendations in Essay Three are designed to engage the
individual to responsibly control a and k in their dietary habits.)
If a decision maker does not consider x or k or a to be control variables when choosing a
q, they may easily and avoidably make an ignorant decision, failing to satisfy precepts of rational
utility-maximizing choice, and experiencing a lower realized utility than they projected when
choosing to consume q. If Americans were making exactly this mistake in their overconsumption
of high-added-sugar foods, the rise in overweight, obesity, and diabetes that are actually
documented would result. I do not claim to have identified a strictly causal model, but the
descriptive hypothetical model offered here represents one possible fit to the known facts.

6.6.1

Similar Neoclassical Models Differ in Treating Time Preferences as Fixed
I contrast this approach with Davide Dragone’s 2009 Journal of Health Economics article,

“A Rational Eating Model of Binges, Diets and Obesity.” Dragone also models an intertemporal
trade-off between food consumption and a later health state, including body weight (analogous to
my “state of health”) as a state variable. But Dragone’s later health state is “the increased
probability of dying as weight deviates from a given physiologically optimal level” (:803).
Dragone models diets and binge eating as rational utility maximization in the presence of
consumption habits that make rapid dietary change costly to individuals, allowing that these
individuals differ in their sensitivity to consumption changes. The mathematically rigorous model,
with its Hamiltonians and Jacobians, derives from the insightful premise that the neoclassical
assumption of instantaneous and costless change to diet is simplistic. But Dragone then ignores
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the literature presented here (section 6.8) that brings to question whether rational decision-making
resources are fully employed at all in certain food consumption choices. By designating the
rational choice as a balance between consumption and the discounted utility of higher probability
of death, Dragone begs the question of whether people consciously and actively weigh the chance
of death when deciding on that ice-cream cone for dessert. (Behavioral economics and decades of
psychological criticism of economics suggests they do not, so striving to apply the neoclassical
rational choice model to certain aspects of eating seems shaky on its fundamental precept.)
If behavior fails to be either rational or utility maximizing, or both, then the mathematical
elegance of the model may prove wasted effort. Dragone ignores that the body has an
evolutionary proclivity to gain weight quickly, but defend that new weight against loss, with the
effect that any small or temporary change in intake will not result in substantial and long-term
weight loss (Katan and Ludwig 2010; Hall et al. 2011; Lambert 2004). By maximizing in part on
the square of the difference between “physiologically ideal weight” (as if this is constant for an
adult) and the individual’s true weight, Dragone ignores that weight is only one determinant of
health associated with mortality. A normal weight individual with advanced cardiovascular
disease may well be in far more mortal peril than a non-diabetic, technically obese individual
with a consistently good lipid profile (high HDL:LDL ratios and low triglycerides). 17 Dragone
uses a simple discount rate applied the same to both actual and physically optimal weight, i.e. an
external discount rate of classical (exponential) form. This seems unlikely to describe actual
discounting in the mind of a dieter/binger, either as discounting or applied to the known and
prescribed weight states.

17

As in 6.7.1.b below: Twenty percent of obese individuals have normal metabolism and lifespans, while 40% of
normal weight individuals have metabolic syndrome with diabetes, hypertension, lipid problems, cardiovascular
disease, and non-alcoholic fatty liver disease – all associated with excess added sugar consumption, regardless of a
person’s BMI (Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis 2012).
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In my Essay One estimations, I attempted to eschew the dangers of overassumption by
posing a model that does not assume rational utility maximization in food choice. I have
specifically avoided the strictures of a Hamiltonian, with the need for a discount rate assumption,
and the need for concavity and convexity demonstrations to assure monotonic drivers pushing the
utility-weight condition to a defined steady state. People change their goals, behavior, and
weights over time, sometimes reacting to their own previous failure to maximize utility by
equation (d), and sometimes without doing so.
Michael Finke and Sandra Huston have also done interesting work that precurses my
theoretical model above, again from the neoclassical assumption of RUMax behavior, in
“Factors Affecting the Probability of Choosing a Risky Diet” (Finke and Huston 2003) and “Diet
Choice and the Role of Time Preference” (Huston and Finke 2003). Finke and Huston
characterize consumption of any ingestible (food, smoking, alcohol) as involving “a choice to
weigh present satisfaction against the risk of a reduction in future satisfaction” (p 291). For both
papers, they treat time preferences as exogenous and fixed, an assumption I avoid in my
estimation in Essay One.
Finke and Huston find that their proxies for individual time preference are correlated
such that behaviors associated with higher discounting of the future correlate with riskier diets,
where risky diets are measured by the Healthy Eating Index. HEI scores for individuals are
compiled by the USDA’s Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion from a Continuing Survey
of Food Intakes by Individuals (CSFII), from 1994-1996 in Huston and Finke’s 2003 study. HEI
scores are based on individual survey responses for a single-day dietary recall. Ten categories
total to 100 possible points, scoring each by compliance with USDA recommended dietary
guidelines. HEI scores below 51 are considered “poor” diet, 51-80 “needs improvement” and 80
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and above a “good” diet. So HEI scores are based on a thin cross-section of an individual’s
actual diet, and accuracy of self-reporting is a methodological concern (Huston and Finke 2003).
Higher levels of education, income, exercise, nutrition panel use, not smoking, and higher
“motivation for nutritional knowledge” are all associated with higher dietary quality by the HEI
measure. Being African American, from the South, 35-54 years old (of four age categories),
and/or male raised correlation with dietary risk.
These are useful results, in that to the extent my variables overlap, these results often
confirm results in Essay One. However, Finke and Huston’s definition of variables are in places
simple, a diet is risky or not, a person smokes or does not, exercises or not, uses nutrition labels
often or not. There is little spectrum, and no attempt to identify how variables might differ in
their expression within other characteristics, such as for example Whites in the South versus
Whites in the Northeast, which could be achieved through interaction of terms. Fundamentally,
Huston and Finke cleave to the neoclassical assumption that dietary choice is conscious, using
full rational faculties, from a clear understanding of both nutrition and the effects of the
individual’s own dietary patterns: “Those who eat an unhealthy diet have made the decision that
these costs outweigh potential future benefits, and have chosen a diet that provides maximal
present utility and, in turn, increases probability of poor health” (p 294). Individuals making food
choices out of ignorance of the effect of nutrition on later health or out of habits that eroded
imperceptibly over time may not consciously or willingly be trading the present for the future in
their choice phase (although they may be demonstrated to have done so, when “reading equation
(b) from right to left”).
Huston and Finke (the “diet and time preference” paper) proceed with similar
assumptions and modeling, concluding that “of all factors in the model, time preference is the
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most important predictor of healthy eating behavior” (p 155). Their results rank variables they
use to proxy for individuals’ future discount rate [education level, smoking, exercise, use of
nutrition labels, nutrition knowledge “motive”] as the most influential in predicting dietary score,
followed by socio-cultural variables [race, sex, age, importance of taste in choice of food], then
market characteristic variables [region, rural-suburban-urban, income, and price]. I have no way
of modeling time preference in Essay One, but use a marketing panel database that accurately
depicts household consumption over years. I evaluate which demographic characteristics rank
most important in quantity of purchase for a single (perhaps the most) unhealthful food, sCSDs
(see next section), and identify which marketing strategy seems to have the largest effect on
purchase for different demographic sub-groups.

6.7

Medical/Nutrition Literature Review
The flowchart in Figure 3, and the two-phase utility models of equations (b) and (d)

create conceptual place settings for relevant medical (and nutrition) literature. Medical literature
relevant to the exploration of potential exceptions to utility-maximizing rational choice
associated with an individual’s consistent consumption of SSBs falls into three categories.
The first category includes articles demonstrating problems and costs associated with
obesity, and that high amounts of simple added sugars in non-nutritive products lead to higher
risk of poor health outcomes later. These articles demonstrate the effect on health of added
sugars of the type and quantity typically in sCSDs, thus their impact on h and Hs. While nearperfect nutrition knowledge is unlikely, when a decision maker is unaware of medical evidence
from clinical nutrition studies, they are less likely to properly assess the direction or more likely
the magnitude of the multiple k for their personal profile. Then proper weighting of the expected
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utility effect over time is more uncertain and less reliable than the weighting of expected utility
(current experience enjoyment) for the “now” period. Literature from psychology tells us that the
current known will receive more weight than the uncertain later effect, both because it is current
(see 6.8.2, habitual eating patterns; Downs, Loewenstein, and Wisdom 2009), and because the
uncertainty is higher for the future effect (see 6.8, a variant of Ellsberg’s challenge to a decision
theory axiom by which decisions are assumed to mimic carefully calculated numerical
calculations maximizing utility; see 6.8.1, Camerer).
The second category includes articles empirically demonstrating the biological
mechanisms by which sugar leads to poor health outcomes. The second category includes articles
that detail in biological terms why the negative health effects of excessive added sugar
consumption occur. These explain the link between added sugars in the diet and health effects h
and Hs.
The third category includes articles explaining the capacity for doses of simple sugars to
directly affect decision-making psychology, or even to demonstrate addictive properties.
Establishing these functional mechanisms would greatly undermine the case for individually
objective rationality in the choice whether to consume sCSDs regularly. Such effects would be
represented as corrupting the influence from the two dashed boxes that directly feed to the
“economically rational decision criteria” box in Figure 3. This effect could successfully blind an
individual to the “later” term in their sCSD consumption calculus.

6.7.1
6.7.1.a

Effects of Obesity and Added Sugar Consumption on Health and Disease
Effects of Obesity and Added Sugar – Overview
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While U.S. increases in overweight and obesity are dramatic, the dietary and
environmental factors driving the epidemic are not unique. In the Western world, there are now
30% more obese citizens than undernourished ones (Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis 2012). From
the WHO Collaborating Center for Obesity Prevention, Boyd Swinburn, Gary Sacks, and others
(2011) write: “The simultaneous increases in obesity in almost all countries seem to be driven
mainly by changes in the global food system, which is producing more processed, affordable,
and effectively marketed food than ever before. This passive overconsumption of energy leading
to obesity is a predictable outcome of market economies predicated on consumption-based
growth” (p 804). A more processed, affordable, effectively marketed, and passively
overconsumed food than sCSDs may be hard to find. But as characteristic of the problem as
sCSDs may be, the problem is much larger. The United Nations member states met in
September, 2011 for “the first High-Level Meeting of the UN General Assembly” to discuss
non-communicable diseases and “the inexorable global rise of obesity,” (Swinburn et al. 2011, p
804). High-income countries led the global obesity epidemic from the 1970s and 1980s, since
joined by middle-income and many lower-income countries, and with the epidemic expanding
from adults to children (<18 years) in each, but with the US leading in childhood overweight and
obesity by far. Worldwide in 2008 1.46 billion adults were overweight, a further 502 million
were obese, along with 170 million children.
This subsection will proceed first by examining the degree to which more calories or less
exercise drive the U.S. energy imbalance, and how excess calories enter the diet.

6.7.1.b Consequences and Economic Costs Associated with Overweight and Obesity
We must conclude from medical and nutrition literature presented so far in this and the
introduction chapter that the overweight and obesity epidemic is dangerous, that overweight and
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obesity are at the population level the product of more calories rather than diminished exercise,
that carbohydrate calories are a critical driver and perhaps the critical driver of overweight and
obesity, and that SSBs are a primary component of that driver. We have examined some of the
vectors by which extra calories may enter the diet and lead to weight gain. Is weight gain in turn
associated with higher morbidity and mortality? Yes.
Some estimates of morbidity: Anand et al. (2008) conduct an “expert review” for
Pharmaceutical Research (no conflicts of interest declared, funding from a foundation claiming
only health interest of the community) and find that “as many as 30-35” of all cancer-related
deaths are due to diet (p 2097), and cite Harvard’s Walter Willett that 75% of prostate cancers;
70% of colorectal cancers; and 50% of breast, endometrial, pancreatic, and gall bladder cancer
deaths are diet related (p 2101, figure 4, information drawn from Willett 1995 [attributed as
Willett 2000 (sic)]). “Findings from…[an American Cancer Society study] suggest that of all
deaths from cancer in the United States, 14% in men and 20% in women are attributable to
excess weight or obesity” (p 2101). They proceed to speculate on chemical pathways through
which the relation between obesity and cancer manifests, stressing “inflammatory cascades.”
Added sugars are strongly associated as inflammatory (Ludwig 2002, p 2419; Malik et al. 2010,
p 1360).
In many societies historically, including in the nineteenth century U.S. (Variyam and
Golan 2002), having some corporeal heft was a sign of health and not just of prosperity. With the
modern U.S. diet, does carrying some extra weight serve as padding against hunger and wasting,
a way of maintaining health, as it was once thought to? No. A prospective study by the NIH of
over a half million American men and women from 50 to 71 years old, with maximum followups of 10 years through 2005, controlled for age, race or ethnic group, level of education,
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smoking status (and previous smoking history), physical activity, alcohol intake, and preexisting
chronic disease. People at the highest and lowest categories of BMI (from self-reported height
and weight) had increased risk of death, but among those who had never smoked, the increased
risk of death diminished for those in the lowest BMI category. For healthy people who had never
smoked, the risk of death was higher for overweight and obese men and women. For those over
50 years who had never smoked, “the associations became stronger, with the risk of death
increasing by 20 to 40 percent among overweight persons and by two to at least three times
among obese persons” compared to normal weight individuals (p 763). “…[O]besity was
strongly associated with the risk of death in both men and women in all racial and ethnic groups
and at all ages. …[E]ven moderate elevations in BMI conferred an increased risk of death”
(Adams et al. 2006, p 776). But rational decision makers (species: homo economicus
americanus), being rational, know of and account for the increased risk of death in all their food
choices, to ensure all-period maximization? If not all, to a person, see flowchart and lettered
equations above for formalized concepts of the failure to do so. And, yes, it gets worse.
A total of 5036 participants from 28 to 62 years old in the “Framingham Cohort Study
were followed up every 2 years from 1948 for up to 48 years,” and the resulting data examined
for any association between the length of time someone had been obese and mortality from all
causes and specific causes, adjusted for BMI. The hazard ratio “for mortality increased as the
number of years lived with obesity increased” (Abdullah et al. 2011, p 985). For each defined
increment of time obese (roughly 0 to 5 years, 5-15, 15-25, and 25+) there was a dose-response
relationship for all-cause, cardiovascular, cancer, and other-cause mortality. “The number of
years lived with obesity is directly associated with the risk of mortality” (p 985). This had been
overlooked in previous studies, and therefore not taken into account when estimating the likely
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economic costs of the obesity epidemic. So the following estimates are likely to be lower than
we may now expect.
What are some of the cost estimates without factoring in the duration effect? Yach,
Stuckler, and Brownell (2006) claim that in a span of five years, the economic costs of diabetes
and obesity doubled, from $44 million to $92 million, citing obesity as the primary driver,
because costs of obesity mimic “health-system costs roughly equivalent to 20 years of natural
aging” (p 63).
The burden of obesity and diabetes on health systems only reflects a fraction of the financial disruptions
they cause to sick individuals, their families and communities. Empirical evidence shows that the full costs
of diabetes accrue to society through lower returns to education, decreased household wages, earnings and
incomes, increased premature retirement and unemployment, and higher dependence on welfare (Yach,
Stuckler, and Brownell 2006, p 64; eight citations supporting these claims omitted, see original.)

As part of a dedicated series on obesity in The Lancet, Wang et al. (2011) offer some scope for
the economic costs of overweight and obesity in the U.S. and the United Kingdom, and how they
are trending. Citing Finkelstein et al. (2003, 2004, 2009), Wang et al. convey that “compared
with normal-weight individuals, obese patients incur 46% increased patient costs, 27% more
physician visits and outpatient costs, and 80% increased spending on prescription drugs” (p 816).
The extra medical costs of obesity then comprise 4 to 7% of U.S. health-care expenditure,
estimated at $75 billion for 2003. 18 Adding similar costs for overweight to the same Finkelstein
et al. (2003) totals raises the estimate to 9.1% of overall US healthcare costs, estimated by others
to be around $147 billion in 2003 (Malik et al. 2010). Annual workdays missed rises 0.5 days for
overweight men, and 6.9 days for excessively obese men (BMI > 40). Lower productivity while
18

Finkelstein EA, Trogdon JG, Cohen JW, Dietz W. Annual medical spending attributable to obesity: payer-and
service-specific estimates. Health Aff (Millwood) 2009; 28: w822–31.
Finkelstein EA, Fiebelkorn IC, Wang G. State-level estimates of annual medical expenditures attributable to obesity.
Obes Res 2004; 12: 18–24.
Finkelstein EA, Fiebelkorn IC, Wang G. National medical spending attributable to overweight and obesity: how
much, and who’s paying? Health Aff (Millwood) 2003; W3 (suppl): 219–26.

404

still showing up (“presenteeism”) for excessively obese men has also been calculated by
Finkelstein et al. 2010 as the equivalent of one month per year, averaging lost productivity of
$3792 per year to employers. 19
Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn, and Wang 2003 calculate that half of the costs of medical
spending attributable to overweight and obesity are borne by the public through Medicare and
Medicaid. This presents a potential means by which economically rational individuals may
discount the economic costs of poor dietary habits, and presents a strong public incentive to limit
health costs arising from the overconsumption of SSBs of all types.
Wang et al. further extrapolate using Finkelstein and others’ figures for an aging U.S.
population, and project the annual increase in obesity-related medical costs (not from
overweight, not from workplace loss), will be $28B (95% C.I. 8–49) by 2020, and $66B (95%
C.I. 19–112) by 2030, acknowledging that on their 20-year projection, they are almost certainly
underestimating the effects from rising childhood obesity.
Costs of obesity arise in the health care system from treatment for increased incidence of
hypertension, coronary heart disease, diabetes, stroke, cancer, and arthritis. Beyond the health
care system, costs are attributed to lower quality of life, and foregone productivity. Wang et al.
do not factor in the increased incidence of death that we are familiar with from Adams et al. and
Abdullah et al. – therefore ignoring the cost of premature death on loss of work productivity.
Still, it remains critical to distinguish association from causality. Overweight and obesity
do not cause ill health, they are markers for increased probability of certain diseases. Twenty
percent of obese individuals have normal metabolism and lifespans, while 40% of normal weight
individuals have metabolic syndrome with diabetes, hypertension, lipid problems, cardiovascular

19

Wang et al. 2011, referencing: Finkelstein EA, DiBonaventura MD, Burgess SM, Hale BC. The costs of obesity in
the workplace. J Occup Environ Med 2010; 52: 971–76.
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disease, and non-alcoholic fatty liver disease – all associated with excess added sugar
consumption, regardless of a person’s BMI (Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis 2012). This will
become clearer as we continue.

6.7.1.c

Genetic Expression, Calories Out, or Calories In?
Biologically, overweight and obesity must derive from a systemic energy imbalance,

where more calories consistently are consumed than are burned by the body to maintain
involuntary and voluntary functions. The worldwide rise in obesity in a few decades rules out the
possibility of population genetic changes over any location scale. Some literature claims that
heritability of BMI explains 40-70% of BMI, “yet genome-wide association studies to identify
common single nucleotide polymorphisms associated with BMI have been unable to explain
more than a small proportion (<2%) of BMI variability.” “The genetic background loads the gun,
but the environment pulls the trigger” (Swinburn et al. 2011, both quotes p 810, Panel 4, quoting
George Bray in the second sentence). Swinburn et al. describe probable drivers of an obesogenic
environment as: “the increased supply of cheap, palatable, energy-dense foods; improved
distribution systems to make food much more accessible and convenient; and more persuasive
and pervasive food marketing” (p 807). The authors further contend that in the U.S., food
availability figures show a downward trend from 1920 to the 1960s as energy needs declined
with greater mechanization of work and domestic chores, and that after a fairly stable 1960-1970,
food availability has been rising, so that now energy intake drives weight outcomes more than
energy expenditure, the reverse of the dynamic in the first half of the 20th century. The problem
is not a balanced combination of less physical activity (than in the late 1960s) and more food
intake per person. The problem is more calories in per person (Cutler, Glaeser, Shapiro 2003). In
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a separate study, Swinburn, Sacks, Ravussin (2009) show that the increase in energy intake is
more than sufficient to explain weight gain in the US from the 1970s, and Swinburn et al. (2011)
cite nearly as definitive findings for the United Kingdom.
Before we examine whether SSBs play a special role in the dietary energy surfeit fueling
the obesity epidemic, it is worth verifying a cursory understanding of quantification issues
associated with calculating energy imbalance and bodyweight. An August 2011 article in The
Lancet (Hall et al. 2011) argues that bodyweight change in response to energy intake changes is
slow, taking a full year to manifest half of the cumulative effect from a maintained per-day
change. Thus, Hall et al. argue, the U.S.’s National Institutes of Health and American Dietetic
Association “erroneously” predict weight reductions of a half-kilogram per week from a 2
megajoule (500 kcal) per day reduction in energy intake. Katan and Ludwig (2010) give an
example of the back-of-the-envelope weight-gain math before noting that actual gain is
asymptotic: adding a 60-kcal cookie daily to one’s diet is naively projected to produce a halfpound weight gain in a month, 6 pounds in a year, and 60 pounds over ten years. But as part of
the energy goes to maintaining new tissue, the net weight gain from the daily marginal calorie
bump eventually levels toward a final 6-pound gain, then stops.
The current NIH & ADA recommendations ignore the dynamic physiological adaptations
that occur with increasing or decreasing body weight, adaptations that alter the energy
expenditures for both physical activity and resting metabolic rate (Hall and two of the other
authors were NIH employees at the time of authorship). Hall et al. note that the field
acknowledges that the static weight-loss model is overly simplistic, but that few methods
attempted predictions of these dynamic changes over realistic time frames. They developed a
sophisticated simulation based on a “web of interacting variables” from the “Foresight Obesity
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Map” developed by the British Government Office of Science and Technology. Hall et al. model
the average caloric increase needed to gain the amount the average American has over the last 30
years, and factoring in adaptive biology, how much caloric change would be needed to lose what
the average American has gained over the last 30 years. A small daily maintained increase in
calorie intake can lead to big changes over time measured in months and years. The body adapts
to the new weight by devoting new calories to maintaining the additional tissue, then resists
weight loss due to the fact that more calories are devoted to functions to maintain the extra
weight.
The simulated results from Hall et al. have dramatic implications for understanding
weight gain and weight loss. The margin of the positive energy imbalance which must be
sustained daily to maintain an energy imbalance, and thus gain the average amount that
Americans have from 1980 to 2010 is about 7 kcals/day. Remembering that 1 gram of
carbohydrate or protein is 4 kcals, and 1 gram of fat is 9 kcals, the 7 kcals/day figure represents
less than 2 grams of carbohydrate (or protein), or less than one gram of fat – bottom line, it’s
small, equivalent to less than a half teaspoon of sugar per day difference. Note for example, that
there are 65g = 240 kcals in a 20-oz. classic Coke. So the 7 kcals/day works out to less than an
ounce of Coke a day.
But Hall et al. explain this 7 kcals/day is just the energy “imbalance” gap. As the body
adapts, more calories are needed to maintain the new tissue, so to maintain the gap, these calories
must be added to the original “7.” Maintaining the “maintenance energy gap” required some 220
extra kcals per day in 2005 over 1978 levels. Johnson et al. (2009) report an estimate by the
USDA’s Economic Research Service that added sugars in the US diet rose almost 5 teaspoons
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per day, or 76 calories, from 1970 to 2005, and another estimate that added sugars in the average
American’s diet went from 235 kcal/day in 1977-78 to 318 kcal/day in 1994-95, a similar rise.
The margin of the positive energy imbalance which must be sustained daily to lose the
average amount that Americans have gained from 1980 to 2010 includes the energy imbalance
and the energy maintenance gaps, again, foregoing the equivalent of 9 ½ teaspoons of added
sugar a day, or about a 20-oz. classic Coke.
…[M]uch larger changes are needed for obese individuals to return to the average bodyweight of the 1970s.
[Because the actual amount varies by the internal dynamics of an individual’s BMI,] [f]or example, an adult
with a BMI higher than 35…, representing 14% of the US population, needs a change greater than 2 MJ
[megajoules] per day (500 kcal per day) (Hall et al. 2011, p. 833).

Katan and Ludwig concur: “Since the weight gain experienced by a typical American must be
caused by repeated changes in diet, physical activity, or both, a small decrease in food intake or
increase in physical activity will halt this increase only temporarily” (p 66). This suggests food
environment or general behavioral changes will be required rather than isolated marginal
consumption decisions (see McCrory, Suen, and Roberts in 6.7.1.c), and further supports the
dynamic conception conveyed in equations (b) and (d) by the health-context-contingent nature of
the effects from choosing a food habitually.
Hall et al. propose a rule of thumb: every 100 kilojoules per day increase in energy intake
(without compensatory energy expenditure) will lead to a 1-kilogram weight gain (or about 10
kcals per day to about 1 pound weight gain), about half of this occurring in the first year, and
95% of it within three years.
Specifically, our computational model of macronutrient balance predicts that large isocaloric exchanges of
dietary carbohydrate and fat result in changes of energy expenditure of less than 400 kJ [kilojoules] per
day, which corresponds to a difference in body fat of roughly 10 g[rams] per day. To detect such a
difference in body fat would require a sustained diet change of more than 100 days (p 831, Panel).
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With this biologically responsible prediction of how weight may actually be gained and
lost provided by the medical community, the lowly economist can begin to more easily imagine
failures of rational choice from the individual failure to appreciate changes too subtle and
asymmetric to be included in marginal daily food-choice assessments. In Figure 3, the degree to
which one’s knowledge and nutrition criteria may diverge from realistic expectations of utility in
rational choice calculation may be larger than neoclassicalists imagine. The k in equation (d)
may appropriately be negative and larger than even a moderately nutritionally wary individual
may have considered. Rational choice based on faulty information then seems more likely to fail
to maximize realized utility.

6.7.1.d Sources of Excess Calories, and Food Environmental and Food Behavioral
Changes Associated with Consuming Excess Calories
The question then arises whether elements of the food environment changed in ways that
increased overall caloric intake, incremental ways that might not be noticed by a rational
individual with utility-maximizing intent. There is evidence consistent with this explanation.
U.S. government dietary recommendations for portion sizes and quantities of defined
food groups are designed to meet biological requirements such that hunger between meals should
not arise. The Dietary Guidelines for Americans, 2010 caution:
For most people, no more than about 5 to 15 percent of calories from solid [saturated] fats and added sugars
can be reasonably accommodated in the USDA Food Patterns, which are designed to meet nutrient needs
within calorie limits (Ch. 3, p.28).
…Saturated fatty acids contribute an average of 11 percent of calories to the diet…(Ch. 3, p.25)
…Added sugars contribute an average of 16 percent of the total calories in American diets (Ch. 3, p.27).
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Belaboring the point: either the average American is rationally deciding to undermine her health,
or she may be failing to maximize long-term utility out of ignorance, habit, and a passive
response to the commercially-driven elements of her food environment. 20
Making shelf-ready foods cheap and ubiquitous for on-the-go Americans is not
necessarily consistent with maintaining nutrition content. Common food processing procedures –
removing the bran and even the germ from whole grains (Anand et al. 2009; Hu 2010), leeching
the minerals from cane sugar, cooking vegetables for canning – strip nutrients from final
manufactured food products. Hydrogenating mono- and poly-unsaturated vegetable oils to make
them solid at room temperature and more resistant to rancidity makes the fat profile trans-fattyacid rich. High transfat profiles in diets are associated with increased cardiovascular risk
(Dietary Guidelines for Americans, 2010, p 25). As Americans turned to more and more
processed foods, particularly after World War II, time-saving convenience was enhanced, and
robust nutrient profiles from “new” processed forms of known foods degraded.
Across a range of vitamins and minerals, dietary needs are complex. Even by the 1970s,
nutrient deficiencies were a hazard for some (Popkin and Siega-Riz 1996) within a generally
well-fed population (Swinburn et al. 2011, as noted above). Nutrient fortification of cereal grains
that have been stripped of nutrients proved one solution – a solution indicating the degree of
transition from whole foods to processed foods. In a then rare population-based study of the
effects of nutrient fortification of cereal grains, Popkin and Siega-Riz (1996) offer:
Results indicate a marked upwards shift in the intake distribution associated with consumption of fortified
foods for all four nutrients [thiamin, niacin, riboflavin, and iron] regardless of income, education, or region
of residence. This analysis provides strong support for the importance of food fortification as a source of
20

To the extent that “commercially-driven elements” are themselves demand led, and demand is fueled by
exogenous preferences as assumed in neoclassical models (rather than influenced by advertising and addictive
ingredients) there is an implicit irony in this characterization, one that is only overcome if the “ignorance and habits”
weigh heavily enough in consumer behavioral choice to overwhelm underlying preference in purchase and
consumption.
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key nutrients in the U.S. diet during the 1970’s (sic) and also shows that these benefits cut across most
sociodemographic barriers (p 20).

These fortifications are found in “meal-based” foods, albeit including (occasionally heavily)
sugared ready-to-eat breakfast cereals. Moving as we have from meals to more snacks and
desserts would naturally imply fewer fruits and vegetables and less of the foods fortified to
provide nutrients known to be deficient in cross-sections of the population. If Americans are
eating far less fresh fruit, vegetables, and whole grains than U.S. Dietary guidelines suggest, and
more calories are coming from snacking, then the calorie-to-valuable-nutrient ratio must rise, and
might upset the diet-energy balance, adding body weight simultaneous with increasing nutrient
deficiencies. 21 Have all these factors occurred? Yes.
Buzby, Wells, and Vocke (2006) find that for Americans to meet the 2005 Dietary
Guidelines for Americans, daily fruit consumption would have to rise 132%, demanding more
than double the existing harvested fruit acreage (to 7.6 M acres from 3.5); legume consumption
would have to rise 431%, and starchy vegetable (esp. potato) consumption would have to decline
35%, demanding more than double the existing harvested vegetable acreage (to 15.3 M acres
from 6.5, a 137% rise); whole grain consumption would have to rise 248%, while total grain
consumption (including refined grains) would have to fall by 27%, for 5.6 M fewer acres in grain
production per year. (The ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry began stressing “whole grains”
in their cereals, with reformulations, around the time the 2005 Guidelines were released.)
Using National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) and CSFII data
generated in cross-sectional dietary recall studies spanning two- to five-year blocks from 1977 to
21

These deficiencies would result both from substituting whole and healthful foods for foods with more
carbohydrates and fats purged of vitamin and mineral content, and from a move from fresh fruits and vegetables.
One may certainly argue that calories are a critical dietary component, but the “valuable nutrients” here are from an
economists’ perspective: the marginally less available ones than empty carbohydrate, fats, or fatty proteins. Valuable
nutrients include: vitamins, minerals, enzymes, essential amino acids, and although not technically a nutrient in any
of these ways, adequate and appropriate dietary fiber.
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2006, Piernas and Popkin (2010) conclude that prevalence of snacking in U.S. adults increased
from 71% to 97%, increasing in each period from the 1977-78 period. Incidents of daily
snacking increased almost by one per day (0.97, P<0.01), and the contribution of snacked foods
to total daily energy intake increased from 18 to 24% (P<0.01), as the energy density of snacks
increased through all time periods studied. The largest increases in energy intake were for
younger adults (19 to 39 years), indicating the likelihood of degrading dietary quality in the
current generation. After high-fat desserts, SSBs were the main sources of adults’ snacking
calories. Piernas and Popkin (2010b), using a similar database beginning from 1989, find that
snack consumption among U.S. children has trended toward three per day per child, with more
than 27% of children’s daily calories from snacking. High-fat desserts and sugar-sweetened
beverages are the most energy prominent snacks, as for adults.
The dietary shift from sit-down meals to snacks is reflected in higher sugar intake, where
higher added sugars as a percentage of dietary calories is associated with inadequate intake of
vitamins E, A, C, and magnesium (Marriott et al. 2010). Milk consumption has fallen off as
meals have become less central to diet, and:
…(P)ediatric crossectional (sic) and prospective studies across the globe have demonstrated significant
negative association between dairy or milk intake and body mass index or body fat. …The pediatric
literature on dairy provides no support to the notion that skim milk is more protective against excessive
weight gain than whole milk and in fact raises the possibility that the very opposite may be the case (Slyper
and Huang 2009, p 148).

A decade ago, McCrory, Suen, and Roberts (2002) 22 cited “epidemiological and
experimental studies in animals and humans provid[ing] strong evidence that biobehavioral
factors [specific eating behaviors]” influence hunger, satiety, and voluntary energy intake (p
3830S). Biobehavioral factors associate with excess energy intake and increases in bodyweight
22

Of the Energy Metabolism Laboratory at Tufts University, part of the Jean Mayer Department of Agriculture
Human Nutrition Research Center on Aging at Tufts University, Boston, MA.
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over time. The authors note that there was no change in self-reported physical activity over the
nine years previous to the writing of their article. They list these biobehavioral influences as:
dietary variety, liquid vs. solid food energy, portion sizes, palatability (taste), snacking patterns,
foods away from home (including restaurant food), and dietary restraint and disinhibition (the
tendency to overeat appealing foods).
McCrory, Suen, and Roberts explain that variety of food is associated with overeating in
animal and human laboratory experiments, and that the increase in variety of foods in U.S.
markets tends to be in the nutrient-poor energy-dense categories.
They site work demonstrating not only the greater-than-60-percent rise in soft-drink
consumption from 1977 to 1998, but a pronounced difference in food compensation
(consumption offset) at subsequent meals for energy/calories taken between meals. Solid-food
snacks offset consumption at subsequent meals by 64%, semi-solid snacks by 21%, while liquid
snacks offset no subsequent eating (0%). Total energy intakes are significantly higher on any day
that soda, alcohol, milk or juice are consumed, versus days when none of these are. In a later
Journal of the American Medical Association article, Schulze et al. (2004) confirm that SSB
energy intake does not affect subsequent food and energy intake. Mourao et al. (2007) confirm
that compared to solid forms of comparable nutrient value (high carbohydrate, high protein, or
high fat) ingested by lean or obese young adults, consuming liquid food offsets later calorie
intake less. Mourao et al. conclude that liquid calorie sources “pose a greater risk for promoting
positive energy imbalance” (p 1688).
From the late 1970s onward, package sizes of prepackaged foods began rising and
portion sizes with them. Even a decade ago, McCrory, Suen, and Roberts find “Several studies
show that portion sizes positively influence energy intake in single meals” (p 3831S). Nielsen
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and Popkin (2003) confirm that portion sizes and energy intake significantly increased between
1977 and 1998 for Americans older than 2 years, with the greatest increases from fast food
restaurants and in the home. Of the “key food items” they list by energy, portion size, and
location of consumption, soft drinks demonstrate the highest portion size increase over the period
(13.1 oz. to 19.9 oz., after 1.0 to 1.6 oz. for salty snacks) and the largest portions in ounces
(followed by fruit drinks at 15.1 oz., and Mexican food at 8 oz., 1994-1996 figures). Wansink,
Just and Payne (2009) have since confirmed in labs at Cornell, that under conditions where the
portion size changes during the meal by surreptitious replenishment, people eat more than they
think they have.
Taste/palatability ranks in surveys as the most important reason individuals give for why
they choose certain foods (ranking higher than healthfulness), and taste is positively associated
with energy intake. People’s taste for sweet foods and drinks can stimulate more eating. The
glycemic index (GI) measures the rise in the level of sugar in the blood (blood glucose
concentration) triggered by carbohydrate consumption. Glycemic load (GL) is GI divided by 100
multiplied by the available carbohydrate content in grams, for the food being measured. So a
food may have a high GI, but low GL, like watermelon. High GI foods can trigger more eating
and thus more energy intake, independent of the calories in these foods, by initiating a biological
sequence that ends in greater hunger (Ludwig 2002). For example:
High GI meals have…been shown to accelerate the return of hunger and increase subsequent energy
intake. Circulating free fatty acids (FFA) are also thought to be important in the control of food intake and
are affected by GI. Plasma FFA were significantly lower 4 -5 h[ours] after high GI meals compared to that
after low GI meals, and both glucose and FFA concentrations independently predicted within-subject
differences in subsequent meal energy intake after test meals differing in GI (McCrory, Suen, and Roberts
(2002, p. 3832S, emphasis added).
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Roberts (2000) offers a table measuring GI from an index where bread=100 (white bread
101, “wheat” bread 99), with GI scores for particular foods averaged across multiple studies.
White rice is highest with 126, followed by baked potato and corn flakes, both around 120.
Critical to the SSB question, pure sucrose (50% fructose, 50% glucose) earns a 92, and pure
fructose a 32, but the fructose-sucrose sugar combination high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS) that
is the staple of SSBs in the U.S. earns soft drinks a 97, above either sugar alone. 23 For reference
apple sugar is fructose, as is most sugar in oranges. The GI for apple juice is 58, higher than the
52 for an apple, and orange juice has a GI score of 74.
McCrory, Suen and Roberts conclude as Piernas and Popkin (2010 and 2010b) do, that
Americans of all ages are snacking more, deriving more energy from snacks, and that snackers
get more than 25% of daily energy from snack foods.
Away-from-home food almost doubled as a portion of energy in the American diet
between 1977-78 and 1995, from 18% to 34%. “U.S. national data also show that foods
consumed away from home are less nutritious than foods consumed in the home, being higher in
total fat and saturated fat, and lower in fiber and essential micronutrients.” Higher frequency of
restaurant patronization is also associated with higher-fat, lower-fiber diets. High palatability of
restaurant foods may also encourage overeating (McCrory, Suen, and Roberts (p 3832S).
Dietary restraint – restricting what one consumes to maintain or lose weight – functions
opposite of dietary disinhibition (defined above), but the two interact. Citing a study of 600
postmenopausal women, McCrory, Suen, and Roberts report: “although dietary restraint itself
did not predict weight gain, it modified the influence of disinhibition on weight gain, so that
individuals who were highly restrained had less weight gain at each level of disinhibition” (p

23

HFCS-55, or 55% fructose, 41% glucose, 4% other sugars, is the HFCS used in soft drinks, whereas HFCS-42, or
42% fructose, 53% glucose, and 5% other sugars, is the HFCS used in many processed foods and baked goods.
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3832S). This reality is reflected in the last dashed boxes before the decision criteria box in Figure
3, and in the individual- and time-specific k and a variables in equation (d).

6.7.1.e

Health Effects of Added Sugars in the Diet, including versus Saturated Fat
There is some evidence that Americans do respond to nutrition warnings from academia.

To wit, to protect themselves from obesity and heart disease, Americans reduced saturated fats in
their diets, from the early 1980s on. Remembering that liquids do not satiate hunger, the primary
elements to fill the stomach are protein, fat, carbohydrate, and fiber. This implies a trade-off
toward the other three groups if one is trying to keep fat content low – make that two, fiber has
gone down, and as added sugars rise in the diet, fiber content falls (Marriott et al. 2010). How
does the literature address the trade-offs made in avoiding fat (and the protein that usually
accompanies it)? Harvard’s Fredrick John Stare Professor of Epidemiology and Nutrition Chair,
Department of Nutrition, Walter Willett (1998):
The percentage of dietary fat is widely believed to be an important determinant of body fat…. Comparisons
of both diets and prevalence of obesity between affluent and poor countries have been used to support a
causal association, but these contrasts are seriously confounded by differences in physical activity and food
availability. Within areas of similar economic development, regional intake of fat and prevalence of obesity
have not been positively correlated. …In short-term trials a modest reduction in body weight is typically
seen in individuals randomly assigned to diets with a lower percentage of energy from fat. However
compensatory mechanisms seem to operate because in trials lasting ≥1 y[ear], fat consumption within the
range of 18-40% of energy appears to have little if any effect on body fatness. Moreover, within the United
States, a substantial decline in the percentage of energy from fat consumed during the past two decades has
corresponded with a massive increase in obesity. Diets high in fat do not appear to be the primary cause of
the high prevalence of excess body fat in our society, and reductions in fat will not be a solution (p 556S,
abstract, italics added).

Willett (1999) also addresses the effects of dietary trade-offs from saturated fats:
Patients prescribed a low-fat diet should be informed that such a diet is likely to increase serum
triacylglycerol and reduce HDL-cholesterol concentrations, which are associated with a higher risk of
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coronary heart disease. …[T]here is overwhelming evidence from prospective studies and randomized trials
that replacement of saturated and trans fats with unsaturated fat in the diet will substantially reduce the risk
of coronary artery disease, but that replacement of fat with carbohydrate in the diet will have little if any
effect (p 108A, Willett’s citations omitted, his italics).

Popkin, Zizza, and Siega-Riz (2003) cite trends in energy intake and USDA figures on food
supply per capita, concluding that from 1965 to 1996 the consumption of fat remained constant
while the consumption of sugars and sweeteners “increased dramatically.”
Referring to a study (Jakobsen and Dethlefsen 2010) “notable for its large size, long
duration and follow-up, and detailed assessment of dietary and lifestyle factors” 24 (p 1541),
Frank Hu (2010) offers:
It is the first epidemiologic study to specifically examine the effects of replacing saturated fats with either
high- or low-quality carbohydrates, and it provides direct evidence that substituting high-GI-value
carbohydrates for saturated fats actually increases IHD [ischemic heart disease] risk.
…The obesity epidemic and growing intake of refined carbohydrates have created a “perfect storm” for the
development of cardiometabolic disorders.
…[R]refined carbohydrates are likely to cause even greater metabolic damage than saturated fat in a
predominantly sedentary and overweight population (p 1541-1542).

Refined carbohydrates, like the extremely refined carbohydrates in SSBs, represent a greater
danger for obesity and heart disease to a population with American habits than when fats
comprise up to 40% of total energy intake.
Particular to SSBs, “regular consumption of SSBs is associated with a higher risk of
CHD [coronary heart disease] in women, even after other unhealthful lifestyle or dietary factors
are accounted for” (Fung et al. 2009, p 1037). This study followed 88,520 women in the Nurses’
Health Study over 24 years, measuring risks of CHD while controlling for other factors for SSB

24

Jakobsen and Dethlefsen’s (2010) study was a prospective cohort study (strongest methodology) involving 53,644
women and men heart-attack free at baseline time, with a median 12-year follow-up. “…[R]eplacing SFAs
[saturated fatty acids] with carbohydrates with low-GI [glycemic index] values is associated with a lower risk of MI
[myocardial infarction = heart attack], whereas replacing SFAs with carbohydrates with high-GI values is associated
with a higher risk of MI” (p 1764).
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intakes of less than once a month, 1-4 times per month, 2-6 times per week, once a day, and
more than two servings per day. There was a significant rise in risk for each consumption level
above 1-4 times per month, the highest risk being over one-third higher than the lowest – the
results are quite robust.
Johnson and Yon (2010) note the risk for obesity, diabetes, and dental caries, but also
summarize literature outlining the sugar-coronary disease link. “Relative to other carbohydrate
sources” sugar intake is associated with increased triglyceride levels and lower HDL cholesterol
levels (dyslipidemia and/or hyperlipidemia). From the Framingham Heart Study, consuming “one
or more soft drinks per day significantly increased the odds of developing high blood pressure” (p
1297). Johnson and Yon also refer to lower intake of needed micronutrients with even moderate
proportions of added sugars in the diet. Marriott et al. (2010) expand on this, noting that levels of
vitamins E, A, C, and magnesium tended to fall further below adequate levels with each 5%
increase in added sugars more than 5-10% of dietary energy. Over 80% of the U.S. population is
“at risk for select nutrient inadequacy” and thirteen percent have added sugar intakes greater than
25% of energy intake. According to Marriott et al. (2010) the Institute of Medicine formed a
committee on macronutrients, whose report recommended 25% or less of energy intake from
added sugar, much higher than the WHO’s 2003 recommendation of 10% or less (Johnson et al.
2009). 25 Marriott et al. recommend that the Institute of Medicine revisit their 25%-or-less
recommendation, to lower it. Johnson et al. also note evidence for inflammation and oxidative
stress rising with more added sugars in the diet, and evidence that iron, calcium, and zinc may
also be deficient in higher-added-sugar diets.

25

Johnson et al. refer to: World Health Organization. Diet, Nutrition and the Prevention of Chronic Diseases:
Report of a Joint WHO/FAO Expert Consultation. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization; 2003.

419

6.7.1.f

SSBs and sCSDs as Primary Added Sugars in a Changing Food Environment
SSBs and particularly sCSDs are the largest component in the average American’s added

sugar profile. Sugar-sweetened beverages (sCSDs, energy drinks, sports drinks, and fruit drinks)
comprise 46% of all added sugars in the American diet. For reference grain-based desserts are
13%, candy 6%, and ready-to-eat breakfast cereals 4% (Johnson and Yon 2010). By the early
2000s, SSBs contributed 8-9% of total energy intake for both children and adults (Nielsen and
Popkin 2004).
Of SSBs, sCSDs are the main source of added sugars “for all age/gender groups” on a
gram-equivalent intake basis, beginning in adolescence, and peaking in adulthood, with some
taper after age 50 (Marriott et al.). The gross predominance of SSBs and particularly sCSDs in
American added sugar consumption that these authors report exactly mirrors percentages
reported by Krebs-Smith in 2001. The particular role that SSBs and sCSDs play in American
overconsumption of added sugars has been growing, and is now well-entrenched.
Table 23 reduces dietary added sugar sources to equivalents of grams of table sugar. In
the top half of the table, rows designate groups of people for whom added sugar is within a
percent range of total daily energy intake. By looking at total added sugar consumed and of this
the added-sugar grams of sugars, sweets, or beverages, and of this the added-sugar grams of
sCSDs, an interesting pattern emerges. The last two columns assist in seeing this pattern. As
added sugars from all sources increase as a percentage of total energy intake for a person, the
portion comprised by sCSDs strictly rises. As a percent of all sweets, and beverages, there are
plateaus below 10% of diet and above 30% of diet, but otherwise, the portion comprised of
sCSDs again strictly rises. If sugar is toxic as Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis claim, then sCSDs
are on average the primary poison of choice for those most toxifying their diets with sugar.
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The bottom half of Table 23 breaks down by sex of the individual within age groups
above 8 the same ratios of sCSD sugars to overall added sugar intake and sCSD sugars to all
sweets and beverages. Male intake is higher in every age group than female intake, and the sCSD
portion of overall added-sugar intake is above half for every male group from 14 to 50, and is
half for 50 and older. Females in age groups 14 to 30 reach the half mark. Sweetened CSDs are
the #1 added sugar source in U.S. diets for all Americans older than 4 years, beating all other
contenders by a very wide margin. Full tables from Marriott et al. and Krebs-Smith make this
point more clearly.
Nielsen and Popkin (2004) find that energy intake from SSB consumption rose 135%
from 1977 to 2001 (CSFII and NHANES), for a 278-calorie-per-day net increase in beverage
calories, after the 35% energy intake drop from reduced milk consumption. Portion sizes
increased and number of servings, so that the proportion of people in all age groups consuming
SSBs increased. Popkin (2010) points out that SSB intake more than doubled from roughly 1960
to 2010. Wolf, Bray and Popkin (2007) also point out that the reason that human beings do not
cut back on overall food/energy intake when drinking carbohydrate-rich beverages is “we lack
the genetic information for a physiological response for responding to these beverage calories
with complete satiation because we evolved with water as our major source of hydration” (p
162). They also claim that the fall in peak gallons per capita of sCSDs after 1997 from 39 gallons
per capita per year “may be an artifact of beverage classification” (p 152). The increasing market
share of energy and sports drinks continue this trend (NPLAN 2011; Harris et al. 2011).
Malik, Schulze, and Hu (2004) assess the likely mechanism for SSBs leading to weight
gain to be the low satiety of liquid carbohydrates, and the failure to compensate for the liquid
energy intake by eating less at subsequent meals. Olsen and Heitmann (2009) do a literature
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review, also concluding that liquid versus solid sugars fail to satiate hunger and in fact stimulate
it, locking the consumer into the medical effect just described –SSB consumption leads to more
calories entering the body, and simultaneously more hunger.
Vectors of overweight and obesity that the consumer is not aware of are not hard to
imagine from that point. Metabolic effects particular to liquid sugars, and particularly highfructose corn syrup (HFCS), are also explored below, along with literature explaining how the
ingestion or regular ingestion of these sugars may affect not only the body but decision making,
including the decision to drink SSBs. 26
Olsen and Heitmann note that the simple increase in energy intake from SSBs may not be
an adequate reason for the weight gain associated with heavy SSB consumption. They find that
the most rigorous studies (prospective studies with five or more years of follow up) show more
consistent results linking SSBs to obesity than studies with shorter follow ups, addressing a
concern raised by Wolff and Dansinger (2008) that results from larger and longer intervention
trials were needed to cement the SSB-weight-gain link.
Bleich et al. (2009) do not agree directly with Olsen and Heitmann, claiming that
NHANES data comparisons with BMI information from the 1988-1994 period to the 1999-2004
period and large epidemiological studies indicate a strong independent effect of SSBs on weight
gain and diabetes. Bleich et al. document a rise in the percentage of adult SSB drinkers (58 to
63%), and a 46 kcal/day increase per adult, about 6 ounces per adult. They note that sCSDs
represent around 60% of all SSB consumption, and that the largest share of SSB calories are
consumed in the home. The highest rates of SSB consumption associate by sociodemographic
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Bray, Nielsen, and Popkin (2004) point out that glucose enters cells by a transport system that depends on insulin
in most tissues, whereas fructose does not. Glucose provides satiety signals in the brain that fructose cannot, because
fructose is not transported to the brain.
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characteristics with populations at the highest risk for obesity. Younger adults (20 to 44 years),
African Americans, and Mexican Americans had notably high consumption rates.
After reviewing 15 cross-sectional, 10 prospective, and 5 experimental studies, Malik,
Schulze, and Hu (2004) also conclude that “greater consumption of SSBs is associated with
weight gain and obesity” (p 274). In a meta-analysis of 88 studies relating soft-drink consumption
to health outcomes, Vartanian, Schwarz, and Brownell (2007) go even further, reaching the same
conclusions about energy intake, failure to compensate for liquid calories, and obesity, among
others. They find clear associations with increased energy intake and body weight, lower intakes
of milk, calcium, and other nutrients, and increased risk of severe medical problems, including
diabetes. Most significantly: “larger effect sizes were observed in studies with stronger methods
(longitudinal and experimental versus cross-sectional studies)” 27 (p 667). They further found
“significantly larger effect sizes among (1) women, (2) adults, (3) studies focusing on sugarsweetened soft drinks, and (4) studies not funded by the food industry” (p 670). For example, in
Schulze et al.’s 2004 prospective study of 91,249 women followed for 8 years, those who
consumed one or more servings of soft drink per day had double the rate of developing diabetes
over the course of the study (an effect only slightly mitigated when controlling for potential
confounding factors including BMI and energy intake), and the effect disappeared when diet soft
drinks replaced the sugared soft drinks. Similarly, after controlling for potentially confounding
factors, women who increased SSB consumption by one or more servings of soft drink per week
to one or more per day had the largest weight gain over 4 years, with the least weight gain among
women who had decreased their intake.
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For a description of the strength of methods, see footnote 7 in Chapter 1 above, with a quote from Malik et al.
(2010).
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In another literature review, Malik et al. (2010) find that not just added sugars, but SSBs
are associated with long-term weight gain, adult-onset diabetes, and cardiovascular disease. They
note that the high glycemic load and HFCS in soft drinks may increase diabetes and heart disease
independently of the increased risk of obesity, due to the HFCS impact on inflammation, insulin
resistance, and impaired function of the pancreatic cells that generate insulin. A direct link
between fructose and increased risk of high blood pressure, visceral adiposity (belly fat),
dyslipidemia (bad cholesterol and triglycerides), may all arise from increased fat creation in the
liver from fructose consumption. They also find that “greater SSB consumption in childhood and
adolescence predicted weight gain into adulthood” (p 1357).
There may be more to this effect. Price (1970) argues that per capita estimations of food
consumption in the population ignore that sex and age can restrict relative eating capacity. Price
proceeds to argue for “unit scale equivalent” measures of food commodities that adjust for sex
and age. Because SSBs do not satisfy – and in fact stimulate – hunger, a smaller person (child or
woman) can consume the same amount of SSB that an adult male can much easier than an
averaged-weight child or woman could eat the same weight in steak, popcorn, or pie. So SSBs
are uniquely poised to bypass rudimentary biological limiting factors to consumption for younger
consumers.
As may be inferred from the literature review results, numerous studies confirm doseresponse and reversal effects, leaving little doubt as to the robustness of health effects from
regular SSB/sCSD consumption by a person of any age, either sex. Going back to 1990 Tordoff
and Alleva found significant increase in calorie intake and body weight across both sexes in a
three week controlled trial adding HFCS versus aspartame-sweetened soft drinks to normalweight subjects. They also note that the literature (even then) had established that humans report
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increased hunger after drinking certain sweet solutions and certain sweetened semi-solids,
“suggest[ing] that sweet oral stimulation initiates a cephalic-phase metabolic reflex that increases
appetite” (p 963). In 2001 from a 19-month prospective study of 548 ethnically diverse
schoolchildren, Ludwig, Peterson, and Gortmaker reported that “[f]or each additional serving of
sugar-sweetened drink consumed, both body mass index…and frequency of obesity…increased
after adjustment for anthropometric, demographic, dietary, and lifestyle variables” (p 505).
Higher SSB consumption at baseline was also independently associated with higher BMIs. In
2006, Ebbeling et al. decreased SSB consumption by an average 82% in a randomized control
trial on adolescents who regularly consumed SSBs. They found that BMI fell significantly versus
the control (who had no SSB consumption change) for the upper baseline-BMI tertile over 25
weeks, but not significantly for the lowest BMI group. In 2009, Chen et al. published results
from a prospective study of 810 adults, measuring height, weight, and dietary recall at baseline, 6
months, and 18 months, in a randomized, controlled, behavioral intervention. They found that
reduction of liquid calorie intake had a stronger effect on weight loss than did reduction in solid
calorie intake, and that a reduction of SSB intake of 1 serving per day was associated with a
weight loss of 0.49 kg at 6 months, and 0.65 kg at 18 months (both results significant at the 1%
level).

6.7.2

Added Sugars, Health, and Disease – Medical Mechanisms
The detrimental effects of sugars on the diet have been known to nutritionists for some

time, but the knowledge seems not to have been absorbed by the general populace (potentially
creating breakdowns of rational utility maximization in dietary choice posited in sections 6.5 and
6.6 above). In 1985, Sheldon Reiser of the Carbohydrate Nutrition Laboratory of the Agricultural
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Research Service at the USDA reviewed literature depicting sugars, versus starches, as strongly
associated with risk factors for heart disease. Reiser concludes:
1) Regardless of the experimental conditions used, the feeding of sucrose or fructose as compared to starch,
either produced undesirable effects on metabolic parameters associated with heart disease or had no
effect….
2) In the context of the diet consumed in industrialized societies (e.g., high saturated fat, cholesterol; low in
fiber and copper), dietary sucrose or fructose can act synergistically with other dietary components and thus
contribute to the many environmental factors producing the high level of heart disease in these societies (p
210-211).

Metabolic risk factors include elevated fasting blood triglycerides, higher LDL cholesterol and
very-low-density lipoprotein levels, lower HDL levels, and elevated blood levels of insulin and
uric acid. Rat and human livers convert 2.6 – 8.6 times more fructose than glucose to fatty acids
under similar experimental conditions, indicating these species have the same de novo hepatic
lipogenesis reactions to fructose carbohydrates (this is important when considering Bocarsly et
al. 2010, below). Cutting sugar in the diet lowered fasting triglycerides, and more so for subjects
with the highest initial blood triglyceride levels. The presence of saturated fats aggravates
sucrose-induced increases in blood triglycerides. With 30% of calories from sucrose in the diets
of either group, those who gorged showed higher triglycerides in the blood, while those who
nibbled did not. When a lot of calories and sugar calories enter the body quickly, this triggers
high blood triglycerides, associated with heart disease. Individuals fed excess sugar for one
week, either sucrose or fructose, showed decreased insulin sensitivity and reduction in the ability
of insulin to bind to monocytes. Uric acid levels in the blood can predict the risk of ischemic
heart disease, and these levels rise when fructose is added to a sucrose load in the diet (as would
occur if SSBs were consumed with a candy or pastry).
Insulin desensitization and failure of insulin to be absorbed properly at the molecular
level lead to overwork by the pancreas, which may eventually fail, producing adult-onset
426

diabetes. In a 2002 JAMA article, Ludwig reviews dozens of clinical trials validating the
glycemic index as a valid mechanism for associating carbohydrate loads with obesity, diabetes,
and cardiovascular disease. Ludwig quotes a medical author from 75 years earlier, who
conjectured even then that eating too much sugar exhausted the pancreas, causing diabetes, and
that the hunger that arises when the blood-sugar level suddenly drops after spiking upward in a
high-carbohydrate ingestion cycle may be a driver of obesity, independent of an associated
diabetic condition. Roberts (2000) notes that “insulin sensitivity is well known to be influenced
by exercise, with highly active individuals typically being more insulin sensitive than sedentary
ones” (p 6).
Ludwig explains the precise biological mechanisms by which high glycemic index meals
cause acute metabolic events. The brain needs a consistent flow of glucose. “Glucose enables
cerebral functioning by providing the fuel for neurons to fire impulses” (Gailliot and Baumeister
2007, p 306). But too-low levels can trigger coma, seizure, or death, and too-high levels have
immediate and long-term negative health impacts. The body therefore tries to regulate blood
sugar levels. High blood sugar, or hyperglycemia stimulates the hormone insulin to promote
uptake of glucose by muscle and adipose (fat) tissues, telling the tissues to use sugar rather than
free fatty acids as fuel (free fatty acids being “the other major metabolic fuel”), leading to higher
free fatty acids in the blood, a marker for cardiovascular disease. Low blood sugar
(hypoglycemia), which can result from the body’s attempt to return to homeostasis after a
hyperglycemic surge triggers counterregulatory hormones (glucagon, epinephrine, cortisol,
growth hormone) that antagonize insulin. High insulin and low glucagon levels persist after the 2
to 4 hours it can take to digest refined carbohydrates, pushing blood sugar low and triggering a
hunger hormonally similar to “a state of fasting normally reached only after many hours without
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food” (p 2417). Postprandial hypoglycemia (low blood sugar a few hours after eating a high GI
meal) “is so common as to be considered normal” despite the complexity and severity of the
hormone response (p 2417). Low-GI foods are less likely to trigger postprandial hypoglycemia
because they do not illicit a counterregulatory hormone response as high-GI foods do (Roberts
2000). “High insulin in the blood: is believed to mediate, in part, the increased risk for heart
disease associated with the insulin resistance syndrome…through independent effects on blood
pressure, serum lipids, coagulation factors, inflammatory mediators, and endothelial function”
[this last concerns the lining of the blood vessels; Ludwig, p 2420].
Ludwig goes on to emphasize that the high-insulin, low-sugar state “may preferentially
stimulate consumption of high-glycemic foods, leading to cycles of hypoglycemia and
hyperphagia [overeating]” (p 2417). Simply put, people falling from a sugar high may
specifically experience a desire for more refined carbohydrates, rather than more nutritious,
filling food, like protein, fat, and fiber. Dieters trying to restrict overall calories who eat highglycemic index foods may exacerbate this phenomenon. In a clinical trial, obese children were
given either steel cut oats or high-GI instant oatmeal for breakfast, and subsequent energy intake
through the afternoon was 53% higher for subjects having eaten the high-GI versus low-GI
breakfast.
High-GI meals stimulate more insulin secretion calorie-for-calorie than low-GI meals due
to postprandial hyperglycemia. Regular hyperglycemia may cause insulin resistance, notes
Ludwig, “[e]ven a modest elevation in blood glucose concentration…may produce insulin
resistance in humans. Insulin resistance, in turn, generally leads to compensatory
hyperinsulemia” (p 2418). High levels of insulin and glucose may circulate in the blood
simultaneously in insulin resistant people. Pancreatic cells that produce insulin come under long-
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term stress, which may trigger adult-onset diabetes. “Postprandial hyperglycemia has…[also]
been recognized as an important risk factor for [cardiovascular disease]…among persons with
diabetes…[and] the general population.…[by producing oxidative stress]” (p 2419). This
oxidative stress from a blood-sugar spike after high-GI consumption manifests in lipids, proteins,
lipoproteins, and DNA, and also “activates inflammation,” and lowers antioxidant
concentrations. These are all changes that likely increase blood pressure and blood clot
formation. 28 Administration of antioxidants can prevent or reverse these effects.
Ludwig defends the science on high- versus low-GI diets, recommending diets high in
fiber, micronutrients, and antioxidants, and low in energy density. SSBs, and particularly sCSDs,
approximate the polar opposite of this recommendation about as completely as a food can.

6.7.2.a

SSB Sugars, Fructose as HFCS: Unique Medical Mechanisms and Health Effects?
U.S. sugar tariffs and quotas and subsidies to corn growers make HFCS an economical

ingredient for food manufacturers. In 1984 the two sCSD-industry majors, Coca-Cola and Pepsi,
switched from using sugar (sucrose) to HFCS in the U.S., while they continue to use sugar in
sCSD manufacture in other countries. HFCS is marginally sweeter per unit equivalent than
sucrose (by about 20%, Bocarsly et al. 2010), easy to blend and transport as a liquid, and in low-
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Numerous animal studies indicate that high-sugar diets promote oxidative stress, and reduce anti-oxidant effect.
Chaudhary, Boparai, and Bansal (2007) look at high-sucrose, low magnesium diets in rats, and find causation of
oxidative stress. Kizhner, Shilovizki, and Werman (2007) find that long-term fructose (the primary sugar component
in HFCS, and “a potent agent in the glycoxidation process”) reduces oxidative defense (through the Maillard
reaction, see in this note below) and alters mitochondrial performance in mice, indicating accelerated aging. Levi
and Werman (1998) found long before in rat studies that long-term fructose consumption accelerates glycation
(bonding of a protein or lipid molecule to a sugar molecule) and “several age-related variables” in male rats. The
biological mechanisms for sugar absorption at the cellular level are extremely similar in rats, mice, and humans.
Archer (2003) explains that sugar metabolism and the (in vivo) Maillard reaction – an interaction of an amino acid
and a sugar molecule that inside the body represents one step in the formation of advanced glycation endproducts
(AGEs) that contribute to a range of human diseases – result in cross-linked proteins whose loss of elasticity is a
contributor to cardiovascular disease, and potential degeneration of the heart, kidneys, and brain. Archer explains
that studies on rodents, dogs, and primates apply equally to humans “as their glucose metabolism is similar” (p 925).
This is relevant to Bocarsly et al. (2010) referenced later.
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and intermediate-moisture foods serves as a humectant (HFCS is hygroscopic, drawing water
from the atmosphere), keeping foods moist and improving shelf life, as well as providing
cohesiveness for chewiness in gums, cereal bars, and candies. Fructose, and by implication
HFCS, is better at chemical reactive “browning” of proteins when they are mixed with sugars
and heat (the Maillard reaction) than sucrose, making HFCS attractive for baked goods.
Americans on average now consume nearly as many pounds per year of HFCS as sucrose.
In a peer-reviewed study supported by PepsiCo North America, Melanson et al. (2008)
review studies linking HFCS to weight gain from the hypotheses that HFCS fails to trigger an
adequate insulin response to a sugar load, which in turn fails to stimulate the appetitesuppressing (brain receptive) hormone leptin and also fails to suppress the appetite-stimulating
hormone ghrelin, which could according to Malik et al. (2010) “initiat[e] the hunger cascade in
the central nervous system” 29 (p 1360). Melanson et al. argue that these studies fail to make an
adequate case, but it appears that they themselves are fighting the uphill battle. The stakes in this
argument are not low. If fructose/HFCS critics are correct, then a policy-created economic
advantage for HFCS may have enabled the food processing industry to cheaply employ a device
that is sweet, preservative, and more stimulating of further hunger than previously common
forms of refined carbohydrates – a win-win-win situation for large food processors whose
offsetting lose-lose-lose might include more obese, diabetic Americans with higher blood
pressure and higher cancer rates.
29

Leptin production is regulated by insulin responses, lower insulin implies lower leptin, Elliott et al. 2002. Leptin
is produced by adipose tissue, ghrelin by gastroenteric tissue. Bocarsly et al. (2010) provide a useful condensed
description of the biological mechanisms by which fructose versus sucrose produces unhealthy fats and fat in the
sense of weight gain (see original for embedded citations omitted for brevity here):
HFCS is different than sucrose in many ways. …[F]ructose is absorbed further down the intestine than glucose, with much
of the metabolism occurring in the liver, where it is converted to…a precursor to the backbone of the triglyceride
molecule. …[F]ructose is metabolically broken down before it reaches the rate-limiting enzyme…, thereby supplying the
body with an unregulated source of three-carbon molecules. These molecules are transformed into glycerol and fatty acids,
which are eventually taken up by adipose tissue, leading to additional adiposity. …HFCS causes aberrant insulin
functioning, in that it bypasses the insulin-driven satiety system. Whereas circulating glucose increases insulin release
from the pancreas, fructose does this less efficiently, because cells in the pancreas lack the fructose transporter (p 105).
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As the literature progresses, doubts that Melanson et al. raise in fact seem less well
founded. In a 2002 review, Elliott et al. cite studies and biological mechanisms demonstrating
that while fructose does not stimulate and insulin response (due to its digestion in the liver rather
than in the stomach, which is one reason that triglycerides rise rapidly with fructose digestion),
long-term fructose consumption is directly associated with insulin resistance, a trigger for
diabetes, and obesity, due in part to compensatory hyperinsulemia – the body’s “emergency”
regulatory hormone response to a state of low insulin in conjunction with high blood sugar.
Elliott et al. find health effects of fructose consumption – insulin resistance, impaired glucose
tolerance, hyperinsulemia, hypertriacylglycerolemia (high blood triglyceride levels, a heart
disease marker), and hypertension – to be clearer for animal studies than for human studies. But
that was 2002. By 2004, Elliott is second author on Teff et al. showing that normal weight
women fed dietary fructose with meals had reduced circulating insulin and leptin, less
suppression of ghrelin, and increased blood triglycerides (all effects at 1% levels of
significance). Also in 2004, Bray, Nielsen, and Popkin examine the same biological triggers
specific to HFCS using USDA-reported food consumption patterns, and conclude that HFCSsweetened beverages are directly linked to the US obesity epidemic.
By 2008, the human trials that Elliott et al. called for, and Melanson et al. claimed were
to date ambiguous, began to find station in the literature. Stanhope et al. (2008) find from 24hour endocrine and metabolic profiles for 34 men and women fed isocaloric meals with sucroseor HFCS sweetened beverages, that the insulin, leptin, and ghrelin responses were similar,
although the triglyceride profiles after HFCS were as high as for pure fructose. They conclude
that short-term effects are similar, but for the triglyceride exception. In 2009, Stanhope and a
longer list of co-authors published results of a study of similar size comparing glucose- versus
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fructose-sweetened beverages as 25% of overweight and obese men and women’s diets for 10
weeks. Fructose but not glucose consumption significantly increased triglycerides, bad
cholesterol, and plasma glucose and insulin levels, while decreasing insulin sensitivity (for
women more than men). While weight gain was similar for both groups, the fructose group
gained more weight in the belly (visceral adiposity; in men more than women). These effects
specifically associate Syndrome X (metabolic syndrome) markers with fructose and not glucose
consumption. “Metabolic syndrome is a name for a group of risk factors that occur together and
increase the risk for coronary artery disease, stroke, and type 2 diabetes.” 30
In 2010, Bray conducts a meta-analysis of the relationship between soft-drink
consumption and the risk of overweight, diabetes, and cardiometabolic disease. He finds a 24%
higher cardiometabolic risk for the top versus the bottom quintiles of soft-drink consumption,
and that versus glucose consumption, fructose consumption induces higher triglycerides, higher
fat creation, higher blood pressure, more inflammation, and less release of insulin and leptin. He
concludes that “fructose is hazardous to the cardiometabolic health of many children,
adolescents, and adults” (p 55), and looks to coming literature to determine whether there is a
“threshold effect” for fructose-related health impacts.
Stanhope and other authors return in 2011 with a study testing diets including the U.S.
“Dietary Guidelines for Americans, 2010” recommendation of added sugar intake at a maximum
of 25% of total energy. They tested glucose, fructose, and HFCS at 25% energy in controlled
(energy-balanced) diets over two weeks on 48 young adults with a range of BMIs under 36, onethird in each added sweetener group. 24-hour triglycerides, fasting LDL, and other markers were
measured. HFCS “increased risk factors for cardiovascular disease comparably with fructose and
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From the U.S. National Library of Medicine, A.D.A.M. Medical encyclopedia (online):
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0004546/, accessed March 17, 2012.
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more than glucose in young adults” (p E1596). This prospective study strongly suggests that the
negative effects clinically proved for fructose consumption extend to a significant degree to
HFCS, and that markers for cardiovascular disease rise in young adults in less than two weeks on
a diet that conforms with the maximum limit for added sugars defined by the U.S. government.
As 13% of Americans already consume at or above this added sugar “maximum recommended
level,” Stanhope et al. conclude that the maximum “may need to be reevaluated” (p E1604). The
concerns of PepsiCo-funded Melanson et al. have been effectively refuted by prospective studies
on humans.
The animal-based literature has now established that with access to equal sweetness
solutions of either HFCS or sucrose in addition to all the food and water they desired, rats over a
long period (6 or 7 months) gained more weight, especially in the abdominal region, and had
higher circulating triglyceride levels on HFCS solution versus sucrose solution, despite having
equal total energy intake (Bocarsly et al. 2010). Of those subjects with 24-hour access to HFCS
solution, males gained more weight, and at a faster pace, than did females. In contrast, additional
sucrose did not lead to obesity, despite the fact that fewer calories were consumed directly from
the HFCS than the sucrose, which also may indicate that HFCS stimulates hunger more than
sucrose. In their discussion, Bocarsly et al. note:
Abdominal obesity in humans is considered the most dangerous form of fat accrual, leading to impaired
health and diminished longevity. …
Storage of excess body fat subsequently can lead to chronic changes in leptin, insulin and corticosterone. In
obese animals, leptin and insulin insensitivity can ensue, with the loss of hormonal satiety signals. …
[I]n the presence of obesity, elevated TG [triglyceride] levels are commonly associated with a clustering of
metabolic risk factors known as the metabolic syndrome [or Syndrome X]. …
[B]y chronically elevating serum TG levels, HFCS may create a propensity towards fat intake and fat
deposition (p 4, emphasis added).
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Having established earlier here that the biological mechanisms for sugar absorption and
conversion are extremely similar in rats and humans (Reiser 1985; Archer 2003), these results
seriously implicate HFCS, versus chemically similar sucrose, in the obesity, metabolic
syndrome, and cardiovascular disease epidemics. This may help explain why obesity rates rose
for the 20 years to the year 2000 despite lower dietary fat profiles, as Americans followed dietary
advice to reduce dietary fat (Roberts 2000).
In 2012, Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis note that sugar has not only been proved (in
humans) to dampen suppression of the hunger-signaling hormone ghrelin, but to interfere with
the satiation-signaling hormone leptin, as well as reducing dopamine signaling, which decreases
the pleasure from eating, compelling an individual to eat more to achieve former dopamine
levels associated with eating. 31 Eating a lot of sugar not only signals the brain to eat more sugar,
but conditions it to do so, a habit-forming drive that occurs on a subconscious, chemical level.

6.7.2.b Medical/Nutrition Literature Clear About the Health Effects of Added Sugars
Sweetened beverages are a multi-billion-dollar industry. The medical/nutrition science
must be sound if there are to be policy recommendations claiming that they are associated with
poor health outcomes, and designed to curtail their consumption. The sweetened beverage
industry will defend itself from poorly conducted studies and unwarranted attacks, as any
industry must. While Malik et al. (2006) and Vartanian, Schwartz, and Brownell (2007) seem to
be the benchmark reviews of clinical trials examining the weight and other health effects of
SSBs, or HFCS, there are other reviews defending HFCS and questioning the SSB-weight-gain

31

A hormone-disruptive process not wholly unlike effects leading to higher amounts of cocaine and heroin use by
abusers of these drugs. Cocaine suppresses dopamine reuptake, and heroin modifies the chemical action of
dopamine in the brain reward centers. All three refined substances interfere with the “normal” brain reward-center
chemistry that prevails before these refined substances are introduced into the body in sufficient quantities.
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link. In an American Journal of Clinical Nutrition editorial, Anderson (2007), claims that the
ratio of fructose to glucose in the American diet did not change in the 40 years since HFCS
replaced sucrose, that there is no evidence that sucrose used in place of HFCS would be less
harmful, and that there is no causal role documented for HFCS beverages in obesity. If these
contentions were marginally plausible when Anderson published this, they have been overturned
by evidence from prospective and clinical intervention trials now. Anderson consults for the
Canadian Sugar Institute, and Archer Daniels Midland, a primary U.S. manufacturer of HFCS.
Melanson et al. 2008, also in the American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, from which
many of the above-cited articles were taken, conduct a review questioning the implication that
HFCS is associated with weight gain (ignoring the cardiovascular disease connection entirely),
and conclude that “HFCS is more similar to sucrose than it is to fructose in terms of its content
[true], appetitive responses [highly unlikely given (later) results presented in 6.7.2.a here], and
aspects of its metabolism…” (p 1741S-1742S). Melanson et al.’s review was supported by
PepsiCo North America.
Gibson (2008) reviews the SSB-obesity connection in observational and intervention
studies, including Malik et al. (2006), and Vartanian, Schwartz, and Brownell (2007), and finds a
very small effect, and inconclusive evidence, based on “inconsistencies of definition, design,
statistical treatment and interpretation” (p 144) which naturally arise when teams of researchers
attack similar but varying questions in different ways. Her review was commissioned by the
Union of European Beverages Associations. Gibson acknowledges that cross-sectional studies
are the weakest design, followed by longitudinal, with intervention trials the strongest (see Malik
et al. 2010, from the seventh footnote in 1.2).
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Despite Melanson et al.’s 96 citations, and Gibson’s 62 citations (“up to July 2008”), they
both seem to have overlooked Lesser et al.’s January 2007 work. Lesser et al. identified reviews,
observational studies, and intervention studies from January 1999 to end-December 2003
concerning soft drinks, juice, and milk, for a total of 206 articles, from which 111 declared
financial sponsorship:
22% had industry funding, 47% had no industry funding, and 325 had mixed funding. Funding source was
significantly related to conclusions when considering all article types (p = 0.037). For intervention studies,
the proportion with unfavorable conclusions was 0% for all industry funding, versus 37% for no industry
funding (p = 0.009). The odds ratio of a favorable versus unfavorable conclusion was 7.61…,comparing
articles with all industry funding to no industry funding (p 41).
…Articles sponsored exclusively by food/drinks companies were four to eight times more likely to have
conclusions favorable to the financial interests of the sponsoring company than articles which were not
sponsored by food or drink companies (p46).

Of course Lesser et al.’s work could not include Anderson’s, Melanson et al.’s, or Gibson’s
work, so the responsible reader must either infer a continuing pattern, or speculate on these latter
authors’ dominant incentives.
However, when SSB/sCSD/sugar/HFCS-industry-defensive arguments find any purchase
in the medical/nutrition literature, they may be used to publicly defend the existence of an
uncertainty in the literature. This could be viewed as the specific and conscious manipulation of
the uncertainty consumers already feel, and excuse the internal tendency to distrust the available
science when it conflicts with a current food desire (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, 2000;
Fulponi, OECD 2009, Jonas et al. 2001).
Research shows that consumers are often overwhelmed and frustrated by the numerous and diverse messages
about diet and health that are issued to the public. A 1996 USDA study found 40 percent of meal
planners/preparers strongly agreed with the statement “There are so many recommendations about healthy
ways to eat, it’s hard to know what to believe.” A 1995 American Dietetic Association survey found that
almost 50 percent of respondents thought news reports on nutrition were confusing and 81 percent preferred
to hear about new research only after it was accepted by nutritional and health professionals (Variyam and
Golan 2002; p 18).
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Of course the well-funded campaign of television commercials defending HFCS as identical to
sugar in biological effect, funded by the Corn Refiners’ Association (www.sweetsurprise.com;
http://news.consumerreports.org/health/2008/10/high-fructose-c.html, accessed Jan 02, 2012),
can only aggravate confusion. The “nutrition” debate has been focused by the industry to revolve
around whether the product is “natural” and sucrose-similar, when the biological issues are the
degree of refinement (see Smith and Tasnádi 2007, sub-section 6.7.4.a below), specific effects
that differ from sucrose or glucose, and volume in the diet.
Thus, the k in equation (d) as applied to SSBs may be artificially prevented from being
adjusted downward by information from sound science, preventing a leftward shift in demand for
SSBs/sCSDs. Formally, this would be attributed to an information failure or a failure of
rationality, with either failure being encouraged by industry’s purchase of literature that with
obvious profit-incentives confounds sound science (per Lesser et al.).
While at this point in the literature more recent intervention and prospective longitudinal
studies provide stronger and clearer evidence supporting known effects of added sugars and
HFCS as cited above, Vartanian, Schwartz, and Brownell’s 88-study meta-analysis still offers
the best summary of where the nutrition science stands:
One of the most consistent and powerful findings is the link between soft drink intake and increased
energy consumption. …
The available literature supports the observation that people do not adequately compensate for the added
energy they consume in soft drinks with their intake of other foods and consequently increase their intake
of sugar and total energy (p 672). …
…[F]ructose is digested, absorbed, and metabolized differently than glucose in ways that favor de novo
lipogenesis [new fat creation] and do not stimulate insulin secretion or enhance the production of leptin,
both afferent signals in the regulation of food intake and body weight. …
[While] cross-sectional and longitudinal studies showed only small positive associations between soft
drink consumption and BMI (rs=0.05 and 0.09, respectively)…a moderate effect size (r=0.24) was
observed for experimental studies that controlled for extraneous variables. …
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[I]ncreased soft drink intake is related to lower consumption of milk and calcium…lower intakes of fruit
and dietary fiber, and lower intakes of a variety of macronutrients…[in all study types].
[From a study of over 91k women over 8 years]…those who consumed 1 or more servings of soft drinks
per day were at twice the risk of developing diabetes as those who consumed less than 1 serving per month.
… [And the clinchers…]
[W]e found that effect magnitudes were consistently larger when studies involved more powerful designs.
…
Our analyses revealed that the overall pattern of results differed significantly when studies funded and not
funded by the food industry were compared. …[T]he average overall effect size for industry-funded studies
was significantly smaller than the average effect size for nonfunded studies. This discrepency was
particularly striking in studies examining the effects of soft drink consumption on energy intake; effect
sizes were moderate (r=0.23) for nonfunded studies and essentially nil (r=0.05) for funded studies (p 673).

Their summary is representative, not comprehensive. For example, it does not include the clear
cardiovascular disease risk established for frequent SSB consumption. Tersely stated, by
consensus of the medical community including the American Heart Association and some USDA
publications, a male (female) adult that is not extremely active can have either added sugar at or
under 150 (100) kcal/d, or a healthful diet.
Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis (2012), in their Nature article, “Public Health: The Toxic
Truth About Sugar,” pull no punches. “[S]ugar induces all of the diseases associated with
metabolic syndrome,” including hypertension, diabetes, ageing (“…caused by damage to lipids,
proteins, and DNA through non-enzymatic binding of fructose to these molecules”) 32, as well as
cancer and cognitive decline. “[F]ructose exerts toxic effects on the liver that are similar to those
of alcohol. …Sugar also has clear potential for abuse” (p 28, all this paragraph).

32

Builds on work including Baynes (2002), “The Maillard Hypothesis on Aging: time to Focus on DNA,” Annals of
the New York Academy of Sciences, 959.
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6.7.3

Health Literacy and SSB Consumption
“Health literacy refers to the ability to obtain, process, and use health information in

managing one’s health. Knowledge is a key component of health literacy and thus increases in
knowledge are important for developing health literacy skills” (Soederberg Miller et al. 2011, p
803; emphasis added, embedded citations omitted). Soederberg Miller, Gibson, and Applegate
(2010), refer to “[t]he ability to understand and use health information to make decisions
regarding one’s health, [as] a set of skills” they call “health literacy” (p 108). They note
“nutrition knowledge is an important component of health literacy…[and] is positively related to
dietary quality” (p 107). Understanding the application of nutrition knowledge to health as a skill
characterizes some of the variability in the “Knowledge, beliefs…decision criteria…” box in
Figure 3 (section 6.5), and has the power to explain some of the variability in decision making
that leads to higher or lower sCSD consumption. When low knowledge is empirically associated
with low diet quality, nutrition education is an appropriate policy solution, independent of tax
policies. This is underscored by their finding that motivation to obtain more nutrition knowledge
is also a predictor of healthy diet.
From corrections and commentary in The New England Journal of Medicine on Popkin,
Siega-Riz, and Haines’ 1996 comparison of dietary trends among racial and socioeconomic
groups in the U.S., it is clear that nutrition performance improved with rising incomes and rising
education in the U.S. for African Americans and Whites, but that a constructed index of healthy
diets had fewer than ten percent of both groups eating a healthy diet in 1965, and between 25 and
30% for both groups in the early 1990s. In a NEJM letter to the editor, Kumanyika (1997) calls
these “percentages with favorable dietary pattern scores… extremely low in all…periods. For
example, in the 1989-1991 survey, only 1 in 10 high-income whites met the recommended
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dietary pattern….” 33 While there is no question that health literacy has improved with a
generation’s worth of rising average education and incomes, applied nutrition knowledge
remains low for many Americans.
Low active nutrition knowledge will prejudicially lower the k multiplier in equation (d),
increasing the likelihood of a negative long-term health result larger than expected in a priori
utility calculation. Amongst others, from Soederberg Miller et al. (2011):
[K]nowledge of nutrition is related to accurate perceptions of food healthiness (p 795). …
[This] study adds to a growing literature showing that knowledge is critical for understanding dietary
choice (p 802). …
[P]rior knowledge was a significant predictor of the acquisition of new nutrition knowledge (p803).

Beydoun and Wang (2008) clarify this effect, measuring nutrition knowledge and beliefs
about the importance of nutrition. They find a clear association between higher diet quality and
higher education or higher income for the highest knowledge and belief tertiles, but that this
association is completely undermined – such that there is no significant association between
education or income and diet quality – for the lowest tertiles of nutrition knowledge and nutrition
beliefs. For the three levels of education and income regressed (thus “tertiles”), diet quality rises
with rising education or income, but starts at a higher baseline and rises most for the highest
tertiles of nutrition knowledge and beliefs. “[Socio-economic status] factors may have an
influence on dietary choice only for those who have the desirable knowledge and beliefs about
nutrition” (p 152).
This finding identifies a mechanism by which the “Knowledge, beliefs…decision
criteria…” box affects “economically rational decision criteria” (an effect that will become
clearer with the specification of Figure 4, below in 6.9). Zoellner et al. (2011) find that higher
33

S. Kumanyika. N Engl J Med 1997; 337: 1848. Printed in response to Popkin Siega-Riz, Haines, 1996, NEJM
335: 716-720.
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health literacy scores are associated with fewer SSB calories taken in each day. Thompson et al.
regress demographic variables on dietary intake of added sugars, finding significant inverse
associations between sugar intake and education level or income levels for men and for women.
Race/ethnicity groups significantly differ. Their results confirm what one would expect by
Beydoun and Wang, that low income and low education will be associated with lower diet
quality, in the form of higher added sugar intake. (See 2.3.2 for more detail on the authors cited
in this paragraph.) From 2003–2006 NHANES data, Marriott et al. find that non-Hispanic
African Americans, people below the poverty line, and underweight people are more likely to
consumer greater than 25% of daily calories from added sugars. This last result is provocative,
reminding us of the fact that most sugar-related diseases can be independent of above-normal
weight classification. Overweight and obesity are merely symptoms, not the core problems from
excessive sugar consumption that Marriott et al refer to. “With each 5% increase in added sugars
category above 15% added sugar intake, we found a lower prevalence of overweight and obese
individuals, with the exception of > 35% added sugars for BMI>30 where the prevalence
increased to 3.2%” (p 236). Is it possible that the effects of high sugar consumption are more
invisible in under- and normal-weight individuals, perhaps because they damage without causing
weight gain, whereas as the body’s processes change above a certain weight, weight effects from
high sugar consumption become a visible symptom of the otherwise similarly damaged health
profile?

6.7.4

The Neurobiology of Preference – Addictive-like Properties of Sugar
We have so far established that there are drivers of obesity and diet-related health

problems that are likely unknown to the average consumer, but nonetheless direct results of
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fairly habitual food choices. Whether foods, and particularly sugars, display addictive properties
that would more directly upset a rational utility-maximizing (again, RUMax) calculus of food
choice is suggested by some of the previous discussion, but remains an open question.
Psychiatrists and Neuroscientist Levine, Kotz, and Gosnell (2003) attempt to explain the
neurobiology of preference for specific foods and nutrients. “The appetite for specific foods and
nutrients may be under neuroregulatory control,” and “sustained consumption of sugars and fats”
may result in “neurochemical changes in brain sites involved in feeding and reward, some of
which are also affected by drug abuse,” that is, affect the central reward systems and may
increase food intake (p 831S). They also suggest that energy expenditure may be affected by
similar mechanisms:
…[F]indings may be related to the actions of both food and drugs on a common substrate, the mesolimbic
dopaminergenic system. Many drugs of abuse cause an increase in dopamine release in the nucleus
accumbens. Similarly, the ingestion of sucrose and other palatable foods has been shown to cause an
increase in dopamine release (p 832S). …
Diet composition may lead to changes in neuropeptides within brain nuclei regulating energy metabolism.
… Sustained fat and sugar consumption affects neural circuitry in a number of brain areas involved in
appetite, reward and energy metabolism (p 833S).

So a diet regularly high in sugar or fat or both seems to affect the neural receptors
associated with reward in the brain. To the extent this is true, and holds for humans, habitual
consumption of sCSDs must affect the subconscious chemistry involved in neurochemical
pathways signaling reward. As early as 1985, Fullerton et al. inferred from animal and human
studies that hyperglycemia in humans may increase the affinity and number of opiate receptors in
the brain, and that this effect and the increased production of beta-endorphins by the pituitary
gland might “lead to further ingestion of sugar (sometimes in the form of binges), contributing to
the pathogenesis of obesity” (p 678).
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Rat experiments also suggest that the increased “availability of foods might negate
physiological controls of ingestion” (p 831S), meaning that consumption may rise with the
simple presence of sweetened liquids relative to water (Levine, Kotz, and Gosnell 2003). Again,
to the extent this holds for humans, the ubiquity of sCSDs then may tend on some level to
overwhelm conscious restraint on one’s dietary choices. To a degree both seem to hold,
according to articles by Wang et al. (2001, 2004), by Avena, Rada, and Hoebel (2008), and by
Lutter and Nestler (2009), who specifically verify that foods and drugs of abuse share the same
limbic pathways of behavior motivation in animals and humans.
If these neurochemical processes do exist as hypothesized, then pathological overeating
and obesity may involve a dopamine neurotransmitter modulating rewarding properties of food.
Rats are used because they can be injected, starved, overfed, and killed and dissected.
Establishing similar neurochemical effects in humans requires non-invasive procedures. In a
2001 The Lancet article, Wang et al. use a radioactive binder to a dopamine type and positron
emission tomography (PET) to find a dose-response correlation: “[t]he availability of dopamine
D2 receptor was decreased in obese individuals in proportion to their BMI. …[D]opamine
deficiency in obese individuals may perpetuate pathological eating as a means to compensate for
decreased activation of these circuits” (p 354). The neurochemistry of food preference seems on
some level to be dopamine based in humans, mirroring animal study results.
In 2004, Wang, and a modified set of co-authors again publish work based on PET scans
of active human brains, and report the effects on normal-weight adults. Appetitive food stimuli
significantly increased metabolism in the whole brain by 24% (P<0.01):
The marked increase in brain metabolism by the presentation of food provides evidence of the high
sensitivity of the human brain to food stimuli. This high sensitivity coupled with the ubiquitousness of food
stimuli in the environment is likely to contribute to the epidemic of obesity. In particular, the activation of
the right orbitofrontal cortex, a brain region involved with drive, may underlie the motivation to procure
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food, which may be subjectively experienced as “desire for food” and “hunger” when exposed to food
stimuli (p 1790).

Wang et al.’s experiment involved actual food stimuli. If there is an extension to presence
of packaging or television advertising (beyond the current scope of this research) then there
would be a neurobiological mechanism for explaining positive purchase associated with food
advertising as demonstrated in Essay One here. Berning (2011) cites evidence that brand
association for an sCSD may impact the brain independently of the reward associated with the
taste experience.
Lutter and Nestler (2009) explain the two pathways regulating human food intake: the
homeostatic pathway controlling energy balance that increases motivation to eat after energy
stores are depleted, and the hedonic (reward-based) pathway that can override the homeostatic
pathway when energy reserves are adequate but palatable foods are present and/or desired. They
conclude: “…it is clear that chronic consumption of highly palatable foods can alter brain
function in ways similar to drugs of abuse, particularly within the mesolimbic dopamine reward
pathway” (p 631-2, emphasis added). As part of a larger exploration of whether food can be
addictive, Lutter and Nestler define food addiction as the loss of control over food intake, as by
conditioning hedonic pathways reflexively override the homeostatic pathway.
Lindqvist, Baelemans, and Erlanson-Albertsson (2008) find that rats fed a regular diet
overconsumed calories when glucose, sucrose, or fructose solutions were also presented, but the
authors traced chemicals and hormones in the subjects to prove that weight gain occurred due to
hunger activation signals, depression of satiety signals, and activation of reward chemicals in
subject’s brains. They were also able to block increased calorie uptake by blocking the
hypothesized chemical pathways. From animal experiments:
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…results in this paper show that sugar solutions (e.g. soft drinks) may contribute to the epidemic-like
increase in obesity throughout the Western world by altering the feeding pattern and promoting weight
gain. The increase in weight gain seems to occur through a caloric overconsumption which may be
attributed to an altered secretion and production of hormones and peptides, such as ghrelin, leptin, and PYY
[peptide YY], involved in appetite regulation and feeding, and possibly also through the activation of
reward systems in the hypothalamus (p 31).

This establishes with clear biomechanical pathways that chronic soft-drink consumption may
corrupt the hormones regulating hunger and satiation as well as the reward signaling mechanisms
in the human brain.
In an extensive review intended to assess the evidence for sugar addiction, Avena, Rada,
and Hoebel (2008) examine the behavioral and neurochemical effects of intermittent, excessive
sugar intake. They note that “food addiction” is plausible because of the similarities in reward
(dopamine and opioid) pathways between some foods and addictive drugs: “any substance that
repeatedly causes the release of DA [extracellular dopamine] or reduces DA reuptake at
terminals via …[known] circuits may be a candidate for abuse. A variety of foods can release
DA in the NAc [nucleus accumbens, the ‘pleasure center’ of the brain] including…sugar,
saccharin, and…[pure fat]” (p 23). They conclude that:
the reviewed evidence supports the theory that, in some circumstances, intermittent access to sugar can lead
to behavioral and neurochemical changes that resemble effect of a substance of abuse. Sugar “dependency”
was operationally defined by tests for bingeing, withdrawal signs, craving and cross-sensitization to
amphetamine and alcohol.
…[T]his review demonstrates…that rats with intermittent access to a sugar solution can show both a
constellation of behaviors and parallel brain changes that are characteristic of rats that voluntarily selfadminister addictive drugs. In conclusion, this is evidence that under some circumstances sugar can be
addictive(p 32).

In a later review of dopamine/opioid theories of reward-system-based overeating, Avena,
Rada, and Hoebel (2009) state: “[c]ollectively, these clinical studies support the view that
overeating can affect behavior and brain systems in a manner that resembles aspects of an
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addiction” (p 625). Experiments on rats confirm that: 1) animals will binge eat on a sweet food
or pure fat, if it is offered intermittently; 2) drug abuse symptoms are evident in sugar-binging
rats, including intake behaviors, neurochemical commonalities between sugar bingeing and drug
abuse – particularly an adaptive effect from extracellular dopamine, and “signs of opiate-like
withdrawal” when administered an opioid blocker, including “[s]omatic signs of withdrawal,
such as teeth chattering, forepaw tremor, and head shakes, as well as behavioral manifestations
of anxiety” (p 625); 3) rats that binge on sugar subsequently will drink more of a 9% alcohol
solution, “suggesting that intermittent access to sugar can be a gateway to alcohol use.” It may be
particularly easy to imagine a human parallel to this last effect in American beverage
consumption patterns as adolescents graduate to adulthood. Avena, Rada, and Hoebel conclude
that it is sweet taste that “may be largely responsible for producing addictive-like behaviors that
include a withdrawal syndrome” (p 627, from solutions whose sugar concentration was chosen to
parallel that in soft drinks).
Thus the sweetness in soft drinks evokes many characteristics associated with addictive
substances in animals whose biological processing of these sugars closely mirrors our own.
Inferring from Avena, Rada, and Hoebel’s careful reviews (2008, 2009), there is enough clinical
evidence in animal trials and from known parallels in human biochemical pathways to offer
reserved support for the contention that sugar is likely addictive to humans under some
circumstances. These circumstances are likely to include intermittent binges within a pattern of
sugar consumption that “trains” neurochemical reward pathways, where self-administration of
sugar dosing is possible. Make no mistake about inter-species comparisons. The neuroeconomist
Camerer states definitively: “rats become biologically addicted to all the substances that humans
become addicted to… Our shared past just implies that when humans struggle to control animal
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impulses (such as drug addiction), the struggle is between the neocortex and older temporal-lobe
areas. Knowing which areas are involved in the struggle is useful for crafting theory and for
prescribing treatments” (p C 30).
Compared to sugar, the addictive properties of the caffeine present in many SSBs and
sCSDs is little disputed, but also represents an addictive factor that can subconsciously affect the
decision to consume sCSDs. Describing caffeine as “the world’s most widely used drug,” and
comparable to “air in having a hardly noticeable taste but participating in a critical metabolic
exchange involving every cell in the body’s central nervous system” (p 298), Hirsch, Lu, and Ma
(2007) cite beverage industry figures when claiming that the average American consumes about
two 12-ounce cans per capita per day. More than 95% of the caffeine in sCSDs is added by
beverage companies, with a small fraction occurring naturally. They list the following factors
relevant to the conscious or unconscious choice to drink caffeinated colas [embedded citations
omitted for brevity, see original]:
…direct physiologic effects of caffeine include enhanced wakefulness, alertness, concentration, and
energy; calmness, steadiness, and improved performance of tasks; mood enhancement; and decreased
reaction time. Caffeine may also act indirectly by mitigating effects of its own withdrawal, and its
pharmacologic effects may include hedonic effects. …
[American Psychiatric Association-recognized] …caffeine-induced psychiatric disorders include anxiety
disorder, and caffeine-induced sleep disorders. …
Symptoms of caffeine withdrawal include fatigue, depression, anxiety, confusion, irritability, insomnia,
headaches, and dysphoria. …Ameliorating the symptoms of caffeine withdrawal by consuming caffeinated
cola may promote an unconsciously positive view of caffeinated cola beverages, which the consumer may
interpret as a positive physical characteristic of cola (p 298).

Hirsch, Lu, and Ma proceed to demonstrate that just like 92% of adults, 86% of teenagers
claiming they drink caffeinated cola over non-caffeinated cola for the taste also failed to be able
to taste the difference, or to drink more of the caffeinated cola in a blind tasting.
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Coca-Cola abandoned the use of some nine milligrams of cocaine in their soft drink in
1903, and now uses only cocaine-extracted coca leaves in its formula, but the company stuck
with sugar and caffeine for reasons that seem obvious – given a profit-maximizing incentive,
weak regulation, and evidence from current medical literature. 34
In their 2004 American Economic Review article, “Addiction and Cue-Triggered
Decision Processes” Bernheim and Rangel use results from psychology and neuroscience to offer
a new economic model of addiction:
…[T]he notion that choices and preferences can diverge is contrary to the standard doctrine of revealed
preferences and therefore requires thorough justification.
There are plainly circumstances in which it makes no sense to infer preferences from choices. …Habituated,
semi-automatic responses beneficially increase the speed of decision-making in some circumstances but lead
to systematic mistakes in others (p 1561-2).

Bernheim and Rangel offer the example of the many Americans who injure or kill themselves by
looking left and walking into the street in Britain, where they know traffic approaches from the
right. Note that people are failing to gather readily available information that could be used to
maximize the utility from the decision, and failing to do so because they are driven by habit, the
exact mistake described in my theoretical models accommodating potential failure of RUMax
behavior. There is a decision to “cross the street now,” to be sure, but not one that maximizes
utility without error, as many economists routinely assume. “A literal application of the doctrine
of revealed preference compels us to conclude either that these people simply prefer to look left,
or that they’re masochistic” 35 (p 129).

34

When the U.S. government lost United States v. Forty Barrels and Twenty Kegs of Coca-Cola (241 US 265), and
Coca Cola was able to maintain caffeine in its product, the 1912 U.S. Pure Foods and Drug Act was amended to list
caffeine as a “habit-forming” and a “deleterious” substance that must be listed on a product’s label
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coca-Cola, accessed 31 Dec 2011). Coca Cola calculates that across its beverage line,
worldwide customers consume 1.7 billon servings per day (http://www.thecocacolacompany.com/?WT.cl=1&WT.mm=footer1-about-red_en_US, accessed 31 Dec 11).
35
Bernheim and Rangel (2005, p 129; the 2004 AER article will remain the default Bernheim and Rangel reference
unless otherwise noted.)
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[T]he decision is plainly a mistake….this systematic error is traceable to features of the human brain.
Recent research on the neuroscience of addiction has identified specific features of the brain that appear to
produce systematic errors with respect to decisions involving the consumption of addictive substances. The
key process involves a mechanism (henceforth called the “hedonic forecast mechanism” or HFM [Bernheim
and Rangel offer this as an economic, not a neuroscience, term] ) that is responsible for associating
environmental cues with forecasts of short-term hedonic pleasure/pain) responses. …Addictive substances
interfere with the normal operation of the HFM by acting directly (i.e., independent of the pleasure
experienced) on the learning process that teaches the HFM to generate the anticipatory response. …
A large body of recent research indicates that the MDS [mesolimbic dopamine system, a.k.a. Levine, Kotz,
and Gosnell’s ‘mesolimbic dopaminergenic system’ above] functions, at least in part, as an HFM. …[A]s
time passes, the MDS fires with the presentation of a cue and not with the delivery of the reward (p 1562). …
The HFM’s main advantage is that it can produce rapid decisions with generally beneficial near-term
outcomes, provided the environment is stable. It cannot, however, anticipate sufficiently delayed
consequences, and when the environment changes, it can neither ignore irrelevant past experiences nor adjust
forecasts prior to acquiring further experience. The competing cognitive forecasting system addresses these
shortcomings (albeit imperfectly) but is comparatively slow (p 1564).

Evidence presented above in this sub-section indicates that sugar works on the mesolimbic
dopamine (reward) system just as addictive drugs do. Bernheim and Rangel state that addictive
substances “activate dopamine firing directly,” so sugar qualifies, albeit with the difference that
the addictive drive is less urgent or potentially overwhelming than for the “11 addictive
substances” that they list (p 1558). Their theory of addiction is built on three main premises: that
use among addicts is frequently a mistake, that use of the addictive substance “sensitizes the
individual to environmental cues that trigger mistaken usage,” and that addicts “understand their
susceptibility to cue-triggered mistakes and attempt to manage the process” (p 1559). Assuming
that sugar poses a weaker level of addictivity than opiates or barbiturates, one aspect of this is
that the substance and negative health effects are less obvious, and generally slower to manifest.
Thus a person whose decision making is influenced by frequent dosing of sugar in the diet may
Of course this point exactly parallels the argument that Americans have become overweight, obese, diabetic,
hypertensive, and cancer-prone because their diets reveal their true (and long-term) preferences, their masochism, or
their stupidity, rather than revealing a correctable ignorance, or a (perhaps nutrition-education-deficiency- or
marketing-induced) Achilles’ heel in otherwise rational consumer decision profiles.
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be far less prone to recognize the short-term or long-term effect, and would not “understand their
susceptibility” and “manage the process” as would someone might who was trying to beat a
heroin habit.
Due to less pressing effects of its consumption, sugar may not meet all three criterion for
Bernheim and Rangel’s model, but it still meets their definition of an addictive substance, despite
the fact that they do not list it. If sugar use in the quantities common in the American diet is a
mistake as medical literature suggests, and if people become sensitized to environmental cues
that trigger mistaken usage, sugar use may prove an informative extension of Bernheim and
Rangel’s model, even if the applicability of their third precept is less binding due to the longer
time it takes to notice the negative health effects from consuming sugar. Sugar does have the
potential to influence decisions through the same neural pathways as substances more likely to
produce the “hot” states that Bernheim and Rangel include in their model. Then the last
paragraph in the last block quote above seems quite relevant to the problem of short-term
pleasure elbowing out long-term effects in decision-making about sCSD consumption. “[T]he
MDS seems to affect which stimuli the brain attends to, which cognitive operations it activates
(what it thinks about), and which memories it preserves, and this may make it more difficult to
engage the cognitive operations required to override the HFM” (p 1563-4). This neurologically
based decision-behavioral pathway finds support among numerous authors in section 6.8 below
(including at least Kahneman, Baumeister, Loewenstein, and Peters, across various publications,
and never together).
If Becker and Murphy (1993) are correct in modeling advertising as entering the utility
function directly as a complementary good, is it much of a reach to inquire whether the
psychological bond that sCSD companies make between their advertising and the products they
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differentiate in large part through their advertising may cause the ads or the packaging to trigger
the MDS to fire with the presentation of the visual cue rather than with the biological delivery of
the sugar reward, planting a “wanting process” that is substantively different from a hedonic
“liking process” (Bernheim and Rangel’s terms, p 1563)? If this occurs, then the ubiquity of
sCSD machines, sponsorships, and television commercials we “consume” by Becker and
Murphy’s argument may encourage the very mistakes (systematic breaks between actual
preference and consumption choice) that Bernheim and Rangel identify as resulting when
addictive substances are involved – the same mistakes that the doctrine of revealed preferences
entirely rules out as possibilities 36 (p 1582). Bernheim and Rangel: “with repeated use of a
substance, cues associated with past consumption cause the HFM to forecast grossly exaggerated
pleasure responses, creating a powerful (and disproportionate) impulse to use. When this
happens, a portion of the user’s decision processes functions as if it has systematically skewed
information, which leads to mistakes in decision-making” (p 1562).
This supports the case already made that consumers of sCSDs are choosing based on
systematically skewed information. Also interesting when extended past Bernheim and Rangel’s
explicit intention to the case of very regular sCSD consumption:
…[T]he processes that produce systematic mistakes are triggered by stochastic environmental cues and are
not always operative. …[C]ue-triggered mistakes are specific to narrow domains. …[T]hey adhere to
particular activities in particular circumstances and do not reflect a general bias toward immediate
gratification. …[I]t does not follow that a general deficit in cognitive control is necessary for addiction. …
…[T]here is an emerging consensus in neuroscience and psychology that decision-process effects, rather
than hedonic effects, provide the key to understanding addictive behavior (p 1564-5).

If the premises upon which Bernheim and Rangel make these assertions hold, this boldly upsets
the “preference type” analysis which constrains a decision maker to be an exponential or a
36

It is worth noting the irony that Becker and Murphy would then be using the doctrine of revealed preferences as
one justification for their modeling of an effect which may defeat this very premise.
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hyperbolic discounter, or risk-loving or risk averse, as a fairly monotonic personal characteristic.
This is a quite restraining assumption. The flexibility inherent with the Bernheim and Rangel
assertion is consistent with what we observe, people rational in most choices, but perhaps
irrational or failing to maximize utility in their dietary choices – substance-specific “mistakes”
for most people. Bernheim and Rangel state this many pages later, while critiquing other
economic models of addiction:
In models with present-biased decision-makers, choice is always aligned with the preferences prevailing at
the moment when the choice is made. Even so, one can interpret present-bias as shorthand for considerations
that lead to systematic mistakes in favor of immediate gratification, contrary to true (long-run) preferences.
As a model of addiction, this framework suffers from two main shortcomings. First, the decision-making bias
is not domain-specific. A present-biased decision-maker mistakenly consumes all pleasurable commodities
excessively; in this respect there is nothing specific about addictive substances. Second, the bias is always
operative—it is not cue-conditioned (p 1581, their emphasis, embedded citation dropped).

Bernheim and Rangel specifically attempt to move beyond constraints that appear too simplistic
in contrast to certain evidence. Bernheim and Rangel (2005) 37 reference “behavioral evidence
indicating that users of addictive substances are often surprisingly sophisticated and forward
looking” (p 116), including those who demonstrate the consumption reductions in response to
future prices that Becker and Murphy use to support the model they espouse in their 1988
“rational addiction” work, but also including users who fake attempts to quit in order to intensify
the pleasure of the next use experience.

6.7.4.a

A Theory of Natural Addiction – Smith and Tasnádi (2007)
Smith and Tasnádi (2007) propose an evolutionary hypothesis based in neurochemical

biology that explains how rational addiction (Becker and Murphy 1988 38) might evolve, and the

37

The 2005 paper is an admittedly less formal derivative of the 2004 AER article. Thus the former will remain the
default Bernheim and Rangel reference unless otherwise noted.
38
More detail below and in section 6.7.5.
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ways in which modern systems may corrupt the effects of once advantageous biological
mechanisms. Smith and Tasnádi are careful not to question Becker and Murphy’s assertion of
adjacent complementarity, the idea that the marginal utility of consumption increases with
experience of a good. 39 In the case of an addictive good, this may mean that the relative cost of
withdrawal makes current marginal utility higher than the option of not consuming the product
one already craves. They also note that other authors who question Becker and Murphy’s
assumptions of perfect information, foresight, and self-knowledge also do not question the
adjacent complementarity assertion. (I maintain this caution.)
Smith and Tasnádi explore the biological foundations of opioid reception, and connect
opioid rewards in the (meso)limbic system (dopamine reward center in the brain) with the
evolutionary advantage of learning that sweet foods (mother’s milk, ripe fruit, raw honey) are
high in valuable micronutrients and very likely nontoxic. They also posit that in primitive
mankind’s foraging for appropriate foods in an uncertain environment, an opioid reward for
learning which foods taste good and importantly when and where they can be located would be
most advantageous when rewarding an associative learning process. They note laboratory
evidence confirming dopamine transmission in the limbic system is associated with learning.
New experiences generate dopamine responses, but once the stimulus is well known, the reward
only fires for “surprises,” or new stimulus-reward pairings.
Addictive substances – opioids, caffeine, alcohol, nicotine, and perhaps sugar – break this
pattern by offering dopamine rewards with every use, with the most powerful drugs not
diminishing in their dopamine effect with repeated use. Smith and Tasnádi then make a thoughtprovoking point. Before chemical refinement, many of the natural sources from which drugs are

39

George Constantinides (1990) refers to adjacent complementarity as “habit persistence,” perhaps an easier term
for the effect of this more (topographical or) mathematical concept.
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made have potent toxic and physically unpleasant properties, protecting early humans from a
pure reward. There are no refined carbohydrates in nature. Refining sugar, like refining cocaine,
or distilling grain alcohol, is a sophisticated process that developed quickly and recently within
the evolutionary timeline. Brain chemistry seems not to have adapted to distinguish dopamine
responses that genuinely reward survival learning and naturally-occurring high-quality
substances from those that merely mimic the dopamine rewards of authentic natural ingestibles:
[W]hat we observe is the manifestation of a sophisticated biological system in which environmental cues
trigger predictable internal neurological and physiological responses; that this system shows all the signs of
being adapted to a pre-industrial environment; and that drugs of abuse, largely developed in the modern
era, have the demonstrable ability to disrupt this system. …
[A]lthough the evidence suggests [that the dopamine-receptive limbic system] evolved for a particular
purpose (choosing a balanced diet), this system can be “hijacked” by technological advances such as the
syringe, refined sugar, and television advertising (p 334-5).

Smith and Tasnádi thus bridge the addictive drug and sugar dopamine pathways with the
neoclassical model of rational addiction, noting that it is industrial processes and products that
create the “mismatch between the modern world and the ‘beliefs’ about the world implicit in our
behavior” (p 328). In the figures and equations proposed in sections 6.5 and 6.6, I proceed where
Smith and Tasnádi do not, questioning Becker and Murphy’s assumptions of perfect information,
foresight, and self-knowledge. I believe the “mismatch” to which Smith and Tasnádi refer
suggests failures of all three of these other Becker and Murphy assumptions, the result being a
biologically driven appetite for non-nutritive SSBs in some people (that may extend to a larger
set of refined carbohydrates). This appetite may be consciously and conscientiously avoided or
rectified by applying what we may learn from medical/nutrition literature and from the
connections Smith and Tasnádi have made. But for at least some portion of the population, I pose
this does not occur, to the threat of their health (see section 6.7 here).

454

With the above results from the medical community indicating precise effects of habitual
intake of sugars on hunger/satiety hormones and dopamine reward receptors, one need not
unequivocally adopt a position that sCSDs are addictive. There is for habitual consumption of
sCSDs little evidentiary defense of the neoclassical economists’ assumption of perfectly rational
utility-maximizing choice in the sense that it is voluntary, deliberative, and considers future
effects in a time-consistent fashion. To assume habitual sCSD consumption is not influenced by
unconscious biological drivers which may motivate behavior independent of rational choice,
when these drivers are themselves the product of an initial sequence of regular sCSD
consumption, begins to strain credibility. Regular consumers of sCSDs are certainly hurting
themselves, and there is strong evidence for many aspects of addiction in chronic consumption of
refined carbohydrates, certainly when they comprise 25% or more of overall energy intake.
Richards, Patterson, and Tegene (2007) run a dynamic random coefficients logit model
on a 30-household sample to look for predicted rational addiction behavior based on
macronutrient characteristics of food, and conclude “it is…apparent that the addiction to
carbohydrates is far stronger than to other nutrients” ([protein, fat, salt] p 322).

6.7.5

Questions Concerning Becker and Murphy’s Theory of Rational Addiction
The neoclassical argument of rational choice is defended in Becker and Murphy’s famous

1988 The Journal of Political Economy article, in which they defend addiction as a rational
utility maximizing choice. In doing so, they maintain that the rate of disappearance of the
physical and mental effects of past consumption of a potentially addictive good is exogenous,
employ the assumption of a constant rate of time preference, and argue that tastes do not change
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over time. 40 Optimal paths for “consumption capital stock” of an addictive good are made using
fixed time-preference and rate of disappearance values. For Becker and Murphy, addiction
involves an interaction between persons and goods, such that “greater current consumption of a
good raises its future consumption” (p 682), and this may hold for one person and not others.
As noted by Smith and Tasnádi, many have criticized these assumptions. From the
medical literature presented here, we know that a substance that directly affects the limbic
reward system, including sugar, can have a conditioning effect on the brain that trains the brain
to want it. Because one state exists before this conditioning effect occurs and another after,
clearly the rate of disappearance of the physical and mental effects in turn influences
consumption. Becker and Murphy acknowledge tolerance effects dependent on previous use, but
turn these directly into utility effects without noting that tolerance must indicate that the rate of
disappearance of the physical and mental effects changes with tolerance, and therefore must not
be fixed or entirely exogenous. 41
Becker and Murphy’s assumption set precludes the notions that behavior may be
involuntary or non-deliberative or lead to regret that is not induced by changes in external
circumstances (i.e. not from an external shock). This assumption set necessitates a critical break
from how psychologists and social psychologists find people to behave. Becker and Murphy’s
assumption set almost tautologically confirms rational behavior, because these critical elements
that undermine their model are assumed away initially. If someone is acting involuntarily or

40

Becker and Murphy do consider time preferences that change when utility is separable over time, but are fixed
within any period. The shortcomings of this approach as I see them are addressed within this sub-section in the main
text. Becker and Murphy consider tastes to be intrinsic to the user, but exogenous in the sense that they cannot be
created or shaped by will or by external influence. Lowenstein offers a much different vision, summarized below,
with empirical evidence.
41
By Becker and Murphy’s first figure, the rate of disappearance times capital stock from consumption of the
addictive good (for any individual) is linear, suggesting that the rate of disappearance is fixed. (The stock of
consumption introduces the adjacent complementarity argument by allowing past consumption to affect future
utility.)
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without deliberation, reverses preferences, is time inconsistent in their behavior, or develops
tolerance to the addictive substance (behavior) such that more is required to achieve the same
utility effect, then at least one of the precepts upon which Becker and Murphy defend rationality
of choice fails to bind. People whose outcomes are rationally determined (and/or utility
maximizing) beg policy intervention less than those whose outcomes are not rationally
determined (and/or utility maximizing).
Because the rate of disappearance may not be fixed (see also reference to Lipscomb,
Weinstein, and Torrance, from Sassi and Hurst, below), the implications for rational behavior
based on the equation of motion of capital stock of consumption may not be as deterministic as
Becker and Murphy claim. Obviously there are levels of addiction, say between a gram-a-day
heroin addict and someone who is grumpy and unfocused without that morning cup of coffee. If
for example the disappearance effect becomes faster with deeper addiction, the preference for
present versus future satisfaction may rise, aggravating the existing problem suggested by the
constant time preference assumption.
Kahneman and the behavioral economists that follow him have long since demonstrated
hyperbolic discounting, where the point in a multi-period sequence that one makes a decision
affects which intertemporal choice is made, particularly with a present bias that discounts future
periods more rapidly and at a higher rate than a fixed discount rate would. Becker and Murphy’s
argument seems to sidestep that a deeply addicted person will steal from immediate relatives, or
risk incarceration or injury to steal from a stranger to fuel the habit and stop the discomfort/pain
(see Loewenstein, 1996, in section 6.8). Such behavior may reflect a change in degree of
preference for the present, and a deep discounting of future welfare, neither of which find
accommodation in Becker and Murphy’s model. In their 1999 American Economic Review
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article, “Doing It Now or Later,” O’Donoghue and Rabin cite “[c]asual observation,
introspection, and psychological research” that “the assumption of time consistency is
importantly wrong,” (p103), and conclude “the existence of present-biased preferences is
overwhelmingly supported by psychological evidence, and strongly accords to common sense
and conventional wisdom” (p120). They find that whether costs are immediate or rewards are
immediate changes the type of person (categorized by their time preferences) who can be harmed
by a poor choice.
Becker and Murphy do consider that in time-separable utility functions, time preference
may change, relative to a fixed rate of interest. Both of these, in addition to a fixed rate of
disappearance of the physical and mental effects of past consumption, are necessary to calculate
the optimal consumption paths by Becker and Murphy’s method. But Becker and Murphy never
consider that while each time-separable decision event may appear rational, that with increasing
addiction to a harmful good, the costs to future utility may rise in a way that proves the addict’s
previous calculations of future expected utility to be in error. They attribute the difference to an
increasing preference for the present, when it may be a loss of control by someone who does not
consciously discount the future so heavily. The loss of control would be a failure of rationality.
In either case, the increasingly addicted individual may enter future periods to find the cost
(lower utility, lower earnings) much higher than self-projected in previous periods. This delusion
or sustained ignorance depicts a failure to realize the utility previously “expected,” with the
problem getting worse. The pattern depicts that the individual’s decisions were not and are not
maximizing in their effect, and the failure to appreciate a degrading pattern of utility would not
be rational. This plausible scenario is precluded by Becker and Murphy’s assumptions. My
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theoretical modeling allows it, but sacrifices predictive power to the more inclusive description.
Policy implications change with perspective, however.
Becker and Murphy suggest that critics of their similar approach (from Stigler and
Becker, 1977) claim that it implies that addicts are happy in their addiction (as they continually
maximize utility). Becker and Murphy defend this by pointing out that it is an existing state of
unhappiness that may fuel addictive-creating behavior. But they ignore the potential for future
regret (as an addict robbing his mother or a stranger may have), to reverse the effect of the
positive expectations for utility that influence current consumption as a maximizing strategy over
all periods (lifetime). 42 They acknowledge that the full price of the stock component (multiperiod effects from consumption of the addictive good) includes harm to future earning capacity,
but the individual is assumed to possess the ability to calculate this cost with full cognizance of
changes in their expected level of addiction over time. There is no regret for any other effect on
health or lifestyle, and apparently perfect knowledge of health effects and how much they will
cost.
This approach imbues Becker and Murphy’s addicts with perspicacity and foresight I
claim to be uncharacteristic of addicts. I do not deny that a predictable adaptation to a future
price change is achievable in some circumstances, but beyond that narrow demonstration, the
economics of our contrary positions boils down to premises that will or will not find support in
other analyses including those of specialists in psychology, habit, and addiction. It is the
fundamental nature of addiction to harmful goods that people are not voluntary in their choice of
level of consumption, so calculation of the costs of effects would be elaborate, and perhaps

42

Becker and Murphy incorporate a Z(t) variable representing individual experience, meant to individuate the
consumption stock variables’ effect on the change of consumption stock (their equation 22). But their mathematical
defense of this assertion still employs a fixed rate of disappearance and fixed time preference, both of which I
challenge with experimental evidence in surrounding sections here.
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beyond the abilities even of someone whose rational faculties were not compromised by
substance abuse. Failure to appreciate the severity of one’s condition, or denial of that severity
would similarly lead to failures to update one’s choice criteria and behavior given new
information (a failure of “Bayesian learning”), so that a Bayesian proxy maximization of utility
also might not be achievable, much less serve as the primary assumption for deterministic
modeling.
Clever re-definition of the term addiction can lead to consistent conclusions when crafted
by bright minds, but the provocative results must not be confused with comprehensive
descriptions of behavior when an artificial ideal of behavior is being described. Their taught
metaphor overextends when they describe binge eating as not reflecting inconsistent behavior
because the binging individual is maximizing over time to balance future weight and the desire
to eat more (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, 2000; Fulponi, OECD 2009, Maio et al. 2007).
Becker and Murphy maintain that “cold turkey” solution to addiction is a lowering of
demand (due to price cues), or of stock of consumption. Such lowering is due to “events” that
somehow do not affect time preference, or involve new awareness, or new resolve. Their model
is consistent, but not determinative. The only element preserving its integrity are the assumptions
that people are rational. When people are indeed rational, the math is consistent. If people are not
rational, the findings are not as deterministic as the authors imply.
For example, a “come to Jesus” moment inspiring a “cold turkey” break in severe
addiction can also be a sudden change in time preference favoring future utility in greater
relation to present utility. Car crashes, near fatal overdoses, arrests, nearly killing one’s own
child – all things that might suddenly change someone’s preferences or time preferences – are
assumed to occur without changing time preferences. This is not a change in price, but a change
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in awareness of price. If there was a lack of awareness before, there was not a full application of
available and relevant information, and this is a failure of rationality. With such a dramatic
moment, there may be a paradigm shift that may lead to an aspect of self-control being exercised
that was heretofore unwanted, considered too costly, or which the individual judged themselves
incapable of executing. While this may be described by the convex utility curve with
discontinuity (figure 2 and Appendix B, in Becker and Murphy), it could just as well be a shift in
time preferences.
Such an event may motivate the employment of an alternate time preference, a conscious
choice that weakens the grasp of an addiction whose primary power is in its seeming resistance
to conscious change. Or failure of rationality may revive and dominate, with the addictive
behavior returning: “people seem to have a powerful ability not to apply general lessons they
understand well to specific situations” (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, p 114). In their discussion
of how rational addicts will handle sufficiently strong complementarity (cold turkey or high
sustained use, figure 2 and Appendix B, in Becker and Murphy), Becker and Murphy clearly
explain what endpoint solutions may look like given particular values of their consumption
capital variable. But they do not describe why their consumption capital variable may abruptly
change, or revert once changed. They describe equations of motion and graphs of optimal paths
for control variables, but ignore psychological effects of “events,” and treat changes in time
preferences (time-separable utility) as if conscious decision cannot generate them. Numerous
real-world possibilities defy their assumptions.
This exploration of the limitations of the Becker and Murphy Rational Addiction model
demonstrates that there are potential weaknesses in the theory of rational addiction that mirror
problems with the neoclassical theory of rational choice as a utility maximizing process.
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Breaking from the unifying vision of all decision makers actively using a rational utilitymaximizing calculus in every decision, I cite critics of this theory not to argue against the precept
that a rational utility-maximizing calculus remains a useful construct, but against the assumption
that it is a universally applicable descriptor of behavior. As section 6.8 elaborates, evidence for
other decision criteria is well documented. Particular to the seemingly minor decision to have a
serving or two of sCSD every day or two, clinical evidence for “failures of rationality” (see Sassi
and Hurst in section 6.8 below) is compelling. There may still exist a rational decision process,
but one hardly conforming to neoclassical assumptions of exponential discounting, fixed tastes
and time preferences, perfect information about the physical and mental effects of continuing the
habit, or to the assumption that the individual is consciously making (rather than avoiding) a
logical calculation in the first place.

6.8

Psychology, Behavioral Economics, Decision Theory, and sCSDs
Those not indoctrinated to the neoclassical economic assumptions of narrow but

comprehensive self-interest, perfectly competitive markets – including full information, zero
transaction costs, complete markets – dispassionate and conscious decision-making, and choices
for which all costs and benefits are accounted now and for the future have been questioning the
rigor of these assumptions for some time. They are occasionally awarded Nobel prizes in
economics, like psychologists Herbert Simon (1978), and later Daniel Kahneman, who in 2002
was a co-recipient with Vernon L. Smith. 43 Smith was one founder of behavioral economics, a

43

Attacks of these same assumptions, attacks that rely on empirical evidence, arise from many camps, including
from Harvard Law Professor Christine Holls, and University of Chicago Jurisprudence Professor Cass Sunstein, and
University of Chicago Professor of Economics and Behavioral Science Richard Thaler, in “A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics,” from a 1988 volume of the Stanford Law Review. Kahneman’s long-time co-author Amos
Tversky would likely also have been honored with the Nobel in economics, but had become ineligible, as Nobels are
not awarded posthumously.
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field that studies the effects of social, cognitive, and emotional factors on economic decisions – a
field tending to produce “experimental findings that suggest inadequacies of standard economic
theories” (Pesendorfer 2006, p 712). 44 The theories of these critics suggest some immediacy in
addressing the question why some people routinely ingest large amounts of added sugars despite
some understanding that this will negatively impact their health.
Herbert Simon’s theories of bounded rationality and satisficing were introduced in
association with Figure 3 in section 6.5. Simon’s theories address choice made under uncertainty.
Kahneman and Tversky propose that people use experience-based techniques for problem
solving, called heuristics, that establish “rule-of-thumb” guidelines to simplify decision making
(Kahneman 1991). Kahneman and Tversky also proffer a “prospect theory” by which the
reference point from which one judges gains and losses that are to result from a decision tends to
affect which decision is made (Pesendorfer 2006). This further supports the notion that context
has the capacity to drive choice at least as much as any known internal preference structure.
Indeed, empirical proof of the propositions of prospect theory require that one of the four axioms
of traditional Bayesian decision theory as developed by Ramsey and Savage must be abandoned,
because proof that an introduced reference point can change an individual’s choice means that
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Pesendorfer, 2006, p 720 (his emphasis):
Behavioral economics has reached the status of an established discipline.
…This symbiotic relationship with standard economics works well as long as small changes to standard assumptions are
made. In that case, the behavioral evidence can be the impetus for small changes of standard models that leave the basic
structure intact. …
With the success of behavioral economics, more radical departures are being considered. …There is no “small”
modification of the standard model that can deal convincingly with the hypothesis that people are wrong about their
objective function or process probabilities incorrectly.
Behavioral economics emphasizes the context-dependence of decision making.

To re-iterate, in my flowchart model of food-choice behavior, I do not question the objective function, but do
question whether individuals are routinely well-enough informed to construct accurate probabilities. This is not a
claim that they could not properly process actual probabilities, if provided them. Separately, I suggest that
individuals may not act on known probabilities if they are addicted, or if they subsume the active decision
process purely out of habit, or from a heuristic derived from faulty premises about the consequences of the choice
to regularly consume SSBs, or from faulty premises about the state of knowledge in nutrition science.
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environmental factors other than utilities determine the value of choice alternatives (Gärdenfors
and Sahlin 1988).
Once there is concession that factors exogenous to an individual’s preference structure
(utility) influence maximization calculations, the objectivity of theories dependent on
calculations requiring objective probability of (payoff) states (per van Neumann and
Morgenstern) is compromised. This is a critical break, because a Bayesian decider need only
satisfy the four Savage axioms to achieve a result “as if he assigned numerical utilities, at least
implicitly, to alternative possible outcomes of his behavior” (John Harsanyi, 1977, his emphasis,
quoted p 13 in Gärdenfors and Sahlin 1988). Proving failure of even one of the Savage axioms in
certain contexts thus implies that individual ability to maximize utility cannot be assumed.
Individuals who resist incorporating new information in their decision process fail in Bayesian
learning, and cannot be assumed to maximize utility by standards of classical decision theory.
Some obesogenic behaviors refute a Bayesian learning process (Maio et al. 2007).
Daniel Ellsberg also demonstrates a paradox arising from the four Savage axioms.
Differences in information about the (payoff) states can reflect in individual preferences, such that
“the alternative for which the exact probability of winning can be determined is preferred to the
alternative where the probability of winning is ‘ambiguous’.” This violates the assumption (third
axiom) “that a decision maker’s beliefs can be represented by a unique probability measure; the
quality of a decision maker’s information about the state should thus not affect his or her
preferences” (Ellsberg, 1961, quoted p 12 in Gärdenfors and Sahlin 1988, who note that
“ambiguous” is Ellsberg’s term). For someone who enjoys their cola but has a low level of
nutrition knowledge, there follows from this example a preference for the known payoff
(enjoyment of consumption experience), versus the “ambiguous” long-term health effects. The
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effects are well-known to the medical community, but as long as they are poorly understood by
the consumer, s/he may be overconsuming due to a miscalculation of expected utilities rooted in
poor nutrition knowledge. From Maio et al., this behavior is also resistant to Bayesian updating.
Reproduced on a large scale, this would result in a state mirroring actual U.S. sCSD
consumption figures and very high-volume purchase increase (tripling since 1970, Nielsen and
Popkin 2004) that follows from poor nutritional knowledge. Because much of this purchase
derives from ignorance and habits, it is not an unambiguous expression of preferences. Therefore
sCSD “demand” is right-shifted by both poor information – a form of the “Ellsberg paradox”
under which individual choice does not conform with highest expected utility – and by
environmental factors. Fully informed consumers with Bayesian learning, the kind economists
tend to assume, would “demand” millions of gallons less of a product with no redeeming
nutritional features that accounts for 7% of all caloric intake. The environmental context in
which food decisions are made has been studied in detail since Kahneman and Tversky’s work,
becoming a focal point of behavioral economic research, with Brian Wansink a prominent name
in the oeuvre.

6.8.1

“Fast and Frugal” Heuristics, Neurobiology of Decision, Failures of Rationality –

When Neoclassical Assumptions Fail to Hold
Gerd Gigerenzer, director of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, in an
essay for the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (vol. 5, 2001),
summarizes a concept of Simon’s that will prove useful in evaluating failures from the
neoclassical model of rationality. Taking for simplicity but one of an individual’s goals, if in
attempting to satisfy that goal an individual has an aspiration level rather than optimization
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criteria, s/he will choose among the universe of alternatives the first choice that satisfies or
surpasses the aspiration level. An aspiration level may be dynamically adjusted according to
feedback. Gigerenzer also modifies Kahneman and Tversky’s (1974) “heuristics and biases”
approach to what Gigerenzer calls fast and frugal heuristics – fast in that there are simple
stopping rules to a search that employ little computation, and frugal in that they use little
information. Fast and frugal heuristics can include ignorance-based decision making and
elimination heuristics. He is careful to explain conditions under which such criteria could prove
optimal, and notes that fast and frugal heuristics could be dynamically altered just as aspiration
levels may be. “The challenge here is to understand what the class of heuristics is, how a
heuristic is selected, and in which environments it is successful” (p 4).
Camerer offers further scientific support for some behavioral-economic challenges to
conventional economic assumptions: “neuroscience has established some tentative neural
foundation for ideas from behavioural economics which were first derived earlier from
experiments and field data” (C32). There is clear evidence for nonlinear probability weighting,
where low probabilities are overweighted, and near certainties are underweighted, seen in the
part of the brain (caudate) that anticipates reward. There is clear evidence that in strategic games
some players use fewer cognitive steps, limiting their strategic thinking, and irrationally
jeopardizing their chances for a favorable outcome. With regards to time discounting, there is
neural evidence that discounting in the conventional economic sense occurs in frontal parts of the
cortex, whereas “present bias” occurs in a more emotional part of brain, implying that the full
process of discounting is “a splice of two processes” (p C32). “Ambiguity aversion” manifests in
a rapid emotional response in the amygdala, more rapid than conscious processing can occur.
This response is observed when there is ambiguity, and does not occur merely for risky bets.
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People with a higher brain activity in an area above the eye sockets had higher ambiguityaversion parameters in studies. Thus there is neural evidence that risk and ambiguity are
processed quite differently. Camerer cites decision theorist Raiffa from a 1961 article, on clinical
results of decision trials: “But if certain uncertainties in the problem were in cloudy or fuzzy
[ambiguous] form, then very often there was a shifting of gears and no effort at all was made to
think deliberately and reflectively about the problem. Systematic decomposition of the problem
was shunned and an over-all ‘seat of the pants’ judgment was made which graphically reflected
the temperament of the decision maker” (p C33).
There is a certain computer logic to this. Why devote scarce decision resources to a
problem whose outcome cannot be probabilistically determined due to ambiguity? There may be
no plainly logical solution. Still, consider how critical this difference must be when one doesn’t
understand the proven risks of global warming, or bad diet, but instead follows the suggestions
of industries commercially threatened by actual science. Emotion is engaged, deliberative
processes are short-circuited, and one reverts to belief rather than evidence. Taking Raiffa’s
evidence as definitive would predict that industries under threat of regulation or taxation may
thus diffuse the force of public opinion simply by generating contrary studies, and airing
advertisements favoring their own views, or without fraud, phrasing the problem in a way that
deflects attention from settled science and toward an ambiguous personal value. Even if these
industry gambits can claim no scientific merit to vouch for them, the public, hearing only a
summary on the news or at the water cooler, will understand that there is scientific ambiguity,
and the industry’s objective is obtained: public support for binding new measures less likely
builds to a strong majority. How could it build when an emotional tie to the status quo is pitted
against a failure to engage a deliberative rational choice process? From the Red Scare of the
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early 1950s, to resistance to controls on smoking before 1964, to resistance to global climate
change, to resistance to nutritional evidence of poor health outcomes from the predominant
American diet, one might find reams of evidence over the last 60 years supporting a prediction
that the neuro-psychological tendency that Raiffa, and later Camerer identify, would be exploited
by any faction with a greater political-economic self-interest in others deciding from emotion
rather than based on empirically supported hypotheses and facts.
Fast and frugal heuristics may engage by default for behaviors already relegated to a
secondary level of attention. The decision having already been made to move a behavior to
secondary status, habit and passive influences would be expected to reign without tempering
from deliberative thought. I mentioned in association with Figure 3 that eating has been
determined to be often a “secondary behavior” to behaviors receiving primary attention, such as
working or watching television. Bertrand and Schazenbach, from their evaluation of the Eating
and Health Module of the American Time Use Survey, calculate that “half of all daily calories
are consumed while also engaged in another task” (p 170). They refer to Brian Wansink’s results
that demonstrate that when a person’s cognitive load (demand for attention, decision-making and
judgment) is high, the person is prone to overeating and misjudging how much they eat
(Wansink 2006). The degree to which Wansink’s many experiments confirm this suggests
diminished flow to the food-decision criteria in the last dashed box influencing decision criteria,
in Figure 3 (section 6.5).
Who is prone to overlooking minor food decisions to a degree that suggests an
automaticity of behavior and a potential impact on health? Wansink and Sobal (2007) conduct
studies that suggest the answer is, well, almost everybody. One study of 139 college students
found that each underestimated the number of food-related decisions they made daily by an
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average of around 221 decisions per day. A second found that subjects presented with an
exaggerated environmental cue (a larger bowl) not only ate more, but “21% denied having eaten
more, 75% attributed it to other reasons (such as hunger), and only 4% attributed it to the cue” (p
106). It seems people are unaware of the vast majority of food decisions they make, meaning
these decisions must be habitual and routinized, or at least fly under the radar of discrete decision
making, and people are unaware of how the food environment influences their decisions or are
unwilling to acknowledge such influence (Wansink and Sobal 2007).
“Habitual processes are especially relevant to understand eating because people eat in
regular patterns that are likely to be susceptible to habit formations” (Rothman, Sheeran, Wood
2009; p S12). Who wants to admit they are not actively controlling something as basic as their
food choices, as these sets of authors suggest we must be doing? Who indeed. But there is a
strength in not actively controlling food choice, albeit one that seems chronically to be turned to
a weakness.
Consider evidence and conclusions from Cohen and Farley (2008), both medical doctors
with masters’ degrees in Public Health, who offer a RAND-Corporation-sponsored special topic
piece in Preventing Chronic Disease that explains why many eating behaviors would be
automatic, and some of the reasons people seem unlikely to admit this. Sampling from multiple
points in their piece quickly stitches an empirically consistent case for viewing eating behavior
as only minimally determined by conscious thought, and largely determined by environmental
factors that if obesogenic, may well be denied:
Assuming that people who are overweight are simply unconcerned about their weight is tempting. But most
Americans consider themselves to be overweight, and nearly one-third are actively trying to lose weight
(including nearly one-fourth of women of normal weight). The observation that so many people continue to
gain weight despite wanting to be thin is more accurately explained by describing eating as an automatic
behavior (p 4).
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Human beings have limited cognitive capacities, with the ability to consciously process only 40 to 60 bits of
information per second—equivalent to a short sentence. However, the entire processing capacity, which
includes the visual system and the unconscious, is estimated to be 11 million bits per second. Therefore the
brain needs mechanisms that do not require cognitive awareness to perceive the environment and react to it.
Indeed, human beings’ ability to be effective, high-functioning beings depends not only on their ability to
think abstractly and creatively but also on their ability to free their minds for this higher-level thinking by
assigning routine tasks to lower-level brain involvement. Therefore noncognitive behaviors are not a sign of
weakness but rather an adaptation that allows human beings to be a uniquely productive species.
…A great deal of mental effort is required to make conscious decisions and then implement them in the
form of behaviors. Most of our responses to our environment can be understood as automatic behaviors. …
Bargh has defined four characteristics of automatic behaviors: 1) they occur without awareness, 2) they are
initiated without intention, 3) they continue once initiated without control, and 4) they operate efficiently or
with little effort. … Once people initiate eating, they usually continue until the food is gone or until some
other external occurrence changes the situation.
Automatic behaviors…occur without awareness, are initiated without intention, tend to continue without
control, and operate efficiently or with little effort (p 1). …
Automatic behaviors share another important characteristic. Because people are unaware of the behaviors,
they are also unaware that the behaviors are not under their control. …
Bargh and Chartrand found that even after people have been shown the results of experiments demonstrating
the automatic nature of their actions, they steadfastly refuse to believe that those actions did not result from
conscious choice. … We blame our lack of willpower on the inability to maintain a diet, when it is more
likely that our automatic responses to ubiquitous cues to eat and the availability of cheap, convenient, caloriedense food are responsible (p 4, emphasis added, Cohen and Farley’s citations omitted).

Cohen and Farley do not push this argument beyond plausibility, offering hope for policy
intervention: “Characterizing eating as an automatic behavior does not mean that human beings
cannot bring eating under volitional control. …All automatic behaviors can be controlled
temporarily” (p 4). Their policy proposals are drastic to the economists’ eye however (see Essay
Three), but more modest policy proposals can follow from their insights.
For many individuals eating manifests behaviors consistent with the Simon and
Kahneman and Tversky critiques, as explained in the OECD’s 2008 The Prevention of LifestyleRelated Chronic Diseases: An Economic Framework (which is Sassi and Hurst 2008) : “bounded
rationality…essentially refers to the presence of cognitive errors in the exercise of rational
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choice for particular forms of consumption. Examples…include the erroneous or partial
understanding of long-term health risks, bias associated with framing of information upon which
choices are based, and others” (p 27). Section 6.7 here details dietary and medical knowledge
upon which many American consumers are failing to act, to the consequent compromise of their
own health. If their conscious goals do not include raising their own chance of obesity, diabetes,
cardiovascular disease, and cancer, then obviously their information is not complete, or their
heuristics are biased, or they are not considering the consequences of their dietary choices much
at all (hyperbolic discounting), or all three. (All of this is in Figure 3, with more to follow before
we see Figure 4, below.) From Sassi and Hurst: “In the case of health-related consumption
behaviors, information is often lacking on the nature and magnitude of the associated health
risks….because it does not exist…because it is concealed or communicated in a misleading form
by parties that have a vested interest…or because it is complex and not easily accessible to the
lay person” (p 25).
Also writing for the OECD, a year after Sassi and Hurst, Fulponi (OECD 2009) explains
heuristics that are efficient in one dimension, but which manifest with low utility outcomes:
Experimental research findings [in behavioral economics] suggest that heuristics or rules of thumb are
often used to simplify decision making and are important in predicting which foods an individual eats, how
much, and whether he will eat these again. This may be an efficient approach to decision making given
time constraints. However, if decision making under time constraints is coupled with outcomes that are
uncertain or occur in the future, errors of judgment can become large (p 13).

We can now see this type of error as ignorance and hyperbolic discounting combining to define
food-choice decision heuristics that “backfire” by imposing lower or negative long-term utility
(as in equation c).
Sassi and Hurst refer not only to information failures as undermining rationality
assumptions, but also to failures of rationality, which include the way choices are made (rules of
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thumb or heuristics may be flawed), biased perception of the information available, including
bias due to the way that information is presented, and cognitive errors in the interpretation of
information. 45 Cawley (2004) refers to “lack of rationality” as, along with information deficits
and externalities, one of the three broad areas of market failure. Cawley states that “lack of
rationality” “covers a vast gray area, with borders undefined by economics and which need to be
informed by cognitive and life sciences” 46 (p 120). Sassi and Hurst also offer evidence from
Lipscomb, Weinstein, and Torrance (1996), who “summarized the key findings from a large
body of empirical literature about time preferences in relation to a variety of outcomes, including
health” (Sassi and Hurst, p 26). They note from Lipscomb, Weinstein, and Torrance that “people
may discount heavily future risks that are perceived as relatively small at the time of
consumption;” “discount rates for losses are typically lower than for gains;” and because
possibly adverse health outcomes are considered for periods far enough in the future so that good
health may be valued less, this “may diminish the importance of such outcomes (heavier
discounting) in the eyes of the consumer” (p 26). Each of these documented behaviors translates
easily to the series of small daily decisions regarding added sugars. “…[S]ubstantial empirical
evidence…indicates that individual health related behaviours often reflect hyperbolic
discounting. This refers to an accelerated form of discounting, which heavily penalises future
outcomes in present judgments, in a way that makes time preferences inconsistent” (p 26).

45

Cognitive errors in the interpretation of information would include what psychological research shows to be a
cognitive bias in misinterpreting new information as more supportive of a previously held hypothesis than it is,
called a confirmatory bias. Agents are seen by Rabin and Schrag (1999) to reach beyond overconfidence, to “near
certainty in a false hypothesis despite receiving an infinite amount of information” (p 37). This brings into new light
the Variyam and Golan quote in 6.7.2.b about the confusion surrounding nutrition information in consumers’ minds,
where perhaps nutrition beliefs consumers hold due to ignorance, poor heuristics, or to justify previous behavior (L.
Festinger’s cognitive dissonance) could bias them to discount or ignore scientific evidence that would provoke a
change of diet in homo economicus.
46
Sassi and Hurst precisely cite cognitive sciences (behavioral economic estimations of time preference) as a means
to inform economic gray areas, and I refer to cognitive and life sciences in this chapter, as Cawley broadly defines
them.
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Sassi and Hurst’s critique is consistent with Pesendorfer, who cites David Laibson that
there is “experimental evidence of an ‘immediacy effect’ in behavior: subjects have a tendency
to choose earlier, smaller rewards over later, larger rewards when the earlier reward offers
immediate consumption but reverse this preference when both rewards are delayed” (p 713).
Again, the implication for sCSD consumption versus abstinence is implicit, and blends well with
implications from Ellsberg’s paradox, showing a preference for the known payoff now versus the
less certain payoff later.
Addressing habitual and addictive behaviors specifically, Sassi and Hurst note that
whether there is a chemical or psychological addiction, “the non-independence of acts of
consumption…may cause concern about individuals’ ability to maximize their own welfare,”
much as I model in sections 6.5 and 6.6. They cite a UK government report emphasizing two
psychological mechanisms that present obstacles to changing habitual behaviors. “Tunnel
vision” reduces the motivation to seek or use information that may better inform people of the
consequences of their behavior, and creates a tendency to discount the value of new information,
especially “when it highlights risks associated with the habitual behavior.” The second
mechanism is that people with habits tend to implicitly assume that because it was desirable to
build the habit, it must be desirable to continue it. Referring to these mechanisms, they state that
“in doing so consumers may overlook longer-term consequences of that consumption which may
well offset any short-term efficiency gains” (p 27-8, for this paragraph). They concede that there
is empirical support for Becker and Murphy’s prediction from rational addiction theory that
higher permanent prices will dissuade addiction, but Sassi and Hurst warn: “Of course,
individuals may still be subject to information failures or failures of rationality which would
make their behaviours inefficient, leading to less than desirable outcomes…” (p 28). Thus, there
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is in this OECD document much to support contentions with Becker and Murphy (6.7.5), much
that exactly supports the concepts defining the models proposed in sections 6.5 and 6.6.

6.8.2

Habitual Eating Patterns – Ignoring Information, Ad-Hoc Preference Formation
In a 2000 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making article, O’Donoghue and Rabin

characterize results quite evocative of the minimal attention paid by some to habitual sCSD
consumption and the longer-term effects of even minor self-control problems, among which we
may consider including unhealthful eating habits:
[S]mall-scale day-to-day decisions are where self-control problems are most likely to influence behavior.
...As we have shown with examples where mild self-control problems cause severe welfare losses, when
making a long sequence of day-to-day decisions, none of which seem important in isolation, even a small
bit of a self-control problem can lead a person to behave in ways different from how she would like to
behave from a long-run perspective” (p 247).

Rothman, Sheeran, and Wood (2009), psychologists exploring deliberative and automatic
processes in dietary choice, offer insight into habits 47 and their effects on eating patterns:
[H]abits bypass reflective action control and automatically maintain dietary behaviors without people
being aware of or intending to respond in the same way as they did in the past.
…As people repeatedly purchase and consume, the size of food portions [exogenously influenced by
packaging, we know from Wansink and Sobal’s results], types of food eaten, and frequency of eating form
characteristic patterns that can become habitual and activated by the context cues that were associated with
eating in the past.

47

Use of the terms “habit” and “habitual behavior” in this paper are not intended to have the full force that
psychologists or social psychologists assign the terms, because I do not claim fluency in their literatures, but are
meant to convey behaviors that are repeated to the point that they take on a degree of automaticity and performance
without conscious intent or perhaps even awareness. Thus, there is at least some degree of bypassing a discrete and
deliberative choice process. I do not intend to conflate “frequency of purchase” with “habitual use” of sCSDs in the
empirical work (Essay One, i.e. Chapters 2–4, built on household purchase data), but in this theoretical work and the
empirical work, I wish to distinguish purchase and consumption patterns that are presumptively automatic (will
average a high minimum each month, even if exact dates vary) from those households that purchase rarely or are
specifically motivated by rare events in the household. No household that purchases 3 liters of Coke every
Christmas and no other time should be characterized as habitual consumers, and no household that buys a few
hundred ounces every few weeks should be exempt from being labeled a habitual purchaser/consumer.
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…[Practice of habits] not only heightens habit accessibility but also reduces the accessibility of
alternative responses. …[B]ehaviors, once they become habitual, are maintained without reference to
preferences and intentions (S11-12; emphasis added; Social psychologists Verplanken, Aarts, and Van
Knippenberg [1997] offer some of the empirical support for these conclusions, as do Verplanken and Faes
[1999], and Verplanken and Wood [2006]).

The last sentence is critical for it claims that everyday behaviors can routinely bypass an
individual’s active set of preferences and goals, in which case deliberative RUMax behavior does
not automatically or easily re-engage once habitual behavior diverges from what deliberative
RUMax behavior would be. The sheer number of Americans unhappy with their weight, heart
disease, and type II diabetes suggests that divergence is quite possible. Perhaps even probable,
given our natural tendency to form habits, then automatically follow them without programmatic
checking to confirm they conform with our RUMax preferences and personal goals.
Social psychologists specifically caution that “frequency of past behavior” is inadequate
to define a habit, as there must not only be repetition, but the development of a degree of
“automaticity” to a behavior for it to be what they call “habitual” (Maio et al. 2007, addressing
obesogenic behavior and how to combat it).
…[A] habit is frequent behavior that is conducted with little conscious awareness and intention, is mentally
efficient, and may sometimes be difficult to control… In addition a habit is cued by the environment in
which the behavior is conducted.
…Previous research has established a number of factors that make habits formidable obstacles…: [f]irst,
habit leads to ‘tunnel vision.’ When habits have developed, an individual is less motivated to attend to and
acquire new information, particularly information that is not consistent with the habit. …[H]abits tend to
resist information-based interventions. Second, habitual behavior seems less guided by attitudes and
intentions than behavior that is conducted in a more deliberative fashion. When a particular behavior is
repeated over and over again, the original reasons and arguments why that behavior was adopted in the first
place may vanish over time (Maio et al.: p 104, citing numerous others).

From these two last quotes we see that particular to food choices, the development of
habits is likely to divorce actual behavior from known preferences and long-term intentions, to
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exclude options for improving habits or deliberative consideration of information that may
expose the flaws of one’s habits. All of this follows from a type of mental efficiency that obeys
biological constraints of perception, information processing, and decision-making resources in
the formation of initial habits, a process that will generate the habit as an output, and no longer
account the environmental (including marketing) cues that were used in the formation.
But habits once formed have a further advantage over intentions – they engage faster, and
without the need to consult the brain’s regulatory center, where the decision to deliberate incepts:
In short, the environment’s automatic activation of well-practiced responses is a key to persistence of habits
despite people’s best intentions. …
First, given that habits are cued relatively directly by the environment with minimal decision making, the
practiced response is likely to be more immediately available than thoughtfully generated alternatives. When
multiple response options are available, the speed of automatically activated responses gives them
precedence over responses generated through slower routes. Second, habits require minimal regulatory
control (p 93). …
In summary, the expectations established through behavior repetition and the automaticity of habit performance
are conservative forces that reduce openness to new information and that perpetuate well-practiced behaviors
despite people’s intentions to do otherwise (Verplanken and Wood 2006, p 95).

In a mode of biological and psychological efficiency (saving decision capacity and the
glucose needed to fuel higher brain functions), under familiar circumstances with no clear and
imminent threat, eating behavior often becomes routine. This saves decision making for choices
considered more important. This is then “satisficing,” and eating as a secondary behavior
occurring as an internally efficient process may recur daily, until habitual. Once established,
habitual patterns are hard to break, as the biological and environmental triggers of habitual
behavior reduce awareness and shrink the window for assertion of intentions – intentions being
consistent with longer-term objectives.
Developing habits, can be a useful functional build-out of heuristics into a behavioral
framework that saves effort and time. Naturally, such solutions favor short-term results to the
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exclusion of better long-term options that would require careful information gathering, Bayesian
learning, and deliberative changes in routinized behavior. “…Habits are functional in obtaining
certain goals or end states. Habits are thus specific behavioral responses to specific cues in the
environment. …Habits may also become the main driving force of behavior, while attitude and
intentions become unrelated to behavior” (Verplanken and Faes 1999, p 594). Development of
habits solves some problems in the low-priority realm of daily eating (from a single day’s
perspective), while establishing an inertia resistant to efforts to change those habits. No one
would wish to make all of their hundreds of daily food decisions discretely. The question
becomes the degree to which one allows one’s rational utility maximization to be compromised,
and whether one has calculated the effects of failing to do so in a way that is fair to one’s future
self.

6.8.2.a

Eating Habits and Decision Theory
Do habits override intentions as the social psychologists contend, such that a preference

for immediate gratification overwhelms goals for long-term health? If so, there is timeinconsistent preference, and if also regret, a failure of rationality. If preferences are known
ordered discrete and considered, as neoclassical economists argue, then no such conflict exists.
This returns us to decision theory.
Decision research scientist Ellen Peters (2009) provides further insight into the decision
environment associated with eating. In sharp contrast to treating preferences as individual
characteristics that can be handled empirically as known, fixed, and beyond the individual’s
control or the environment’s ability to affect, Peters quotes other authors as noting that nearly
every current theory in decision making may be characterized as a theory of preference
construction. Thus Peters indicates knowledge among a great class of decision theorists that
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preferences are constructed at the time of decision making “based on internal and external cues
available at the moment” (p S81). “…[E]ven in familiar domains such as everyday eating
behaviors…decisions are quite prone to preference construction” (p S82). According to Peters,
preference construction (versus recall and application of known preferences in a consciously
deliberative decision process) is more likely when there are conflicts between known preferences
(say, a sweet drink now, versus target weight later), when feelings are difficult to fit onto a
numeric scale, and when people do not have strong feelings about different options (eating habits
do not trigger strong feelings).
Beyond simple comprehension, individuals must be able to determine meaningful differences between
opinions, weigh factors to match their needs and values, make tradeoffs (e.g., between risks and benefits)
and ultimately choose. But consumers often make food purchases and consumption behaviors based on
habit, implying that many of these later processes do not always take place in day-to-day eating behaviors
and are instead replaced by habitual responding (p 85).

Peters further offers that as preferences are constructed “on the spot” based on internal
and external cues at the moment, there are two tracks, a fast one that conserves decision
resources, and a slow one that does not. She labels these “affect heuristics,” which use emotion,
and are effortless, spontaneous, implicit, intuitive, automatic, associative, and fast; and the
“deliberative mode,” which uses rational thought and is “conscious, analytical, reason-based,
verbal, [and] relatively slow” (p S82). For most eating, habitual behaviors are therefore likely to
“kick in” unless there is an uncommon demand for a deliberative process. With this perspective
we can see why marketing of snacks, fast food, and soft drinks can be so effective. It specifically
triggers the mode that quickly and automatically intercedes before deliberative (rational utilitymaximizing) thought, unless one is quite wary: “Marketers, who well understand the power of
affect, typically aim their ads to evoke an experiential mode of information processing. As a
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result, individuals must learn to cope with these feelings that food marketers attempt to elicit if
they want healthy eating habits” (p S82).
Maio et al. (2007) speak of “automatic attitudes” that “arise spontaneously without
thought or deliberation,” and “implicit measures” that affect evaluations of choice options
whether or not people can remember what these implicit measures are. These largely parallel
concepts that decision-theorist Peters and behavioral economists and psychologists (including
Kahneman) discuss, albeit with differing vocabulary, describe a fast and reflexive decision
process mode that one would associate with a successful marketing/television-advertising
campaign – one that ties a conceptual image to a branded product. Of many possible examples,
consider Coca-Cola®, with its themed campaigns selling “life,” enjoyment, and an active sports
life – images more central to its ads than the sugar water itself. Particular to food, Maio et al.’s
implicit measures “arise quickly and spontaneously without thought or deliberation.”
“…[I]mplicit measures can predict variance in behavior that is not explained by self-report measures of
attitude. …[R]esearchers…found that implicit measures of preference for brands of yoghurt…fast-food
restaurants…and colas significantly predicted brand choice, product usage, and even brand recognition in a
blind taste test. …[T]he implicit measures predicted variables even after controlling for the explicit ratings
[self-reported measures of attitude]. Thus implicit measures have a unique relationship with common, foodrelated behaviors. …[T]his unique relationship may be particularly strong when the behaviors are relatively
spontaneous and automatic, rather than thoughtful or deliberative (…) (p 115-6; emphasis added; embedded
citations dropped, and marked by “(…)”).

This is further empirical support directly refuting the assumption that food choices are evaluated
subject to deliberative, RUMax choice, or inflexible intrinsic preferences.

6.8.2.b Poor Information Gathering, Advertising, and Failure to “Bayesian Update”
Zimmerman (2011) adds to literature concerned with the ability to affect perception and
preference by controlling marketing variables. He refers to retailers who construct an appearance
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of value by placing higher cost items near lower cost ones, as with “supersizing” and “value
meals.” Using Peters’ perspective, this triggers the rapid “affect” reward of getting a deal, the
illusion of having deliberated properly, while preventing a deeper deliberation on overeating:
“the marketer’s trick is to get the consumer to overconsume by focusing on the virtue of
economy, not on the vice of gluttony” (Zimmerman, p 294).
There is clear and longstanding evidence that time constraints affect the gathering of
nutrition information as well as the preparation of healthy meals. When quality of food is a
secondary or tertiary focus of attention, food advertising may fill a gap, but will also favor
convenience foods and highly processed foods. Food is the second most advertised product
category, with expenditures in 1995 of around $16 billion, versus the $0.3 billion the USDA
spent promoting the Food Guide Pyramid and healthy eating practices (Blaylock et al. 1999, for
the paragraph). Smith (2002) argues that people evolved searching for particular biological
information about food options, but that the information in television advertisements poorly
matches the biological search criteria, and that television ads for processed foods in this sense
misinform.
Advertising showing happy, attractive, successful people (or professional athletes), or
cute carefree cartoon animals enjoying SSBs/sCSDs might join an individual’s own socialization
watching her family and friends drink soft drinks. At the very least it is clear that the ads appeal
to an emotional level rather than conveying economic or nutrition information about the product,
and this would trigger the emotional decision structure (Peters’s “affect”), versus a deliberative
(slower) one. Smith (2002) cites evidence that the actual nutritional quality of advertised foods is
usually poor. But the associative imagery from the ads may still trigger socialization or possibly
preference formation (Smith 2002), and more certainly may trigger selection of the advertised
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food. In this way advertising might feed “social norms and social imitation” that “function as
decision-making guidelines that keep individual learning and information search to a minimum.”
“Custom, not optimization, governs much of life, even in the economic and intellectual worlds”
(Gigerenzer 2001, p 3308, both last quotes). Effective marketing of high-energy low-nutrient
foods can promulgate habitual consumption that divorces behavior from utility maximization,
and from the updating of decision behaviors with the availability of new information (Bayesian
decision theory, or Bayesian learning) that one would expect from a rational utility maximizer.
Without conformity to the precepts of the Bayesian theory of learning, there is no
theoretical mechanism determining that individuals with differing initial subjective probabilities
will “converge toward an intersubjective probability distribution if given more and more
information about what the world is actually like” (Gärdenfors and Sahlin 1988, p4, their
emphasis). The rigorous, comprehensive, self-correcting model of decision theory breaks down
given actual evidence of eating behaviors and the difficulties observed in trying to change them.
Eating environment and habits are factors that can mask, override, or even create at least
some portion of individual preferences. Wansink, Just, and Payne (2009) discuss ways the food
environment can lead to unconscious eating behaviors:
…[C]onsumption can also be unknowingly influenced by environmental cues—benchmarks or reference
points [such as large packages, plates or serving bowls, or even food stocked in pantries]—that may subtly
suggest a consumption norm that is appropriate, typical, reasonable, and normal. …[T]he tendency to be
biased by these cues may be even as powerful—within limits—as the taste of the food itself.
All of these cues perceptually suggest that a larger amount of food is normal, appropriate, typical, and
reasonable to consume. Most individuals dutifully follow these implicit suggestions. The influence of
consumption norms, as with normative benchmarks generally, often occurs outside of conscious awareness (p
165-6).

Low levels of nutrition knowledge can help formation of bad habits that themselves work
against the acquisition and incorporation of information that would update the decision structure
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toward achieving an equilibrium where long-term health is not significantly compromised. The
chain of rational utility maximization is broken, as long-term preferences are unconsciously
ignored by those in the rut of unhealthful eating habits. In the common food environment
contexts that satisfy Maio et al.’s, Wansink’s (including more evidence below), and Gärdenfors
and Sahlin’s observations, utility maximization cannot be assumed, and rationality seems
unlikely to hold to the defensible theoretical standard set by classical decision theory.
University of Chicago professors, Richard Thaler, of Economics and Behavioral Science
at the graduate school of business, and Cass Sunstein of the Law School came to many of these
same conclusions before much of the newer food-related behavioral economic work by Wansink
and colleagues was published. They refer to “Bayes’ rule” as a proxy for Bayesian learning,
discussed above, which explains how existing beliefs change the probability assigned to a
particular hypothesis as new evidence presents (Sunstein and Thaler 2003). “People do not
exhibit rational expectations, fail to make forecasts that are consistent with Bayes’ rule, use
heuristics that lead them to make systematic blunders, exhibit preference reversals (…) and make
different choices depending on the wording of the problem” (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, p 176).
“It is the strong claim that all or almost all Americans are choosing their diet optimally that we
reject as untenable” (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, p1168, their emphasis). They advocate reengineering of aspects of the food environment, as will be discussed in the Policy chapter (Essay
Three).
Thus a litany of theories well-tested by psychologists and behavioral economists criticize
the idea that Americans rationally optimize in their dietary habits. Just and Payne 2009:
Behavioral economic models combine heuristic decision rules with economic decision making. … Thus some
behavioral economic models seek to tell us how individuals’ decisions deviate from the decisions that might
make the individual better off. In the context of food, we may be able to model and identify when individuals
make decisions to consume that disregard or underweight health information. … …[I]n deciding whether to
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employ a rational or heuristic model, [we must question] whether the individuals are freely able to choose
the outcome they want. In this case, it is difficult to argue that obese individuals have chosen
deliberatively to become so. Rather, individuals invest 40 billion dollars annually in attempts to restrict their
own eating behavior in the form of diet plans (S50, emphasis added).

We can easily picture an individual with bounded rationality and imperfect
nutrition/medical knowledge with reasonable health goals that are short-circuited by the decision
habits he uses in the rush of daily life. It is easy to imagine an American who may not know their
optimal weight, but has an aspiration-level goal of a certain weight that may be maintained with
what he considers to be a reasonable level of food choice effort. If he edges over that weight, or
substantially overshoots the target without realizing it, he may justify the new weight in a
dynamic update to his aspiration, rather than updating his aspiration for his effort level. This may
well ignore the medical literature on the risk involved. In a daily environment, his own fast and
frugal heuristics may be much more focused on solving problems unrelated to diet, and these
could allow sugar fixes and thirst quenchers from the (perhaps advertised) options present when
his energy flags or thirst develops. An individual’s heuristics may be influenced by culture and
habit more than by his own perhaps vague “target-weight-per-food-selection-effort” aspiration.
Failure to adapt dietary habits given the weight increase above a target level is a demonstration
of failure of Bayesian learning – violating a critical theoretical assumption justifying the ability
of individuals to subjectively achieve optimal outcomes without calculating strictly numeric
probabilities. The rationality criterion from which individual choices cannot be impugned
because they maximize according to the individual’s preference structure no longer remains
adamant, but is exposed to be flexible, permeable, possible but not deterministically descriptive,
as in the theoretical models proposed here in sections 6.5 and 6.6.
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6.8.2.c

Automaticity of Habit versus Rationality in Habit Formation
The previous sections present the argument that many people tend not to think through

food choices or eating pattern development in deliberative, rational ways, for reasons whose
mechanisms are now fairly clear. This does not imply that conventional economic analysis can
tell us nothing, but that the differing assumptions between the two approaches limits crossover in
understanding.
Zhen et al. (2011) estimate a model of demand for SSBs “under habit formation,” and use
the results to analyze short- and long-term effects of a half-cent-per-ounce tax on SSBs at two
levels of household income. The dynamic Almost Ideal Demand System they estimate employs
Becker and Murphy’s (1988) concept of consumption in one period affecting consumption in a
later period. They infer from Becker and Murphy that addiction is “an extreme form of habit
formation,” and seek to “investigate the plausibility of beverage addiction” (p 176). But this
cannot be addiction or habit in the sense that a rational process has been overwhelmed or shortcircuited, because it follows from the Becker and Murphy construct. Zhen et al. investigate
rational habit formation within a dynamic flexible demand system, but “the consumer is rational
in the sense that effects of current purchases on future utility are accounted for through user
costs” (p 178). The consumer is rational because s/he accounts for all future costs including the
“durability effect” of the good (as a service flow into future periods from current consumption)
and the degree of habituation. But the degrees of durability and habituation are estimated by
purchase behavior assuming lifetime utility maximization and calculation of the durability and
habit effects relative to the interest rate. This again follows Becker and Murphy in that the
assumption of rational decision-making in part predicates results. Zhen et al. define a consumer
as myopic if s/he does not consider the effects of current purchase on future utility, so “user costs
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are replaced by market prices” (p 180). While a useful proxy in this approach, this method would
overestimate utility gains if future utility would be compromised by current consumption (as we
have seen from the medical literature it probably will be), and this method cannot accommodate
failures of rationality due to failures of information or a behavioral process that skirts
deliberation (because it implicitly assumes a two-stage budgeting process, one that could not be
conscious and therefore could not be deliberative if evidence from the previous two sections
holds). So while valid on its own terms, the model does not conform to the precepts of the
models I offer. As with Dragone (2009), Huston and Finke (2003), Finke and Huston (2003), and
Mancino and Kinsey (2008, to follow), the work flows from the assumption that consumers do
not act with a degree of engrained automaticity, in contrast to repeated arguments we have just
seen that people actually do. This will affect policy recommendations, as all of these approaches
will overlook the importance of the need to directly help people become more aware of their
behaviors and improve their eating heuristics as a means of achieving rational utility-maximizing
behavior, rather than assuming it.
Zhen et al. report interesting results consistent with expectations. For high-income
households, a rational behavior model seems to fit the data better, and for low-income
households, a “myopic” model seems to fit better, where consumers do not seem to account for
later utility effects of current purchase. Results are not inconsistent with my own empirical
results (that lower-income households, particularly at lower-education levels, tend to be less
price responsive and more advertising responsive than higher-income households), perhaps to a
degree supporting the robustness of both approaches.
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6.8.3

Loewenstein and Visceral Factors
In the consideration of why people make food choices that they know on some level must

harm them over time, it is useful to consult Carnegie Mellon’s George Loewenstein, who offers a
theoretical structure extending rational decision theory to include the prospect that people may
not always feel in full control of their actions, and may not admit or respect that condition later.
In a 1996 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes article, Loewenstein
cites theoretical and empirical research across decision theory, psychology, sociology, and
behavioral economics, to craft an argument that explains discrepancies between actual behavior
and rational self-interest. He proposes that there are “drive states” (“hunger, thirst, sexual desire,
moods and emotions, physical pain, and craving for a drug one is addicted to”, p 272) that
usually negatively have a direct hedonic impact, and which affect the desirability (current
expected value) of a good or action. He calls these visceral factors, and assesses two central
premises to this perspective: “First, immediately experienced visceral factors have a
disproportionate effect on behavior and tend to ‘crowd out’ virtually all goals other than that of
mitigating the visceral factor. Second, people underweigh, or even ignore, visceral factors that
they will experience in the future, have experienced in the past, or that are experienced by other
people” (p 272).
This first premise supports my contention for equation (d) that the “now” term is likely to
be disproportionately weighted over the “later” term, just as Gigerenzer, and Sassi and Hurst
directly contend, from different premises. Loewenstein’s second premise, in that he clearly
means this as a reflexive bias, would explain why people are so reluctant to change behaviors
that are not working toward longer-term goals – because they are in some way strongly inclined
not to acknowledge that their habits are failing to work toward longer-term goals. Regular

486

consumption of high-sugar non-nutritive foods like SSBs certainly follow from these premises
for at least some portion of the population – otherwise the nutrition figures on added sugar
consumption as a percentage of total energy intake, and on obesity, diabetes and cancer rates, as
well as volume turnover and profits for major food manufacturers, would hardly seem plausible.
Verplanken and Faes (1999) come to a similar conclusion, although tending toward the
reflexive influence of environment rather than the flipped switches of preference that
Loewenstein describes:
Counterintentional habits may be especially formed when behavior involves short-term hedonistic-driven
motives [have a Coke and a smile] at the expense of long-term benefits of attaining valued goals [target
weight]. …[B]y satisfactorily repeating a behavior, relatively chronic contingencies between situational
cues and habitual responses are formed, which bring behavior under the control of specific situational cues
(p595) [say, automatic purchase of large Coke, with popcorn at the weekly trip to the cinema].

Returning to Loewenstein, he slowly outlines a spectrum for the influence of visceral
factors on behavior, from low levels, where “it makes good sense to eat when hungry…and to
take pain killers when in pain”; to “excessive” influence, where “visceral factors can be so
powerful as to virtually preclude decision making…[ – n]o one decides to fall asleep at the
wheel, but many people do”; to “overriding of rational deliberation by the influence of visceral
factors” such as occurs with phobics and heroin addicts (p 273, emphasis his). He recommends
that decision theory would gain advantage by distinguishing between visceral factors and tastes,
because as visceral factors intensify, they focus attention and motivation to forms of
consumption associated with that factor, while “[n]on-associated forms of consumption lose their
value” (p 274). In contrast to other contemporary decision theorists who “typically define
irrationality as a failure to adhere to certain axioms of choice such as transitivity or
independence”:
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The theoretical perspective proposed here views irrationality not as an objective and well-defined
phenomenon, but as a subjective perception that occurs in the mid-range of the continuum defined by the
influence of visceral factors. At low levels…people generally experience themselves as behaving in a
rational fashion. At extremely high levels…decision making is seen as arational—that is, people don’t
perceive themselves as making decisions at all. It is in the middle region…when people observe themselves
behaving contrary to their own perceived self-interest, that they tend to define their own behavior as
irrational (p 289, emphasis his).

Loewenstein refers to “a good-specific collapsing of one’s time perspective toward the present”
(p 275), such that “intense visceral factors cause behavior to depart from perceived self-interest”
(p 288). This creates “an inherent asymmetry between the temporal selves” (p 288) within an
individual over time that implicitly negates the assumption of a constant time preference.
The subjective nature of decision making under ephemeral influences that include
conditioned brain-reward-center pathways associated with pure-sugar consumption bring into
question assumptions of utility maximization in the routine consumption of sCSDs. 48 The
economic assumption that people bought and consumed what they wanted based on a fully rational
calculus of all of their goals over all periods does not stand up well to Lowenstein’s argument, or
implications from medical evidence. Lowenstein cites a spate of researchers – not theorists –
arguing that “most behavior is relatively ‘automatic,’ ‘mindless,’ habitual, or rule-guided” (p 289,
embedded citations omitted, see original). “Contrary to the central assumption of decision theory,
not all behavior is volitional, and very likely most of it is not. … My argument is that much
behavior is non-volitional or only partly volitional—even in situations characterized by substantial
deliberation” (p 289).
Loewenstein describes propositions characterized by the influence of visceral factors, by
which one’s own failures of rationality (Sassi and Hurst’s term) are discounted by individuals in
their internal assessments of the influence of such factors. The first proposition reduces roughly
48

Beyond the neurobiology already discussed, see Baumeister’s various works, section 6.8.4.
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to “the more you want it now, the more likely you are to overvalue having/doing it now.”
Second: in assessing the effect of future visceral factors, our current valuation of a future good
and our guess at the valuation we will place on it later are fairly close. Third: immediate visceral
factors will lead to greater valuation of immediate consumption than delayed consumption, even
when visceral factors for immediate and delayed consumption increase equally. Fourth: currently
influential visceral factors will have mild effects on decisions for the future, even if their
influence will fade before the future. Lowenstein’s fifth and sixth propositions are critical to my
contention in the models in section 6.5 and 6.6 that rational utility maximization may fail in part
due to a dynamic element, where decision criteria are poorly formed or poorly maintained, and
not updated: “[5th] People underestimate the impact of visceral factors on their own future
behavior. [6th] As time passes, people forget the degree of influence that visceral factors had on
their own past behavior. As a result, past behavior that occurred under the influence of visceral
factors will increasingly be forgotten, or will seem perplexing to the individual” (p 278). In his
final proposition, Loewenstein extends these six propositions from intrapersonal to interpersonal
comparisons, where other people play the role of the later self.
In a 2000 American Economic Review article, Loewenstein refers to : “Numerous
studies…[employing] diverse methods to show that people tend to interpret their own behavior
as the result of deliberative decision-making even when this is not the case” (p427). Loewenstein
continues, claiming that contrary to standard beliefs, it is the visceral factors that while
changeable are highly systematic in their influence on behavior, while the effects of cognitive
deliberation “are a major source of unpredictability” (p 427). Loewenstein models the influence
of visceral factors on behavior as a form of “state-dependent preferences” within a vector of
visceral states (p 427). Economists tend to discredit the influence of visceral factors, says
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Loewenstein, because people appear to act in conflict to their own best interest, and because
“people tend to underestimate the impact of visceral factors on their own current and future
behavior” (p428). Visceral factors: “function biologically to grab the attention… designed to
function with minimal or with no higher-level cognitive mediation. For this reason visceral
factors can have an enormous influence on behavior in the absence of cognitive deliberations.
They can even override such deliberations” (p 428).
Loewenstein poses that welfare maximization lies somewhere between the extremes of
ignoring visceral factors and treating them as the same as any other influence on tastes.
According to Loewenstein, visceral factors may critically affect bargaining power, intertemporal
choice, and decision-making under risk and uncertainty. They thus may explain anger and
selfishness triggers in negotiations; otherwise ‘normal’ decision-making suddenly yielding to
extreme discounting of the future; the low correlations observed between different intertemporal
trade-offs by the same individual; and divergence between emotional reactions and cognitive
evaluations to perceived risks (p430). “Understanding the emotions people experience at the time
of consuming, or deferring consumption, is critical for understanding and predicting the
intertemporal trade-offs they make” (p430). One may speculate on the emotional effect of
decades of television advertising by the world’s number-one soft drink seller that associate Coke
consumption with Joy, Life, and Love, and of other major brands with youth (Pepsi),
independence (Dr. Pepper), and sports acumen (Sprite). Berning (2011) states that television
advertising creates long-term brand identity, which can stimulate the brain independently from
the brain reward for consumption.
In a 2001 article Loewenstein et al., making clear that their model of “risk as feelings” is
based on a substantial body of research and extends to decisions that do not involve risk, contend
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that “the gut feelings experienced at the moment of making a decision, which are often quite
independent of the consequences of the decision, can play a critical role in the choice one
eventually makes” (p 281). The effect of emotions, which biologically are more basic and rapid
than cognitive evaluations (p 268) allow feelings to affect if not bypass cognitive processes,
undermining what the authors call the “cognitive-consequentialist” approach (taken by
economists among others).
[F]eeling states are postulated to respond to factors, such as the immediacy of risk, that do not enter into
cognitive evaluations of the risk and also respond to probabilities and outcome values in a fashion that is
different from the way in which these variables enter into cognitive evaluations. Because their determinants
are different, emotional reactions to risks can diverge from cognitive evaluations of the same risks (p 270).

Certainly the immediacy of risk in the mind of someone thinking about having a Coke is remote,
while there is a “positive affect” to the anticipated emotion of the experience, constructed in part
by decades of advertising (acknowledging that soft-drink manufacturers keep investing billions
in advertising because the strategy works; Fulponi OECD 2009). Then despite actual risk (from
regular consumption), there is no perceived need to balance emotion with rational consideration
of long-term effects, and one “obeys the thirst” (as Sprite television ads tell us to do) with no
engagement of rational mechanisms to protect long-term health. The “cognitiveconsequentialist” paradigm fails in this case.
By Loewenstein’s argument, which is well supported by common example and clinical
evidence, tastes (preferences) do change, and are influenced by internal and external factors,
such that the visceral factors can make the taste for one good or behavior overwhelm other
desires, if only briefly. Satisfying a lust “right now” is something people do, something that
demands flexibility in tastes/preferences and in time preferences. This theory explains why
someone would consume sCSDs daily, while also being able to answer that they know this may
harm them, and informs connections in the models presented in sections 6.5 and 6.6. “I want
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some sugar” may be a subtle, barely-noticed cue upon which one acts, forgetting the force of the
impulse later, and by Loewenstein’s propositions, entirely discounting that cue’s influence when
assessing the motivations of one’s own behavior.
So it is no surprise that Read and van Leeuwen’s (1998) empirical test designed in
response to Lowenstein’s theoretically- and empirically-based work strongly confirms
predictions. Participants made a choice one week in advance with an opportunity at the time of
consumption to have a healthful or unhealthful snack at a time soon after lunch, or later when
they are usually hungry.
Preferences often fluctuate as a result of transient changes in hunger and other visceral states. When current
decisions have delayed consequences, the preferences that should be relevant are those that will prevail
when the consequences occur. However, consistent with the notion of an intrapersonal empathy gap
(Loewenstein 1996) we find than an individual’s current state of appetite has a significant effect on choices
that apply to the future. …First, advanced choices were influenced by current hunger as well as future
hunger: hungry participants chose more unhealthy snacks than did satisfied ones. Second, participants were
dynamically inconsistent: they chose far more unhealthy snacks for immediate choice than for advance
choice (p189).

This is strong support for the application of Loewenstein’s theory exactly for SSB-type
consumption, demonstrating the influence of visceral factors and dynamic inconsistency.

6.8.3.a

Mancino and Kinsey – A Structural Economic Model of Loewenstein’s Visceral
Factors, and How It Differs From My Theoretical Model
Mancino and Kinsey (2008), citing Loewenstein and behavioral economists, offer a

structural model including visceral factors – no easy feat as this requires some quantitative proxy
for an individual’s relevant visceral state. They cleverly dig into daily dietary recall data to
construct a mini-panel of meal-by-meal behavior for individual participant types to which fixed
effects can be applied. Mancino and Kinsey are motivated in part by the rise in health concern
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among food shoppers, and demonstrated demand for health and diet books, that exists
simultaneously with rising obesity and poor-nutrition-related illnesses of overconsumption
already documented here. “These conflicting trends highlight a disturbing inconsistency. …A rift
between long-term objectives and short-term desires can lead to time-inconsistent choices” (p 1).
This forces them toward behavioral economic literature, which offers models attributing timeinconsistent behavior “entirely to a reward’s temporal proximity” (p 3-4), which Mancino and
Kinsey find lacking. They turn to Loewenstein’s theory of visceral influences, which “allows a
broader range of situations to trigger present-biased behavior” (p 4). Loewenstein poses visceral
factors that are temporally separable, affecting a decision only in its time period, and separable so
that each factor may affect only one consumption variable (p 4).
Mancino and Kinsey offer a model of utility that is solvable in standard economic fashion
(Lagrangian optimization with respect to food choice, whose first-order conditions are used for
comparative statics, to predict the effect of different values of variables). Some of Mancino and
Kinsey’s predictions follow strictly from assumptions that differ from assumptions in my model,
but their work is clean, and clearly supports their motivating hypotheses: increasing visceral
factors in period 1 cause more unhealthful food choice; increasing an individual’s awareness of
the effects of poor dietary choice lowers the choice of unhealthful foods; and as visceral factors
rise in intensity, the individual’s nutrition information impacts food choice less, such that those
with higher information are less likely to forego their longer-term goals and choose unhealthful
food.
Mancino and Kinsey empirically test their model using CSFII and DHKS food intake
survey data. When there are longer intervals between meals, or food eaten away from home,
individuals consume “more calories and more calories from solid fats, alcohol, and added sugars.
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Longer intervals between meals are also associated with lower diet quality” (p i). Increasing time
pressures – more hours worked in a week – aggravate the interval-between-meals effect. This
offers further empirical support for the hypothesis that situational factors change time
preferences, and the quality of dietary choice.
Mancino and Kinsey’s model is an important step forward in the move to incorporate
factors that can change time preferences in real time into economic models of consumer food
choices. My model continues beyond the two-time-period model, indicating the degree of failure
of rational choice within an unhealthy pattern of consumption. The structural model is
constrained to define a discount factor identifying time preference. This is simple for the twoperiod case, and their discount factor is a constant between 0 and 1. But when extended to more
periods, the strength of visceral factors – to be consistent with Loewenstein and others – will flex
this discount factor, so that it is not consistent. And at meal-level analysis, the effects of
breakfast may last more than one further meal time, with different discount rates within the day.
This complicates a structural analysis considerably, and depending on the effect length,
tractability may become an issue. While this may not upset the basic direction of Mancino and
Kinsey’s findings, it shows a weakness of structural assumptions about time preference.
I am forced by my characterization of choice within a dynamic pattern to implicitly use
distributions of k and a as each is the product of a combination of influences, including time
preference and changing levels of discipline in evaluating food choices, that impact one’s
assessment of later health effects from current choices. Thus my model, which I do not yet claim
is quantifiably estimable, allows an even ‘broader range of situations to trigger present-biased
behavior.’ When an individual’s dietary habits are fairly consistent, this may prove estimable –
with k as an estimate or an estimable distribution based on an individual’s dietary pattern of
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choices, and a an estimable distribution of larger patterns in which visceral factors play out to a
predictable degree – in a way that a time-preference constant that changes meal-by-meal may or
may not be. It is perhaps informative to recall that in Loewenstein’s 2000 American Economic
Review paper, he models visceral factors formally as state-dependent variables, claiming visceral
factors are “highly systematic in their influence on behavior,” relative to the unpredictability of
outcomes from cognitive deliberation, and may be “mathematically represented as a slightly
more general form of …[O’Donoghue, Rabin, and Loewenstein’s 1999] ‘projection bias.’” (p
427, 428). While Loewenstein draws on many clinical studies verifying mechanisms and
behaviors, identifying temporary psychological states to a level an empirical economist may
consider to be “data” may prove difficult. Still, Loewenstein’s confidence suggests that some
form of quantitative modeling of equation (d) may at some point prove tractable.
Ultimately, Mancino and Kinsey’s model still assumes a discrete rational choice for a
single incident, assumptions I explicitly question (the figure/graphic models I offer above and
below stress this). This again favors viewing my model as for a pattern of behavior more than for
a single food choice incident. My view that realized utility may break from expected utility in a
way that would surprise the earlier version of the decider also extends beyond the classical
approach of Mancino and Kinsey, which assumes utility maximization. Nothing in my equation or
flowchart models violates Mancino and Kinsey’s predictions or results, but my formulations
cannot fit within their assumption set.
Ultimately, any good existing somewhere on the positive scale of addiction must be said
to have visceral influence. Sugar (HFCS) displays addictive-like properties (Lustig, Schmidt, and
Brindis 2012; Avena, Rada, and Hoebel 2009), but these are less compulsive to behavior than
opiate addictions like heroin, if we may infer that fewer crimes and acts of violence are
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committed to satisfy an acute need for (admittedly legal) sugar than to procure (illegal) heroin.
Lowenstein’s spectrum of visceral factors may help frame how to respond to the failures of
rationality associated with daily intakes of sugar well in excess of recommended dietary limits.
Vohs and Baumeister (2009) “encourage a view of addiction that allows people to sustain a
belief in free will and to take responsibility for choices and actions” (p 231), as a means to
dissuade anti-social behaviors (cheating, stealing, aggression, reduced helping of others)
associated with weakened free will. Because sugar is at the lowest end of the addiction scale, the
simple act of bringing more attention to its consumption may break the power of visceral and
emotional factors to undercut or bypass more fully rational choice. This would involve policy
designed to get people to change their food-choice heuristics permanently.

6.8.4

Baumeister, Ego Depletion, and the Influence of Sugar on Decision-Making
We have already observed that sugars in sCSDs may condition the brain’s system of

chemical rewards to expect more sugar, that added sugars are objectively and routinely too high
in the American diet, and that visceral factors may exercise a disproportionate influence on the
choice to consume now versus satisfying other goals, such as long-term weight or health.
Princeton-trained social psychologist Roy Baumeister offers further insight into how the conflict
between health objectives and daily – even hourly – needs and desires may tip decision criteria to
favor the marginal soft drink over the long-term health goal. 49 In short he offers theoretical and
clinical evidence supporting a theory as to why self-control fails, that is, why the voice of homo
economicus may be drowned out in the internal conflict over what to do(/eat).

49

Economists unfamiliar with Baumeister might gauge his influence in other social sciences by noting that 6 of the
nearly 150 academic papers Baumeister has authored or co-authored have been cited more than 500 times in Scopus
listings. SciVerse Scopus is an Elsevier-owned bibliographic database spanning over 18,000 titles, including over
16,500 peer-reviewed journals.
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As early as 1991, Heatherton and Baumeister proposed that binge eating (“eating that
results from disinhibition of dietary restraints” whether or not within a pattern of bulimia as
clinically defined) is motivated by a desire to escape from self-awareness dominated by
emotional distress, including anxiety, and depression. By “narrowing attention to the immediate
stimulus environment and avoiding broadly meaningful thought” there is disengagement from
normal inhibitions against eating, and “an uncritical acceptance of irrational beliefs and
thoughts” (p 86, quotes for paragraph). Heatherton and Baumeister provide an extremely
thorough review of literature supporting the case that gastronomic stimulus can be used to
disengage from the constraints of rational thought. If this effect exists to scale – and lesser
degrees of binging, with less critical mass of emotion motivating the consumption of highly
palatable foods – then the diet-based break from rational thought they identify could plausibly
extend to high dosing of refined sugar products, like SSBs.
But speculation is unnecessary on this point. Baumeister’s later work connects more
important dots for us. Baumeister et al. (1998) coin the term ego depletion to describe a state
where one’s inner capacity for active volition in choice and action becomes depleted by use.
They conduct multiple laboratory tests – resisting tempting food, making a meaningful personal
choice, suppressing emotion, and performing a task involving high self-regulation – and
conclude that across a variety of executive functions, people’s capacity for active volition
demonstrates measurable signs of depletion, from what the authors believe is a common resource
of “ego”/self-assertive energy.
In a 2002 Journal of Consumer Research article, Baumeister describes this depletion as
one source of self-control failure associated with consumer behavior. The depletion may result
from or consequently affect any conflict in goals or standards, and may induce a failure to
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monitor one’s own behavior. When weighing the decision to drink a sCSD versus one’s longerterm health – and by Loewenstein’s later propositions that one ignores the strength of visceral
effects when looking back on a decision – it is easy to extend Baumeister’s theory of consumer
behavior to a failure to rationally maximize (lifetime) utility when one’s will fails and one drinks
a sweetened soda for the fifteenth day in a row. In another 2002 article (2002b), Baumeister
concludes from clinical evidence that the effects of self-control energy depletion “appear after
seemingly minor exertions because the self tries to conserve its remaining resources after a
depletion” (p 129). If true, this could prove that it is very easy to reach a state where one’s will to
resist a sugary treat may be lowered. His continuing work hypothesizes as to why this should be,
then experimentally explores his hypotheses.
In a 2003 article, Scheichel, Vohs, and Baumeister report on tests of the depletion of the
volition and self-control response after simpler and after more complex mental activities.
Participants asked to regulate attention and emotion before being tested performed worse at logic
and reasoning tests, but the same as controls on general knowledge, rote memorization, or
nonsense-syllable recall. “Cognitive tasks…depend on executive control,” and “in the current
research the more complex tasks were impaired precisely because they required the self to exert
executive control” (p 45). Logical reasoning is “especially impaired when the self has already
expended some of its resources in a prior, seemingly unrelated act of self-regulation (such as
stifling one’s emotional distress or keeping attention away from extraneous stimuli)” (p 45). This
would be the same capacity for logical reasoning that neoclassical economics asks us to assume
naturally automatically and flawlessly governs every choice decision in life.
By 2007 Gailliot, Baumeister et al. are measuring blood glucose after laboratory tests of
self-control (the Stroop task [attention focusing], thought suppression, emotion regulation,
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attention control), and social behaviors (helping, coping with thoughts of death, stifling prejudice
in an interracial interaction). Test results demonstrate that:
(a) acts of self-control reduced blood glucose levels, (b) low levels of blood glucose after an initial selfcontrol task predicted poor performance on a subsequent self-control task, and (c) initial acts of self-control
impaired performance on subsequent self-control tasks, but consuming a glucose drink [versus a placebo]
eliminated these impairments. Self-control requires a certain amount of glucose to operate unimpaired. A
single act of self-control causes glucose to drop below optimal levels, thereby impairing subsequent
attempts at self-control (p 325).

Why should these striking results be?
[R]ecent evidence…[indicates] that some brain and cognitive processes…consume substantial amounts of
energy—indeed, some far more than others. The “last-in, first-out rule” states that cognitive abilities that
developed last ontogenetically are the first to become impaired when cognitive and physiological resources
are compromised. Self-control, as a relatively advanced human capacity, was probably one of the last to
develop and hence may be one of the first to suffer impairments when resources are inadequate. The
present findings suggest that relatively small acts of self-control are sufficient to deplete the available
supply of glucose, thereby impairing the control of thought and behavior, at least until the body can retrieve
more glucose from its stores or ingest more calories (p 334-335).

Late in 2007, Gailliot and Baumeister offer a comprehensive review of literature linking
blood glucose with self-control. “Self-control failures are more likely when glucose is low or
cannot be mobilized effectively to the brain (i.e. when insulin is low or insensitive)[sic].
Restoring glucose to a sufficient level typically improves self-control. …Self-control appears
highly susceptible to glucose” (p 303). Remembering from Smith and Tasnádi that humans
evolved believing sweet taste meant high-nutrient, toxin-free nutrition, we may suspect humans
do not seek a particular type of sweetness when reflexively moving to restore self-control. But as
sugar, and especially HFCS, lead to insulin resistance, glucose diminishment in the higher brain
becomes more likely, and we may infer that the “visceral factor” driving us for a sugar fix may
increase to a degree that would preempt any economically “rational” resistance to sugar that
might remain.
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This biological focus can tend to pull our attention from the simple self-medication to
treat an emotional low that high-use SSB drinkers may be performing when drinking Coke – a
product with decades of catchy expensive feel-good-if-you-drink-our-product ad campaigns – or
even when drinking one of Coke’s less successful cousins, since the sugar load is similar: “when
people feel distressed, their greatest priority is likely to be repairing their negative mood. Solace
can often be achieved by immediate pleasures that derail the goal. For instance, stress may cause
consumption of high-fat foods, derailing the goals of a good diet” [Maio et al. 2007, p111].
Gailliot and Baumeister note also that automatic information processing requires far less
mental effort and energy than the demands of higher logic and self-control, and also that the
glucose-self-control relationship is by no means linear in effect beyond its restoration to a fullfunctioning level:
Effortful, controlled, or executive processes require more glucose than simpler, less effortful, or automatic
processes, and they are more likely to be impaired when glucose is low or cannot be used effectively (p
306). …
Getting more glucose beyond having enough will not yield further increments in self-control, whereas
getting enough glucose to recover from a depleted state will yield improvements until optimal level is
reached (p 307).

Incidentally, consuming alcohol impairs most forms of self-control, note Gailliot and
Baumeister, perhaps largely due to the fact that it reduces glucose metabolism throughout the
body and brain, particularly to the regions of the brain underlying self-control functions (the
frontal cortex, p 315). Some other features noted by Gailliot and Baumeister are that: depressed
individuals exhibit lower cerebral glucose levels in the regions of the brain regulating emotions;
self-control deteriorates throughout the day, which “might be partially attributable to reductions
in the flow of glucose”; and “the effects of glucose on self-control often seem independent of
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people’s urges” (they cite evidence that glucose improved smoking cessation, whether or not a
nicotine patch was also used; p 320).
Not everyone agrees with Baumeister’s work. According to a New York Times Magazine
article on ego depletion (“Do You Suffer From Decision Fatigue,” 21 Aug 2011, by John
Tierney, who co-authored Willpower: Rediscovering the Greatest Human Strength with
Baumeister) Heatherton turned against Baumeister later in his career, but eventually surprised
himself by coming to the same results regarding blood glucose depletion in higher- versus lowerorder brain centers. Job, Dweck, and Walton (2010) of Stanford University undertake
experiments whose results indicate that participants’ beliefs about whether ego depletion can
occur predicts the stick-to-it-ive-ness of their performance in a range of lab experiments.
Critically for the inference here, they “do not question that biological resources contribute to
successful self-control” (p 1692). They do not refute Baumeister and colleagues’ claims, but do
offer an important caveat that may be important for policy. Job, Dweck, and Walton’s results
associating beliefs about the depletability of self-control resources with self-control performance
echo in some ways the work of Beydoun and Wang that consistent belief that elements of
nutrition are not important tend to break the positive effect education has on dietary choice. Job,
Dweck, and Walton indirectly offer some hope for education-policy-based reforms to help
correct the way in which Americans may be sugaring up as a way to self-medicate in order to
stay highly functional: awareness of the problem and updated nutrition beliefs may prove
economical policy approaches to reducing added sugars in the American diet. Becker and
Murphy seem likely to agree that a stressful environment is associated with higher levels of
addiction (p 690), but whereas Baumeister would attribute this to stress overtaxing self-control
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faculties, Becker and Murphy would characterize the effect as the addictive good appearing to
have a higher marginal utility relative to the low marginal utility of an uncomfortable life.
In a 2008 Journal of Consumer Psychology article, Baumeister et al. find that:
Ego depletion affects consumers. Researchers showed that people shifted toward less edifying and more
self-indulgent fare when depleted…[including] shifting toward candy instead of healthful granola bar
snacks. …
Actual consumption is affected too. …[D]ieters ate more food when depleted than they would otherwise.
Nondieters were relatively unaffected by ego depletion. The distinction is important because it suggests that
ego depletion does not simply increase appetites or pleasure seeking. Rather, it undermines the defenses
and the virtuous intentions that would otherwise guide behavior (p 9). …
The rational pursuit of enlightened self-interest requires intelligent thinking. Ego depletion makes people
think less intelligently [on IQ tests and other mental tests]. …
[D]epleted persons succumbed to various flawed decision strategies, all of which conserve effort by taking
short cuts instead of reasoning out the problem (embedded citations omitted throughout, see original;
emphasis added throughout, p 10).

The effects Baumeister and others identify define some ironic and alarming vicious
circles for chronic sCSD drinkers (/refined carbohydrate lovers). The very self-control needed to
avoid consuming sCSDs (if one is attracted to them and understands their danger) fails when
blood sugar is low – and a sugar fix can temporarily re-boot self-control. Refined sugar products
are cheap, legal, and ubiquitous, and thus are perfectly poised to serve as a means to selfmedicate against flagging blood glucose that the brain seeks to replenish after executive-function
stresses. A sugar ebb seems to create a state resistant to one’s ability to decide using more
comprehensive information and a longer time perspective, and a sugar fix seems to replenish
one’s focus and capacity to judge. A temporary blood-sugar drop during a stressful day seems to
generate precisely the present-oriented behavior that will bypass rational consideration of longerterm effects, and then replenish one’s capacity to think through long-term effects if one were so
inclined. And from Loewenstein’s propositions we can see this magic window of opportunity for
SSB consumption opening, closing itself with consumption, then being forgotten or explained
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away. The result might then be SSBs accounting for a large portion of daily added sugars, and a
consequent rise in weight and diabetes trends, consistent with those observed over the last 30
years.
It may now seem rational over the very short term to grab a sugary beverage if one’s
ability to self-determine is flagging. Remember, people have not read Baumeister’s academic
literature and are ignorant to the depth of the medical literature as well. They are responding to
their environments and to internal cues over time with an eye to, if not maximizing personal
performance, at least to avoiding feelings of low energy and lack of will. Physical evidence on a
time-scale short enough to appreciate and account for tells them they feel better and are more
productive with their sugar-caffeine fix. The negative health effects, while very real (e.g., an
immediate boost in blood triglyceride levels) are invisible until much later. As HFCS (55fructose, 45-glucose) digestion forces high blood glucose levels, this stresses the body, but offers
repair of a depleted ego – until the hypoglycemic crash that follows when insulin is dramatically
spiked to seek blood sugar balance. Even this crash might be avoided if one drip feeds oneself
sugar all day (thank you, 7-11 “Big Gulp”), which in turn is more likely to provoke insulin
resistance, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease over time. Chronic added sugar consumption
quite plausibly seems to the passive or even the self-aware observer over weeks or months to be
a rational patch for the leaking air from the self-control tire, and in fact works in any short period
– while simultaneously oxidizing the rubber, rim, and axle.
Of course this type of “rational” patch ignores the alternative of eating a diet that does not
set up a hypoglycemic cycle, or addressing low blood sugar with a piece of fruit (not fruit juice)
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that offers natural sugars in the presence of fiber, which controls against hyperglycemia (that
stages a hypoglycemic crash) 50 or other nutrifying choice.
Baumeister et al. here have brought in dozens more clinical studies that deepen the
evidentiary base for some of Kahneman and Tversky’s assertions, and the evidentiary base for
exactly the failures of rational utility maximization posited by the models in sections 6.5 and 6.6
to describe the decision to consume sCSDs regularly. Let’s return to the figures and equations
from sections 6.5 and 6.6, updated with this new information.

6.9

Empirically Informed Decision Theory Pertaining To Regular Consumption of SSBs
Figure 4 combines element from Figures 2 and 3, and delineates features informed by

clinical evidence from the medical, psychology (pharma-, consumer, and social), decision theory,
and behavioral economics (for convenience, I will include Loewenstein in behavioral
economics). So the existing classical structure from Figure 2 remains a possible path, and the
elements of Figure 2 now inform this path within the context of elements from Figure 3.

50

Fiber intake with any food creates a better blood profile, with better lipid and coronary heart disease marker
values, and natural fruit sugars reduce serum triglycerides (Jenkins et al. 2000). Fiber intake with sugar intake
lowers the blood sugar spike, regardless of the type of fiber (Jenkins et al. 1978). (Psyllium) fiber-enriched meals
“decreased glucose, insulin, ghrelin, and [peptide YY] responses,” strongly modifying postprandial signals from the
gastrointestinal tract (Karhunen et al. 2010). Nature apparently refuses to bend in the body’s response to refined
carbohydrates versus the fiber-rich whole-grain and natural fruit/vegetable varieties we evolved eating. No amount
of marketing or artificial flavorings and colorings seems to throw over the biological need to take in fiber with sugar
in order to soften blood-sugar surges and blunt their effects.
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Figure 4. Model of Choice Behavior Flexible to Internal and External Influences
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The critical new features in Figure 4 are potential feedback loops from consuming or
failing to consume refined carbohydrates (dashed arrows), the separation of decision making
capacity devoted to a current decision into low- or high-faculty modes, and the introduction of
reflexive choice (guided by strong visceral factors and/or simple heuristics) rather than active
choice (box above “active choice”). Potential behavioral paths now include RUMax behavior
and the capacity to bypass active choice and lifetime-utility-maximizing discrete choice (large
curved clear arrow, with question marks for the two final paths to consume or not to consume).
The feedback loops derive from the medical/nutrition literature and work co-authored by
Baumeister on the importance of glucose to active decision making, and the failure to apply selfdiscipline associated with low blood glucose. Low-faculty or low priority decisions would tend
to use reflexive mechanisms, either without attention, or employing a simple heuristic. The
separation of low- and high-faculty dedication of decision resources follows from at least
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Kahneman and Tversky, Loewenstein, Gigerenzer, Peters, and Baumeister and co-authors. It is
this likelihood to not devote decision-making resources to the SSB decision that is incompatible
with the rational utility-maximizing framework.
In an American Economic Review (1978) printing of his address to the American
Economic Association (the year he received his Nobel prize), Herbert Simon suggests that
attention may be a more scarce resource than information, by implication limiting the application
of available information to decisions whose priority is necessarily subsumed by more pressing
decisions: “In a world where information is relatively scarce, and where problems for decision
are few and simple, information is almost always a positive good. In a world where attention is a
major scarce resource, information may be an expensive luxury, for it may turn our attention
from what is important to what may be unimportant” (p 13). This offers a plausible explanation
for the failure to devote information-gathering resources and rational decision-making capacity
to a choice of foods, given other priorities and stresses in life. The stresses of modern life
encourage hyperbolic discounting, and one notices only later the health/weight effects of one’s
heuristics. A group tasked by the United Kingdom with thinking through 50-year scenarios for
how to tackle the obesity problem notes that “the role of habit and volitional control over
behaviors that have a cumulative day-to-day impact over many years has been poorly
articulated” (Maio et al. 2007, p 103). But related mechanisms have been proposed and tested
across many fields. The flow chart and lettered equations offered here are consistent with various
mechanisms supported by substantial empirical evidence. Maio et al. are themselves a gateway
to a deep variety of empirical literature demonstrating what methods facilitate and what methods
fail to induce behaviors and behavioral change.
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It is not the case that people cannot override any suggestion, drive, or visceral drive to
consume sugar if they want to, there simply seems to be enough empirical evidence to suggest
that many people imbibe SSBs regularly because they act without a health-preserving heuristic
predisposed against added-sugar consumption. There is every indication from clinical results that
an admittedly low-priority decision will be determined with very little conscious consideration,
likely a heuristic informed by habit. From Baumeister and co-authors, and from Loewenstein,
there are explanations supported by clinical evidence that people with future-oriented time
preferences can find their time preferences compromised to value the present much more highly
in mundane daily circumstances. Greater SSB consumption is likely to increase under these
conditions of temporary re-calibration of time preference – for example, in a bar when one wants
to drink less or no alcohol.
This process implicitly circumvents active economic decision making of the type one
would expect to occur for the much rarer choices with higher lifetime stakes, such as whether to
join the army or go to college, whether to marry, whether to pay for a biopsy. From section 6.8,
we may expect that the heuristics are subject to “fast and frugal” dynamics, and a consumer
burdened with dozens of more critical decisions daily would to conserve her own time and
decision resources seem unlikely to look for, acknowledge, or incorporate uninvited health
information, or to observe health states that change slowly over time. Arising from these
incentives and the generally poor nutrition knowledge Americans demonstrate by their lifestylerelated chronic diseases, her decision heuristics may be poorly constructed and poorly
maintained from a long-term health perspective – while seeming perfectly rational to her. (She
may unwittingly be following Loewenstein’s propositions that the effects from visceral factors
on decision-making are greatly discounted when they are not present.)
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Individuals have the capacity to update their heuristics concerning SSB/added-sugar
intake, but on a daily basis are likely to notice little incentive to do so, and are perhaps more
likely to notice environmental or internal cues consistent with reasons driving high SSB/addedsugar consumption to became habitual in the first place. We expect from Loewenstein and from
Baumeister that any internally acknowledged promise to “be better” about one’s diet may easily
fade in one’s decision calculus in the presence of stress, decision fatigue, or slightly flagging
blood sugar. So as habits develop, there is biological feedback that may reinforce habit-forming
behavior in an already stressful daily environment, and thus reinforce the simplistic heuristics
that support SSB consumption instead of a fully rational utility-maximizing calculation over
lifetime utility. With high socialization of SSB use, with fairly consistent, very stylish
advertising for sCSDs (and SSBs) over one’s lifetime, and given the extremely low priority of a
non-filling snack amongst the competition for one’s decision-making resources, SSB habits may
develop in persistent ignorance, driven to some degree by one mode of rational thought. The
SSB-consumption heuristics then dominate, crowding out any re-consideration of dietary
behavior without a new and demanding signal, one apparently more demanding than slowly
increasing BMI.
The critical point in the behavioral chain of decision is the heuristic that dominates when
decision-making capacity is low. A heuristic that is present-biased with a poor health outlook
will guide reflexive choices toward consuming more added sugars, while a heuristic that is
medically (or at least statistically) informed, constructed, and maintained with an eye toward
future health outcomes will guide reflexive choices toward fewer added sugar consumption
choices. This context presents a critical opportunity for nutrition education policy. In an
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 2009 article, Downs, Loewenstein, and
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Wisdom report that: “Present-biased preferences typically encourage unhealthful choices
because enjoyment of a meal is immediate whereas the consequent weight gain is delayed” (p 2,
original emphasis), then the authors demonstrate that reversing a present bias toward consuming
an unhealthful meal can be achieved simply by changing the default option the potential
consumer faces.
The social failure to properly educate people about how to feed themselves healthfully
puts the information-gathering onus on them, increasing the marginal “rationality” of unhealthful
choices and habits by increasing the cost of learning to improve diet. Previewing results in Essay
Three, the obvious policy fix is a dedication to teaching responsible nutrition-seeking heuristics
to a higher average level. Given the large expenses associated with diet-based chronic disease, it
seems that social welfare has a strong chance of improving with the investment of even many
billions of dollars if the result is more healthful food habits. The net improvement over
investment would result from an offset in direct and indirect medical costs, including
productivity impairment and loss from high rates of obesity, diabetes, and cardiovascular
disease.
People need to be given enough education so that their natural desire for health can be
accommodated, rather than failing under the prospect of trying to learn all the facts and heuristics
on one’s own limited budget of time and attention. The simple act of eating a diet rich in protein,
fiber, and micronutrients, and secondarily in fat (which is filling and provides the main energy
source for muscles when carbohydrates do not) will help avoid hypoglycemic incidents
associated with diets high in refined carbohydrates. Reverting for a moment to the neoclassical
model, if there are elements of rational addiction as defended by Becker and Murphy (1988)
present in this system as applied to SSBs, then a high tax would be effective. Empirical results
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from Essay One suggest that for many higher-volume purchasers of SSBs, a tax high enough to
achieve this would seem ridiculous on its face (and Finkelstein et al. 2009 find a 40% tax on
SSBs would cost little and affect weight only little). While Becker and Murphy agree that highereducated people demonstrate lower preference for the present versus the future (p 687), they do
not attribute causality in either direction.
All of the arguments supporting Figure 4 extend to equation (d) from section 6.6 as it was
described: Exp[Utility | q]max = u0[q] + k · a · u1[h(Hs(q,x))]. These arguments variously
impact the direction and magnitude of the weighting factors k and a on the “later” term, while
enriching the understanding of time-preference changes and some of the biological and
psychological mechanisms that drive them.
Empirical results in Essay One may also be used to test hypotheses suggested from the
psychology and behavioral economics literature. If we assume that low level of formal education
suggests a higher likelihood of poorly developed critical skills for effective nutrition – poor
eating decision heuristics, lower ability to gather or understand nutrition facts, less humility
when weighing one’s desires and prejudices 51 against scientific evidence – then low education
would dominate low household income in predicting higher positive response to sCSD marketing
variables. It strongly and generally does. The significantly different purchase responses to
marketing variables across ethnic sub-groups may comply with the notion that levels of effective
nutrition education are passed socially, or that the markets for certain foods are “social markets”
(OECD 2008, citing Becker and Murphy 2000).
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Jonas et al. 2001, on “confirmatory bias,” see 7.7.2a.
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6.10.

Summary and Key Conclusions
This essay examines the ways and reasons that habitual sCSD consumption may break

from economic assumptions of rational utility maximization. Bringing to bear neighboring
literature that refutes neoclassical economic assumptions about how consumers make (food)
decisions, this essay presents an empirical model and flowchart depicting dynamic consumer
choice behavior to routinely drink SSBs/sCSDs. The model and flowchart presented here are
flexible to failures of neoclassical economic assumptions about consumer behavior. Both the
model and the flowchart provide a valid track for individual decision making consistent with
classical theory, and provide a track defended by literature presented here for which sCSD
consumption is inconsistent with rational utility-maximizing (RUMax) choice.
Clinical, empirical, as well as theoretical results from a range of fields that border terrain
claimed by economics confirm that not only might consumer preferences not be fixed, timeconsistent, and consistent with long-term utility maximization, they almost certainly fail in all
three ways for routine patterns of SSB consumption for many consumers – perhaps the majority.
The active breach of these economic assumptions violates both the completeness and transitivity
conditions necessary to meet the economic definition of rational, and breaks the logical support
for much of the applied field’s presumption that preferences revealed through consumer choice
are mathematically equivalent to knowing a consumer’s full preference set. As Bayesian
updating of information criteria is also unquestionably disputed for this product type, there is no
clear case for a self-correcting mechanism to ensure a rational or stable utility function
associated with SSB consumption.
It is no longer safe to conclude that the amount of SSBs consumed is that which
maximizes the utilities of the individuals who buy them. The weight of evidence presented here
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directs the challenging conclusion that for many consumers the amount purchased is not driven
by utility maximization, but by the impact of other forces on decisions. As by definitions in the
medical and nutrition literature the average American overconsumes SSBs, we must conclude
that conventionally estimated demand for the SSB category depicts a curve shifted to the right,
because it is driven by internal and external forces that provoke consumption in excess of what
an objective utility maximization strategy would (were one calculable), assuming individuals
value their future health even moderately. This is no small result, as it re-orients how economists
present the fundamental motivations of our SSB demand studies and how we justify application
of our empirical results. Why focus on price-elasticities of demand as indicators, if product price
may be a tertiary driver of consumption rates?
If the argument in this essay is valid, then some of the same unobserved unmeasured or
accountable but un-included factors that right-shift demand almost certainly skew estimable
price elasticities of demand, but we may not be able to empirically determine how much. Policy
recommendations from economists usually flow from the assumptions that the quantities of
sCSDs that individuals purchase represent an optimum consciously derived using stable internal
and time-consistent preferences that properly factor effects across future time periods –
assumptions biased to embrace a status-quo driven by this premise of maximization. This
premise drives policy recommendations independent of the accuracy with which most current
demand models account for relevant influences on consumer behavior. When the development
and maintenance of food habits, SSB marketing environment factors including ubiquity of the
product and of highly sophisticated persuasive advertising, and the biochemistry of decisionmaking may all affect consumption patterns more than rational utility-maximizing discrete
choice leveraged by price and flavor may, then policy recommendations intended to curb
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overconsumption must address this gamut of causative factors, not just assume that consumers
will react rationally to taxes and the provision of more product information. This is how material
in this essay connects to Essay Three.
The effort in this essay is not an indictment or dismissal of current approaches. It is an
exploration of where these methods, when facing a larger body of scientific evidence, are
constrained to fail by their own logic. It is also an exploration of how to begin to model a postneoclassical model of consumer decision-making as it is, rather than how we wish it were in
order to satisfy mathematical requirements for our estimation models, and in order to study
theoretically optimal individual choice.
The model and flowchart I present here (both expanded or repeated in section 6.9.) differ
from partially similar models published by Dragone (2009), Huston and Finke (2003), and by
Mancino and Kinsey (2008) in that they do not assume rational behavior by individuals in their
dietary choices, and the time-inconsistency of preferences is not assigned a fixed value, but
assumed to vary, given supporting evidence from neighboring literature. I make no claim that
either of my models is empirically estimable, only that they describe actual behavior more
comprehensively than current neoclassical approaches to modeling do, constrained as these other
approaches are to representative individuals who consistently and rationally optimize when
making choices.
Much of the chapter – all of 6.7 and 6.8 – surveys empirical clinical and theoretical
literature challenging economic precepts of RUMax behavior as these precepts apply to SSB
consumption. This review builds the spine of arguments refuting neoclassical assumptions about
consumer behavior relevant to regular SSB consumption. Three types of medical/nutrition
literature are presented: the costs of medical effects from overconsuming added (not naturally
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occurring) sugars, the biological mechanisms by which these effects occur and the degree to
which SSB sugars may be particularly harmful, and the effect of dietary sugar on decision
processing. Primary elements are summarized here, usually without citation unless directly
quoted, and occasionally simplified, i.e., without requisite academic nuance that is in the main
text. Both choices assist brevity here.
Conditions of overweight and obesity associate with higher morbidity, higher mortality,
and higher medical costs at every age “equivalent to [adding] 20 years of natural ageing” (Yach,
Stuckler, and Brownell 2006). It is the amount of calories ingested that drive weight gain in the
U.S. in recent decades, not a diminishment in or failure to exercise, the physical activity level
remaining similar to the mid-‘70s level while caloric intake greatly increased. 52
The food environment changed considerably from the 1960s on, making energy-dense
nutrient-poor (ENDP) foods relatively cheaper and more ubiquitous, with exceptionally heavy
marketing. Snacking on ENDP foods, including SSBs and all added sugars, greatly increased, as
vitamin mineral and fiber intakes per dietary calorie dropped considerably. Dietary fat does not
drive body fat. Dietary fat consumption remained flat from 1965–1996 as sugar consumption
greatly increased, and American’s body fat greatly increased. SSBs and sweetened Carbonated
Soft Drinks (sCSDs) are the primary source of added sugar in American diets, and for the
average American consuming the average daily number of SSB ounces, SSBs alone overwhelm
the limit set for all discretionary calories (i.e., for all fats, sugars, and alcohols) allowable after
meeting a USDA-defined balanced daily diet. This average excess holds for most age groups
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All estimates of weight gain or loss that rely on linear models of addition or subtraction by fixed kilocalories
(kcals) per day are medically incorrect, and suggest conclusions that are not defensible. Hall et al. 2011 correct this
problem, and Hall works with other authors on this. We do know it is much harder to take weight off than put it on,
and the amount of sustained calorie reduction for an average American to lose the weight gained from 1980 to 2010
is roughly equivalent to a 20-oz. Coke per day – but an obese person would have to cut many more calories than
this, with 95% of the cumulative weight reduction taking three years to manifest for either type.
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above 8 and below 60, with some variance owing to larger intake by males than females. From
Table 23, for those who consume above 25% of all their dietary calories as added sugar, sCSDs
are the preferred vector of delivery.
Two primary factors fuel SSB overconsumption. First liquids satiate less than semiliquids and solids, displacing less food intake at meals. Second sugar causes hunger by
suppressing hormones that signal satiation and reduces dopamine signaling. This induces hunger
for more sugar as insulin levels are pushed too low then too high in response to an overload of
incoming added sugars, and induces more (sugar) eating to meet conditioned expectation levels
of dopamine reward.
SSBs are associated across many surveys of clinical studies with weight gain, diabetes,
and heart disease (independent of the increase from weight gain). Weight gain seems particularly
fueled by the fructose in SSBs (high-fructose corn syrup, HFCS) versus glucose, as specific
differences in digestion of fructose versus glucose engage natural mechanisms that increase the
lipid profile in the blood and the likelihood that these lipids will deposit in fat cells and on
arteries. While high sugar intake in combination with low fiber intake triggers a cycle that wears
out the insulin-producing areas of the pancreas, high fructose intake actually makes the body
more insulin resistant, demanding more be produced, while also triggering hormones that block
satiation, providing direct mechanisms for diabetes and weight gain. HFCS-based SSBs (nearly
all in the U.S. from 1984) present the worst commonly available sugar profile for triggering all
of these effects. A 2011 study induced markers for heart disease in dozens of healthy young men
and women by replacing 25% of their total calories with an HFCS solution – an effect not seen
with a 25% replacement by a glucose solution.
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Surveys of literature concluding that HFCS and SSBs containing it are no worse than
other sugars are directly discredited, and attempts to purchase “academic” results intending to
discredit mechanisms summarized in the last paragraph are exposed. While never final, the
medical literature is largely unambiguous in consensus about these mechanisms.
The neurobiology of preference may now be identified in ways that can inform economic
theory, filling in gaps that greatly frustrated many of the great economists a century ago, who
gave up on the field of psychology as unable to quantify utility. Consuming high-added-sugar
foods wires dopamine pathways to favor more sugar in patterns nearly chemically identical to
opiate addiction. Using animals with brain chemistry extremely similar to humans, every
condition of chemical addiction is confirmed for sugar. Eating a lot of sugar not only signals the
brain to eat more sugar, but conditions it to do so, a habit-forming drive that occurs on a
subconscious, chemical level. Note that most sCSDs also include caffeine, for which the
addiction argument is already conceded. So everything in an sCSD bottle but the water, coloring,
and some artificial flavors is chemically addictive. In a 2004 American Economic Review article
bridging neurobiology psychology and economics, Bernheim and Rangel discuss chemically
addictive substances (and although not included, sugar very nearly matches their criteria):
There are plainly circumstances in which it makes no sense to infer preferences from choices. …Habituated,
semi-automatic responses beneficially increase the speed of decision-making in some circumstances but lead
to systematic mistakes in others (p 1561-2).
…[T]here is an emerging consensus in neuroscience and psychology that decision-process effects, rather
than hedonic effects, provide the key to understanding addictive behavior (p 1564-5).

Addiction when it exists works as if it biases information, and episodes of consumption
of addictive substances are cued in part by one’s environment. Mistakes of judgment or choice
can be substance specific, meaning the appearance of different time preferences for an individual
contingent on which choice the individual is considering. Thus decisions do not occur as
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rationally or as optimally as economists assume, especially for addictive substances, and while
less urgently driving behavior than controlled substances may, sugar is close to the set Bernheim
and Rangel describe. An SSB consumer’s apparent willingness to trade future health for current
taste may not reflect a general present-biased time preference, once one acknowledges that time
preference need not be monolithic. A single discount rate applicable to all decisions then seems
clunky, restrictive, and potentially inept for characterizing decision behavior.
With the above results from the medical community indicating precise effects of habitual
intake of sugars on hunger/satiety hormones and dopamine reward receptors, one need not
unequivocally adopt a position that sCSDs are addictive. There is for habitual consumption of
sCSDs little evidentiary defense of the neoclassical economists’ assumption of perfectly rational
utility-maximizing choice in the sense that it is voluntary, deliberative, and considers future
effects in a time-consistent fashion. To assume habitual sCSD consumption is not influenced by
unconscious biological drivers begins to strain credibility. Becker and Murphy’s (1988) Theory
of Rational Addiction (not intended to include sugar) maintains that the rate of disappearance of
the physical and mental effects of past consumption of a potentially addictive good is exogenous,
employs the assumption of a constant rate of time preference, and argues that tastes do not
change over time. Becker and Murphy’s assumption set precludes the notions that behavior may
be involuntary or non-deliberative or lead to regret that is not induced by changes in external
circumstances (i.e. not from an external shock). This assumption set necessitates a critical break
from how psychologists and social psychologists find people to behave. Becker and Murphy
never consider that while each time-separable decision event may appear rational, that with
increasing addiction to a harmful good, the costs to future utility may rise in a way that proves
the addict’s previous calculations of future expected utility to be in error. They attribute the
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difference to an increasing preference for the present, when it may be a loss of control by
someone who does not consciously discount the future so heavily. The loss of control would be a
failure of rationality. Failure to appreciate the severity of one’s condition, or denial of that
severity would similarly lead to failures to update one’s choice criteria and behavior given new
information (a failure of “Bayesian learning”), so that a Bayesian proxy maximization of utility
also might not be achievable, much less serve as the defense for the revealed preference
assumption needed for deterministic modeling.
O’Donoghue and Rabin: “[c]asual observation, introspection, and psychological
research” support that “the assumption of time consistency is importantly wrong” (p103), and
conclude “the existence of present-biased preferences is overwhelmingly supported by
psychological evidence, and strongly accords to common sense and conventional wisdom”
(p120). They find that whether costs are immediate or rewards are immediate changes the type of
person (categorized by their time preferences) who can be harmed by a poor choice.
But how could sugar demonstrate very similar neuro-chemical influence to opioids?
Smith and Tasnádi 2007 contrast their Theory of Natural Addiction with Becker and Murphy’s
theory, noting that the evolutionary development of neurochemical preference for sweetness
included no refined substances, only mother’s milk, ripe fruit, and rarely found honey. Processed
carbohydrates falsely trigger chemical reward signals associated for millennia with wholesome
non-toxic and often short-seasonal foods. At the cellular level, the brain cannot distinguish the
difference, the body accepts or regulates incoming sugar automatically. Large continuous
quantities and fructose-heavy loads strain the body’s regulatory (homeostatic) systems, leading
to disease conditions listed above.
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Certainly people are capable of rising above this chemical trickery once they are aware of
it and committed to change? Indeed, but other mechanisms that also serve practical and efficient
functions may tend to thwart awareness and commitment. Psychologists studying decision theory
for decades, including Nobel prize winners Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman, have inferred
then clinically demonstrated the existence of decision-resource-preserving short-cuts of
judgment called “heuristics” (rules-of-thumb), by which we efficiently circumvent biological
bounds to how much information we can process at once, and by what priorities. They have also
demonstrated that “prospect theory” functions, with the effect that one’s choice is affected with
changes in reference point from which one judges gains and losses – something that would not
occur with fully known preferences and constant time preference in full-attention utility
calculations. This demonstration demands that at least one of the classic set of Savage axioms
ensuring objectivity of utility assessments – ruling out reversal of choice, the influence of
context, and regret – must be violated. The theory of revealed preferences, and the Bayesian
updating equivalent which extends the theory practically, are no longer axiomatic. Favoring
more certain(/nearer) outcomes, over less certain or further away outcomes then occurs even
when this means that an individual choice will not conform with highest expected utility (the
Ellsberg paradox; in our context, think of sweet taste now versus the prospect of poorer health
later). Lipscomb, Weinstein, and Torrance 1996 survey a large body of empirical literature,
finding with Pesendorfer’s 2006 survey of behavioral economics strong support for an
“immediacy effect” that heavily, hyperbolically discounts the future.
Utility maximization may not be the criterion of choice. Simon proposes “satisficing,”
that takes from available or near options to minimize search costs, and Gigerenzer (2001)
discusses “aspiration level” criteria by which one accepts the first candidate that rises to a
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minimum requirement. This non-optimizing criteria is in the class of “fast and frugal heuristics”
that are likely to apply to small-expense, mundane choices like snack foods and soft drinks.
“[S]mall-scale day-to-day decisions are where self-control problems are most likely to influence
behavior. ...[W]e have shown…examples where mild self-control problems cause severe welfare
losses…” (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2000, p 247).
Evidence from neurobiological studies shows people favor simple quick decision
processes versus investing the brain resources for full rational processing. Ambiguity of
information or outcome – such as a person only vaguely familiar with the health effects of
routine SSB consumption would perceive – triggers the brain to pick a simple decision process
rather than fretting through a full-resource process, and errors in judgment follow (Fulponi,
OECD 2009). This certainly applies to food decisions:
Experimental research findings [in behavioral economics] suggest that heuristics or rules of thumb are often
used to simplify decision making and are important in predicting which foods an individual eats, how much,
and whether he will eat these again. This may be an efficient approach to decision making given time
constraints. However, if decision making under time constraints is coupled with outcomes that are uncertain
or occur in the future, errors of judgment can become large (Fulponi, OECD 2009, p 13).

Wansink finds that people are unaware of many dozen food decisions daily, and time-use survey
results clearly show that eating is often a “secondary behavior,” conducted when primary
attention is focused elsewhere. Consistent with an array of Wansink results, medical doctors with
MPHs, Cohen and Farley, argue that eating is often a function of automatic behavior, not
complex choice (quote structurally condensed for brevity):
Human beings have limited cognitive capacities, with the ability to consciously process only 40 to 60 bits of
information per second—equivalent to a short sentence. ... Therefore noncognitive behaviors are not a sign of
weakness but rather an adaptation that allows human beings to be a uniquely productive species. …A great
deal of mental effort is required to make conscious decisions and then implement them in the form of
behaviors. Most of our responses to our environment can be understood as automatic behaviors. … Once
people initiate eating, they usually continue until the food is gone or until some other external occurrence
changes the situation. Automatic behaviors…occur without awareness, are initiated without intention, tend to
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continue without control, and operate efficiently or with little effort (p 1). … [E]ven after people have been
shown the results of experiments demonstrating the automatic nature of their actions, they steadfastly refuse
to believe that those actions did not result from conscious choice. … We blame our lack of willpower on the
inability to maintain a diet, when it is more likely that our automatic responses to ubiquitous cues to eat and
the availability of cheap, convenient, calorie-dense food are responsible (p 4).

People develop (food) habits to conserve decision-making resources and “get by” rather
than optimize. Then their habits can drive behavior without reflection let alone deliberation or
maximization, and indeed may shield against new information and deliberation. “…[B]ehaviors,
once they become habitual, are maintained without reference to preferences and intentions,”
(Rothman, Sheeran, and Wood 2009, p S12). From a British study commissioned to address
obesity long-term:
…[A] habit is frequent behavior that is conducted with little conscious awareness and intention, is mentally
efficient, and may sometimes be difficult to control… In addition a habit is cued by the environment in
which the behavior is conducted.
…[H]abit leads to ‘tunnel vision.’ When habits have developed, an individual is less motivated to attend to
and acquire new information, particularly information that is not consistent with the habit. …[H]abitual
behavior seems less guided by attitudes and intentions than behavior that is conducted in a more
deliberative fashion. When a particular behavior is repeated over and over again, the original reasons and
arguments why that behavior was adopted in the first place may vanish over time (Maio et al.: p 104, citing
numerous others).

Decision theorists now generally agree that preferences, rather than being a fixed ordered
and known priority set, are formed at the time of decision making: “…even in familiar domains
such as everyday eating behaviors…decisions are quite prone to preference construction.”
Spontaneous quick emotional heuristics can easily trump a slow deliberative analytical decision
mode. “Marketers…well understand the power of affect, [and] typically aim their ads to evoke
an experiential mode of information processing,” the quick emotional heuristic (Ellen Peters, p
S82, both quotes). Food is the second most advertised product category, with fast food chains,
where sCSDs are prominent, often appealing to an appearance of value by supersizing low-
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nutrition and EDNP foods, “focusing on the virtue of economy, not on the vice of gluttony”
(Zimmerman 2011, p 294).
All the mechanisms confirmed by empirical research and described here challenge the
contention that revealed preference theory or Bayesian learning by consumers can to any
measure be relied upon to demonstrate that consumers have maximized utility. The nutrition
effects of chronic sCSD consumption are so strongly negative that they seem destined to degrade
future utility for most chronic sCSD consumers, making utility maximization an unreasonable
premise.
Consumer psychologist George Loewenstein formalizes the notion that drive states such
as thirst hunger and sex drive that he calls visceral factors crowd out long-term objectives,
creating good-specific collapsing of time perspectives, which arise temporarily then fall away.
Consequences associated with regret that one has acted against one’s longer-term goals may
follow. Unfortunately, Loewenstein (1996) concludes based on reams of empirical evidence,
“people underweigh, or even ignore, visceral factors that they will experience in the future, have
experienced in the past, or that are experienced by other people” (p 272). Thus humans routinely
enter states where they dismiss the import of later consequences, but will not account for this in
advance calculations, and afterword will honestly claim that they were optimizing. This would
seem a structural economist’s nightmare: chronic violation of our assumptions about optimal
behavior, with embedded irrationality, or at least dishonesty as to motives and effects. Mancino
and Kinsey (2008) rise to structural modeling of a Loewenstein effect, but despite clever
formulation and responsible execution, are forced to restrict themselves to two periods and a
fixed discount factor applied to discrete rational choices.
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Psychologist Roy Baumeister has identified that the higher-order brain functions of selfcontrol flag when overtaxed, and finds that higher-order brain functions, being the last to
develop, have the heaviest glucose draw, and are the first to be winnowed when glucose levels
begin to dip. So one’s ability to resist a sweet treat now actually falls at the time that a sweet
treat would be suggested by the body to get a needed boost – as we now know it will when
coming off of a sugar high. Baumeister et al. 2008 (quote structurally condensed for brevity):
Ego depletion affects consumers. Researchers showed that people shifted toward less edifying and more
self-indulgent fare when depleted…[including] shifting toward candy instead of healthful…snacks.
…[D]ieters ate more food when depleted than they would otherwise. Nondieters were relatively unaffected
by ego depletion. …[D]epletion…undermines the defenses and the virtuous intentions that would otherwise
guide behavior (p 9). …Ego depletion makes people think less intelligently [on IQ tests and other mental
tests]. …[D]epleted persons succumbed to various flawed decision strategies, all of which conserve effort
by taking short cuts instead of reasoning out the problem (p 10).

The prospect for habituation or addiction in the kinetic modern environment, as people selfmedicate with sugar (replenishing a depleted ego), is self-evident. Baumeister et al. bring dozens
more clinical studies that deepen the evidentiary base for some of Kahneman and Tversky’s
assertions, and the evidentiary base for exactly the failures of rational utility maximization
posited by the equation and flowchart in 6.9.
Refreshed with this overview, reviewing assertions throughout the main text will now
cohere better. The degree to which one’s knowledge and nutrition criteria may diverge from
realistic expectations of utility in rational choice calculation may be larger than neoclassicalists
imagine. Low active nutrition knowledge will prejudicially lower the k multiplier in equation (d),
increasing the likelihood of a negative long-term health result larger than expected in a priori
utility calculation. Low active nutrition knowledge will also raise the influence of a, according to
Beydoun and Wang (2008) and Zoellner et al. (2011). This finding identifies a mechanism by

523

which the “Knowledge, beliefs… decision criteria…” box affects “economically rational
decision criteria” in Figure 4.
The k in equation (d) may be negative and larger than even a moderately nutritionally
wary individual may have considered. Rational choice based on faulty information then seems
more likely to fail to maximize realized utility. Choice is uninformed, and without Bayesian
learning serving to update decision criteria (which are likely to be habitual triggers rather than
deliberative anyway), the “later” term in (d) will remain negative in some proportion to the
consumption in the “now” term.
In Figure 4, when “Current devotion of psychological decision-making capacity” follows
the “Low” track, choice is reflexive, and there is no handle for new information to be
deliberately and rationally applied. The k in equation (d) as applied to SSBs may be artificially
prevented from being adjusted downward by information from sound science, leaving demand
for SSBs/sCSDs artificially high. Formally, this would be attributed to an information failure or a
failure of rationality.
In imagining empirical applications of this model, I am forced by my characterization of
choice within a dynamic pattern to implicitly use distributions of k and a, as each is the product
of a combination of influences, including time preference and changing levels of discipline in
evaluating food choices that impact one’s assessment of later health effects from current choices.
Thus my model, which I do not yet claim is quantifiably estimable, allows an even “broader
range of situations to trigger present-biased behavior” than does Mancino and Kinsey’s. When an
individual’s dietary habits are fairly consistent, this may prove estimable – with k as an estimate
or an estimable distribution based on an individual’s dietary pattern of choices, and a an
estimable distribution of larger patterns in which visceral factors play out to a predictable degree
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– in a way that a time-preference constant that changes meal-by-meal (as Mancino and Kinsey
use) may or may not be.
To summarize, there is preponderant evidence that consumption of SSBs at even average
levels is unlikely to result from a utility-maximizing process, and this may hold for a range of
EDNP foods. This essay models in two ways consumer decision paths that diverge from
conventionally assumed RUMax decisions, without disallowing RUMax choice in either model
type. This essay argues that a number of assumptions necessary for neoclassical-theory-based
empirical strategies are proved false by clinical evidence of consumer behavior applied to
unhealthful foods. Economic characterizations of consumer behavior predicated on these
assumptions may be suspect, and may benefit from re-examination. Policy recommendations
derived from quantitative work that is grounded on assumptions that do not withstand empirical
scrutiny may need to be narrowed in scope or reformulated by proponents, or discounted by
policymakers.
The next essay marries some elements from my results in Essay One with arguments here
to generate a policy package scientifically more likely to lower SSB consumption than any
existing recommendation set I have found.
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Dietary Reference Intake Life
Stage Groups

Two-Day Mean of
Energy from Added

Table 23.

Mean Intake of Added Sugars in Gram-Equivalents [g-eq (SEM)]a,b,c

Group
0 ≤ x ≤ 5%
5 < x ≤ 10%
10 < x ≤ 15%
15 < x ≤ 20%
20 < x ≤ 25%
25 < x ≤ 30%
30 < x ≤ 35%
>35%
Children 4 to 8 yrs
Males 9 to 13 yrs
Females 9 to 13 yrs
Males 14 to 18 yrs
Females 14 to 18 yrs
Males 19 to 30 yrs
Females 19 to 30 yrs
Males 31 to 50 yrs
Females 31 to 50 yrs
Males 51 to 70 yrs
Females 51 to 70 yrs
Males 71+ yrs
Females 71+ yrs

No. of
Obs. In
Group

Total added
sugar consumed
(A)

Sugars/sweets/
beveragesd
(B)

Regular soft
drinks
(C)

987
1,976
2,551
2,278
1,427
689
275
249

24.9 (0.54)
45.0 (0.79)
67.0 (0.95)
91.6 (1.03)
127.2 (1.74)
160.4 (3.31)
197.6 (4.95)
232.9 (7.48)

7.7 (1.01)
19.8 (0.58)
36.5 (0.98)
57.0 (1.30)
86.0 (2.43)
115.5 (2.42)
152.5 (10.03)
187.6 (14.52)

2.7 (0.19)
6.8 (0.30)
14.6 (0.50)
27.3 (0.80)
47.1 (1.06)
69.0 (2.42)
96.0 (3.93)
116.7 (4.12)

Rough
Fraction
(C)/(A)
1/8
1/7
1/5
3/10
>1/3
>2/5
just < 1/2
1/2

1,136
688
749
836
901
578
641
954
987
858
956
594
554

92.2 (1.73)
103.4 (2.37)
87.2 (2.16)
115.2 (3.02)
81.7 (1.62)
117.7 (4.02)
76.3 (1.56)
106.3 (2.24)
69.2 (1.36)
78.2 (1.96)
58.0 (1.32)
58.9 (1.67)
47.3 (1.29)

51.5 (33.94)
65.8 (13.81)
51.2 (5.51)
83.4 (27.48)
58.6 (33.52)
84.3 (31.11)
51.6 (23.51)
69.6 (12.08)
40.5 (4.37)
44.2 (12.78)
28.9 (8.69)
30.9 (13.39)
22.7 (5.60)

21.1 (1.09)
31.0 (1.54)
22.3 (1.61)
44.6 (1.99)
28.8 (1.84)
47.6 (2.40)
25.6 (1.66)
39.2 (1.79)
19.3 (1.32)
22.8 (0.96)
13.0 (0.80)
15.1 (0.86)
9.4 (0.60)

> 1/5
3/10
1/4
< 2/5
1/3
2/5
1/3
>1/3
<1/3
3/10
>1/5
1/4
1/5

mean gram-equivalent (standard error of mean)

a

Rough
Fraction
(C)/(B)
~ 1/3
~ 1/3
2/5
~1/2
>1/2
3/5
> 3/5
> 3/5
2/5
< 1/2
> 2/5
> 1/2
1/2
>1/2
1/2
>1/2
<1/2
1/2
>2/5
1/2
2/5

Table adapted from Marriott et al. 2010, Table 7 and Appendix Table 7. All names, categories, definitions, and values in
columns before “Rough Fractions” are from Marriott et al., whose original table names follow. Table 7: Mean Intake of Added
Sugars in Gram-Equivalents [g-eq; see next Table note] by Food Category for all people aged 4 years and above by Range of
Percent of Estimated Daily Intake from Added Sugars With Total Energy Intake as a Covariate and Covariates from the Food
Frequency Questionnaire in the Analysis, National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) 2003–2006. Appendix
Table 7: Mean Intake of Added Sugar in Gram-Equivalents (g-eq) by Food Category for Dietary Reference Intake (DRI) Life
Stage Groups with Total Energy Intake as a Covariate and Covariates from the National Health and Nutrition Examination
Survey (NHANES) Food Frequency Questionnaire in the Analysis, NHANES 2003–2006. The standard error of the means
(SEM) is the standard deviation of the sample means over possible samples drawn from the population. Particularly for the LifeStage-Group gram equivalents (lower portion of table, below the grey bar), “the standard errors reported in this [Marriott et al.’s]
table have been adjusted via balanced repeated replication, and therefore account for the complex NHANES sampling design.”
Table titles in this note, the text after the parenthetic clause in the previous sentence, and all remaining Table notes are verbatim
from Marriott et al table annotations.
b
One Gram-equivalent equals an amount of added sugar comparable to 1 g sucrose in carbohydrate content.
c
Sample excludes under 4 years, fasters, and pregnant and lactating women. Analysis controlled for total energy intake.
d
Examples of sugars/sweets/beverages sub-categories include: sugars/sweets: sugar, sugar substitutes, candy, ice cream toppings,
syrups, chewing gum, gum drops, ice pops, gelatin desserts, jams, jellies; regular soft drinks: cola and non-cola type, cream
sodas. Ginger ales, root beer, chocolate-flavored soda; regular fruitades/fruit drinks: all single fruit and mixed fruit beverages
such as apple juice, apple-cranberry-grape juice, fruit punch, lemonade, fruit flavored sports drinks; fruit flavored powdered
drinks; low calorie beverages: any sugar-free or low calories beverage, carbonated or not carbonated; alcoholic beverages: any
alcoholic drinks including beer, wine, cocktails; other non-alcoholic beverages: coffee, tea, coffee substitutes, non-fruit
beverages, non-alcoholic beer, wines, cocktails, non-carbonated water.
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Essay Three

Habitual Soft-Drink Consumption: How Markets Fail, and How Policy
Prescriptions Must Adapt

Chapter 7

Policy Options for Reducing SSB Consumption –
Moving Beyond Platitudes
Abstract
Standard economic analyses of sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) demand focus on
transactions between manufacturers, retailers, and consumers, but ignore market failures
associated with marketing environments and consumer failures to maximize lifetime utility
through acquired food habits. Literature from many fields indicates consumer behavior divergent
from economic theory. I offer a vocabulary that brings attention to a full spectrum of market
failures. Drawing from quantitative findings in economics, my own empirical results, and from
broader literature, I propose a heretofore unique policy program that will improve health
outcomes by scientifically addressing and countering causes of SSB overconsumption in the U.S.

7.1

Overview
The empirical work in Essay One suggests that providing information/education is likely

to be more efficacious than other tax-based initiatives in addressing sugar-sweetened beverage
(SSB) overconsumption. The evidence that eating behaviors very often exhibit compromises or
failures of the rational utility-maximization (RUMax) behavior assumed by neoclassical
economists suggests that policy proposals that flow from standard economic models may prove
inadequate for achieving policy objectives. I consider standard economic tools and current policy
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proposals regarding SSB/sCSD ([calorically] sweetened carbonated soft-drink) consumption,
bringing to bear my own quantitative results, as well as evidence and perspectives from critics of
standard economic models as they apply to eating behavior and behavioral change.
This process yields a revised set of policy proposals, justified by a wide range of
empirical and theoretical literature (quasi-exogenous literature: behavioral economics,
neuroeconomics, decision theory, psychology, consumer psychology, social psychology,
medical/nutrition). I contend that this new proposal set, so informed, supersedes the body of
singular, and first-level-combination proposals that currently dominate the literature of policy
proposals meant to impact SSB consumption. In short, I contend that all policy proposals to
reduce SSB consumption rates and the effects of this consumption currently advocated by the
economic, medical, and public health communities each tend to overlook key behavioral factors
that are likely to severely undermine the effects of these policies, at least at politically achievable
tax rates. By pooling empirically-based understanding across fields into a comprehensive
perspective, I suggest a scientifically based combination-policy regimen, that if implemented
should prove more effective than the recommendations from any of the existing fields that have
weighed in on the health epidemics associated with dramatic overconsumption of nutrientdeficient sugar calories, as we find in SSBs. 1

1

Often, our enjoyable work as economists occurs when we are able to create, derive, prove, or find empirical
evidence for concepts that challenge limits of conventional thinking, concepts that offer perspectives that explain or
rectify apparent paradoxes. Perhaps the most famous example is the theory of marginal value, by which Adam
Smith’s famous diamond-water paradox was solved. Many names are associated with that attribution, including
W.S. Jevons, M.E.L. Walras, J.B. Clark, A. Marshall, and V. Pareto. Becker and Murphy (1988) propose that
substance addiction is a rational behavior, and offer limited empirical support for some aspects of this perspective.
Others – particularly psychologists, social psychologists, and behavioral economists, but including some consumer
psychologists and economists – have challenged the rational utility-maximizing paradigm of individual behavior as
it concerns eating habits and American health epidemics. I have attempted to conceptually identify where standard
economic thinking overlooks elements fueling behaviors which from the neoclassical perspective have rational
utility-maximizing individuals choosing to make themselves large and unhealthy, often while simultaneously not
only claiming but in action demonstrating a desire to be thinner and more healthful.
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By accounting for behavioral and environmental factors already identified across a range
of disciplines as consumption decision drivers (Essay Two = Chapter 6), I propose a policy set
that I contend is capable of reorienting these drivers toward healthier dietary patterns, without
significantly limiting adults’ range of consumer choice. These include changes to SSB marketing
environments, and the use of tax revenues on SSBs (sCSDs) and their multi-media
advertisements to fund public service announcements and public education programs with
content specifically designed and tested to achieve multiple objectives. These objectives include
the raising of public awareness to the presence of added sugars and to health effects from
consuming them in excess; suggested reformulations of internal decision heuristics relevant to
unhealthful food consumption; and a systematic building of nutrition education to a level that
will accommodate more health-producing self-regulatory behavior.
After an introduction to and discussion of research objectives for this essay, Section 7.4
reviews the neo-classical perspective of markets and market failures, and the types of corrective
prescriptions that may follow from market failures. Section 7.5 introduces a theoretical model
and vocabulary to clarify or expand these concepts in a framework relevant to market failures
associated with sCSD/SSB consumption. Sections 7.6 through 7.10 serve as a review of literature
suggesting market failures in the sCSD/SSB industry(/ies) that meet the definitions in 7.5.
Section 7.11 draws from the set of related literatures that confirm factors likely to
associate with market failure in sCSD/SSB markets and consumption, and lists proposals
emanating from these literatures intended to address overconsumption problems.
Section 7.12 integrates knowledge developed or reviewed throughout the three-essay
dissertation to this point to identify policy vectors to reduce sCSD/SSB overconsumption. I
specifically link policy tools to the mechanisms identified in the literature as contributors to this
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overconsumption, and suggest forms for these policy tools that preserve producer and consumer
choice, that re-orient toward a more efficient (and fairer) market, and that from quantitative
evidence and theory will actually alter behavior, rather than only theoretically doing so. Section
7.13 anticipates problems implementing the policy set, including industry and political
objections. Section 7.14 summarizes arguments and key conclusions.

7.2

Introduction
Human nutrition and public health are complex systems, with dozens or even hundreds of

influences affecting ever-changing outcomes. No one food type can ever definitively be said to
be the sole cause of a disease, just as tobacco use can never unassailably be said to strictly cause
cancer – so long as any small but significant number of people smoke regularly and remain
cancer free. But correlations can be very informative, and compelling enough to justify policy
interventions designed to reduce consumption. There are precedents for illegal drugs, and the
heavily regulated and taxed consumables alcohol, tobacco, and marijuana.
Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis (2012) point out that “over the past 50 years, consumption
of sugar has tripled worldwide,” “sugar consumption is linked to a rise in non-communicable
disease,” and “excessive consumption of fructose [added sugars] can cause many of the same
health problems as alcohol” (p 28-29). The radical increase in sugar-sweetened beverage
consumption, and especially the consumption of sCSDs over recent decades has been studied
extensively by the medical community. The independent medical community (those not
contracted by sweetener or SSB manufacturers, per Lesser et al. 2007) find the SSB and sCSD
categories to be the largest contributors of added sugars (non-naturally occurring in the food) to
the American diet. Marriott et al. 2010 further find that Americans tend to consume added sugars
greatly in excess of recommended limits, on the order of 83 grams-equivalent per day, or around
530

320 kcals – more than double the recommended limit for adult men and three times the limit for
adult women. These refined carbohydrates in combination with the inadequate intakes of
essential nutrients that they displace (Marriott et al.), are associated with or are contributing
factors to: weight gain, metabolic syndrome, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, hypertension, and
certain cancers, including some of the most common non-smoking-related cancers in both sexes.
It is a mistake to characterize SSB policy primarily as a vector against overweight and
obesity. Overweight and obesity are markers for disease, symptoms that may or may not
correlate to actual diseases that are strongly associated with high consumption of simple
carbohydrates as a portion of overall diet (Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis 2012; Fulponi OECD
2009). The sugar-disease connection exists independent of individual BMI, and although high
sCSD consumption causes weight gain (Malik et al., all claims here extensively supported in
Essay Two) the connection between added sugars as a percentage of diet and rising BMI is not a
linear relationship (Marriott et al., p 236). Medical costs and insurance rates in the U.S. have
been rising at double-digit rates for decades. Not including insurance companies, the medical
sector now accounts for some 17% of the U.S. economy. Diet-related diseases now cost more
than contagious diseases and genetic disorders combined (Fulponi OECD 2009, Swinburn et al.
2011). There is a strong public health case for dramatically lowering SSB consumption, as well
as a strong economic case for preventing diseases rather than treating them, especially because
half the treatment costs for diet-related diseases are borne by the public (in the range of $45B in
2002, Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn, and Wang 2003). This represents a substantial externality cost for
the public, outside of the economic transactions between soft-drink manufacturers, individuals,
and health insurance companies.
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The empirical work in Essay One demonstrates that lower education is more strongly
correlated with high sCSD purchase than lower income, although both are consistently
associated, especially in combination. This finding suggests that information-based or educationbased policy interventions are likely to be more effective than tax interventions in reducing SSB
purchase. Ethnic grouping is also a strong relevant factor, but there is no identification of the
mechanism involved. There may be more sub-cultural acceptance of sCSD consumption in
certain groups, but this cultural tolerance is arguably a derivative of effective nutrition education,
as for the Education variables. So policy recommendations favoring an educational rather than
tax-based (i.e., price-, or income-based) approach may also be effective in addressing ethnically
identified differences in purchase response to sCSD marketing variables.
Specific implications from my results (or others’) for policy will be more useful if
discussed later in this essay (7.11 and 7.12). It is important to note early on that in emphasizing
educational policy interventions, a frustrating problem arises. It seems that more information
does not seem to lead consumers to more healthful dietary choices:
•

“Perhaps the most puzzling and frustrating aspect of the obesity epidemic is the contrast
between our understanding of the biology of the problem and our inability to halt the
epidemic” (M.D.s and Masters of Public Health, Cohen and Farley 2008, p1).

•

“How can we explain this seeming paradox – increased information, observable information
effects, yet disappointing public health outcomes? One problem is that dietary quality
depends on overall patterns of behavior…. [C]ontradictory changes…[such as the shift to
low-fat milk while eating more high-fat cheeses in fast food] may reflect consumer difficulty
in assimilating and using information in the more complex ways necessary to create an
overall healthy eating pattern” (Food Assistance and Nutrition Research Program, Economic
Research Service, USDA, Guthrie and Smallwood 2003, S47).
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•

“Poor diets and rising obesity rates among Americans have persisted despite increased
awareness and publicity regarding the benefits of a healthy lifestyle” (applied economists
specializing in consumer food topics, Mancino and Kinsey 2008, p i).
Are there assumptions that responsible researchers make when conscientiously

recommending policies, assumptions about behavior and behavioral change that may not be
accurate and may preempt the effectiveness of well-intentioned policies? If so, to what extent do
economists tend to fall prey to overassumptions that may doom policy effectiveness? (Of course
the entire field of behavioral economics exists in response to the latter question.) Are economists
looking in the right places to resolve this paradox, or does our work contribute to the patterns
identified in the paradox, and then stop?

7.3

Research Objectives for Policy Essay
Intriguing answers from the empirical and theoretical essays here suggest that current

policy proposals to limit sCSD consumption are too narrow, and are in their currently proposed
forms unlikely to yield intended effects. Formally: If the implicit decision to consume sCSDs
regularly proves to be questionable in its rational utility maximization for typical individuals,
what policy actions seem most likely to effectively curb overconsumption? How do my
empirical results further inform which policy interventions are likely to be most efficacious?

7.4

Market Failures and Economists’ Standard Prescriptions
Economists’ standard approach to SSB consumption or the obesity problem is shaped by

our basic approach to any economic question, an approach that tends to narrow the analyst’s
focus to price-quantity reactions. Assumptions about individual preferences, rational choice, and
market dynamics all incline the economist to look past many factors that influence actual
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purchase-consumption dynamics (factors explored in Essay Two, Chapter 6, and here). To the
degree that what we tend to focus on diverges from real and influential dynamics, policy
recommendations that follow from these same assumptions are likely to fail.
Why? Because conventional industrial-organization or marketing analysis relies on
economic theory presuming utility-maximizing consumer choices when estimating demand for
SSBs. 2 Then from an obesity policy perspective, the same conventional approach seeks to curtail
consumer demand using tools from the standard tool kit for correcting minor market failures:
taxes or product information. But the market failures that need correcting are now so deep and
endemic that they challenge the scope of standard economic market-failure theory. Over the last
four decades, these more recently recognized market failure types have grown very quickly in
bio-evolutionary terms, but too slowly in relative cultural terms to trigger focused consumer
awareness. These newer market failure types create a market context in which standard economic
demand estimation and policy recommendations are likely to be misplaced – even when they are
responsibly executed and consistent with their own assumptions.
A market consists of sellers and buyers consciously transacting in a common space. 3 If
all first principles of neoclassical economic theory hold, transactions are competitive and “fair”

2

While my quantitative work is on sCSDs, because I focus on the psychological and medical aspects in Essay Two,
I conduct estimation in a way that while associating quantity purchased with category price, may accommodate
consumers who do not maximize lifetime utility with their sCSD purchases. Later in this chapter, I explain that
despite my empirical focus on sCSDs, policy derived from my quantitative and theoretical analyses should apply to
the entire SSB category. The biology of sCSD consumption closely parallels that for nearly any SSB consumption,
although health effects may be worse from sCSDs, for reasons described in Essay Two. Psychologically and
medically, that which binds for sCSDs holds for SSBs.
3
The definition from the beginning of the methodology chapter: “‘The market’ is a solution to an equation
consisting not only of sellers, their evident marketing tools (e.g., price, sale, advertising), and buyers, but a venue
(the local Designated Marketing Area) that exists distinctly in each period of observation for both buyers and
potential sellers.” The key differences are that “venue” must now be understood to include elements of the market
space that include less-than-evident marketing tools, and we now recognize that sellers and buyers may not be
rational and utility-maximizing (RUMax) in their behavior. “Common space” may be physical, or more etheric in
conception, such as a web-based transaction platform like e-Bay, or e-Trade, which bring buyers and sellers together
through an electronic clearinghouse whose computer servers may be thousands of miles from buyer or seller.
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in the sense of achieving a Pareto-optimal equilibrium. If there is any structural or transactional
impediment to achieving a Pareto optimal solution, then some type of market failure exists.
Economists classically define four primary classes of market failure: market power,
externalities, public goods, and information failure/asymmetric information. All of these exist in
sCSD/SSB consumption, but not always where economists are trained to look. Many of the
newer-type market failures (yet to be clarified here) occur within the purchase and consumption
environment that behavioral economists have described, but also result from failures of rational
utility maximizing (RUMax) behavior described in decision theory, consumer psychology,
social psychology, and in the nutritional/medical literature describing the effects of consuming
SSBs. To the extent that conventional demand analyses and the policy recommendations that
flow from them fail to conform to actual decision and market processes, analytical results must
be non-determinative, and will be more normative than positive, despite claims to the contrary. If
the degree of dissonance is high enough, results and policy recommendations may even be
suspect.
I shall proceed to describe the classical and newer-type market failures in order, as a
prelude to a discussion of the literature on policy approaches to SSB consumption, and to a
discussion of why a new level of integrated policy approach is not only warranted, but necessary.
Market power is the ability to advantageously influence markets, market behavior, or market results. While
market power is typically associated with influence over prices, it also can take the form of influence over
demand, product flows, quality, marketing functions, and other firms’ market behavior. Firms seek and use
market power in order to achieve their economic goals (Kohls and Uhl 1985, p 300; my emphasis).

In any discussion of sCSD industry market power, there is no question that an industry
strongly dominated by a few world-famous brand names that each have been marketed for over
100 years – with aggressive television advertising over the last forty years – has determined
prices far in excess of anything close to the marginal costs involved in producing and distributing
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spiced sugar water. Coca-Cola is the number one brand by far, with Coke and Pepsi controlling
up to three-quarters of the world beverage market (Sharma et al. 2010), but many brands are
household names, and can be found in nearly every grocery, fast-food, convenience, and vending
outlet in the U.S. Successful branding makes product-specific demand more inelastic, and
industry-level advertising in addition to other marketing strategies helped more than triple caloric
intake of sCSDs in less than 25 years (including private label; Nielsen and Popkin 2004; while
Fletcher, Frisvold, Teft 2011 note a 500% rise in consumption over the last 50 years). Along
with rising income and changing U.S. dietary habits, the end effect is a demand curve shifting
out in each decade since at least 1950. One must include a wider range of SSBs, including
energy and sports drinks, for this to remain true after 1997 (Nielsen and Popkin 2004; NPLAN
2011; Harris et al. 2011).
Market structure and successful product differentiation in the sCSD industry indicate
significant market power by themselves (e.g. concentration ratio of 2 ≈ 75%). However even this
market power is enhanced by manifestation of the other three classical market failures, which by
their existence each serve to block any market corrections that would naturally reduce demand
and leave prices to collapse toward a competitive oligopsonistic level (characteristic of highly
advertised differentiated products). In economic theory one expects market power to raise prices
and therefore reduce demand. But the marketing of the product and century-long acculturation of
sCSD consumption has been so effective that demand has expanded despite continued high profit
margins. As documented in Essay Two, the scale of sCSD consumption now directly impairs the
health of the U.S. population as a whole.
If “a consumer or firm…[is] directly affected by the actions of other agents in the
economy,” i.e., by a transaction to which the consumer or firm is not an explicit party, there is a
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spillover effect, or externality. “In general, when external effects are present, competitive
equilibria are not Pareto optimal” (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, p 350). The cost of obesity,
diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and cancers (all of which are correlated with SSB consumption,
of which sCSDs are the primary component) does not fall only on those individuals who
regularly consume SSBs. Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn, and Wang (2003) estimate that half of health
care costs related to overweight and obesity fall on the public in the form of U.S. government
health care programs, an externality cost estimated to be around $45B in 2002. Of course the
costs to insurance premiums resulting from this vector of poor health also becomes externalized
if premiums are not adjusted by dietary behavior or at least by degree of overweight and obesity
of insured policyholders. Then there is the externality of foregone productivity that occurs within
firms, from the lower productivity or increased absence of those who have damaged their health
marginally by SSB consumption.
But these market failures still cleave closely to standard economic analyses. The “public
good problem” is not as obvious. “Public goods…are commodities that have an inherently
‘public’ character, in that consumption of a unit of the good by one agent does not preclude its
consumption by another. Examples abound: roadways, national defense,…and knowledge all
share this characteristic. …[P]rivate provision of public goods is typically Pareto inefficient”
(Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, p 350).
In the context of the greater sCSD market, any “public good problem” must be perceived
as the failure of government to sustain adequate elemental features of the sCSD market, in the
interest of ensuring that transactions are generally capable of allowing individuals to maximize
utility as firms are allowed to maximize profits. The need for emphasis will become clearer as
we proceed.
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Information asymmetry market failure, like public good market failure, does not readily
appear to the standard economist in the form it is most relevant for SSB markets. For example,
there is nothing known to be in the proprietary formulas of sCSDs or SSBs that is a poison
known to the companies but not to the public – as substandard brake linings in a car might be.
Information failures tend to be far more subtle. The Oxford Health Alliance’s “Chronic Disease:
an Economic Perspective” addresses some subtleties of public goods and information failures:
It is…important to distinguish between problems due to insufficient and those due to asymmetric
information – despite the interrelations between the two. Asymmetric information occurs when one party to
an exchange has private information that it does not share with the other party. Insufficient information is
information that is not deliberately hidden, but which some individuals cannot use or interpret adequately.
These differences lead to very different policy conclusions. In the case of asymmetric information, a
mechanism has to be developed by which the party with private information reveals the information;
insufficient information can be corrected using comprehensive or targeted information campaigns.
Two key features of consumers’ incomplete and possibly asymmetric information are potentially relevant in
the context of chronic disease: 1) insufficient awareness about health risks involved in consumption choices;
and 2) inadequate information about certain addictive aspects associated with the consumption of unhealthy
goods….
Insufficient and/or asymmetric information is more likely to prevail under certain circumstances, such as
among children and teenagers. Imperfect information is also more common: where the health effects of a
behaviour are insufficiently understood and researched (for example, because of the long time lag between
behaviour and outcome). …and where industry’s marketing efforts distorts information, intentionally or
otherwise (p 35). ...
On the whole, government intervention in the form of the provision (and production) of health information
is in principle justifiable, as information is a public good, which leads to it being under-supplied in the
absence of government intervention. … The public provision of information can in principle take many
forms, including product labeling, comprehensive or targeted public-information campaigns, or restricting the
marketing of unhealthy food (p 36). …
Time-inconsistency [of preferences] can be easily confused with insufficient information…, especially in
the case of addictive goods. …The outcomes of these market failures may be identical, but the causes – and
hence the policy implications – differ significantly. While the solution to limited information is to provide
more information,…, the solution to time-inconsistent preferences is to provide individuals with effective
commitment devices (Suhrcke et al., p 37, embedded citations deleted for all pieces of this block quote).
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It is clear that if industry marketing efforts distort information, even unintentionally, government
intervention may include public-information campaigns and restriction of marketing. If we
expect “distorting information” to include the suggestion that SSBs are not unhealthy because
they are favored by top professional athletes then there are at least some cases where information
has been distorted by marketing. The topic will be handled in coming paragraphs and sections
below, citing economists and non-economists who claim that industry marketing has a causal or
near-causal effect on the American obesity epidemic (and diabetes epidemic, etc.). The validity
of such arguments would build a case (at least) for restriction of SSB industry marketing.
While neither individuals nor firms can have or process perfect knowledge, we can easily
imagine a ratio between knowledge relevant to their respective maximization processes that they
are aware of and use, and knowledge relevant to their maximization processes that they are
unaware of or do not use. One type of “information failure” would then involve consumers
having a lower ratio of relevant knowledge necessary to maximize their utility than the ratio of
relevant knowledge that firms need to maximize profit. The firms would have an implicit
advantage, because their relevant information ratio for optimizing would be larger. Consumers
would be more vulnerable to failing to optimize, given the market cues they do consider.
An example of this is the classic asymmetric information problem of firms knowing how
consumers will react to marketing cues when individuals themselves remain relatively naïve
(Fulponi OECD 2009). (Again, these contentions may seem overstated, but will be clarified
below in discussing the literature considering sCSD market failures in practice.) Here it is
already clear that if economists assume that consumers are completely aware of the marketing
cues being presented them, and make fully cognizant choices, then these same economists must
conclude as a direct correlate of this assumption that there is no asymmetric information problem
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of this type. In Essay Two, and in this chapter, literature is presented suggesting numerous
reasons that consumers may fail to appreciate the influence of sophisticated marketing signals as
marketing signals controlled by a firm or industry. The simple ubiquity of soft-drink vending
machines is so commonplace to Americans that while the visual message is constantly
reinforced, it may no longer be perceived as advertising. Della Vigna and Gentzkow (2010) refer
to general empirical demonstrations indicating that a persuasive influence from advertising exists
independently from advertised information, and both can change a receiver’s beliefs:
“[u]nsophisticated receivers neglect incentives, noninformative dimensions of messages affect
behavior….” (p 665). Information: asymmetric. Advantage: firms.
Adverse selection, signaling, and screening are further types of failure of information, but
are not prominent issues in the sCSD market between manufacturers and the buying public.
Again, market failures of the information type will become clearer as we proceed.
Consider some of the opening sentences of Phillip Nelson’s classic Journal of Political
Economy (1970) article, “Information and Consumer Behavior,” in light of market failures as
they may exist in the sCSD industry. “Consumers are continually making choices among
products, the consequences of which they are but dimly aware” (p 311, all quotes this
paragraph). This applies directly as a premise for the theoretic model in Essay Two, which coinforms the policy prescription analysis here. “Monopoly power for a consumer good will be
greater if consumers know about the quality of only a few brands of that good.” Coke and Pepsi
have massive market shares. Is this really an edge due to consumer “experience” (verified by the
experience of using the good), or an edge due to consumers limited need to “search” for Coke
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and Pepsi brands, the latter determined by their ubiquity? 4 Besides production function and
market-size variables, “...consumer behavior is also relevant to the determination of monopoly
power in consumer industries.” A view of “consumer behavior” broad enough to include RUMax
failure would again put Nelson exactly ahead of my interpretation. “…[A]dvertising and
inventory policy are affected by consumer ignorance about quality differences among brands.”
Change “brands” to “product categories” and we have consumer nutritional ignorance facilitating
the move from milk to SSBs as with-meal beverages. “The difference in the price of information
can lead to fundamentally different kinds of consumer behavior.” Forty percent of household
meal planners overestimate the nutritional quality of their diets (Variyam Shim and Blaylock
2001). Appreciation of this fact makes one of Nelson’s statements once again prescient to the
current work. Nutrition knowledge is an underprovided public good, placing the information
search cost on the consumer to obtain a knowledge base adequate to keep them from creating
health problems with their diet. If so “fundamentally different kinds of consumer behavior” will
not be solved by simple blanket tax or information policies. Remember, by treatment cost, dietbased non-communicable diseases are now the number one health problem in the world (Fulponi
OECD 2009).

7.5

Market Failures Resulting from Compromise of Elemental Features of a Market
Appreciating arguments derived from empirical work in behavioral economics, social

psychology, and the medical/public health community, it seems that a Pareto optimal equilibrium
may not be achievable, even at market-clearing prices, if the elemental features of a market that
can influence market transactions do not satisfy the neoclassical assumptions that define the ideal
4

“Experience” may be affected, per the argument of Becker and Murphy (1993), by utility-raising advertising, but I
refer here specifically to whether the taste experience itself (blindfolded) is so unique as to determine categoryleader market shares.
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market setting in which a Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium must occur. These neoclassical
assumptions include a level playing field on which players transact and rational players
unerringly acting in their own long-term self interest – i.e., they do not neglect incentives, nor is
their behavior affected by noninformative dimensions of messages, such as those that Della
Vigna and Gentzkow summarily identify. To clarify the discussion, establishing reference terms
will prove useful. Let’s call these elemental features:
(market) frame = the market environment or transaction space, inclusive of all features
that may affect the probability of transactions occurring or that may affect transaction outcomes
(i.e., allow transaction outcomes to conform to, or cause them to fail to conform to, a competitive
ideal); and
RUMax agents = rational utility-maximizing agents, which for parsimony of terminology
will include consumers as “agents” of their own interests, and will allow the term “utility” to
extend beyond consumers to include the pursuit of profits, market share, or firm life by firms,
and individual interests of agents for a firm, insofar as these may impact sale in the market.
RUMax agents are actors we expect to consistently (predictably) pursue self-interested (utility or
profit-maximizing) goals that can be met by transacting in this market.
Failures of frame (to be perfectly competitive) would include a compromised market
environment, giving one side advantage. Failures of RUMax agents would be market-relevant
behaviors that are not comprehensively rational (as neoclassically defined, see section 6.4 here)
or utility maximizing. RUMax-failing agents, for internal reasons or from influence by a frame
whose pure competitiveness is compromised, may not consistently act according to neoclassical
precepts. RUMax-failing agents do not perfectly defend and pursue their own best long-term
interests when representing themselves in the market. Where “failures” of frame or of RUMax
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agents seems too absolute a term, I shall use “compromise of frame,” or “compromise of RUMax
agents,” to denote a similar but less absolute concept. Note that compromises or even failures of
frame or of RUMax agents do not preclude the existence of a market, they simply make a Pareto
optimal market outcome unlikely or impossible, just as the four classically acknowledged market
failures do. “Market failure refers to problems in the decision-making process, and cannot be
judged solely by looking at which decisions were made” Cawley (2004, p 120).
Academic authors in the medical and Masters of Public Health communities refer to
“obesogenic environments” which would be classified as failure of frame, e.g., food
environments oriented toward low-cost energy-dense low-nutrient foods as default options,
where the default options are the choices favored by the structure of the environment in which a
decision is to be made. (Think “office vending machine” for between-meal hunger at work.)
Behavioral economists occasionally refer to “failures of rationality,” or describe unstable and/or
time-inconsistent preferences, that would fall under the failure of RUMax agents. While
“obesogenic environments” may arguably tend toward embodying some diluted ambient form of
market power, and time-inconsistent preferences may tend toward some form of information
failure, it is difficult to attribute either of these discipline-specific criticisms to particular market
failures of the “classic four” type. Failures of frame or of RUMax agents can therefore arguably
be represented as different types of market failures from the “classic four.”
Returning to the definition of a market, the buyers and sellers are RUMax agents, and the
transaction space (not just spatially, but holistically) is the frame. Because a market cannot exist
without the elemental features of agents or a transaction space, these elemental features comprise
a substrate below the market transactions themselves. Let’s call this substrate: Level 1.
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Given that a market exists (the elemental features of Level 1 are present), the market
enables transactions, where transactions are a type of product made possible by the machinery
(elemental features) of Level 1. Let’s call the transaction level: Level 2.
The character of transactions may be freely competitive, or may be compromised in some
way. Three of the four classic market failures represent failures of the market to transact in a
perfectly competitive way that yields a Pareto optimal outcome: market power, externalities, and
public goods. This leaves the information-based market failure types – information failure, i.e.,
inadequate supply or signaling of information, and information asymmetry. Information flow or
problems with information flow occur between: 1) economic agents in the form of product
information, pricing, and buyer-seller communication; 2) between the frame and economic
agents in the form of market-environmental influences on appetites or behavior (red table cloths
in Italian restaurants); and 3) between Level 1 and Level 2 in the form of information asymmetry
affecting a transaction type (say, buyer ignorance that there is a second and cheaper merchant of
the same product in town, in which case the buyer might be willing to pay a monopoly
premium).
These relations suggest the following theoretical graphic:

Level 2:

Discretely Economic Transactions
(character of transactions: freely competitive OR not freely competitive)

Level 1:
Holistic Market Environment  transaction-relevant info  Transacting Agents
(market frame)
(RUMax agents)
Using the vocabulary and depiction in this theoretical graphic, we can see what a failure
of frame may look like for the market for energy-dense nutrient-poor foods, such as sCSDs or
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SSBs (or pretzels, for that matter). If the market “setting” or environment has evolved over time
under influence of one transacting party (firms with sophisticated marketing strategies), over
another (individuals who are not conscious of firms’ attempt to manipulate their appetites) to
favor the first party, then this dictated market evolution does not favor a Pareto optimal
transaction set. Note that this dictated market evolution is not strictly visible as market power, in
the sense that firms raise price, increase market share, or enforce barriers to entry, which are
each manifestations of market power of the type that industrial organization economists might
usually attempt to measure and empirically discern. If this dictated market evolution continues
over time, with more effective marketing strategies that influence consumers on a level below
their attention, then a “new normal” is created in which the evolved market space resembles the
previous market space in most ways, but with a new tilt favoring the profit-maximizing firm.
Industrial organization economists might usually fail to see or to measure such influences, and
being trained to explain them away as matters of individual taste, built on preferences that are
characteristics of the consumer, as sex, age, or ethnicity are.
If a market environment biased by dictated market evolution exists, this represents a
compromise of frame, where the playing field for market transactions is no longer level – the
“free and fair market” frame will have been bent to favor SSB firms. There is little resistance,
even among neoclassical economists, to the notion that where free and fair markets are
compromised, there is a possible role for government to intervene. This concession to
government power is based on the fundamental role of government to redress market
imperfections that are not self-correcting. Even the most libertarian will concede government
must enforce contracts, protect property, and correct any of the classic four market failures if
they are large enough to lower net public welfare more than the costs involved in correcting such
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failures. Governments have the right and responsibility to set regulate and enforce market
conditions conducive to Pareto-optimal outcomes. These include equalizing knowledge,
information access, and market dynamics, so that weaknesses or biases in elemental features of
the market do not implicitly favor sellers or buyers.
Returning to the claim that there is a public good problem in the sCSD market, the
government role in maintaining strong and robust elemental features of a market comes to bear.
From a perspective, because participation in a market like that for a common foodstuff does not
preclude others from participating, provision of an institutional or regulatory or legal space in
which a fair market can exist is a type of public good. Public goods are non-rivalrous, nonexclusionary spaces [goods] for public activity [consumption], which are underprovided by
private markets. People usually follow their incentive structures, as do firms. But individuals
with multiple objectives and capacity constraints may fail to be RUMax in their eating behavior,
as supported by the literature justifying the theoretical model in Essay Two. For example,
economist Frederick Zimmerman (2011), discussing how the inherent complexity of weight gain
thwarts rational choice assumption, states that “consumers are largely unaware of their own daily
calorie intake/expenditure balance, but they are also largely uninformed about the broader costs
and benefits” (p 291). Arguments in Essay Two make clear that many sCSD consumers will
have tendencies to be RUMax compromised in their food choices, while it is implicitly clear that
firms have the incentive to bend the market frame to their profit-maximizing advantage
whenever and however they can, and as long as legally possible. This can be done without fraud,
or dishonesty, by constructing environmental cues that stimulate subtle aspects of consumer
psychology – ubiquity of product and placement within retail settings, ubiquity and character of
advertising, shape color image and lettering on packaging, etc.
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Again, Zimmerman, this time intemperately but unambiguously states: “Culture – not
individual rationality – has given people around the world broadly healthy diets for millennia” (p
291); and “ … In the past 30 years, food culture has been manipulated by the marketing of highly
processed foods as never before. Food culture no longer hews to tradition, but increasingly
answers to commercial interest, funneling consumption toward high-profit foods” (p 292).
To the extent that Zimmerman is accurate, this is precisely the “bending of the market
frame” being discussed. Zimmerman also makes clear that the culture has changed rapidly, but
not so quickly that the majority of consumers or policymakers resisted. Why would they when
the advertising and marketing techniques emerged incrementally? Only someone cognizant of
the market frame and interested in maintaining a level and square frame would care and protest.
Recognizing that this dictated market evolution unfolded over decades, and its effect was in part
masked by the slow breakdown of traditional family structures and specific food subcultures,
may mean accepting that the solution must also unfold over decades.
Human biology and psychology may be influenced by manipulations of taste and
perception. This incentivizes firms manufacturing and marketing their products to stage and
exploit an individual’s RUMax failure, so that firms profit off of the individual’s naiveté as they
sell us energy-dense low-nutrient foods. This is the accusation that behavioral economists,
psychologists, decision theorists, social psychologists, and many in the medical community are
making. One such example is Coca-Cola dominantly purchasing shelf space at eye level in
supermarkets; another is ubiquitous soda vending machines. (Where are the fresh fruit vending
machines?) Where dictated market evolution of the frame occurs, a perfectly competitive
outcome is not trivial, because the market is no longer “fair” in the way a coin or die or strategic
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economic decision-making game may be. This compromise of frame may be attributed to the
government failing to provide a public good – a competitive market environment.
Knowledge is a public good (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, p 350). If RUMax failure
by sCSD consumers occurs in part because nutrition knowledge is too low to motivate formation
of healthy dietary habits that overwhelm less health-producing desires (Variyam and Golan
2002, Beydoun and Wang 2008), then non-RUMax individuals by dint of their failure to
maximize utility will determine a Pareto sub-optimal outcome. This can be characterized as
resulting from individuals with too little knowledge relevant to their maximization process,
which in turn results from public failure to provide an adequate knowledge base for participants
to engage the market in their own best interests (Cawley 2004). Failure to provide an adequate
minimum base level of nutrition education shifts the cost of privately acquiring nutrition
education onto consumers. With an inadequate education base, consumers do not properly
calculate the benefits of self-informing, and consequently do not undertake education to raise
their level of active nutrition education to a level that would foster RUMax dietary choices. The
proof is a population that is the most overweight and unhealthy due to diet-based diseases of any
population in history, where the people are not happy with this outcome. If the diet industry were
very small, if no one seemed disappointed in diagnosis of Type II diabetes, if one’s diagnosis
with one of the cancers that primarily feed on blood glucose were seen as a small price to pay for
the enjoyment of sugar in the diet, then we might infer that people did not regret their current
health status and had maximized their utility with their previous dietary patterns.
The sCSD industry politically defends the existing market frame – whose evolution has
in part been dictated by profit-motivated marketing mechanisms over decades – as “the market.”
The hackneyed mantra: “the market” should not be meddled with, as doing so would move firms
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and individuals from a Pareto optimal outcome. The sCSD industry’s economic power is
converted to political power, as with many examples in agricultural economics, 5 and the
industry’s political power is used to thwart Congress from defending the proper economic role
for government in establishing an unbiased and self-correcting market frame with RUMaxenabling education (Brownell and Warner, 2009). But a market frame that is biased by dictated
evolution should be challenged as resulting from government failure to provide a public good,
failure to maintain a fully competitive frame.
Economists, focusing on the “classic four” market failures, tend to overlook these deeper
Level 1 market failures, so there is not from economists’ ranks a common cry for public
investment to correct frame and RUMax agent (Level 1) problems. By keeping the frame
oriented toward an optimal market outcome, making much more nutrition knowledge and
awareness of marketing influences the new default for consumers, there would be no domination
of information or frame by industry (sellers over buyers). A government providing adequate
public goods and consumer protections would correct these deep market failures, failures to a
large degree proved by research presented in Essay Two and below.
Notice also that the “4 P’s” of marketing – product, price, place, and promotion – also
focus the attention on Level 2 aspects, rather than on the transactional subtext and aspects of the
agents rather than the products. Place is more physical, and seems more a stage rather than a

5

Even a short list of examples of corporate/industry power in agricultural economics must include Archer Daniels
Midland (ADM), Cargill, and Monsanto. All three of these companies have primary stakes in making HFCS, the
primary non-water ingredient in American sCSDs. To ADM’s creation and manipulation of U.S. ethanol policy: “A
bet on ethanol, with a convert at the helm,” New York Times, October 8, 2006, Alexei Barrionuevo. To Cargill’s
behind-the-scenes style of political influence versus ADM’s more open style: The Political Economy of US
Agriculture, Brooks and Carter, 1994. To allegations claiming extensive documentation that Monsanto has exercised
extreme influence over U.S. and international policies affecting the disbursal of genetically engineered crop
technologies, there is the film the World According to Monsanto (2008, National Film Board of Canada, coproducer; dir. Marie-Monique Robin), http://www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=209 (accessed 19 Feb. 2013), and
listings in OpenSecrets.org.
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shapeable space; the mind of the buyer is not referred to directly. There is no apparent foothold
for an industry’s marketing to skew a probability of transaction or the character of a transaction.
Level 1 problems, while still market failures, though not of the classic four type, cannot
be solved by Level 2 analysis, results, or policy recommendations (except coincidentally). This is
the root of criticisms of the standard economic approach from behavioral economics and other
fields that weigh in on the epidemic threat to health that current trends in American waistlines
portend. The sugar/SSB/sCSD problem is in fundamental aspect a Level 1 problem. So all pure
Level 2 recommendations are destined to fail, because singly and by the level of analysis, they
will be of inadequate scale to address market environmental and consumer RUMax problems.
“In general, our review of research on effective habit change strategies for complex behaviors,
such as those that yield obesity…suggests that any single intervention strategy is unlikely to be
sufficient to yield change across the whole population” (Verplanken and Wood 2006, p 98).
The question then becomes do we as a nation want to solve our market and health
problems? Before we answer we must recognize that this can be done without limiting consumer
choice much at all (Sunstein and Thaler 2003; Thaler and Sunstein 2003; Just and Payne 2009;
Maio et al. 2007). If our answer is yes, then we must scale our policy solutions to address Level
1 problems. This would involve an intentional policy set to reverse the effect of market elements
determined by a dictated market evolution, wherever the effects bias the market environment
toward the interests of the sCSD/SSB industry. Reversing these effects would first require
regulation and restriction of certain marketing practices for products that consumed in quantities
common to many Americans are fundamentally harmful. This would further require a large and
careful education campaign, with new nutrition education and marketing-awareness messages.
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The scale of the problem – diet-related diseases are the number one health-care cost in
the world, and SSBs are the largest energy-dense-nutrient-poor calorie source in the diet –
further dictates that we must not succumb to protests from “free marketers” and the sugarproducts industries. These reforms will not be unfair encroachment on private operation or trade,
but would be regulatory adjustment of a compromised market frame – a compromised market
frame that would not have been established over the last four decades if the government had
acted warily against a dictated market evolution. In addition to setting a fairer market frame, the
provision of an under-provided public good in the form of education to raise the sophistication of
the general public in nutrition and response to marketing will allow consumers to make
responsible choices in their health-production calculus.

7.5.1

Market Demand and Market Correction – Perspective Affects Policy Prescriptions
A level market frame and adequate level of effectively applied nutrition education would

serve as quantity purchase dampeners for most individuals. 6, 7 Without such (Level 1)
interventions, inference done on any (Level 2) market demand would tend to ignore that much of
the entire curve is right-shifted.
From a meta-economics perspective, the problem results from a failure to
comprehensively apply the very principles that economists stand on. Economists assume that
people make utility-maximizing decisions by deliberatively and efficiently using information and
cognitive resources. We assume this is done only for discrete rational decision making and that
6

Some may conceivably maximize their utility at high levels of SSB consumption, so these changes would do little
to affect their purchases. This would be the group that loves SSBs so much that they never regret the weight gain,
heart disease, diabetes, work loss, etc.
7
In order to speak briefly and comprehensively about this sub-section topic, there is a reliance here on material
supported in detail elsewhere, mostly in 6.8, but also in 7.6 through 7.9 below. This material includes citations from
decision theory, behavioral economic, psychology, consumer psychology, social psychology, medical/nutrition, and
neuroeconomic literatures.
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only discrete rational decision making is used for purchase and consumption choices. Empirical
economists working on Level 2 make assumptions about preferences and behavior, then use real
data to calculate estimates of demand and price elasticities of demand, infer market structure, and
draw conclusions about policy recommendations. All of these tools and processes are useful.
A problem arises when we are forced to recognize that the assumptions economists are
trained to make about preferences and behavior, that consumers are RUMax in the given market,
are repeatedly challenged by empirical evidence from other fields and some evidence within the
field, and that failure of these assumptions to hold brings down in cascade the structures built on
these assumptions, structures that end in calculation of demand, consumers’ price elasticities of
demand, and policy recommendations.
In fact, for eating habits and especially for highly marketed sugar-based products, long
before the discrete rational decision making process may be consciously engaged, biological
application of efficient use of information and cognitive resources has already engaged, and
psychological application of efficient use of information and cognitive resources has already
engaged, narrowing the awareness of the preference and choice process to favor elements in the
environment that are highlighted in some way, that are common, and that have been consumed
without noticeable short-term ill effect. (This psychological application is explored by social
psychology, consumer psychology, and decision theory, in addition to classical psychology, see
Chapter 6.) Cohen and Farley (2008) explain biological and psychological efficiencies are useful.
But economic models of demand for highly processed and marketed foods do not appreciate that
mechanical gains in decision efficiency do not imply conscious rational choice: “noncognitive
behaviors are not a sign of weakness but rather an adaptation that allows human beings to be a
uniquely productive species. …A great deal of mental effort is required to make conscious
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decisions and then implement them in the form of behaviors. Most of our responses to our
environment can be understood as automatic behaviors” (p 3).
These noncognitive processes that engage before and perhaps instead of discrete rational
choice designed to maximize lifetime utility (economists’ bailiwick) meet economists’ own
definition of efficient use of available resources, but these resources are neural, not economic.
These processes can and do shunt decision through an emotional rather than a deliberative
pathway. When this occurs, the process obviates the late-stage, high-neural-resource deliberative
process that classical economists assume always characterizes economic decisions. It is these
biologically and psychologically precedent processes that have been hijacked to a degree by
decades of high-quality persuasive (not informative) marketing, social acceptance of a goodtasting product sampled and enjoyed by nearly everyone, but whose primary ingredients are
addictive or nearly addictive. Economists’ analyses, assumptions about the correctness of their
analyses, policy prescriptions, and presumptions about the correctness of these, are all contingent
on a level of discrete choice and efficiency that is actually unlikely to exist in the choice to
consume sCSDs or their near-cousins, SSBs and other well-known, ubiquitous, high-sugar/lownutrition snack foods. All such foods use similar marketing techniques and take advantage of the
same biological and psychological processes. The sCSDs are simply the best at this game, and
Coca-Cola® is king. Calorically-sweetened carbonated soft drinks are the purest sugar (no trace
of fiber, protein, or fat), often plus caffeine, in a low-cost form that is so convenient that it
doesn’t even require chewing to consume.
Classical economic logic dictates that to the degree that SSB market outcomes are not
efficient due to failures of frame and RUMax behavior, the larger system must change, because
the quantity we see purchased is not demand, as it would be under neoclassical assumptions for
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free markets and rational choice, but an artificially large demand. Quantity purchased does not
equal market demand for SSBs, in the sense of a fair market, where consumers act rationally and
the frame is level. There are a host of empirically identified mechanisms that manipulate
preference and consumption quantity for this type of product. Marketing, product ubiquity,
stocking, and flavor enhancement can all increase purchase and consumption patterns by
affecting biological and psychological drivers – drivers that may not correlate strongly with
underlying individual preferences in the absence of these environmental cues. Meanwhile, lack
of nutrition education and lack of consumer awareness of the impact of sophisticated marketing
techniques or even of consumers’ own dietary habits decreases resistance to increased purchase
and consumption. So long as the distinction between quantity purchased and demand is clear, the
term demand may be used as a simplifying proxy. But demand cannot mean the sum of
exogenous individual preferences expressed by purchase quantity in a fair market, because
evidence in Essays Two and below suggests this seems very unlikely to occur for perhaps the
vast majority of people in the SSB market. Arguments against policy intervention cannot cite
that they undercut legitimate preferences and demand for a majority of the population, without
expressly refuting decades of corroborative evidence suggesting the demand they fill is created,
not a genuine reflection of original preferences.
No matter how efficient the production, distribution, and from the firm’s perspective,
marketing, of sCSDs (SSBs) may be, if the volume sold is meeting an artificially large demand,
it is a misallocation of social resources, and as such can only detract from attempts to maximize
social welfare. Given the market failures implicit in and the health effects that follow from this
inflated artificial demand, there is a perfect case for attaining higher total welfare by any
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government intervention that results in market outcomes that more closely comply with
fundamental economic definitions of market-clearing demand.
To account for the empirical evidence, changing economists’ assumption set to reflect
scientific evidence has serious implications for our estimates and our policy recommendations.
Empirical evidence from studies of the psychological and biological mechanisms involved
suggest that every popular policy mechanism currently proposed will in the form proposed, fail
to reduce the scale of SSB consumption enough to produce the intended effect on public health.
With combinations of policy interventions expressly designed to address Level 1 market
failures, gross product purchased will fall. This is not an assault on commerce, commercial
rights, or market demand. The fall in quantity purchase within a square market frame in which
informed aware individuals choose based on long-term utility maximizing goals will allow a
classically defined market demand to equilibrate.
Changes to the SSB market are not impositions on SSB markets, but necessities. They do
not threaten free speech or commercial rights, they protect the rights of consumers that have been
infringed through the construction of artificially large demand for health-threatening products.
Considering Loewenstein’s (see 6.8.3) depiction of “arational” behavior, and the at least semiaddictive nature of high-sugar foods (especially in the absence of dietary fiber), as well as the
often unexamined momentum of dietary habits, it is clear that much SSB consumption is not well
deliberated, and may not be volitional in a solidly defensible sense. If sCSD (SSB) purchase and
consumption is not fully and freely volitional, then policies to regulate advertisement, packaging,
content, or marketing of sCSDs may be more freely considered, without the full weight of the
counterargument that their restriction must be undercutting welfare. If regular consumption at
levels challenging dietary recommendations is not fully intentional and rationally utility
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maximizing, then it is overconsumption to begin with, and policies that decrease consumption by
educating consumers and countering the dictation of market evolution is simply a reasonable
intervention to correct market failure. Policy intervention is a responsibility. When markets are
fundamentally broken, policy must apply to foster a more socially efficient outcome.

7.6

Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro: Well-Known Level 2 Analysis Misses Level 1 Problems
A clear example of Level 1 problems being lost to Level 2 analyses may be found in the

famous explanation of U.S. obesity offered by Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro (CGS) in their
National Bureau of Economic Research paper ultimately published in the Journal of Economic
Perspectives (2003). CGS are sensitive to potential failures of some standard economic premises:
The standard model of consumption involves rational individuals who decide how much to consume on the
basis of price and income, fully accounting for the future health consequences of their actions. But at least
some food consumption is almost certainly not fully rational. People overeat, despite substantial evidence that
they want to lose weight. The diet industry has $40-100 billion in annual revenues [CGS cite: Cummings,
Laura. 2003. “The Diet Business: Banking on Failure.” BBC Online. February 5]. Food brings immediate
gratification, while health costs of overconsumption occur only in the future (p 112).

By this point much of that argument will sound familiar (from Essay Two, and Just and Payne
2009 make it too). As food processing has moved more from the kitchen to outside factories, the
time-cost of food preparation has fallen, allowing people to eat a greater variety of foods and
higher volumes. CGS note that the amount of food eaten at meals has not changed much, and
that “most of the increase in calories is from calories consumed during snacks…the number of
snacks in the typical day increased dramatically over [the mid-‘70s to mid-‘90s] (p 101).” They
also note that total exercise has not dropped enough to count fall in caloric expenditure as a
factor in general weight gain. They note that the increase in the food supply over their study
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period is “three to four times the increase that is needed to explain the increase in average
obesity over the time period” (p 102).
CGS reject that changing demographics, market price and household income changes, a
relative price decline for food, or an increase in women in the work force driving more meals
away from home are responsible for the rise in caloric intake and American obesity. CGS offer
theory and empirical evidence to support their hypothesis that a lowering of the relative cost of
food preparation is responsible for the extra calories. Their result is a solid explanation rooted in
a Level 2 approach that is foundational in the literature concerning the economic approach to the
modern obesity problem, with some tips of the hat to potential Level 1 problems.
But being primarily a Level 2 analysis, it overlooks some compromises of frame and
RUMax behavior that may exist on magnitudes that could explain more of the obesity effect
CGS attempt to characterize. First, they find only a 20-minute-per-person-per-day decrease in
food preparation time from 1965 to 1995. If this is indeed a critical motivation of increased
caloric intake, then how is it that weight gain continued, even accelerated in the last decade of
the study period, while the time advantages of food preparation technology would have been
mostly captured in the 1970s and 1980s, with proliferation of snack and pre-made foods?
There is no question that more processed foods in the diet “lowered the time price of food
consumption” (Gortmaker et al. 2011, p 838), but most food preparation time is for meals, not
snacks. Excess calories entered the diet primarily with the addition of snack foods, by CGS’s
own claim. So this is a vector of new food that would have proved time-prohibitive to prepare
using in-home technology, had it been eaten before (daily potato chips or frosted snack cakes
from scratch?), but it was not. No food preparation time savings accrue from foods that were
rarely or not eaten before. Time saving in period B relative to period A demands that a task be
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performed in both periods. Some move from fresh to canned or frozen meal ingredients would
mean potentially lower nutritive quality of calories in meals, and a lowering of preparation time,
but again, the predominant caloric influx is from snack foods. High-calorie-low-nutrition
processed snack foods were not a major part of the 1965 diet, but entered and proliferated as an
obesogenic behavior in parallel to, but largely unrelated to, the lowering of food preparation
times. Couldn’t proliferation of the microwave alone account for much of the difference in meal
preparation times?
Also, workout time, including travel to and from a workout site may average more than
20 minutes daily for many people, so a rational person wanting to manage their weight would
have recognized this and stopped snacking, to block the time inefficiency of spending more time
to exercise than the time-cost savings from lower food preparation time. Or if physical
conditioning is not a priority, a rational person would weigh 20 minutes per day and snack
enjoyment against the probability of lower life enjoyment and lower productivity from obesity,
and later insulin injections and dialysis, or even chemotherapy bills. (This returns us to capacity
constraints recognized by Herbert Simon, psychologists, decision theorists, and behavioral
economists. Cohen and Farley 2008 offer exact numbers for neural processing bits/second.)
Underappreciation of an increase in low-nutrient dietary calories may follow from a
misapplication of linear logic, or from a compromise of market frame that consumers fail to see,
while failure to adapt one’s snacking behavior may follow from consumer failure to do full timecost calculations for their weekly time budgets. These are “failures of rationality” (Sassi and
Hurst OECD 2008), which CGS in principle acknowledge may occur, but that they do not
appreciate in their empirical model.
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Beyond these, the primary factor CGS overlook in a Level 2 analysis is the compromise
of frame represented by changes in food quality. Meals are more likely to have some nutritional
plan than snacks, and meals are often comprised of culturally traditional mixtures of protein, fat,
starches, and nutrient-rich foods (meat, potatoes, salad), while processed snack foods are often
extruded or gun-puffed refined grain-based products, often with soy oil and added sugar. To treat
them as equivalent foods under the category of either “food” or “calories” – as a person with low
effective nutrition education may be wont to do, especially in a hurry – is in error, given the
tremendous difference in nutritive profiles.
Food quantity may rise a small amount as relative price falls, but highly nutritional foods
are filling, whereas low-nutrition foods are less filling. Calories alone may tip the BMI scale in
bio-physical terms, but the types of calories ingested do matter for hunger and eating behaviors,
and it is this qualitative difference that undermines the CGS analysis. Refined carbohydrates
stimulate hunger, while protein and fat satiate it, with the effect amplified for semi-liquids and
liquids, as less solid foods ingested between meals displace meal calories less (Olsen and
Heitmann 2009). After a Coke and chips, you will be hungry again soon, both from the
ingredients, and because you did not respond to the initial hunger by nutrifying the body to
properly neutralize the hunger. If low-nutrient, carbohydrate-rich snacks are eaten instead of fruit
or nuts or whole grains, or protein, etc., a person will eat more – because these snacks are easier
and faster to eat, because hunger will return quickly if satiating hormones are not generated (or
are suppressed, as high-fructose corn syrup [HFCS] does, Teff et al. 2004), and because hunger
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will return more quickly if hunger-producing hormones are triggered by postprandial
hypoglycemia (Ludwig 2002, Olsen and Heitmann 2009, and others). 8
Food manufacturers in the CGS study period could have produced and advertised
nutritive and filling snacks out of sweet potatoes, kale, and lean beef, and some may have. These
could still be made crunchy, spicy, sweet, savory, or “fun.” But the vast majority make refinedflour crackers, snack cakes, potato starch products, etc., because these tend to predominantly use
artificially cheap (farm-program-supported) ingredients. 9 Profit margins are higher with cheap
ingredients and highly advertised “fun” snacks (see Becker and Murphy 1993, Table 1, for foods
and Coke as among the top 10 largest advertising-to-sales ratios among major national
advertisers).
Fruits and vegetables and raw nuts are nutritious snacks. Where is the big margin in that?
Profit margins rise with more levels of processing. The lower the percentage of the retail price
the grower gets, the higher the mark-up for the “value added” by processing, labeling, and
distribution for everyone else in the chain. Where is Madison-Avenue advertising for bananas? A
banana is a banana; highly nutritive, but without a big advertising budget. Dried shredded sugarcoated banana chips attached to sweetened crunchy ready-to-eat cereal flakes…now there is a
profit margin middle men want a piece of. Buy cheap, sell dear: manufactured refined-grainand -sugar-based snack foods. Because these foods do not fill biological needs in a way likely to
satiate hunger over time, people will eat more of them. (Doritos television ad from the 1990s,

8

See also Essay Two, 6.7. Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro were capable of recognizing the food quality argument, as
evidenced by the following quote, but they either missed it or discounted it for some reason (p 94): “Countries with
a greater degree of regulation that support traditional agriculture and delivery systems have lower rates of obesity.”
9
Potatoes do not receive farm support, but are much higher calorie per acre than grains, and the few whole potatoes
in bags of chips make for a high profit margin that is well-known. There is less than a single raw potato in a childlunch snack bag of potato chips that sells even at a very low retail price in a discount membership store in a large
bulk pack for $12 for 50 ounces ($0.24 an ounce,
http://www.samsclub.com/sams/shop/product.jsp?productId=163825&_requestid=17934, accessed on 04/06/12). An
average potato weighs about 6.5 ounces.
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starring Jay Leno: “crunch all you want, we’ll make more.” Doritos isn’t selling food, it is selling
the crunch experience, coated with spices engineered to encourage another bite involuntarily – a
taste development process similar to that described in Schlosser 2001.)
Food manufacturers will argue that their product lines are driven by consumer demand,
but while perhaps slightly true, the argument is made assuming that no one notices that the
market frame is bent. For example, this argument ignores the artificiality of demand created by
advertisements, the fact that there was no general clamor for such products in the 1950s and ‘60s,
ignores the fact that there is no good counterfactual where wholesome foods were more
aggressively marketed (or where the increasing sophistication of processed food marketing was
countered in the U.S. by public service announcements or advertising restrictions), and tends to
deflect attention from firms’ incentive to secure a higher profit ratio for cheap ingredients sold
dear.
Lowered cost of food preparation and “cheap” snack foods will make them more
attractive to consumers exactly as CGS state, and consumers will enjoy a larger variety of
processed branded products and with greater net volume of caloric intake, relative to fruit and
nuts, and to any snack food prepared in the home. The variety is an illusion, because of the very
narrow range of commodities involved in most of these snack foods (USDA program crops and
potatoes). It is a compromise of RUMax to continuously fail to notice that there is very little
biological (vitamin, mineral, and enzyme) variety in your “varied” food consumption set. More
importantly, the majority of the obesity effect need not have occurred if the manufactured snack
foods had been nutritious. Snacks would be more filling, so there would be fewer empty calories
going in, and less than the 27% displacement of nutrient-dense foods by energy-dense nutrientpoor foods (Marriot et al., p 229). But if snacks were more nutritious, people would stop eating
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them when they became nutrified, because hormones would signal satiation. Satiating hunger
quickly would lower snackfood sales volume, so firms will naturally prefer to manufacture
products whose consumption triggers more consumption (sCSDs or sugary snacks), rather than
quickly satiating a temporary desire.
CGS also do not mention that if people are eating enough quality foods at meal times,
they are less tempted to snack at all, because the slower digestion of protein and fat stave off
hunger. Only if advertisements (or socialization, or addictive properties) manufacture desire
(persuasive rather than informative advertising) could a well-fed person be induced to intake
large amounts of a low-nutritive snack. Ignorance of the health effects of the snack food may be
cited to defend why a well-fed person would snack so much, but this violates classical economic
RUMax assumptions, and again, supports my case.
So the obesity problem may in part derive from the lower food-preparation cost that CGS
identify – which being a time-saving is hardly a problem at all – but seems much more likely to
result from a change in net dietary quality that strongly encourages unconscious overeating of
empty calories. Meal habits may also have degraded over CGS’s period of study (suggested by
trends recognized by Senauer, Asp, Kinsey 1991), amplifying the transition to lower food
quality. More food enters the diet that has lower relative shelf price (compared to meat, fruit,
vegetables, and nuts) and lower nutritive quality. These cheaper lower-quality foodstuffs fail to
satiate and often induce hunger, and will do so if consumed, regardless of meal habits. If these
alternative explanations hold, CGS fail to empirically identify what may prove to be the
preponderant causal factors, leaving a well-executed but mis-specified model.
Alternative explanations presented here represent changes of frame, possibly from
dictated evolution of markets, and possibly provoking RUMax-compromised behavior of
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individuals who unconsciously equate snack foods with satiating nutritive foods, or tend to eat
by reflexive rather than deliberative behaviors. Cohen and Farley (2008), characterize eating as
generally an “automatic behavior,” while being clear that it can be brought under volitional
control (“All automatic behaviors can be controlled temporarily,” p 4). Consider the CGS
conclusion based on the premise of rational rather than reflexive (rather than “automatic”)
behavior. If people made a responsible economic trade-off – maximizing utility when eating
more, because relative food costs dropped as processing times were transferred out of the home –
then these people are happy enough being overweight, and are therefore better off: “People
without extreme self-control problems will be better off. While there is no evidence on the
incidence of extreme hyperbolic discounting in the population, we suspect that most people are
better off from the technological advances of mass food preparation, even if their weight has
increased” (p 115).
From a Level 1 perspective, this seems to be a tenuous leap, while from a Level 2
perspective rooted in the classical economic approach, it is at least defensible. But if CGS are
correct, people have to be less concerned about their weight than about the 20-minutes saved
each day. Without expressly intending to, Cohen and Farley parry and thrust:
Assuming that people who are overweight are simply unconcerned about their weight is tempting. But most
Americans consider themselves to be overweight, and nearly one-third are actively trying to lose weight
(including nearly one-fourth of women of normal weight…)(…). The observation that so many people
continue to gain weight despite wanting to be thin is more accurately explained by describing eating as an
automatic behavior (p 4; citations omitted, marked using “(…)”).

These are Level 1 problems, and it is little wonder that Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro did
not fully appreciate them in a responsible and well-defended Level 2 analysis. CGS do
responsibly use qualifiers for those individuals who are not strictly RUMax in behavior: “People
are worse off if this health cost is greater than the welfare gain from lower costs of food
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preparation” (p 114). “People with self-control problems may find themselves overconsuming
food, particularly when the time costs of food preparation fall. In this situation lower time costs
of food preparation may be a welfare loss” (p 113).
They assume that this group is by far the minority, and “people without extreme selfcontrol problems” are the majority, so “most people are better off” at the higher weight (p 115).
In contrast to the medical literature and national diet-industry figures, CGS seem to have
mischaracterized the preponderance of type in each group, and therefore while carefully
defending their argument, imply that there is general welfare gain, when a Level 1 appreciation
suggests a general welfare loss, because there are more losers on the scale than winners. It is not
only those with “extreme self-control problems” who are losing out, but the majority, who are
subject to reflexive eating habits, and the third who signal that they regret their weight. Perhaps
even more people regret their overweight, obesity, or diabetes, and no longer actively signal this
because they believe that their weight is beyond their control. Maio et al. 2007 refer to a sense of
control as one of the three primary motivators of behavior or behavioral change.
Ultimately, the 20-minute/day time savings does seem too small to primarily motivate a
nationwide obesity epidemic. For many of the reasons presented in Essay Two it seems doubtful
that most Americans consciously traded their long-term health for more snacks. For reasons
carefully supported in Essay Two, the Level 1 factors may prove far more compelling an
explanation than CGS’s primary argument. From a policy perspective, CGS are bound to
conclude that if most people are better off from the division of labor in food processing
(apparently despite the $90B/yr obesity-related U.S. medical bills), there is little reason for
government intervention. The Level 1 assessment explains why people may ignore changes in
quality when they (falsely) see most “food” as equivalent, and why they may fail to understand

564

the full consequences of eating high-calorie low-nutrition foods, artificially inflating estimated
demand for these foods. This “demand” tends to inflate BMIs, and not artificially. The Level 1
analysis suggests that compromises of free market assumptions exist in sufficient severity to
merit policy intervention.
In contrast to CGS, who provide a balanced Level 2 analysis, Marlow and Shiers (2010)
use Level 2 blinders, demonstrating the type of bristly defense of results determined by precepts
that usually associate with industry sponsorship of research (Essay Two, Lesser et al. 2007).
They conclude that soda taxes are unlikely to significantly lower obesity (as do Fletcher,
Frisvold, Teft 2011, referring to their own earlier quantitative work), but proceed to argue on
general principle that because a government is unlikely to assess the perfect tax level, and taxes
will likely prove regressive, that desired behavioral corrections will not occur, and such taxes
“may promote unintended consequences that may adversely affect public health” (p 34). Marlow
and Shiers’ conclusions are scientifically irresponsible while by strict logic not incorrect. This is
the result of intentional framing of arguments they seek to overturn, so that their arguments must
logically prevail over logically indefensible straw-man arguments. Marlow and Shiers rely on
logical tricks like the inability to definitively establish single-source “causality” as a failure to
strongly associate product use with health effect (a move from the tobacco industry playbook,
explained by Brownell and Warner 2009). Similarly, they dismiss peer-reviewed meta-analyses
that conclude that SSBs harm health. If one stays strictly in the Level 2 mindset, it is easy to miss
the many ways in which such arguments mimic responsible economic assessment while failing
to achieve honest academic assessment.
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7.7

Conventional Economic Approaches to sCSD Market Failure: Taxing sCSDs and
Giving Consumers More Information
Having outlined how conventional, “Level 2,” analyses tend to overlook causative factors

relevant to SSB overconsumption, let us now turn to policy options that flow from different
assumption sets and recognition of causes. Section 7.7 discusses current policy approaches to
reduce SSB consumption usually advocated by economists, and the strengths and limitations of
these tools. Section 7.8 examines arguments and empirical evidence from within or near
economics that question neoclassical assumptions.

7.7.1

Taxing sCSDs or SSBs
Taxes (subsidies) are a classic policy tool for addressing market failure, and given the

flexibility of tax policies compared to regulatory bans or command-and-control policies,
economists favor taxes. Consumers and companies facing a new tax may adapt their methods
while still remaining relatively free to determine their own process of maximization (utility or
profit). There are many reasons a food may be taxed, from redressing market failure, to import
restriction, to general revenue generation (such as a state sales tax covering entire categories of
products), to specific revenue generation (for targeted revenue use), to a sin tax. Sin taxes are
used to partially discourage consumption when some sort of market failure presumptively
encourages overconsumption, 10 including a compromise of consumers’ RUMax behavior from

10

As a general rule in discussing policies and the need to correct market failures, I will use the term
overconsume/overconsumption to mean consume in excess of recommended limits, referring usually to
consumption of added sugars in excess of American Heart Association (Johnson et al. 2009), and Institute of
Medicine (Marriott et al. 2010) recommended limits, or finally to Stanhope et al. (2011), who question the roughly
25% limit as too generous after discovering significant increase in markers of heart disease after healthy subjects
were on a diet with 25% of their energy intake as added sugar in soft-drink form for two weeks. Using the inferably
more scientifically objective World Health Organization’s 2003 recommendation that added sugar intake be less
than 10% of total energy intake (Johnson et al. 2009) is a stricter standard, one the U.S. is clearly not yet prepared to
accept. Inference on the relative objectiveness of the American and WHO standards is suggested by processes
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addictive goods (this is an economist’s wording of a perspective more commonly held by noneconomists, who are less likely to ascribe to Becker and Murphy’s A Theory of Rational
Addiction, 1988). Sin taxes are a “cultural intervention,” given the cultural judgment implicit in a
sin tax (Zimmerman 2011). According to Fulponi (2009), so far no OECD (federal) government
has taxed specific foods to reduce their consumption – as a sin tax would apply. Powell and
Chaloupka (2010) confirm within the U.S. that as of 2009 no state or local government uses softdrink taxes to promote healthier eating. The implicit choices in the OECD and U.S. of not having
imposed such taxes is in part attributable to the relative ineffectiveness of tax measures in
achieving health outcomes, due to the low price elasticity for food and often easy substitutability
that may lead to poor correlation between policy target and tax effect.
Imperfect information about products or health effects, distortions of preferences by
marketing campaigns, time-inconsistent individual preferences, and negative externality costs
associated with consumption have all been cited as motivation for taxing soda (Brownell et al.
2009). The taxing of sodas in the U.S. is often currently proposed as a new policy intervention
using economic justification, but are proposed also as a form of sin tax, since sCSDs are
generally considered to be an unhealthful product. This is not a novel concept: “Sugar, rum, and
tobacco, are commodities which are nowhere necessaries of life, which are become objects of
almost universal consumption, and which are, therefore, extremely proper subjects of taxation”
(Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776; 11 or
Chaloupka, Powell, Chriqui 2011b, p 650).

described in the books of Marion Nestlé, David Kessler, and the articles at least of Lutter and Nestler 2009, and
Brownell and Warner 2009.
11
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3300/3300-h/3300-h.htm, accessed 06 April, 2012.
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Taxes can be effective mechanisms for achieving second-best outcomes closer to
estimated/hypothetical “free-market” equilibria as would be achieved in the absence of market
failures.
In practice to date, the consistency and level of state sales taxes, even when applied to
soda despite a general waiver for food items (Smith, Lin, and Lee 2010 provide a table of state
taxes in 2009), does not seem to serve as an active disincentive large enough to impact health
outcomes, as an effectively large sin tax might (Fletcher, Frisvold, Teft 2011; Powell and
Chaloupka 2010; Sturm et al. 2010; Brownell et al. 2009). Smith, Lin, and Lee (2010) use
estimation results to predict a 37 kcal/day reduction in SSB consumption from a 20% tax on
SSBs. Finkelstein et al. (2009), estimate a mean reduction of 12.4 kcal/day from a 40% tax on
SSBs, at a mean household cost of $28.48. These are disappointingly small effects, given the 120
kcal/day rise in SSB consumption from 1977-78 to 1999-2001 (Nielsen and Popkin 2004).
Anyone expecting a politically feasible tax scheme to greatly affect consumption
behavior may be in for a disappointment. Smith, Lin, and Lee claim to be the first to have
calculated cross-price elasticities for products to which tax-deflected SSB drinkers would
substitute, and encouragingly find that water would be the strongest substitute (albeit bottled
water, which will give major soft-drink bottlers less to complain about, given their ownership of
dominant bottled-water brands: PepsiCo=Aquafina®, Coca-Cola Company=Dasani®). Smith,
Lin, and Lee do warn that without straight pass-through of the tax (100% of the 20% excise tax
is passed to the consumer), effects may vary, and a tax higher than 20% would be required to
achieve targeted effects on consumption.
From Powell and Chaloupka (2010), we know that recently 40 states tax junk food and 34
states tax sCSDs, from which Powell and Chaloupka conclude that small stable taxes or
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subsidies are unlikely to produce significant changes in BMI or obesity prevalence. Nonetheless,
larger pricing interventions may affect those most at risk for overweight, as well as children and
low-socio-economic-status individuals. Furthermore:
…results suggest that taxing high-sugar food items may have long-run significant effects on weight outcomes
(p 244).
The current body of empirical literature that we reviewed offers limited evidence that weight outcomes could
be improved by using fiscal policies and that substantial price changes are needed to improve these outcomes
significantly (p 246).

So small taxes seem not to have positive health effects by themselves, but relatively large taxes
might for certain target groups. Powell and Chaloupka note that no studies to date have linked
tax data to individual-level data to derive BMI or obesity tax elasticity estimates, but Fletcher is
currently working on this (spring of 2012). Lopez and Fantuzzi (2012) conduct a counterfactual
with a 10% ad valorem tax on CSDs (caloric and diet), using results from a random coefficients
logit model, and find that a tax of this magnitude would discourage some CSD use, but not
enough to impact obesity. They do not consider hunger-promoting effects of caloric CSD
consumption (Olsen and Heitmann 2009), nor do they break from most economists and use an
accurate (Hall et al. 2011) model of caloric-change-to-weight-effect over time. The age of the
data places it before the rise of sports and energy drinks in the market, and the authors do not
discuss consumer adaptation to a post-tax pricing scheme, ignoring the likelihood that after an
initial price shock habitual consumers would – goaded by advertising and with no education to
help alter behavior – revert to use of the same or calorically similar products (Zhen et al. 2011).
Given the similarity of Lopez and Fantuzzi’s results to related empirical work, it appears their
findings – that low-income consumers will be more effected by a 10% tax and that obesity would
likely be unaffected by such a tax – likely would not change if the authors were to appreciate the

569

potentially confounding factors just mentioned. Lopez and Fantuzzi conclude that a program
more comprehensive than a stand-alone tax on sCSDs will be needed to affect obesity rates.

7.7.1.a

The Type and Scope of Tax Strongly Impact Policy Efficacy
Assuming that an effective tax policy can exist that redresses market failures in the

sCSD/SSB industry and improves health outcomes from consumer choice, the efficacy of such a
policy still depends on a number of factors. Policymakers must determine the definitions of
which beverages to include or exclude in the tax framework, and the type of tax. No one with
health objectives should include sCSDs while excluding other calorically sweetened beverages
including energy and sports drinks, and fruit drinks – carbonation is irrelevant to the medical
effects of high sugar intake.
Sales taxes are calculated as a percentage of retail price; excise taxes are calculated per
unit or per volume. Brownell, in conjunction with various authors back to Jacobsen and Brownell
(2000), has proposed a one-cent-per-ounce excise tax on calorically sweetened beverages (and
not on non-calorically sweetened sister products in the same supermarket aisle). Brownell also
with various co-authors proposes a sales or excise tax that would kick into effect above a certain
threshold level of grams of added caloric sweetener, or kick in above a certain number of
kcal/oz., or a tax per gram (equivalent) of added sugar, acknowledging that some theoretically
possible tax structures would prove difficult to administer. Pomeranz et al. (2009, including
Brownell), note that a regulatory cap on the amount of sugar in certain products is also a
theoretic policy option that could achieve the same ingestion targets as a tax at a certain level.
They do not that economists generally prefer taxation strategies to command and control, without

570

noting that this is because it allows firms more flexibility to discover the most efficient
solution. 12
Brownell et al. (2009) recognize three disadvantages to sales versus excise taxes.
Consumers might simply switch to lower-cost brands or large containers (excise taxes are more
effective in raising price when volume discounts are available, Chaloupka, Powell, Chriqui
2011c). Also problems with sales taxes – consumers may become aware of the tax only after
purchase, lowering the disincentive to purchase because it does not appear as a higher shelf
price, and free refills on fountain drinks would remain untaxed. Moreover, many states exempt
all foods and beverages from sales taxes, which could further legislative difficulty. As
disincentives to the amount of sugar per ounce in SSBs, excise taxes offer advantages, and can
be assessed on producers and wholesalers, where they would be easier to levy and enforce.
Targeting bottlers with an excise tax might miss taxing fountain drinks. Brownell et al. (2009)
suggest raising excise taxes with inflation.
As a policy option, sales or excise taxes rise or fall on the same premise: that consumers
and firms will be making rational economic choices, and respond to the tax in their own best
interest. This makes any tax method unlikely to be an effective primary vector for reducing SSB
consumption if the consumption itself is not demonstrably determined by consumers’ RUMax
behavior. If consumers are not RUMax in their SSB consumption, other policy options should be
emphasized. Brownell et al. (2010) advocate SSB taxes because “changing food prices is a
means of creating better defaults [meaning ‘default options’]” (p 386). While this is strictly true,
this assumes rational response to a tax, when the original quantity purchased may not have been
the product of RUMax behavior. Why would non-RUMax consumers suddenly flip to RUMax

12

Pomeranz et al. (2009) is a shotgun approach, focused on laying out every possible strategy to lower SSB
purchase, without exploring the mechanisms by which strategies might work, as provided here.
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when faced with a modest new tax on their habitually favored good? As Just and Payne (2009)
plainly state:
Because food decisions are made with little cognitive involvement, food policies designed to appeal to highly
cognitive thought (e.g. fat taxes, detailed information labels) are likely to have little impact. …As a general
principle, when individuals do not behave in their own interest, markets will feed perverse and sub-optimal
behaviors (p S47).
…[T]here is substantial evidence that prices are not the primary driver of many food decisions. Many
purchases are separated from the consumption either by time or individuals making it difficult for price to
play a direct role. …[A]bout half of individuals cannot recall the price of items they have placed in their
shopping carts only seconds after the fact. If individuals do not recall prices at the time of purchase, it is hard
to imagine price playing much of a role in consumption decisions once the item is in their home. Multiple
grocery items purchased together results in consumers dissociating the item from the purchase price in a
process referred to as payment decoupling (p S49).
…If people make systematic mistakes, then policy makers may have another justification to help (p S50).
…If policies simply proscribe some behaviors by consumers, raise the relative prices of some foods, or provide
more health information, this will not fundamentally alter the structure of the game (p S53).
…We conclude that many of the proposed solutions to the obesity problem are unlikely to have much of an
impact. In particular, policies that adjust prices or increase health information are likely to be ignored by
exactly those individuals who have a tendency toward obesity. Rather individuals have become obese or
overweight by making food decisions that ignore cognitive factors, relying more on heuristic decision
mechanisms (p S54). 13

Policies better oriented to addressing the psychological factors (often Level 1) that induce
purchase levels higher than most peoples’ physiologies can healthfully accommodate are
preferable to the standard (independent) tax policy that Level 2 analysts usually propose.
Chaloupka, Powell, Chriqui (2011b) claim that “the weight of the evidence suggests that
taxes on the order of a cent or two per ounce will raise prices by enough to reduce net caloric
intake and obesity.” They continue: “At worst, such taxes would have little impact on overall
caloric intake, while promoting substitution of healthier alternatives for the empty calories
contained in SSBs, reducing some of the health consequences of SSB consumption” (p 651).

13

There is a larger presentation of Just and Payne’s 2009 work exploring bad heuristics associated with low
information levels by consumers, in sub-section 7.8.4 below.
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Few economists echo their argument that health effects will result from tax rates that low. The
political infeasibility of much higher tax rates is likely to rise with the proposed rate. (Industry
resistance to SSB-consumption-reducing policy proposals is discussed in sub-section 7.13.1
below.)
The penny-per-ounce proposal translates to a 15-20% rise for a 20-oz SSB. Brownell et
al. (2010) cite -0.8 to -1.0 own-price price elasticities of demand for SSB as a category, but
expect higher elasticities to result in practice as many consumers switch to diet versions
(untaxed). Smith, Lin, and Lee use an Almost Ideal Demand System and Nielsen HomeScan data
for demand estimation with cross-price elasticities. They estimate (uncompensated) own-price
price elasticities of demand for the calorically sweetened beverage category of -1.26, meaning an
effective price rise of ten cents would lead to a 12-and-one-half ounce purchase reduction. Smith,
Lin, and Lee find that diet beverage consumption also drops significantly in rising caloric
sweetened beverage price (-0.457), while there seems to be positive substitution to skim milk
(0.198), to fruit and vegetable juices (0.557), and an even stronger substitution to bottled water
(0.749). (All of the Smith, Lin, and Lee results are reported to be significant at the 1% level.)
Using their own less rigorous calculation of own-price elasticities of demand, Brownell et
al. (2009) calculate that a penny-per-ounce tax on SSBs (larger category than sCSDs) may
generate $14.9B/yr. Jacobsen and Brownell had estimated in 2000 that $1.5B/yr. could be
collected from a penny-per-ounce tax on sCSDs.
In classical economic style, Jensen and Smed (2007) note that: “A key result from the
economic literature on regulation is that the cost effectiveness of a policy instrument depends on
the instrument’s precision in targeting the considered problem. The more precisely the regulation
targets the problem the smaller will be substitution effects” (p 2).
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A key motivation for my quantitative essay (Chapters 1–4) was to identify specific
demographic groups to target for policy intervention to reduce sCSD purchase. Jensen and Smed
claim there were no empirical studies evaluating the design of tax/subsidy instruments for
optimizing efficacy of policies intended to have nutrition effects. They quantitatively analyze
seven different food tax and subsidy instruments or combinations of instruments, and find that
average cost effectiveness of taxes to reduce ingredients in products is 10-30% higher than for
taxes targeting whole products. For SSBs/sCSDs, this implies that policies targeting sugar/HFCS
will prove more cost effective in nutrition result that policies targeting products. There is little in
the quasi-exogenous literature explored here that would dispute this. Calorically sweetened
carbonated soft drinks still remain a good policy target as a product, because they are archetypal
in being pure HFCS vectors (in U.S. recipes) with no other nutritive features of any kind. Taxing
caloric sweeteners (ingredients rather than products) in the general way that Jensen and Smed
suggest is most efficient is likely to prove politically even less feasible than taxing SSBs,
because the industrial coalition moving against initiative legislation will be larger, and probably
no less unified. Perhaps ignoring political constraints, Powell and Chaloupka (2010) find
empirical evidence supporting a “multipronged approach” to food-price and obesity problems,
advocating taxes on less healthy energy-dense foods, and subsidies for “healthier, less-dense
foods” (p 249).
A common objection to taxes on SSBs is that the taxes will prove regressive, because
poorer households spend a larger percentage of their income on food. Brownell and Frieden
(New England Journal of Medicine, 2009) dismiss objections to the regressive nature of an SSB
tax because poor households are disproportionately affected by diet-related diseases, and would
therefore derive the greatest benefit from dietary improvement (which curbing SSB consumption
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implicitly is). Powell and Chaloupka (both economists, 2010) argue that the regressive nature of
taxes may be offset if low-income households actually consume more, because they would
benefit more from use reduction. Powell and Chaloupka point out that some of the tax revenue
could be used to subsidize healthy foods for low-income households, compensating for lost
income, and promoting health. Of course without draconian administration there would likely be
a mismatch between taxees and recipients, but there could still easily be a net positive effect
versus having no program. Frazão and Allshouse (2003) use USDA dietary budget information
to make the interesting point that eating a healthy diet need cost no more than current diets for
most Americans, which undermines the regressivity argument, and Carlson and Frazão (2012)
revisit the question with more varied analysis and similar results. SSBs can be cut from the diet
with no nutrition loss at all, and may decrease hunger in their absence.
Taxes can only be regressive if people actually pay them. Extension of other arguments
in this essay (including but not limited to those of Peters 2009 in section 7.10.1, and Kapteyn and
Wansbeek 1982 in section 7.8) may also weaken the argument that SSB reduction may lower
overall utility. If SSB consumption results from preferences constructed by compromise of frame
and RUMax, instigated in part by aggressive marketing and product ubiquity, then cutting them
from the diet would represent a form of return to more “original” or “default” preferences as they
did or would exist in absence of dictated market evolution. In this case predicting a utility
decreasing outcome from an SSB-reducing policy strategy would be difficult to defend.
A sin tax, which the current set of tax proposals for SSBs ultimately is, discourages
primary users from using the taxed good. If the net burden of a cent-per-ounce tax on SSBs
should total $1/wk for two households each drinking 100 ounces per week after the tax (down,
we may assume from an even higher level, on the order of 4 liters a week, given Smith, Lin, and
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Lee’s elasticities), one household with poverty-level income for a family of four and one
household with four times that income, there is a disproportionate burden on the first household.
But is the burden significant relative to the (holistic) result without a tax? $52/$21,000 = onequarter of one percent of income, for a household that may be less likely to have full health
insurance coverage, and $52/$84,000 = six-hundredths of one percent of income, for a household
more likely to have full health insurance coverage. The first household, described categorically
rather than individually, is less likely to get preventative or early diagnosis care, which would be
cheaper for either the household or the public, whichever will pay ultimately for health care.
Temporarily bringing externalities of health care costs into the mix, it is far less clear that there is
an unfairness imposed by the tax, if the public is to pay half the burden for health problems
generally, given its large share of billing for lower-income households and retirees (Finkelstein,
Fiebelkorn, and Wang 2003). Given the variety of other beverage options, including water, it
does not necessarily ring true that the household forsaking SSBs in the face of a penny-per-ounce
excise tax will continue to feel this is a particular burden into the future. If SSBs were consumed
out of habit rather than from repeated informed choice, there may not in cutting or quitting SSB
consumption be much loss of utility to the household, and the unfairness argument becomes
moot. If fairness includes the society-wide “social planner” perspective, the regressivity problem
of an SSB excise tax may find inadequate footing.
In a 2011 paper, Lin et al. (again with Smith and Lee, but also with Hall to add dynamic
estimation of weight loss) claim that a 20% effective tax rate, about 0.5 cents per ounce, would
generate $5.8 billion per year, on the order of Brownell et al.’s 2009 estimate. Lin et al. note that
while likely regressive, the tax would represent about one percent of household food and
beverage spending, higher than my back-of-the-envelope calculation, but not a budget breaker.
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Finkelstein et al. (2010, of which Zhen is second author), estimate that a 40% tax on
SSBs would cost the mean household $28.48, with the largest share of the $2.5 billion in annual
tax revenues coming from high-income households.
Zhen et al. (2011) run a policy analysis scenario for a half-cent-per-ounce tax on SSBs,
using results from an Almost Ideal Demand System model adapted to account for “habit” of
purchase in the sense that consistent purchase indicates habit. They find that the long-run effect
falls 15-20% as habits reclaim some of the short-term purchase offset from the tax, but settles
between $1.47-$1.55 per month for low-income households and $1.32-$1.44 per month for highincome households. This remains a trivial degree of regressivity, even if doubled or quadrupled.

7.7.2

Information Asymmetry in sCSD or SSB Markets – Is Giving Consumers More
Information an Adequate Strategy?
U.S. federal laws requiring nutrition labeling provide consumers with the opportunity to

see basic nutrition content of foods. 14 Not everyone readily avails themselves of this opportunity.
Those with higher levels of formal education and higher levels of prior knowledge tend to read
labels more (Variyam and Golan 2002;Variyam, Shim, and Blaylock 2001), and tend to respond
to relevant new information about a food product by modifying their behavior more than those
with lower levels of formal education (Guthrie and Variyam 2007; Guthrie and Smallwood
2003). Peters (2009) cites a study proving that many people did not properly understand food
labels, and a third could not do the math to convert carbohydrates per serving in a bottle of soda.
From this we must conclude that many people are not using or cannot effectively use label
information to consistently update a conscious nutrition plan. In “Economics, Food Choices, and
Nutrition,” Blaylock et al. (1999) lament: “On balance, Americans appear to be acting on

14

The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 updated the longstanding Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938, which replaced the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.
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nutrition information, but offsetting the cumulative effect on their total diets with increased
calories and added fats and oils” (p 283).
Most paradigms assume that when the consumer is provided with knowledge—nutrient content of foods, for
example—attitudes toward diet will change, resulting in changed dietary behavior. However, knowledge by
itself will not affect behavior; motivation must be provided.
… Knowledge of nutrition can take two general forms: knowledge of principles…and knowledge of the
specific nutrient content of a food (p 276-7).

More facts are not enough to break habits, and education must be designed to change
motivation. Just and Payne (2009): “…individuals tend to have very little knowledge of how
eating impacts their health. …[I]ndividuals tend to cite convenience and taste as the primary
drivers of food decisions—with health playing only a very minor role” (p S49). In a comparison
of diet quality changes between 1965 and 1996, Popkin, Zizza, and Siega-Riz (2003) find that a
high level of formal education (College) was associated with the most improvement in diet
quality, with larger effects than those correlated with race or income. Results in Chapter 5, from
regression on household sCSD purchase alone, tend to confirm this, with the exception of
African-American female heads of household. Beydoun and Wang (2008) find that low nutrition
knowledge and nutrition beliefs that do not mesh well with nutrition facts tend to strongly
undermine any positive diet effect one would expect with rising education level. One can see
how this relative ignorance and apathy would push food decision-making toward reflexive
choice rather than rational choice (as I model in Essay Two). The fact that low nutrition
knowledge confounds a positive education effect suggests that nutrition education specifically
must be a key part of policy. There will be better dietary outcomes by raising nutrition
knowledge and nutrition as valued by the consumer, relative to a general rise in level of formal
education. Nutrition knowledge and concern by consumers above a certain level magnifies a
positive education effect.
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General education level does not prevent self-deception about diet quality: “Our results
caution against expecting rising incomes and educational levels to improve the accuracy of diet
quality perceptions” (Variyam, Shim, and Blaylock 2001, p 321). General education level may
have some effect, as with the supposition in the empirical essay here that education level may
proxy for level of effective nutrition education (defined in this essay below). But nutrition
education itself is the only thing that may change motivations, nutrition education based on
principles relevant to dietary habits, not just nutrition facts specific to a product. Variyam and
Golan (2002): “Studies show that nutrition knowledge differences among consumers translate
into measurable differences in food and nutrient intake” (p 16).
Everyday behaviors like food choice often are subject to such failure. People do fail to
update their decision strategies for complex behaviors whose effect are long term. Verplanken and
Wood (2006) discuss how to change dietary habits: “In summary, the expectations established
through behavior repetition and the automaticity of habit performance are conservative forces that
reduce openness to new information and that perpetuate well-practiced behaviors despite people’s
intentions to do otherwise” (p 95). So people rutted in dietary habits not rooted in nutrition
knowledge are either ignoring relevant information, which is not consistent with assumptions of
rational decision making, or are not applying Bayesian learning, which is also not consistent with
assumptions of rational decision making. Those who do apply relevant information, demonstrate
Bayesian learning, or genuinely don’t care about what they eat or the long-term costs or health
effects still conform to classical precepts of rational economic choice.
The point is that there is more than one type of consumer, and not all types meet
rationality criteria. This builds on the theoretical model in Essay Two, and goes to the difference
between information and education. This difference has important implications for policy

579

recommendations, the primary ones being that increasing the amount of information about the
product – a natural recommendation from a Level 2 perspective – is likely to be inadequate to
change consumer behavior on a scale commensurate with better health outcomes on a national
scale; and that a commitment to raising effective levels of nutrition education and consumer
awareness must be vested, despite the relative difficulty and expense, if health goals are to prove
achievable. 15
This is a community/public responsibility that has been shirked to ill effect. Human
knowledge about what is safe and healthy to eat has always tended to be a public good. As social
animals who are incapable of self care in our early years, and ill-suited to hunt or manage the
elements alone in our pre-technological state, we heavily rely on elders and the group to pass on
knowledge (a public good). (We now use books and the internet rather than observing or having
respectful conversations with elders, but knowledge of previous generations is still passed on.)
After suckling, mammals must be taught what to eat, and the larger the brain, the longer the
teaching cycle tends to be. Manning (2004) argues that the human brain may have grown and
sustained in size primarily to accommodate more food-based information when changes in
climate forced hominids to roam more widely for food sources, across habitats and across
seasons.
For millennia humans have had family, tribe, and culture to teach individuals about safe
food sources. Now we have family (tribe), culture, and a wholly new subset of culture –
consumer marketing. Now firms’ profit incentives may diverge from consumer health incentives
in a way that the previous “look-to sources” of information for individuals (family and culture),

15

“The premise that reflective strategies such as health messages or counseling sessions can be used to not only
elicit changes in the content of people’s beliefs, but also change the structure and association of those beliefs and
promote healthful responses to food cues may provide the basis for the development of new intervention strategies”
(Rothman, Sheeran, Wood 2009; p S15).
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never did. There would seem to be an evolutionary tendency to trust examples of people eating
foods, without the development of a tendency to distrust manufactured images of people eating
foods, or to suspect the quality of foods others look happy “consuming” 16 (Smith and Tasnádi
2007, cite an example where electrically manipulating the mother’s brain allowed researchers to
train natural carnivores – housecat kittens – to imprint aberrant food behavior and eat bananas).
Modern food marketing has exploited humans’ biological and psychological gap
(Zimmerman 2011) simultaneously with the evolution of industrial culture to be more rapid and
individual oriented, with higher incomes, fewer sit-down meals, and more interpersonal food
variety at meals (Senauer, Asp, Kinsey 1991). In short, as the evolved mechanisms for learning
food choice and habits have begun to shift slightly from their traditional reliance on family and
culture and toward individual “taste,” individual “tastes” have been manufactured in the absence
of a new human mechanism to ensure safe and responsible food choices for the group, and for
the young who are developing habits. One test for this assertion would be to see whether there is
eschewing of foods traditionally known to be healthful (low relative demand), in favor of highly
processed highly advertised foodstuffs, many of which didn’t exist fifty years ago, and that
overuse ingredients that are unhealthful in amounts ingested with but a few extra servings. This
we exactly observe (Nielsen and Popkin 2004; Piernas and Popkin 2010; Marriott et al. 2010;
Buzby, Wells, and Vocke 2006; Popkin and Siega-Riz 1996).
The divergence between the rewards that accrue to human food culture and the effect
from fealty to new marketing messages precisely defines a role for “culture” to intervene to
correct the divergence. As no other agent or movement has reacted on a sufficient scale to turn
16

Imagine a Coke commercial with the glistening bottle being raised and drained in the sun, followed by the very
active/sports-oriented actor’s or actress’s smile:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8GHchvvzms&feature=results_video&playnext=1&list=PL2F7DA31CE03E31
9B; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UL1eFCNRACw; or, say, world-famous golfer Jack Nicklaus:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&NR=1&v=vKplbZWsmYs; accessed 02 May, 2012.
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the tides of the new health epidemics, “culture” here must be in the form of its enforcer of last
resort, the government, which must act through policy to step in with two primary corrective
actions. Policy must provide the public good of nutrition education and educate consumers to
recognize and resist sophisticated marketing where purchase choice might tend the purchaser
away from their own best long-term interest, and must put reasonable restrictions on the
unhealthful manipulation of appetites and food habits. With only slight modification, this is why
we have and enforce laws against business and consumer fraud. The diet-based health epidemics
that weaken citizens and tax American coffers demand that we provide the missing public goods,
and fill in the information and educational deficiencies associated with Level 1 compromises and
failures in food markets.

7.7.2.a

Information Versus Education – Effective Nutrition Education
As a policy provision, increasing the amount of information a consumer may access at

relatively low cost to the consumer adds to the set of facts the consumer may actively consider
relevant to a specific consumer choice. If the person does not stop to consider relevant facts
before choosing to consume sCSDs or SSBs, say because they have been drinking them regularly
since the age of 12, or because they don’t generally read nutrition labels, or they don’t know how
to interpret them, then the added information is unlikely to have the effect the policy is targeting.
This is to some degree the case, as evident from the “food information/health performance
paradox” referred in the quote set in 7.2. Malik, Schulze, and Hu (2006) on concluding a
systematic review of then extant literature on the SSB-weight-gain connection “[SSBs],
particularly [sCSDs]…provide little nutritional benefit and increase weight gain and probably the
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risk of diabetes, fractures, and dental caries. …[I]t is imperative that current public health
strategies include education about beverage intake” (p 286).
Effective nutrition education is the application of nutrition knowledge in daily dietary
choice. “U.S. Department of Agriculture studies have shown that nutrition knowledge has a
measurable impact on nutrient intake and diet quality for consuming individuals, as well as for
other members of the household” (Frazao and Allshouse 2003, p 845S). There is correlation
between the level of formal education a person has and their effective nutrition education
(Beydoun and Wang 2008; Zoellner et al. 2011; Thompson et al. 2009; Deshmukh-Taskar et al.
2007; Kranz and Siega-Riz 2002; Guthrie and Smallwood 2003), as one would surmise, given
that a fundamental goal of formal education is to increase individuals’ discriminatory faculties
and their application of (evidence-based) knowledge in decision making. Another goal is to help
people be more perceptive of relevant factors and consequences, which in a consumer context
would include being more aware of when and how they are deciding, and what the long-term
effects of certain decisions or decision patterns will be. So the level of formal education of the
consumer to an extent may proxy for level of effective nutrition education.
The fact that those with higher levels of formal education tend to read labels more is
equivalent to saying that more educated people tend to demonstrate higher levels of effective
nutrition education. Obviously there are many types of exceptions, but the point is that one goal
of education is to help people to use more facts, higher quality facts, and use them more
efficaciously in their decision making. Information is facts; education is the building of the
framework in which facts become useful in choice processes. Decision-theorist Peters (2009)
implicitly distinguishes between information and education, but in a way that clarifies here:
Affect and beliefs are also important. How can long-term abstract preferences such as health be made salient
enough to overcome short-term consummatory desires on an ongoing basis?
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…[T]he challenge is not merely to communicate nutritional information to the public, but to understand how to
present that information so that it is used appropriately in eating decisions ( pS85-6).

Remembering from Essay Two Peters’ differentiation of the emotional “affect heuristics” which
engage quickly, and the “deliberative mode” which needs to be triggered and will engage only
slowly, we may depict education as the critical element that incentivizes people to break from the
affect heuristics they have been using in their unhealthful diets, and to deliberatively re-task their
habit-producing mechanics toward healthier ends. New information alone is less likely to “stick”
without adequate education. Cawley (2004) refers to presentation of information to make it
“stick” (in a way that in part meets my definition of “education”): “…findings suggest that the
market failure caused by a lack of information regarding calorie content of purchased foods may
not be resolved by simply providing more information, but may require finding ways to present
information so that consumers may process it more quickly and easily” (p 121).
Education is thus a means of overcoming biases people tend to formulate and live by,
biases that justify previously made choices (cognitive dissonance, per Leon Festinger), biases
that lead to the rejection or misinterpretation of new information. These tendencies are real – not
to be dismissed lightly with assumptions about perfect or adequate information – and profoundly
impact consumer choice and health outcomes. In a 1999 Quarterly Journal of Economics article,
Rabin and Schrag summarize:
Psychological research indicates that people have a cognitive bias that leads them to interpret new
information as supporting their previously held hypotheses. We show…that such confirmatory bias induces
overconfidence…. Indeed, the hypothesis that the agent believes in may be more likely to be wrong than
right. We also show that the agent may come to believe with near certainty in a false hypothesis despite
receiving an infinite amount of information (their emphasis).
…[A] large and growing body of psychological research suggests that the way people process information
often departs systematically from Bayesian updating (p 37).

While theoretic rather than food-market tested, the general principles Rabin and Schrag support
are consistent with observed consumer behavior responding to nutrition information and
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labeling. Jonas et al. (2001) offer further evidence that the confirmatory bias problem may be
aggravated due to the long period of re-enforcement behavior in drinking SSBs – brand loyalties
for beverages are set in the teen years (Brownell et al. 2009). Sporadic presentation of new
nutrition information cannot jump the hurdle placed by years of re-enforcement. We may be
seeing cognitive dissonance at work in information gathering and assessment, as Jonas et al. find
evidence that confirmation bias is caused in part by heightened commitment to a previously
made decision:
Research on selective exposure to information consistently shows that after having made a decision, people
prefer supporting over conflicting information. …In the present research the authors show that an even
stronger preference for supporting information arises if information is presented and processed sequentially
instead of simultaneously…, and they [the authors] demonstrate that this stronger confirmation bias is due to
sequential presentation and not to sequential processing of information… (p 557).

Only when the level of (effective nutrition) education is high enough will the individual
absorb relevant new information, and be more likely to apply this information in a RUMax way.
Otherwise the individual will be more resistant to even the recognition that the information is
accurate and relevant, and new information will fail to affect behavior (Maio et al. 2007). As a
result, any non-RUMax consumer behaviors are likely to persist, because information that may
upset the habitual pattern behaviors is filtered (Maio et al. 2007). Non-RUMax behavior
resulting from any number of reasons (Essay Two) may be moved toward RUMax behavior by
education, but is unlikely to be moved by the simple presentation of more product characteristic
information, which is what Level 2 approaches traditionally recommend. Maio et al. with
extensive citations to empirical literature, point out that even providing health information is
often inadequate motivation for individuals to change behavior.
…[I]t is very important to understand the attitudes and interpretations of target audiences prior to the design
of well-meaning message interventions. The development of messages aimed at behavior change should not
be based on so-called common sense, but on social psychological theory, and evidence, combined with
pretesting (…; p 105).
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If we succumb to the temptation of merely trying to raise people’s awareness of the dangers of unhealthy
eating, we might convince them that an unhealthy diet is a bad thing, but have little impact on their behavior.
… First, because people are reluctant to feel vulnerable to health risks (…). … Research on fear-arousing
communications has demonstrated over and over again that health behavior change is driven by perceived
vulnerability to a health risk and not by its perceived severity (…). …[U]nless we can convince them that
they are at risk themselves, they are unlikely to take any action (…; p 107; omitted citations designated with
“(…)”).
Second, even if people accept that they are at risk, they require recommendations about specific behaviors.
The specific behaviors must be perceived as protecting against the health risk (p108).

Maio et al. point to research indicating that the salient determinants of behavior must be carefully
identified, and may differ by type of individual, who may idiosyncratically weigh material costs
and benefits and emotional factors. They cite Loewenstein (2001) that emotion can drive
behavior when there is a conflict between emotion and cognitive assessment in risky situations (p
109).
Naturally there is crossover between some types of information and some types of
consumer education. I will proceed focusing more on education rather than information as the
solution to information asymmetry problems in the sCSD/SSB market, attempting to be clear
about the difference when relevant.
Because those with less formal education or low (effective) nutrition education do not
tend to respond to new relevant nutrition information by changing their habits (as much as those
with higher education levels), providing information is unlikely to be an efficient policy
mechanism for changing unhealthful consumption habits, despite the low cost of providing
information relative to the cost of educating people. Maio et al. (2007) explain that habits once
formed create a type of “tunnel vision” that precludes to a large degree the consideration of other
options (see 6.8.1). They stress how this can lead campaigns designed to provide consumers with
relevant information (as economists suggest) to fail: “The tunnel vision and the attenuated power
of attitudes and intentions are bad news for informational campaigns. These campaigns are based
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on the assumption that the target group attends to and processes the presented information, forms
or changes attitudes and intentions accordingly, and thus adopts the propagated behavior” (p
104). Campaigns failing to attend to these mechanisms and verifying that they work in target
populations will almost certainly fail to achieve the primary objective. The short version:
providing consumers with more information as a policy to redress bad eating habits like high
SSB consumption will fail for the same reason that the bad habits persist, a Level 1 reason. Level
1 reasons are well-poised to nullify the Level 2 premises regarding the effectiveness of providing
rational consumers with more information.
Verplanken and Wood (2006) explain why providing information may fail, and why even
“education” must be calibrated to change habitual behaviors:
Interventions that provide people with information about the right thing to do or that increase their
understanding about how to perform a behavior are likely to be effective primarily with actions that are not
practiced habitually. …[P]eople’s intentions, desires, and judgments do not easily overcome the practiced
response that is cued automatically by the environment” (p 95).
Education interventions that change consumers’ beliefs and understanding of their behaviors are most likely
to impact those who have not established habits. However, education programs may have long-term effects
that bring about change in performance environments, such as when education conveys new norms and values
that infuse decisions of policy makers (p 98).

In arguing for congressional authorization to evaluate the effectiveness of USDA dietary
guidelines, so that the definition, publication, and implementation of these guidelines may be
improved, Guthrie and Smallwood (2003) offer:
Government involvement in providing information on private behavior, such as food choice, is justified by
the high cost of poor diets, as measured in medical expenses and lost productivity (p S42).
More educated consumers, in particular, are more effective users of nutrition information. …[P]reexisting
preferences for less healthful foods limit the effects of nutrition education, an argument for early intervention
to help develop healthier preferences earlier in life (p S47).

Fulponi (OECD 2009), in response to the information asymmetry between producers and
consumers, advocates giving consumers more information so that they may make more informed
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choices, but notes that the evidence favors school-based programs, meaning education more than
information. She explains, citing Maio et al. (2007) that changing habitual behaviors is difficult
due to the “tunnel vision” that develops with habituation, making one ignore other alternatives,
and even resist new information. Maio et al. (2007) stress that transformations of the food
environment “are often crucial, because all of the best will in the world cannot elicit behavioral
change if the environment does not provide reasonable opportunities;” and further stress that
“education is another important long-term…[performance environment] intervention” (p 119).
So policies to redress existing information asymmetry problems – particularly Level 1
versus Level 2 problems – are likely to require at least educational supplementation to
information, where information is not simply supplemental information about the characteristics
of the product (sCSD), but information on marketing effects that may compromise RUMax
consumer choice, and nutrition effects that may compromise long-term consumer utility (i.e.,
ignorance of the severity of health effects leading to a mis-assessment of long-term costs
resulting from the choice to consume). While recommendations may overlap or differ, the policy
goal from a Level 1 approach is the same as for a Level 2 approach: to achieve the best
approximation of RUMax behavior for consumers while maintaining insofar as possible legal
profit-maximizing opportunities for industry. The nearest approximation of a theoretical Pareto
optimal market outcome remains the goal. Ensuring a level and square market frame and an
education-information base adequate to enable RUMax choice are goals of either Level
approach, but are more likely to be assumed in the Level 2 approach, and more explicitly
considered in the Level 1 approach.
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7.7.3

Combining Taxes with an Information-Education Strategy
Since at least Jacobsen and Brownell in 2000, existing literature reflects the recognition

that taxes alone are unlikely to reduce SSB consumption to the degree the health community
advocates, and directing revenues to fund an information-education strategy would prove more
effective (Brownell et al. 2010; Chaloupka, Powell, Chriqui 2011a, 2011b, and 2011c;
Zimmerman 2011; Kuchler, Tegena, Harris 2005). Pomeranz et al. (2009):
The government…could tax soft drink manufacturers and distributors to fund campaigns aimed at reducing
the consumption of soft drinks paid for with revenue dedicated to both public health improvement practices
(Jacobsen and Brownell 2000) and the speech to advance such efforts. Another option would be to tax a
particular ingredient, such as the sugar or high fructose corn syrup used in processed food products, to fund
the same government activities and speech (p 112).

Fletcher, Frisvold, Teft (2011) find the existing evidence from taxes alone support the
need for “wider net” interventions:
Comprehensive interventions that reduce access to soda, increase the price of soda, and inform the public
about potentially negative health consequences are likely to be more effective than relying solely on excise
taxes (p 659).
…We find that the existing evidence argues for policies that cast a wider net than would a tax on soft drinks
or even on SSBs.
…A comprehensive soft drink policy, including taxes and other restrictions, framed not only as an “obesity
tax” but touting health benefits along many dimensions, may be both more successful and more effective (p
665).

Brownell et al. (2009) find that from survey data, public support for soda taxes rises if the
revenues from the tax are to be earmarked to promote childhood nutrition and obesity prevention
programs. France has implemented some form of this (Pomeranz et al. 2009). Sturm et al. (2010)
find that existing taxes are too small to impact consumption enough to impact obesity rates, but
do find that certain target populations (inclined toward overconsumption) may be more tax
sensitive. They advocate using revenues for obesity prevention programs, a specific form of
education.
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Using SSB tax revenues to fund some sort of nutrition education effort is the new
minimum baseline for policies intended to actually improve health outcomes. The questions then
arise: to what extent might taxes remain inadequate to solve policy goals for SSB consumption
reduction, what form must education take to be effective (and what information should
accompany it), and what theories and evidence inform alternative explanations for poor dietary
behavior, and what other policy mechanisms do these suggest? Answering the last question next
will lay the foundation justifying new policy strategies.

7.8

Economists Expand Policy Recommendations Beyond Narrow Assumptions About
Behavior and Market Failure in SSB Markets
Having explored the motivations and limitations of tax and information policies, it is

worth exploring arguments from economists for new and different policy mechanisms.
Empirically derived predictions that implementing new taxes that would raise SSB retail
costs by 20% or more will not fulfill health objectives, and that providing consumers with more
product information will also fail to fulfill policy objectives expose how quickly the first-order
Level 2 strategy set plays itself out. Others with less vestment in strict neoclassical economic
assumptions about the SSB market have leveled critiques and suggested other strategies, tending
toward what I describe as Level 1 types of analysis. Many of these are economists, or are
working with economists. Each attempts to move beyond the restrictive economic assumptions
that have much evidence to disprove them, while still cleaving to a primarily economic
framework. In this effort, the citations in this sub-section commonly serve as direct antecedents
to my approach. The character of the authors’ perspectives and critiques and the quality of their
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evidence must be evaluated in the larger process of generating policy proposals that may be
predicted based on a wide evidentiary base to have higher probability of success.

7.8.1

Cawley – Health Economics, Preference Formation, Knowledge as a Public Good
In “An Economic Framework for Understanding Eating Behavior,” John Cawley 17

(2004) seeks to establish an economic framework for behavior that respects that individuals both
demand and produce health, in order to outline criteria for policy interventions to promote health.
Cawley respects what economics can offer, while also respecting the limits of the policy
proposals that Level 2 economics can offer to redress market failures. In his attempt to apply an
economic framework to eating behaviors that so consistently seem to break from RUMax
assumptions, Cawley anticipates the approach in this paper: “The economic perspective, if
integrated with and informed by other disciplinary approaches, may lead to innovative
breakthroughs with ramifications for both research and policy” (p 124).
Economists’ silence on how preferences are formed and how they change (while by
default assuming they are known and stable, despite the current state of decision theory) lead
them to recommend changing prices (tax/subsidize), rather than changing people’s preferences,
say by re-educating people not to harm themselves. Cawley observes that because economics
offers no guidance on the origin of consumer preferences, economics tends to overlook “the
extent to which advertising shapes preferences,” and therefore the extent to which regulation
may be appropriate (p 123).
It is worth turning briefly from Cawley’s critique to consider a classic work in preference
formation theory. Economists Kapteyn and Wansbeek, in “Empirical Evidence on Preference
17

John Cawley is a Professor in the Department of Policy Analysis and Management, and the Department of
Economics, at Cornell University, and co-Director of Cornell's Institute on Health Economics, Health Behaviors and
Disparities, as well as co-Editor-in-Chief of the journal Economics and Human Biology. Cawley received his Ph.D.
in economics from the University of Chicago.
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Formation” (1982), challenge mainstream economic assumptions by arguing that an individual’s
welfare function is a direct function of not only their own consumption, but the consumption of
others in the individual’s social reference group, meaning that relative social standing must be
considered in utility. Therefore innate, slow-changing, and auto-referenced internal preferences
cannot sufficiently describe behavior. “[E]conomists’ almost universal neglect of preference
formation has led them to construct theories that are in certain respects altogether unrealistic” (p
137).
With relatively few exceptions, economists have ignored preference formation. In quite a few areas, theories
are heavily dependent on the assumption that preferences are constant and/or independent of behavior of
others. Allowing for preference formation has some significant consequences.
In welfare economics the Pareto principle…loses its practical appeal if it can no longer be assumed that an
income increase for some, without an income reduction for anyone else, provides an increase in social
welfare. In cost benefit analysis distributional aspects move from the periphery of the problem to the core. …
If the casual observer (that is everyone who is not an economist) is right in asserting that an individual’s
consumption behavior is influenced by the consumption of others, then all economic models of consumption
are misspecified. …
The evidence on preference formation [PF] sketched in this paper is unambiguous. It uniformly supports the
PF theory. …[M]ore testing is possible and should be carried out, but at the very least, the existence of the
preference formation phenomenon appears to be firmly established. Consequently, economic theories that are
based on the assumption of constant preferences should be considered unacceptable (p151-2, emphasis
added).

Television or even print advertisements showing happy healthy attractive and often sporty
people drinking SSBs is an attempt to exert a psychological if not actual peer influence favoring
these products. Kapteyn and Wansbeek’s evidence, now supported by a generation of subsequent
authors, is plausible as a mechanism for the success of SSB ads, including Coca-Cola, the world’s
#1 SSB. Policies to restrict advertising content seem less onerous if preferences are not simply
reflected in purchase, but are rather manipulated by very sophisticated and high-volume
advertising in a way that bends behavior to induce health-threatening levels of consumption of
highly processed products.
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Consumers at least more aware of potential manipulation and actual health consequences
might be better armed to choose wisely. This returns us to Cawley, who argues that information
is a public good that the government is naturally charged to provide – “…objective information
tends to be under-provided by private markets, and there is a role for governments to sponsor
production and dissemination of information” (p 121). Cawley refers specifically to
obesity/nutrition/diet information with this observation. He observes that “economists lean
toward a generous view of human capabilities” which disposes us toward the assumption that
people behave rationally, despite strong evidence of the contrary, often embodied in the violation
of time-consistent preferences. “Time-inconsistent preferences, that is, succumbing to the
temptation to accept immediate gratification at the expense of long-run best interest, seem to be
fairly common in humans” (p 122) – a precept that must be respected in policy debates. When
time-inconsistent preferences are employed, the optimal tax rate must include not only all
external costs, but some internal costs as well (p 122). Fulponi (OECD 2009) notes from a
review of behavioral economic literature, that the seemingly biased or irrational choices that
people make (the same that Cawley refers to) can lead to large errors in judgment when decisions
are made under time constraints or with uncertainty (of the probabilities of outcomes or
payoffs/costs). All of these are Level 1 criticisms based on evidence.

7.8.2 Thaler and Sunstein – Behavioral Economics and Law, Default Options Matter
The University of Chicago’s Sunstein and Thaler (2003) argue from solidly behavioral
economic premises: people’s preferences “are unclear and ill-formed, and their choices will
inevitably be influenced by default rules, framing effects, and starting points” (p 1159). “Default
options” are the choices that will be made for people if they do not assert their own decisioncapacity and will. Behavioral economist Dan Ariely of MIT has repeatedly demonstrated that a
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change in default options can dramatically change “market” outcomes, as for example the
extreme difference in driver’s-license-designated organ donation in a country where one must
opt in, versus a country where one must opt out (e.g., in The Upside of Irrationality, Harper
Collins, 2010). Sunstein and Thaler refer to a “status quo bias” that appears to be deeply
psychological, and can prevent the engagement of self-protecting or maximizing decision
faculties. “People fail to make forecasts that are consistent with Bayes’ rule, use heuristics that
can lead them to make systematic blunders, exhibit preference reversals (…), suffer from
problems of self-control, and make different choices depending on the framing of the problem”
(p 1168).
With focused relevance to the topic here, “It is the strong claim that all or almost all
Americans are choosing their diet optimally that we reject as untenable” (p 1168, their
emphasis). They then define and defend “libertarian paternalism,” which roughly means a
planned shaping of the market environment (we might call it market frame) to allow the full
spectrum of consumer choice, while correcting for influences that bias the market environment
toward unhealthful choices: “…libertarian paternalism should attempt to steer people’s choices
in welfare-promoting directions without eliminating freedom of choice” (p 1168).
Thaler and Sunstein (2003) defend their “libertarian paternalism” policy proposals as
necessary because people fail to rationally protect themselves, and defend the concept from
critics who fail to see that there “are no viable alternatives,” and who falsely believe that
paternalism always involves coercion. They point out that re-setting default options could be
consistent with what people would prefer default options to be, if only they were asked, and that
changing default options so that people must make explicit choices is useful because it brings
people closer to conformity with RUMax precepts that consumers choose deliberatively.

594

Understanding that their suggestions to re-shape the market environment, change default options,
and help consumers avoid status quo bias are not coercive is easier when one sees these proposed
policies as an attempt to bend a market frame that has been skewed by a dictated market
evolution back into a level and square shape. Thaler and Sunstein hammer their point home by
saying that such intervention is no more manipulative than not executing such changes, because
every food choice environment embeds default options implicitly. There are few such
environments without them. The policy maker is adjusting or “nudging” an existing default
option, not instituting one where none before existed. Thaler and Sunstein popularize these
arguments about how environments affect decisions in their book Nudge: Improving Decisions
About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2009, paperback).
Chandon and Wansink (2002) suggest that any policy that reduces the visibility (salience)
or convenience of products will help reduce consumption, as might the repackaging of products
in inconvenient-sized portions.

7.8.3

Bernheim and Rangel, Camerer – Neuroeconomics, Addictive Substances

Undermine the Role of Revealed Preferences
Stanford University economics professors Bernheim and Rangel (2004, 2005) explore the
economics debate about individual preferences and consumer choice in ways that are supportive
of positions taken or favorably discussed by Cawley, Fulponi, and Sunstein and Thaler, while
still offering new perspective. “Traditional revealed preference [theory] doesn’t recognize the
possibility that actions and preferences may systematically diverge—that people make mistakes”
(2005, p 128). Bernheim and Rangel refer to American pedestrian accidents in London (see
6.7.4), offer a scale upon which revealed preferences are more tenable at one end (musical tastes,
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sexual preference), and less tenable at the other (eating disorders and psychoses), with
consumption of addictive substances indeterminate in location.
Having reached a determination that choices don’t reliably reveal preferences in the context of addictive
substances, how do we distinguish between good and bad outcomes? …
It may, however, be difficult or impossible to reliably estimate a model that allows for mistakes while
restricting attention to data on consumption behavior (as is traditional among economists). We know of no
objective way to determine the incidence of mistakes if we have to allow for the tautological possibility that
people always prefer what they choose (p 130-1).

This perspective clearly demonstrates the difference between Level 2 analysis and a Level 1
problem. Writing from a neuroeconomic perspective, as Bernheim and Rangel do, Camerer
(2007) expects “the largest innovation [from neuroeconomics to] …come from pointing to
biological variables which have a large influence on behaviour and are underweighted or ignored
in standard theory” (p C35). Camerer suggests that for economic theorists, how the brain makes
decisions may be thought of as “many biological state variables influenc[ing] preferences; given
those state-dependent preferences, prices and budget constraints have familiar influences” (p
C38). Camerer offers neuroeconomic examples that “suggest that the concept of a preference is
not a primitive (as Pareto suggested)” (p C35). Camerer continues: “This view implies that if we
understand what variables affect preferences, we can shift preferences and shift behaviour
(without changing prices or constraints)” (p C35).
Endorsing this view, I argue that dictated market evolution has effectively done precisely
this, putting the onus on policymakers to devise countervailing devices to straighten the “bent”
market frame, and induce more RUMax-approximate behavior. Otherwise, there is a largely
involuntary transfer of money to marketers of products with unwholesome amounts of addedsugar (by dietary community standards), at the great expense of Americans’ long-term health.
The fact that the money seems voluntarily spent should not blind economists to the compromise
of frame or RUMax behavior, or the economic consequences of allowing these failures to persist
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in the name of “revealed preferences” when the principle may not bind for the many reasons
explained in Essay Two, and may not bind by at least the understanding that American
pedestrians in Britain probably do not tend to prefer injury or death in inordinate numbers, as
Americans whose diet comprises greater than 25% added sugars probably do not consciously
court diabetes and heart disease.
When now-famous economists rejected psychology 100 years ago, and endorsed the
theory of revealed preferences as adequately equivalent to knowing an individual’s internally
fixed (in the period of decision) individual preferences, this was before the inventions of new
highly-processed low-nutrition foodstuffs, and before the developments of new marketing
techniques that employ advances in psychology that economists in the footsteps of the greats
have studiously ignored. Now the quasi-economic literature has empirically demonstrated that
what people choose to buy and consume diverges from what RUMax decision-making would
predict one buy and consume given one’s full priority set. This defines a Level 1 problem and
demands Level 1 solutions, independent of the many positive contributions that the Level 2
perspective has enabled in economic theory and empirics.
Bernheim and Rangel (2005) are careful not to abandon the theory of revealed preference
completely, noting the theory is attractive as a political principle precisely because it protects
individuals in their decision-making sovereignty from any governmental condemnation of
lifestyle choices as contrary to the individual’s “true” interests:
Given the clear dangers involved, if we relax the principle of revealed preferences in evaluating policies, it
behooves us to set a high scientific threshold for reaching a determination, based on objective evidence, that
preferences and choices systematically diverge in a given context. Although preliminary progress has been
made, this is one of the most important open questions in economics (p 131-2). …
In most instances, it is appropriate to infer the preferences of the affected individuals from their actions.
However, in the context of addiction substances, objective scientific evidence overturns the validity of this
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principle. Specifically, recent research in neuroscience supports the view that the consumption of addictive
substances is sometimes rational, and sometimes a cue-triggered mistake” (p 139).

I maintain that Bernheim and Rangel’s high scientific threshold has been met and then some in
establishing that for most Americans, their best health (and correlatively, economic) interests
systematically diverge from their choice to consume added sugar at the current average rate or
higher, the primary vector being sCSDs within the primary category of SSBs.

7.8.4

Just and Payne – Behavioral Economics, Poor Information, Bad Heuristics
In a 2009 article, “Obesity: Can Behavioral Economics Help?” Just and Payne state that

consumers “regularly and predictably” contradict standard assumptions of economic analysis,
making decisions that undermine their own goals, especially food decisions. People trade shortterm pleasure for long-term health (they offer no theoretic model, as I do in Essay Two, but do
identify variables “known to control consumption” by type in a diagrammatic table). Just and
Payne criticize the neoclassical assumption that “utility is determined by preferences and habits,
which are generally taken as primitive and immovable” (p S48), explaining that this view cannot
appreciate systemic mistakes in decision making (RUMax compromised behavior), with market
failure a predictable and inevitable result. The market fails to provide enough information (for
RUMax decisions), or the market fails by not appreciating the external costs pushed onto others
by bad health choices.
For most people the context of decision-making proves important, more so when they are
distracted and short on time. Quick decision-making heuristics then dominate the potential of
slower deliberative thinking to affect a particular food choice.
Given the limited ability of individuals to retain and use accurate health information, coupled with varying
levels of self control, profit motivations of marketers can become predatory—though not necessarily
malicious (p S47).
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… Both work and play now emphasize convenience. The consequence of convenience may not only be less
exercise but also a state of being that discounts cognitive effort in favor of heuristic-driven consumption
decisions that can be easily manipulated by marketing environments.
… We suggest that…in most cases, marketing environments (i.e., packaging, price, and promotion)
leverage peoples’ heuristic consumption decisions that are anomalous to rational decision making. Heuristic
driven consumption behavior can be easily steered by marketing environments to meet profit interests. …If
food policies fail to account for heuristic-based food decisions, they are destined to fail simply because they
do not mirror consumer reality (p S48).

Just and Payne contrast behavioral economic (heuristic) models with the classical economic
game theory approach of von Neumann-Morgenstern games with potential Nash equilibrium
solutions, because in heuristic models individuals may not be maximizing their own well being
relative to the other players’ best strategy. “However, within heuristic models, while the
marketer (through experimentation, etc.) will behave as if they know how individuals will
respond to change in the environment, our evidence suggests that the individual is unaware of
how the environment affects their consumption decisions” (p S52).
Marketers now employ decades of cumulative consumer research – exactly as a profitmaximizer should – while successive generations of consumers remain naïve to the ways subtle
cues in the market have changed. Consumers remain naïve to the way that the frame has been
bent to favor purchase, to the way this bent frame is often sold as “convenience.” This
“convenience” can ultimately prove a bitter trade of short-term fleeting and inconsequential
“gain” for a very real persistent and long-term cost. Just and Payne call this firm-to-individual
information asymmetry a “mechanism design problem” in which “loss of efficiency due to the
asymmetric information” between marketers and consumers is severe enough to derail the
classically expected effects of standard tax and information policies.
This asymmetry of information about how the individual acts will persist no matter what the prices or health
information provided. Thus, simply taxing foods or providing more health information is not likely to
eliminate this inefficiency. In this context, the mechanism design problem will lead the marketer to find a
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way to exploit the individual’s environmental responses to induce greater profits at the individual’s expense.
Thus the environment that is causing individuals to consume too much food is endogenously determined by
the individuals’ own behavioral responses to food. Policy measures that do not account for the mechanism
that creates the food and eating environments may only have temporary effects as marketers find ways to
adjust the environmental factors to maximize profits – likely subverting policy goals (p S52).

A neoclassical mindset coupled with Level 2 analysis trains a researcher to treat the
individual’s “endogenously determined…own behavioral responses to food” as a self-determined
function of utility flowing from preferences that are not influenced by environment or persuasive
advertising. Herein lies the fundamental misspecification of Level 2 analysis to a Level 1
problem – fundamental because it encompasses simultaneous compromise of both market frame
and RUMax behavior. The economist devout to classical assumptions cannot find fault with the
voluntary utility-maximizing choice a consumer makes in the selfsame information-asymmetric
markets Just and Payne describe, nor with the methods of profit maximization of the firm. How
could she? These faults have been assumed away. Just and Payne expose a bitter irony:
“…because people do not believe that their consumption decisions are under their complete
volitional control, the decisions they do make are justified [i.e., characterized by economists] as
occurring because of inherent preferences” (p S54). Thus when a person’s perceived lack of
control seems to be influenced by environmental factors and largely unconscious heuristic
drivers that may work contrary to their “true” preferences – as would be clear in an explicitly
deliberative process with a balancing of time preferences that reflects actual long-term goals –
economists tend to mis-characterize this feeling as resulting from their true preference set.
Only by becoming aware of the contrary evidence does the unsettling challenge to
conventional assumptions begin to undermine the laissez-faire and caveat emptor policy
prescriptions that naturally flow from the classical economic assumption set. “Variables that
have received the least amount of attention in the policy context [salience, presentation,
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packaging, labels], but may be the most important, are environmental drivers of food
consumption” (p S51).
Just and Payne lay out what is by my vocabulary dictated market evolution and a bending
of the market frame to favor the information-rich sCSD/SSB industry over the information-poor
potential consumer, and presage many of the same conclusions. They also endeavor to expand
the power of economics to treat problems by expanding the scope of analysis using evidence that
moves us beyond narrow assumptions about how people behave.

7.8.5

Zimmerman – Health Economics, Logic, and the Flaws of Cutler, Glaeser and

Shapiro (2003)
Frederick Zimmerman 18 directly argues that Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro’s (2003)
“rational choice” explanation for the rise of obesity in the U.S. – a function of the reduced cost of
food processing time for a household, being a relative decline in food price due to technological
development – “does not fit the facts of the current obesity epidemic” (p 285). Zimmerman lays
out where he believes CGS’s argument founders, and offers an alternative explanation he
believes has more power.
Zimmerman contends that an adequate explanation (or significant explanatory variable
set) for the particular rise in U.S. obesity must account for: the sudden rise in obesity from
around 1980 and after, while remaining stable before this trend; must explain the ubiquity of the
obesity phenomenon across population, age group, and education and income levels, as well as
across ethnic sub-groups; and must explain the disproportionate influence from beverages and
snacks compared to meals (because mealtime caloric intake level has been stable for decades).

18

Ph.D., Economics, University of Wisconsin; at time of authorship, Chair of Department of Health Services,
University of California at Los Angeles.
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Zimmerman lists a number of points where rational choice behavior does not match
evidence presented to support the rational choice hypothesis for obesity rise. The first point on
Zimmerman’s list is the argument that low food prices make food so much cheaper that people
consume more. Remember I made the point previously that people were not generally underfed
before this epidemic, so cheaper food is not as convincing an explanation as the lower nutritional
quality of the calories. Zimmerman notes that a 10% decline in food prices is used in the lowfood-cost argument to explain a 10-15% rise in caloric intake, “implying a calorie-income
elasticity of 1 or greater, much higher than what has been established for individual food groups”
(p 289). Nor is the effect different for lower- and higher-income groups, groups one expects to
have substantively different calorie-income elasticities. So this explanation does not hold. Cheap
corn prices due to U.S. farm subsidies are used to explain the general food price decline leading
to obesity. Zimmerman points out that the savings to the manufacturer from using HFCS
averages about 1.6 cents per can, translating to less than a penny a can rise in price if corn were
not subsidized. Not a motivating price change for consumers. Zimmerman also dismisses high
fruit and vegetable prices as a motivation for obesogenic diets, because lower relative price does
not translate into overconsumption of the cheaper food – indeed overconsumption would be an
irrational waste of resources. The same if one attempts to explain overconsumption from a fall in
the preparation time of food. Thus fall two more explanations for the rational choice model of
U.S. obesity.
More women working would raise the time cost of food preparation, and magnify any
rising child obesity that by Cutler Glaeser and Shapiro’s argument would result from falling food
preparation times, but there is no empirical evidence of this for any but the wealthiest quartile of
working mothers. Rising levels of insurance coverage and better therapies would lower the
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personal cost of obesity, perhaps motivating a higher obesity rate from a rational choice
perspective. However, Zimmerman informs, there is no evidence that there is an association
between obesity and insurance coverage, including the inception of Medicare and Medicaid
coverage. “Because these [rational choice] models do not identify potential causal mechanisms
that were relatively stable before 1980 and increased dramatically around that time, and because
they do not identify causal mechanisms that would have similar effects across the population,
they fail to meet the explanatory desiderata outlined…above” (p 291). Zimmerman elaborates
that the empirical magnitudes of the mechanisms that proponents of rational choice suggest are
too small to explain the rise in obesity, meaning that leaps of faith are required to embrace any of
the mechanisms listed by CGS and others.
Zimmerman presents and defends the notion that increases in the amount and
sophistication of advertising and marketing have changed the American diet more than rational
choice hypotheses can explain.
A huge literature has shown beyond any reasonable doubt that…“marketing works.” Marketing has been
shown to increase the availability of product brands in the mind, to increase preferences for those brands, to
increase consumption of those brands, and to increase consumption even of dissimilar foods. Marketing
works not only by operating on the unconscious mechanisms that regulate food consumption—the salience of
food in the environment being related to perceived hunger and consumption—but also by changing the
conscious preferences of consumers. How different this model of human behavior is from the rational-choice
assumptions of consciously rational decision-making around stable, exogenously given preferences (p 292).

Zimmerman explains that “marketing” included elements much larger in magnitude and
effect than advertising. Non-advertising marketing includes “in-store displays, giveaways,
contests, licensing deals, sponsorship deals, product placement, product innovation, sophisticated
pricing, and expanded sales venues” (p 293). So the 60% real increase in total advertising
expenditures per capita in the U.S. from 1980 to 2000 pales in comparison to the rise of nonadvertising marketing expenditures from half of advertising budgets in 1983 to triple advertising
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expenditures by 1993. Advertising expenditures rise, while “a massive increase in the quantity
and sophistication of nonadvertising marketing” (p 293) leverages these expenditures to greater
effect.
Zimmerman offers examples that prove interesting in how clearly they may affect Level
1 mechanisms while likely escaping Level 2 analyses focused on estimating consumer demand,
price-elasticities of demand, or market structure – that is, analyses looking at the ultimate effects
of these mechanisms, rather than at the mechanisms themselves. Not long after supermarket
scanner data began to be used to asses test marketing of new products, new product introductions
proliferated rapidly, built on the safety of scientifically accurate marketing evaluations of
consumer responses.
Technological changes in food innovation are oriented not to make products with any
nutritive advantage, but to evoke the lifestyles associated with their consumption (e.g., PepsiCo’s
Mountain Dew Code Red). The goal is to bypass the simple biological role of nutrition and have
people focused on purchasing the associated psychological effect (not unrelated to Becker and
Murphy’s prestige effect). “That’s just good marketing,” you say. Then consider aspects of such
“innovation” that may lead to unconscious overconsumption of the innovative foods –
overconsumption versus what people would rationally choose for themselves in advance of
eating. Highly processed branded products have the potential for specialty flavors that “have the
potential to create a special tie with the consumer” (p 294) that less carefully processed foods
lack: a constructed “hyper”-palatability (with sweet-salt-fat mixes and trace tastes carefully
researched in artificial ingredient factories in New Jersey 19). Processed foods are also softer than
“real” foods, so that they can be eaten faster. Both aspects make these highly processed, highly
19

Eric Schlosser, in Fast Food Nation : The Dark Side of the All-American Meal (Houghton Mifflin, 2002, 288
pages), describes a visit to such a plant and goes into the details of how useful it is to have a substance that can make
a strip of paper smell exactly like a sizzling beef burger on the grill.
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marketed, highly profitable foods more likely to be overconsumed (think “chicken nuggets”
versus a bone-in chicken breast with an identically spiced coating). These “innovations” trigger
biological cues of taste and food-in-per-effort that cannot exist in unprocessed foods.
Constructing an appearance of value also triggers limbic rewards less possible with fresh
fruit or nuts. “The marketer’s trick is to get the consumer to overconsume by focusing on the
virtue of economy, not on the vice of gluttony” (p 294), for example putting high-priced lowvalue items near something else on the shelf or menu to construct the appearance of value, as
occurs with “value meals,” and portion size (“supersizing”) deals. Average fast-food portion
sizes increased slightly in the 1970s but “accelerated rapidly in the 1980s, and continued their
increase into the 1990s, when a take-away drink larger than the human bladder was introduced”
(p 295); even the medium size of fast foods has increased over time. Zimmerman calls this a
“cultural change,” and called the relaxing of regulatory restrictions against certain advertising
types or venues that occurred under the Reagan administration a “regulatory change” that is
likewise directly correlated to the period whose sudden obesity rise economists are trying to
explain. The regulatory relaxation accommodated competitive food in schools and school profit
on vending machine margins. By 1998, 73% of high schools had exclusive pouring contracts.
Product placement on television and in films, more attractive and lighter packaging, and inschool advertising all added to these marketing effects, and added to the obesogenicity of
environments where greater salience translates to greater consumption (p 295, citing Wansink
and other’s study of how the visual proximity of candy leads to greater consumption).
Zimmerman has methodically exposed flaws in argument, failure to empirically
demonstrate causality, lack of longitudinal support for proposed mechanisms, and weak
magnitudes for correlates that CGS used to explain the sudden rise in American obesity.
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Zimmerman then emphasizes the contrast in prescriptions between the marketing explanation
and the rational-choice explanation for rising obesity:
In a world-view in which people choose rationally exactly what is best for them, it is natural to conclude that
people’s rational choice to become obese is making them better off. And if they are better off, any
intervention can only make them worse off. …
Many states have laws on the books that prevent lawsuits against food manufacturers and marketers, and
these laws often style themselves as ‘personal responsibility’ or ‘common-sense consumption’ laws. Yet as
institutional economists have long recognized, personal responsibility takes place only within a particular
legal and social environment, and this legal and social environment profoundly shapes the decisions that
people make.
What is at stake, then, is not merely an etiological exercise, but a defense of the very notion of public health
(p 298). …
Obesity is not a rational choice. Most obese people regret their weight status, and obese individuals have
poor quality of life, which implies that any choices made along the path toward obesity were made either
without adequate information or without due foresight (p301-2, internal citation omitted).

Zimmerman concludes having presented facts and arguments that meet his criteria as
causal mechanisms – being stable before 1980 then rising quickly, applicable across all
demographics, with a disproportionate emphasis on caloric beverages and snacks, and of an
appropriate magnitude – by stating “the most compelling single interpretation of the admittedly
incomplete data we have is that the large increase in obesity is due to marketing” (p 302):
[M]arketing is the single most important cause of obesity because only the marketing explanation has
adequate conceptual plausibility, paired with a strong evidence base for each link in its causal chain (p 300).
… Of course, every individual determines his or her own dietary decisions. Yet as structural changes in the
food-marketing environment over the past 30 years have made it increasingly difficult to make healthy
dietary choices, many adults have faltered. …Although this may seem a pessimistic conclusion, it is in fact an
optimistic one. Only by identifying the structural forces that operate on individual choices can we make a
collective choice to limit their influence, and thereby be freed of them (p 301).

This is a primary argument favoring a social scientist’s Level 1 perspective, and favoring policy
proposals that follow from identification of plausible causal links with sufficient empirical
support. Zimmerman’s last paragraph here exposes the tension between people’s need to feel that
they determine their own choices, and the reality that a bending of the market frame and decades
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of increasingly sophisticated marketing seem to have compromised their ability to do so, absent a
conscientious dedication to gathering appropriate knowledge and actively using deliberative
resources.

7.9

Non-Economists On the Interplay Between RUMax Action and Environmental
Influences on Behavior
Much of the implicit struggle between Level 1 and Level 2 perspectives is more likely to

be explicit between those who argue that diet weight and health are primarily matters of personal
responsibility (a characteristically “conservative” or “nature” argument by modern American
political nomenclature), and those who argue that diet weight and health are primarily influenced
by environmental factors that influence or constrain voluntary behaviors in ways the individual
cannot or does not usually control (a characteristically “liberal” or “nurture” argument by
modern American political nomenclature). There is no need for either to be primary or exclusive,
and there is nothing making either perspective non-economic.
Because economists are trained to take a Level 2 perspective, emphasizing or assuming
RUMax behavior, there is a bias trained into modern economic thinking that would favor the
personal responsibility perspective. In contrast, many of the environmental influence arguments
stem from non-economists. But there remains crossover, as demonstrated in the previous section
(7.8). This crossover is not a coincidence, or a quixotic gambit by a radical fringe. If the
conservative/Level 2 perspective worked purely, there would have been no dramatic rise in
obesity from the early 1980s, or such a rise would have been solved already with taxes and
information. To argue that a Level 2 perspective works purely is to argue that over 100 million
Americans simultaneously and consciously decided to sacrifice future health, quality of life, and
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economic productivity for Coke and snack pies – there is either mass hysteria, mass stupidity, or
a set of deeper factors at work. The theoretic Level diagram defended here argues that it is the
latter case, based on evidence presented in Essay Two and here.
Kersh (2009) explains that personal responsibility advocates stress a rights-based theory
meant to focus perception on protecting freedom of choice, that this angle has religious roots,
and that it can prove philosophically difficult to build support against this framing of the
problem. Personal responsibility advocates tend to favor industry voluntary action as a policy
choice (p 299). In contrast those who contend that the obesity problem stems more from
obesogenic environments than from failures of personal responsibility tend to fault expanding
portions, expanded choice sets slanted toward actively-marketed processed foods, the ubiquity of
these foods, and incessant advertising (p 300).
It is productive to avoid manichean characterizations of the problem. Sunstein and Thaler
take pains to stress that their “libertarian paternalism” removes no consumer choice (for adults),
and their approach is not one driven by political expediency. It sets a more stable philosophic
base from which to defend policy proposals – it faces a real problem without overreaching in a
way that exposes a philosophic flank to attack. In the formulation of the theoretic models in
Essay Two and this essay, I respect that something that may be characterized as an obesogenic
environment exists, and that individual choice occurs and must be protected within a marketoriented frame. Both personal and environmental factors impact individual choice, and the
questions become the degree to which each determines behavior, and how policy oriented at
reducing behavior that generates poor health outcomes should be made to reverse actual causes,
rather than supposed ones.
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That personal and environmental factors impact individual choice seems to be the only
characterization that is both valid, and more importantly, sound. (That is, is the only
characterization supported by theory and evidence across much of the range of academic
disciplines focused on the problem, making both the conclusions valid, and the premises on
which they are based true.) Recall from Essay Two the academic group employed by the United
Kingdoms’ Foresight Programme of the Department of Trade and Industry to examine 50-year
trajectories of alternative scenarios for addressing the pressing national problem of obesity. Maio
et al. (2007) argue from the perspective that individual behavior is a function of both individual
preferences and the individual’s environment, holistically understood: …individual choices are
always made within particular environments. “The two key policy implications here are that
generic behavior change campaigns may have different effects on individuals from different
socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds and that it may be important to identify ‘predatory’
environmental influences on individual choices” 20 (p100-1). Therefore solutions must be
upstream (environmental, including the removal of “predatory” influences), and downstream
(individual). Both must be considered for behavioral change initiatives to be successful. Only by
addressing the environment and the individual, can the gap between individual intentions and
behavior be properly addressed (p 100).
Cohen and Farley (2008), (medical doctors with Masters’ degrees in Public Health, in an
article sponsored by the RAND Corporation), offer an important perspective for economists to
appreciate, because by Cohen and Farley’s premise that eating is an automatic behavior (see
Essay Two), the belief that personal responsibility in the sense of active volitional decision
making dominantly influences individual eating behavior cannot reasonably hold. Cohen and
20

Maio et al. cite, apparently for the embedded concept and use of the word “predatory”: D. Halpern, C. Bates, G.
Beales, and A. Heathfield, 2004, Personal responsibility and changing behaviour: The state of knowledge and its
implications for public policy, http://www.pm.gov.uk/files/pdf/pr.pdf, which they accessed November 9, 2007.
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Farley may pose as near polar opposites to the libertarian wing of economists and industry
proponents, but their solutions about environmental drivers of “automatic behaviors” are not
without merit, and are built on empirical evidence rather than dogmatically echoing Lockeanpurist philosophy. Cohen and Farley do not abandon the concept of efficiency, as “eating as
automatic behavior” has roots in biological efficiency, despite also having psychological
consequences that make it hard for people to recognize their behavior, admit it, and disabuse
themselves of harmful effects from that behavior.
Cohen and Farley define ‘environment’ as “the context in which human beings act. Every
moment…people…perceive features of their environments. …Some of those perceptions occur
without awareness, and many behavioral responses similarly occur without awareness or
conscious thought” (p 2). They define ‘priming’ as “the manipulation of decision and judgments
by the previous presentation of words, concepts, or images that are not perceived as being related
to the task at hand” (p 2-3) as may occur with advertising images – as any man who has drunk a
premium beer in public and not been approached by an attractive woman may attest to this.
‘Salience’ is simply “how much it attracts the attention” (p 3). Priming and salience of certain
foods in the environment contribute to environmental influence on eating. Cohen and Farley cite
empirical evidence that: food portion sizes have risen, and the amount eaten rises with portion
size; that the “amount of food consumed increases as the effort to eat it decreases” (as
Zimmerman 2011 also explained); that “the mere sight of food can stimulate people to eat”; and
that “the longer the meal, the more people eat” (p 2). “Wansink’s work demonstrates repeatedly
that environmental cues influence the frequency and quantity of what people eat and that people
do not typically recognize these cues” (p 2). For example, from Wansink, Just, and Payne
(2009): “Primarily, environmental factors influence eating by altering perceived consumption
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norms, or interfere with our ability to monitor how much we have consumed” (p 165). Wansink,
Just, and Payne describe a potential mechanism and measurable effects:
“Eating is multidimensional and difficult to monitor. This can lead people to focus more on food choice than
on their consumption volume…and it can lead to unmonitored, unintended overeating. Caloric estimates are
biased not only by the size of the packages and plates, but also by the size of the meal. In general, all people
underestimate their calorie consumption by a predictable compressive power function” (p 166).

While Cohen and Farley’s argument is well-supported, compelling, and deserving of
attention from preference purists, their policy conclusions seem restrictive and impractical to
economists, as they smack of command and control, without Sunstein and Thaler’s respect for
choice. They are also too inflexible to the education-induced ability to break patterns of “eating
automaticity” and establish new habits, as social psychologists advocate:
This [toxic environment] concept suggests that educational or motivational approaches to reducing
population-level consumption, such as the food guide pyramid, nutrition labeling, and dietary counseling, will
continue to fail. In place of these approaches, to reduce consumption we should decrease the accessibility,
visibility, or quantities of foods to which people are exposed and reduce the cues in our environment that
encourage eating. The best approaches include reducing portion sizes, limiting access to ready-to-eat foods,
limiting the availability of snack foods in schools and workplaces, and reducing food advertising (p 4).

If more subtle means are employed to discourage overconsumption of what the Food Pyramid
calls “discretionary calories,” reduced demand will handle much of the Cohen and Farley agenda
without (or with perhaps a much diminished) “junk food rights” battle in society and Congress.
Harris et al. (2009) cite evidence that “food advertising can ‘prime,’ or automatically
activate, increased food consumption in children and young adults and that these effects are not
mediated by hunger, advertising awareness, or mood” (p 215). This supports the interpretation of
automaticity. Do adults behave similarly, or does the marketing designed to obviate deliberative
thought fail, because adults carefully consider all food decisions?
Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis (2012) explain the degree of the public health threat from
refined sugars in the quantities currently consumed, and offer four criteria used to justify the
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regulation of alcohol, that they claim apply equally to sugar. Each criterion tends to be difficult
to place neatly in either the personal responsibility or obesogenic environment camp:
unavoidability(/ubiquity); toxicity; potential for abuse; and negative impact on society. For each
criterion Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis present unequivocal evidence demonstrating that refined
sugars meet the same standards for regulation that society has been upholding with alcohol. They
summarize that “individually focused approaches, such as school-based interventions that teach
children about diet and exercise, demonstrate little efficacy” (p 28). They advocate “gentle
‘supply-side’ control strategies” (p 28), a type of environmental funneling that curbs availability
without banning, as is proving effective in lowering consumption and health harms in the cases
of tobacco and alcohol, the nearest parallel consumables to added sugars.
Citing a large gap in understanding between researchers/practitioners and policymakers,
Katz (2009) advocates structural interventions that change the food environment at low cost to
the government (remove vending machines, ban SSB sales in places or for some groups).
With the goal of breaking through an impasse in policy formation, Brownell et al. (2010)
attempt to forge a compromise between the individual responsibility argument common in policy
debates about obesity, and the collective responsibility argument of “environmental influence”
advocates. They note that a “Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act” created to ban
lawsuits against the fast food industry passed in the U.S. House, but failed in the Senate.
Subsequently, versions passed in 23 states. But Brownell et al. recognize that personal
responsibility cannot be the whole story. “Humans are highly responsive to even subtle
environmental cues, so large shifts in access, pricing, portions, marketing, and other powerful
drivers of eating and activity will have major effects on weight (p 380).” They refer to the
available science, which suggests that elements of the food environment and biology routinely
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engage appetite and consumptive behaviors on a sub-rational level. The elements are not beyond
the scope of attention(/awareness) and control, but routinely influence behavior without the
conscious intent or even acknowledgement of the unaware individual.
Brownell et al. enlist the work of Sunstein and (University of Chicago economist) Thaler,
arguing that default options may be reset within institutions, and thus through structural
intervention bridge the divide between individual and collective responsibility. To reiterate, food
decision environments already have default options, and Thaler and Sunstein argue these can be
made healthier. By the vocabulary chosen here, this occurs by disarming certain environmental
elements residual to dictated market evolution. Sunstein and Thaler build on the work of other
economists, including Choi (2003), who studies the impact of default options on choices of
employee health plans. There is no reason to suspect that the first options presented in food
environments would function much differently. “Default options have an enormous impact on
household ‘choices’” (Choi, p 180). Default options make “acts of commission” (opt out) costly,
and opt-out costs vary over time. Choi lists multiple factors that can make default options more
binding: default options are implicitly perceived as advice; “people are susceptible to
procrastination” (p 180); and default options are “sticky” because of loss aversion (where
someone values an item that they perceive as having, more than they value an item they do not
yet perceive themselves as having).
Chandon and Wansink empirically demonstrate an environmental effect on purchase and
on postpurchase consumption, independent of a more general decision to consume at some point.
Chandon and Wansink use household scanner data, field study, and two lab studies to examine
whether products that consumers stockpile in the home are consumed faster (“A ConvenienceSalience Framework of Postpurchase Consumption Incidence and Quantity”). As SSBs are grab-
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pour-and-drink products (no can opener or other ingredients or steps), we may presume to
consider them high-convenience products. Chandon and Wansink present results that:
…show that stockpiling increases product salience and triggers consumption incidence among highconvenience products. However, when the decision is made to consume a product, stockpiling increases the
consumption quantity for both high- and low-convenience products (p 321). …
Findings from the field experiment and the scanner data study show that stockpiling indeed causes people
to consume products at a faster rate. …[scanner and field study] reveal that stockpiling increases the
consumption rate of high-convenience products more than that of low-convenience products (p 332, emphasis
added). …
Consumption decisions are influenced by factors that do not influence purchase decisions (p 333). …
Our findings that stockpiling can increase the short-term rate of consumption support other studies that
show that sales promotions are not always a zero-sum game (p 334).

Salience, in the form of visual presentation, which is enhanced by stockpiling, including
in the home, leads to consumption at a faster rate. Wansink, in a 1996 Journal of Marketing
article, finds that larger package sizes of familiar products encourage greater consumption
quantities (per use), in part due to the perception that larger packages are less expensive to use.
Wansink concludes that package size is a marketing variable that can affect product use long
after and many more times than it has influenced purchase (p 13). Cohen and Farley report
evidence from the Journal of Marketing Research that salience is an important feature of food
environments, because: “when the amount of shelf space for a consumer item is doubled in
grocery stores, sales of that item increase by about 40%. This effect is seen regardless of whether
the item is generally popular or unpopular. Sales also increase when special displays and endaisle displays are used and when items are displayed at eye level” (p 3, embedded citations
omitted).
Have you ever seen a supermarket SSB (not just sCSD) aisle where Coke and Pepsi did
not dominate shelf space? Remember from the empirical essay here that there is clear evidence
that households routinely stockpile sCSDs. This is not surprising given that contents and
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packaging are very well designed for stockpiling and convenient use, with no loss in product
quality over time for unopened containers. In this way, consumers seeking economy in their
household budget may be contributing to environmental circumstances that encourage their own
higher rate of consumption. Any consumer unaware of this effect may be consuming SSBs at a
rate faster than their own conscientious RUMax calculation would project. If so, this is a
compromise of frame and of RUMax behavior likely to create long-term negative health impacts,
without the consumer consciously sourcing the cause.

7.10

SSB/sCSD Advertising and Marketing – Targeted Soft-Drink Advertising
The role of advertising is one of the established watersheds between neoclassical

formalists and those questioning the neoclassical assumption set. Advertising that helps raise
consumer utility and firm profits, regardless of how this is achieved, is good, and should not be
restricted (neoclassical view). Those arguing that uninformative advertising can change tastes (be
persuasive without being informative) tend to people the camp less committed to belief in stable
preferences.
Dixit and Norman (1978) argue their work shows advertising “to be socially excessive,
even when post-advertising tastes are used as the standard for welfare judgments and the
monopoly profits resulting from advertising are included in welfare” (p 1). In 1984, Grossman
and Shapiro make the theoretical assumption that all advertising in a differentiated product
market “conveys full and accurate information about the characteristics of products,” and still
find the market-determined levels of advertising to be excessive given the diversity of the market
(p 63). In 1984, Kihlstrom and Riordan state: “A great deal of advertising appears to convey no
direct credible information about product qualities” (p 427), while pointing out that if there is an
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effective market mechanism for mediating the relationship, advertising may signal product
quality, just as Phillip Nelson suggested over a number of papers (Milgrom and Roberts 1986).
If advertising changes tastes, the assumption that there are fixed known and ordered
preferences becomes less firmly rooted, and advertising restrictions may be welfare increasing
for products that may be abused. “There is no fixed standard for value judgment [in welfare
analysis] when tastes are variable” (Dixit and Norman, p 1). The desire to cleave closely to a
fixed standard of value judgment may provide a motive for well-meaning economists with the
objective of evaluating welfare effects under different scenarios, including different policy
options. This motivates economists to assume that tastes are not variable, and to resist contrary
evidence that might undermine the robustness of results achieved through serious and paid effort.
One objective of marketing through advertising is to make consumers aware of their
preferences (neoclassical view, as Becker and Murphy 1993), or develop consumers’ preferences
through product information or persuasion/image associations (exo-neoclassical economic view,
Galbraith in The Affluent Society, Daniel Ackerberg, and the premise of theoretical work by Dixit
and Norman, for starters). Persuasive images associate the advertised product to what we may
now (after Essay Two) refer to as “visceral factors” that powerfully drive consumption: hunger
(now) sells candy bars; sex (soon) sells cars and beer and jeans, etc.; thirst (now), and love, life,
fun, and a computer-generated polar-bear mother sharing a treat with her cubs sell soft-drinks.
Visceral factors we remember engage action without triggering “rational thinking” that might
“put the brakes on” an impulse. Profit-maximizing SSB companies now spend over $1.6 billion
per year on advertisements just to children and teens (FTC 2008, ES-1), ads that like those for
adults do not inform as to price, availability, or clearly differentiable product characteristic. If
these companies are not playing to individuals’ visceral factors they may be completely wasting
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that money. If they are playing to visceral factors, they are exploiting psychological vectors of
economic weakness, and should be heavily regulated. Society has already made this last
pronouncement for slavery, opiate drugs, alcohol, and tobacco. “Advertising can influence food
choices; otherwise it would not be undertaken on the scale that it is by the food industry”
(Fulponi OECD 2009, p 14; citing Marion Nestlé’s 2002 Food Politics). Milgrom and Roberts
(1986) suggest that uninformative advertising can still be a profit-maximizing strategy for firms
by signaling product quality to consumers. But profit maximization fails to be a case against the
need for regulation, as for the banned and regulated industries just listed.
The quiet battle between those who see advertisements as primarily informative and those
who see advertisements as socially expensive attempts to shape flexible preferences reduces to a
battle between those who see advertisements as economic goods, and those who see some form
of advertisements as economic bads, or at least as appropriate for regulation or restriction.
In a general exploration of the nature and effect of persuasive communication, Della
Vigna and Gentzkow (2010) provide insights that apply to sCSD/SSB advertising, given the
lessons from behavioral economists, decision theorists, and social psychologists already
reviewed. Della Vigna and Gentzkow explain that existing models of persuasion fall loosely into
two categories: “belief-based” persuasion, whose proponents hold that “persuasion affects
behavior because it changes receivers’ beliefs”; and “preference-based” persuasion, whose
proponents hold that persuasion affects behavior independently of beliefs, either directly entering
the utility function or through factors peripheral to beliefs (p 653). Those who fall in the beliefbased camp argue that recipients of persuasive communication (“receivers”) are rational
Bayesians, and argue that advertisements are informative, signal information, or have effects
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proxying for a theoretic game. I shall attempt to interpret the likely effects of sCSD ads through
both of the lenses Della Vigna and Gentzkow describe.
In belief-based models of persuasion, rational receivers will never be made worse off by
exposure to persuasive communication, because it increases the supply of information, and more
competitive information markets tend to improve welfare. “Welfare effects are harder to evaluate
if receivers are not Bayesian or if persuasion works through emotion or preference change” (p
654). Again, this problem may incentivize some economists to deny preference-changing effects.
From evidence and conclusions presented here, it is clear that many consumers are not Bayesian,
and that sCSD advertising is emotion based (as ads convey no content or price or availability
information, with the rare exception of a new product or slight reformulation; Becker and
Murphy 1993; Ackerberg 2001). So there seems to be evidence that welfare cannot be assumed
to rise with sCSD ads, given the failure of precepts for belief-based models.
Many belief-based modelers have found diminishing returns to repeating the same
advertisement. This is “consistent with receivers’ priors becoming increasingly strong over time”
(p 19). While the specific ads vary over the years, the positive-emotion, positive-association
messages of the main advertising sCSD companies (Coca-Cola Company, PepsiCo, Dr. Pepper
Snapple Group) stay consistent over time. This may indicate strong priors are established over
the long term, possibly decades, by sCSD advertising leading to brand recognition and brand
loyalty. Cumulative advertising effects might explain the dominance of brands with relatively
large mark-ups on lightly spiced carbonated sugar water, a product that can cheaply be mimicked
in manufacture by almost anyone. Addictiveness is an alternative hypothesis.
I suggest that the strength and the depth of consumers’ “Bayesian priors,” if one accepts
the belief-based model, are strong enough to help habituate consumption. Della Vigna and
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Gentzkow further note that the credibility of the sender influences the inferences of receivers.
The Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo have extreme product integrity over time, and over a
century each of client satisfaction, with few corporate scandals. There is no non-nutritional
reason not to trust them. So belief-based modelers would predict effective response to their ads.
But it is not clear that consumers buying more due to advertisements would raise consumer
welfare. Welfare rises when advertising promotes competition that lowers prices, decreases
search costs, or increases market transparency (p 664). None of these functions is served by
sCSD television advertising in the very mature U.S. market.
Preference-based modelers predict that sCSD ads will be effective without conveying
information. Evidence that beliefs may be affected by framing, salience, and attention – noninformative dimensions – blur the line between the two model types (p 656). “…[A]dvertising
campaigns can have an effect even if they do not convey credible information as long as they
have a direct impact on preferences” (p 659). But these effects occur through behavioral
economic modalities (framing, salience) rather than by conveying discrete competitive
advantage. “The broad conclusion from theory is that welfare effects are more likely to be
positive when persuasion functions as information and receivers are rational” (p 665). Neither of
these seems to hold generally, either for the majority of sCSD ads, or for consistent consumers of
sCSDs. Neither can possibly hold for the television ads seen by children (98%), and adolescents
(89%) for food products high in sugar, fat, or salt. This is because young children have not
developed the cognitive abilities to discriminate marketing or persuasive content from truth
(Harris et al. 2009, p 213, 215). There seems to be no solid argument that sCSD television
advertising is likely to raise consumer welfare, although it certainly raises sales, even in short-
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term effect (see my empirical results). The policy conclusion is that limiting it cannot be argued
to certainly lower welfare.
If soft-drink companies themselves believe that advertising will be more effective
targeting groups with lower education and income levels than average, they would target
African-Americans (and outside of the high education and income bias found in the Nielsen
database used here, Hispanics) in addition to any group highly responsive to sCSD advertising.
(Asian male heads of household respond strongly to sCSD marketing, by the quantitative
analysis here.) Harris et al. (2011, p 16) cite a marketing industry media source quoting CocaCola as targeting African Americans, Hispanics and Asians for 86% of its future growth.
African-American and Hispanic targets for growth markets in the sCSD industry are confirmed
by the industry overview offered by NPLAN (2011; The National Policy & Legal Analysis
Network to Prevent Childhood Obesity). Growing markets are important in a multi-billion-dollar
industry with dynamic product lines. Minorities and children are specifically targeted.
After a 2008 self-imposed advertising restriction on television ads to children (see
CFBAI, this section below) by some SSB manufacturers, Harris et al. (2011) report SSB and
energy drink advertising in 2010 of $948 billion, of which three-quarters is spent on television
advertising. Coca-Cola leads the pack at $300 million, with PepsiCo at $250 million. Compared
to 2008, these figures represent roughly a 5% rise, but a doubling of sCSD ads viewed by
children and teens – whom even adamant defenders of neoclassical economic premises will
concede do not routinely make fully-informed, rational utility-maximizing consumer choices.
Teens view 12% more SSB and energy drink ads than adults. Harris et al. quote the CDC in
Atlanta: “There is no reason to give a child a soda or sugar-sweetened drink. …The powerful
influence of marketing and the targeting of young people cannot be ignored here” (p 14).
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African-American households have been empirically identified as preferential targets for
sugary food advertising for nearly a decade. Tirodker and Jain (2003) find that prime-time
television shows with high “Black” viewership had six times the soft-drink advertisements of
general prime-time programming, along with double the candy and chocolate ads, and all of the
“other dessert” ads. Henderson and Kelly (2005) confirm this, analyzing 100 hours of prime-time
viewing, and finding 10% more of all ads in the African-American television market versus the
general market are for food advertisements, with two-thirds again more (mean) food
advertisements per 30 minutes of viewing than in the general market. The African-American
market in their analysis had five times the number of candy advertisements (p=0.001), and three
times the soft-drink ads, with soft-drink ads 10% of the African-American market, while only
2% of the general market (p=0.004). Harris et al. (2011) cite evidence that “black children and
teens viewed 80 to 90% more TV ads for…[sugary and energy drinks] in 2010 compared to their
white peers.” While greater viewing times account for some of the difference, “black teens and
children viewed 2.5 to 3 times as many ads for Sprite as compared with white youth, and four of
six Sprite ads featured black main characters.” The numbers are nearly the same for Vitamin
Water, with the black:white child-teen ad-viewing ratio more than 2.5 to 1, while for Coke and
Pepsi the ratios run about 2:1 (p 11, quotes for paragraph). Targeted advertising restrictions may
be warranted, and the quantitative work here may assist in identifying target populations at the
household level.
Andreyeva, Kelly, and Harris (2011) regress the associations between exposure to food
advertising and fast food and/or soft-drink consumption. They find that each incremental rise in
advertising exposure equivalent to just over one sCSD ad every two weeks (33 per year) is
associated with a 9.4% increase in children’s soft-drink consumption (p=0.01). They calculate
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advertising response elasticities indicating a 6.5% increase in child soft-drink consumption with
a 100% rise in advertising exposure. So there is reasonable evidence that sCSD companies are
not just throwing their advertising dollars away, and that the companies develop teen and adult
tastes as early as they can. The societal comfort level with the product could prejudice regular
consumers against reacting to conflicting information on nutrition content that would question
their judgment in consuming sCSDs on a regular basis (Sassi and Hurst 2008; Jonas et al. 2001).
Such a prejudice sends the decision path in Figure 4 through the “reflexive choice” junction, and
reinforces a false probability assessment for the k multiplier in the expectation calculation of
equation (d), as well as shielding the a from information suggesting long-term health would be
better served by not regularly consuming an energy-dense nutrient-poor food (see sections 6.6,
6.9).
Television ads are not a full measure of effective marketing, however. “Nearly 24% , or
$116 million, of carbonated beverage youth marketing consisted of in-school expenditures”
(Federal Trade Commission 2008, p ES-2). Harris et al. (2011) compile FTC data to show this
in-school sCSD advertising is the largest marketing segment targeted to youth in 2006 (before
the CFBAI, see next paragraph), even larger than the TV ad budget for sCSDs. Not a mixed
message from the SSB manufacturers, but certainly a mixed message in an educational
environment. Advertising restrictions must be considered if simply as a means to avoid implicit
“sanctioning” of sCSD use in educational environments.
The self-imposed participation by some soft-drink manufacturers in the Children’s Food
and Beverage Advertising Initiative (CFBAI) from 2008 is narrow in its participatory guidelines
(Federal Trade Commission [FTC] 2008). Speers, Harris, and Schwartz (2011) find that product
placement on television programs, wherein a product or its image is seen being used by someone
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in the show, is dominated by sCSDs, traditional restaurants, and energy drinks, together
comprising 60% of all product placement appearances. Coca-Cola garnered 70% of all product
placements seen by children and 61% of all seen by adolescents in 2008, with over 95% of these
attributed to a single show, American Idol. So despite Coca-Cola’s CFBAI pledge to avoid
marketing to children, children saw on average in 2008 four Coke appearances a week in prime
time. The force of product placement versus a full advertisement (per Andreyeva, Kelly, and
Harris) is beyond the scope of this review, but by inference, there is support that child/teen sCSD
consumption increases with this degree of exposure.
The FTC report requested by Congress (FTC 2008) states that “television advertising still
dominates the landscape of marketing techniques to promote food and beverages” (p ES-2)
accounting for 46% of all youth marketing expenditures, with sCSD and (fast-food) restaurant
ads dominating adolescent-directed advertising. Still, there have been strong forays into new
media advertising, including Internet, texting, viral marketing, premium prizes, in-store displays
targeting children or adolescents, cross-promotions, licensed character tie-ins (especially with
movies), and celebrity endorsements, joining product placement in the active marketing tool kit.
Harris et al. (2009) cite a well-known but non-peer-reviewed publication to make the plausible
claim that “newer forms of marketing…are designed to circumvent active processing of
advertising information and, thus, deactivate skepticism and other defenses” (p 215). Harris et al.
(2011) also make the critical observation that the CFBAI pledge does not include any
commitment to reducing advertising to adolescents, who have the highest consumption of sugary
beverages of any age group (by Ogden et al. 2011), and that Coca-Cola admits specifically
targeting teen customers, as a good model for business growth (Harris et al., p 17). A copy of the
wording of Coca-Cola North America’s October 2010 (restated) Council of Better Business
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Bureaus Pledge (including its CFBAI commitment) are available in “Breaking Down the Chain:
A Guide to the Soft Drink Industry” (NPLAN 2011; The National Policy & Legal Analysis
Network to Prevent Childhood Obesity; at www.nplan.org).

7.10.1

SSB/sCSD Advertising and Marketing – Policy Questions About a Key Formatter
of Market Environment
Beyond tax schema and information or education policies, a further common theme is the

regulation or restriction of SSB advertising and marketing, both from economists like
Zimmerman, and non-economists like Brownell. SSB marketing is ubiquitous and thereby sends
nearly constant messages, whether one considers these to be informative or persuasive.
Marketing/Advertising restrictions are a policy proposal defensible from economic principles if
marketing/advertising is deceptive, if it changes or creates preferences that would not otherwise
be formed and pull someone toward a lower lifetime utility, if its volume suggests inefficient use
of social resources, or if it is predicated on a market failure. The latter is claimed for the
information asymmetry implicit when sugary foods or drinks are marketed to children, who have
not developed the ability to discern true from false images (Harris et al. 2009, p 215). For adults
who arguably may not be as driven by automaticity of eating behaviors or habits as children, the
case that persuasive imagery is a definitively predatory type of information asymmetry is not as
easily made.
The position already defended here is that marketing/advertising of SSBs is almost
always persuasive, not informative, that it is designed to circumvent deliberative choice by
developing more associative characteristics between the product and feelings. Persuasiveness
and strong association with feelings is not deceptive by a high standard, but begins to meet some
level of criteria for deceptiveness. As one example, Sprite®’s campaign of having famous
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African-American sports stars (mostly basketball players) selling Sprite to African-American
youth (Gatorade® is no better), associates sports performance with a very unhealthful product.
(Of course, the Coca-Cola that Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis [2012] claim is toxic in its added
sugar profile versus tolerable daily load actually does “add life”, and “is ‘it’,” and polar bear
mothers do give it to their cubs, so there can be no valid accusation of deceptive imagery there.)
If unwary consumers are being persuaded to eat more high-sugar low-nutrient foods than they
otherwise would without modern marketing (a Zimmerman axiom), and to medically-defined
excess, as Americans on average do, then externality costs associated with the poor health that
results from marketing becomes a nearly indisputable market failure.
Advertisements do raise consumption utility as Becker and Murphy (1993) contend, but
enjoying an image (prestige effect) in no way lowers the negative health effects that the medical
community associates with SSB consumption. Economists and marketing academics have
already argued that advertising for these types of products is excessive from a social perspective,
even when it is maximizing for individual firms (see 7.10). Zimmerman’s analysis carefully
builds a plausibly causal link between the growth in sophisticated marketing and U.S. obesity.
Leaving aside the extreme market concentration in many SSB industries, there is a market failure
given the degree of information asymmetry described here, as well as the failure to provide
nutrition education that would help consumers safeguard themselves from some marketing
effects.
Century-old dominant SSB firms have conducted decades of research and employ the
elite of advertising executives to hone every aspect of marketing, from manufacturing flavors to
upbeat television ads to container shape and color, whereas consumers tend more to demonstrate
ignorance about nutrition, and to be naive to their own decision mechanisms. Decision theorist
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Peters (2009) notes multiple weaknesses in consumers’ ability to decide that make them
vulnerable to manipulation or poor decision-making:
Preferences are constructed based not only on cues from the situation but also on stable characteristics of the
decision maker (e.g., traits such as emotional reactivity, habits, and genetic makeup) and the decision maker’s
transient characteristics at the moment of decision making (e.g., states of arousal, stress, or pain).
…[T]wo individual differences—numeracy and age—…influence information processing and decision
making and have been linked to some extent with problematic information processing and/or behaviors with
respect to food (p S83).

Peters explains one of the information processing problems: “Inadequate numeracy may
be an important barrier to individuals’ understanding and use of information in eating behaviors”
(p S83). In one study Peters refers to, 89% of individuals reported using nutrition labels, but
many did not adequately comprehend the information, and 32% could not properly calculate the
carbohydrate calories in a 20-ounce soda with 2.5 “servings” in the bottle. These same
consumers we expect to intuitively understand how to manage their own preference construction
processes to avoid emotional manipulation of their sCSD consumption decisions by perfectly
attractive and emotional soft drink ads?
Marketers, who well understand the power of affect [“affect heuristics” Peters defines as fast, automatic,
effortless, intuitive, and use emotion rather than deliberation to catalyze decision] typically aim their ads to
evoke an experiential mode of information processing. As a result, individuals must learn to cope with these
feelings that food marketers attempt to elicit if they want healthy eating habits. … [p 82, Peters offers
empirical results and citations.]
These results imply that diet interventions may be more successful when they include training
components in areas such as stress management and time management as a way to increase the cognitive
resources available for dieting and thereby decrease the role of affect in decisions (p 83, emphasis
added).

Conventional economic analyses (Level 2) provide information that may also prove
useful when considering whether to restrict marketing practices in some circumstances. Zheng,
Kinnecun, and Kaiser (2010) find that television advertising for soft drinks rotates the demand
curve counterclockwise, increasing demand elasticity, and suggesting that the number of
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consumers willing to buy rises, with the greatest impact on those with the lowest marginal
willingness to pay (Berning 2011). 21 To the extent that my empirical results reflect a positive
correlation between purchase in the same week that sCSD advertising increases for consistent
purchasers, there may also be an outward shift in the demand curve, in addition to
counterclockwise rotation.
Raising a consumer’s willingness to pay for a product is not necessarily consistent with
RUMax behavior on the consumer’s part, particularly if individual preferences are engineered by
advertising imagery. There is no absolute way to counter those who hold the hard line that
preferences are characteristics of the individual, but empirical evidence across numerous studies
and the decision theory literature (as indicated by Peters 2009) does not indicate a long shelf life
for preference-as-characteristic purists (see 6.8.2). Harris et al. (2009) cite clear evidence that
preferences are created by advertising associations in children, and possibly adolescents.
Andreyeva, Kelly, and Harris (2011) find that for children, “for both soft drink and fast food
consumption, carbonated soft drink advertising emerges as a strong and significant predictor of
consumption” (p 227). Harris et al. (2009) cite a review of reviews of the effects of food
marketing to children, that concludes: “food promotion has a causal and direct effect on
children’s food preferences, knowledge and behavior” (p 213). Maio et al. (2007) again citing
multiple empirical works, suggest that preventing food ads during child-oriented television
programming would prove an important change to the food environment to help combat rising
obesity levels.
Overwhelming support for Level 1 factors indicates a benefit to SSB industries that have
managed to dictate market evolution and bend the market frame so that SSB marketing is so

21

Berning cites other studies that seem to contravene the counterclockwise demand curve rotation, but these are for
baskets of goods, not for sCSDs.
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embedded in society that it is considered a right. But it also indicates a cost to those whose
psychologies and consumption choices have been influenced by decades of sophisticated
marketing for a near-addictive product type, costs in health and lost productivity. Level 2
analyses may deny that RUMax agents can be compromised by persuasive advertising, but the
amount of peer-reviewed science they have to deny to maintain this grows daily. A Level 1
perspective demands it is time to have a science-based discussion about restricting certain types
of and venues for SSB advertising (of which sCSD television advertising is a subset). Industry
lobbying and “personal responsibility” advocates will defend their economic or philosophical
turf, but like the strict neoclassical economists who may fear the threat to mathematical
tractability from admitting RUMax-compromised consumers exist, they must deny a
preponderant scientific literature in order to do so. There is precedence for this struggle in the
fight to regulate alcohol, tobacco (Brownell and Warner 2009), and in certain industry and
politicians’ campaigns to deny the scientific fact that much of the current rise in atmospheric
carbon-dioxide is indisputably of human origin. 22 Industry resistance will be discussed in subsection 7.13.1., but this political problem should not constrain the presentation of responsible
policy recommendations suggested by scientific evidence.

7.10.2

SSB/sCSD Advertising and Marketing – Policy Ideas from Broader Literature
The 2008 Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress, “Marketing Food to Children

and Adolescents: A Review of Industry Expenditures, Activities, and Self-Regulation,”
represents the official recommendation from a federal agency to Congress, so none of the

22

The current rise in atmospheric carbon-dioxide is indisputably of human origin because CO2 isotopes from a
multi-decade panel of atmospheric assays chemically demonstrate these isotopes could originate only from human
industrial processes. Doubters can start here:
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml; or here
http://mediasite.dl.uconn.edu/Mediasite/Play/04f37a778ee942a4a79ccf16e210cd8b1d.

628

policies they propose can be considered radical. In fact, regardless of a proposal’s ability to rise
to academic or public prominence, such ideas should be considered baseline, especially those not
ensconced in polite and tepid language. 23 The 2008 FTC Report was “the first comprehensive
overview of food and beverage company marketing expenditures and tactics” (NPLAN 2011;
The National Policy & Legal Analysis Network to Prevent Childhood Obesity).
The Report’s “Recommendations for Food and Beverage Companies” are extensive:
All companies that market food or beverage products to children should adopt and adhere to meaningful
nutrition-based standards for marketing their products to children under 12. A useful first step would
be to join the CBBB [Council of Better Business Bureaus] Initiative.
Companies should broadly construe “marketing” to include all advertising and promotional
techniques 24 …
Companies should continue and increase efforts to improve the nutritional profiles of their products…
through product innovation and reformulation. Companies should improve upon the nutritional criteria
adopted for “better for you” products as they find ways to lower sugar, fat, sodium, etc., without
sacrificing taste and appeal. In applicable cases, companies should re-examine whether the fact that a
product has “less” of, or is “reduced” in, calories or certain nutrients (e.g., sodium, sugar, or fat) is, by
itself, a sufficient basis for qualifying as a “better for you” product. …
Companies should devote particular attention to outreach aimed at ethnic minority populations that
are disproportionately affected by childhood overweight and obesity. …
The CBBB should closely monitor participating companies’ compliance with their pledges. ...
Expand the scope of “advertising to children” to encompass all advertising and promotional
techniques, including, for example, product packaging and in-store marketing. …
Work toward standardizing the nutrition criteria for “healthy dietary choices” that may be marketed to
children, such as by product category. …
23

The only perspective that can cast such recommendations as radical has been refuted by empirical and clinical
evidence in Essay Two and this essay. Given this evidence, “industry rights” arguments against such proposals fall
to standard economic arguments. Companies have the right to make unhealthful products, and to an extent to
advertise and market them. They do not have the right to manipulate people into lowering their lifetime utility by
taking advantage of psychological mechanisms that resist awareness to dictation of market frame – certainly not by
economic arguments. Legal issues regarding manipulative advertising as free speech remain unsettled.
24
“…all advertising and promotional techniques, including but not limited to: advertising on television and radio, in
print media, and on the Internet (including third-party and company-sponsored websites); product packaging and
labeling; advertising preceding a movie shown in a movie theater or placed on a video (DVD or VHS) or within a
video game; promotional content transmitted to personal computers and other digital or mobile devices; advertising
displays and promotions at the retail site; specialty or premium items distributed in connection with the sale of a
product; promotion or sponsorship of public entertainment events; product placements; character licensing, toy cobranding and cross-promotions; sponsorship of sports teams or individual athletes; word-of-mouth and viral
marketing; celebrity endorsements; and in-school marketing.”
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Require companies not to engage in, approve, or allow placement of their product in media directed to
children under 12.
Require participating companies to ensure that their franchisees are bound by the companies’ pledge
commitments, such as by incorporating the pledge commitments into any franchisee contracts. …
All companies that sell “competitive” food or beverage products in schools should join the Alliance for
a Healthier Generation or otherwise adopt and adhere to meaningful nutrition-based standards for foods
and beverages sold in schools, such as those recommended by the Institute of Medicine. [“Competitive
foods” can be understood to mean competing by brand, such as Coke® versus Pepsi®, or Taco Bell® versus
KFC®.] …
Companies should cease all in-school promotion of products that do not meet meaningful nutritionbased standards (ES8-11 in Executive Summary, original italics, bold added).

The unequivocal nature of many of these recommendations is striking. “All” companies,
“closely monitor,” and “cease” may signal a high level of frustration by our federal stewards of
trade standards, a level similar to what I find among certain economists and the medical
community. In brief, television advertising restrictions are inadequate given the spectrum of
marketing techniques now available. Nutrition standards must be defined and adopted to limit
marketing of unhealthful food categories, and marketing of products below those standards must
be discontinued in schools and in any media targeting children. Voluntary standards are not well
trusted to be followed or to affect adequate change.
This is not a philosophical debate, but recommended minimum standards for Congress
and Food and Beverage Companies to maintain. To re-iterate, these recommendations, rooted as
they are in the best federal data and methodologies, and vetted for political sensitivity and
subject to political pressure in the wording of the draft (Nestlé 2002, on this process in the
generation of the USDA Dietary Guidelines) must be the new baseline minima for policy
recommendations. Strict adherence to these recommendations should be the least stringent
version of a compromise solution after Congressional battles are fought. For example, given the
biological and psychological mechanisms already discussed, there is a strong case for extending
all of these to children under 18, or even to adults under 25, or even extending them to include
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workplaces as well as schools. “Psychological research has identified mechanisms through which
marketing influences behavior outside of the individual’s conscious awareness; these affect
adolescents and adults, as well as children” (Harris et al. 2009, p 221). If reforms apply only to
12 and under, data will eventually support expansion of similar provisions to older populations.
Of course, much faster is much better given the epidemic rates of diet-based diseases in the U.S.
and associated costs.
For media and entertainment companies, the FTC Report recommends that companies
limit their licensing of characters to healthier foods and beverages, that the companies test the
effectiveness of health and nutrition messages aimed at addressing childhood obesity, and that
the companies should consider adopting a self-regulatory initiative, as sCSD companies not
coincidentally had in 2008.
The FTC is coordinating with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Food
and Drug Administration, and the USDA to define nutrition principles and standards through an
“Interagency Working Group on Food Marketed to Children.” 25 This obviously continues
directly from the (block-) quoted FTC recommendations above.
Based on their quantitative work, Chou, Rashad, Grossman (2008) recommend
eliminating the tax deductibility of advertising expenses for fast-food television advertisements
as a means of lowering child obesity. Henderson and Kelly (2005) empirically find that African
Americans are disproportionately targeted with television advertising for fast food, candy and
soda, results that suggest that targeting of advertising restrictions is appropriate if a more general
case is not won quickly. “Nutrition educators can help counter the effects of unhealthful food
advertising by teaching consumers the critical thinking skills needed to evaluate the [food]
advertisements” (p 195). Speers, Harris, Schwartz (2011) find that the Children’s Food and
25

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/04/110428foodmarketproposedguide.pdf, last accessed 28 April, 2012.
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Beverage Advertising Initiative (CFBAI) pledge to limit advertising to children from 2008 is
grossly undermined by Coca-Cola’s domination of product placement on television shows.
Indicating the inefficacy of narrow self-regulatory pledges: “Progress on child nutrition is
difficult to imagine unless the powerful force of food and beverage marketing is attenuated, if
not eliminated… the exposure of children to food marketing is massive and begins early. Nearly
all food marketing to children worldwide promotes products that can adversely affect their
health” (Harris et al. 2009; p 220).
Harris et al. (2009) not unlike the aforementioned FTC Report, offer conditions that
could be met to make self-regulatory pledges both plausible and potentially useful in addressing
childhood obesity problems. They also point out that an expert panel convened by the WHO
rejected CFBAI-style industry self-regulation as insufficient. The panel recommended that
“WHO should support national actions to substantially reduce the volume and impact of
commercial promotion of energy-dense, micronutrient-poor food and beverages to children; and
consider development of an international code on the marketing of food and beverages to
children…” (Harris et al. 2009, p 218).

7.11

Strategies for Healthier Food and Policy Ideas from the Medical/Nutrition
Community and from Economists Who Appreciate Level 1 Constraints
Policy recommendations vary according to the objectives they are intended to achieve.

One may expect the same researcher to offer different policy recommendations rooted in their
own research results based on whether the objective is to reduce SSB consumption, reduce
American obesity, improve Americans’ dietary quality, or lower incidence of diet-related chronic
diseases. There is obvious overlap between some of these objectives. Many of the articles from
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the medical/nutrition literature consulted here began with different objectives, so there cannot be
unanimity in prescriptions. It is helpful that regardless of which primary objective one seeks from
this list, policy recommendations do not conflict. Particular recommendations and emphases may
change.
Economists (Chaloupka, Powell, Chriqui 2011a, 2011b, and 2011c; Fletcher, Frisvold,
Teft 2011; Powell and Chaloupka 2010; Powell, Chriqui, Chaloupka 2009) tend to look at SSBreduction policy as a potential means to control obesity rates, which in turn is seen as reducing
obesity-related chronic diseases. As explained early in this essay, this is simplistic, and one of
the reasons that econometric attempts to link SSB-reduction with obesity-reduction has not
proved promising for tax rates less than perhaps 4 cents an ounce. Health problems that cannot
easily be seen are often far worse than excess bodyweight, and should be the primary focus of
SSB reduction. Obesity is a common byproduct of overconsumption of SSBs (Malik et al. 2010;
Vartanian, Schwartz, and Brownell 2007; Malik, Schulze, and Hu 2006), but CVD, diabetes, and
hypertension directly result from overconsumption of SSBs, without necessarily correlating with
the BMI of users (Lustig Schmidt and Brindis 2012; Stanhope et al. 2009).
Because of the many poor health outcomes linked to high intake of added sugars, the
primary focus here will be on policies to reduce SSB consumption, albeit within the larger
understanding that changing the average dietary profile away from added sugars and toward
more nutritive foods will improve health outcomes for the U.S. population. As SSBs are the
number one source of added sugars in the American diet by an extreme margin (Marriott et al.
2010), reducing SSB consumption can only assist in reducing overweight and obesity and
improving American health profiles. Using sCSDs as a proxy for SSBs does not compromise any
of the following arguments in any way I have yet perceived.
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Recall that liquid calories are more likely to result in weight gain than solid or semi-solid
calories (Chen et al. 2009), that decreasing SSB use has been associated with lowering of BMIs
in heavier subjects (Ebbeling et al. 2006), that SSBs may cause weight gain by vectors other than
their own calorie load (Olsen and Heitmann 2008), that fructose and HFCS energy intakes at the
25% level raised CVD markers in healthy subjects in only two weeks (Stanhope et al. 2011), and
that the number of years lived with obesity is associated with the risk of all-cause and causespecific mortality (Abdullah et al. 2011). There is no need to narrowly view the benefits of SSBreduction as an anti-obesity objective, or to seriously doubt the efficacy of that narrow objective.
The question becomes how to achieve SSB reduction, again perhaps while enhancing other
dietary positives.
The closer an author cleaves to arguments that respect biological drivers of food
decisions in opposition to the assumption that fully informed, aware, and rational decisions are
the undeniable purview of every economic individual, the more that author is compelled to
suggest strong limitations on advertising, marketing, and presentation cues including packaging,
over a simple tax-and-inform strategy. This I would call a Level 1 awareness overriding Level 2
limitations. This tendency generally holds for economists and non-economists, so the medical
community tends to advocate changes in food environment, including advertising and marketing
restrictions, inherently doubting the single-mode effectiveness of tax-and-inform strategies.
There is no question that the medical/nutrition community favors reducing dietary added
sugars. Over a decade ago, Krebs-Smith (2001) advocated trading out sugar beet acreage for
fruits and vegetables. Regardless of the potential growing zone problems with this suggestion, it
precedes Buzby, Wells, and Vocke’s 2006 explanation (see 6.7.1.c) that simple compliance by
U.S. citizens with U.S. Dietary Guidelines would require millions of acres be transferred into or
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out of production for primary grains, feed grains, fruits, and vegetables – on an order that could
not quickly occur, even with instantaneous shifts in demand. An economist sees that what would
cause such a demand shift should be the larger question. If the demand shift could be induced
without force, say through raising awareness of the advantage of individual compliance with the
Guidelines, then the nation’s agricultural production profile will change on its own (perhaps even
if artificially constrained by unresponsive farm program policies rooted in Depression-era and
pre-obesity-epidemic production priorities). Krebs-Smith also advocates taxing soft drinks and
snack foods, limiting their availability in schools, and restricting marketing of same to children.
She makes further useful recommendations as a nutrition expert: quantifying what “use
sparingly” means in the (now older) USDA food pyramid, stressing in educational literature that
5-A-Day fruits and vegetables should replace “empty calorie” (junk) foods, and quite useful for
addressing the added sugar problem, recommends labeling added sugars separately on nutrition
content labels from naturally occurring ones (534S).
In a 2002 article, McCrory, Suen, and Roberts are already advocating control of
environment and mechanisms to help people self-monitor their diet to break from habits:
…[E]xisting data strongly suggest that individual biobehavioral dietary habits need to be regularly selfmonitored to help prevent weight gain and combat the current obesity epidemic. In addition, environmental
factors such as excess portion sizes and the lack of easy access to affordable low energy dense foods may
need to be addressed at a population-wide level to effect nationwide changes (p 3833S).

The American Heart Association’s 2009 scientific statement upgrades its 2006 statement
to propose an upper limit for the intake for added sugars. “A prudent upper limit of intake is half
of the discretionary calorie allowance that can be accommodated within the appropriate energy
intake level needed for the person…” (Johnson et al. 2009; p 1016).
Recently the 2010 DGA [Dietary Guidelines of America] Advisory Committee stated that among several
strategies to reduce the incidence and prevalence of overweight and obesity, Americans should avoid sugarsweetened beverages. The use of the word avoid is the strongest recommendation to date for a policy
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document of this nature, indicative of the strength of the association between sugar-sweetened beverages and
obesity (Johnson and Yon 2010; p 1297; authors’ emphasis).

Vartanian, Schwartz, and Brownell (2007) already targeted SSBs within added sugars,
whose danger had become more apparent by the time of Johnson et al.’s articles (cited): “Given
the multiple sources of energy in a typical diet, it is noteworthy that a single source of energy
[soft drinks] can have such a substantial impact on total energy intake. This finding alone
suggests that it would be prudent to recommend population decreases in soft drink consumption”
(p 673).
Marriott et al. (2010) make an evidence-based recommendation that by their results
implies limiting intake of SSBs, as SSBs are an increasingly prominent vector for added sugars
for those whose intake exceeds 20% of calorie intake:
Among children less than 18 y, and adults of all ages, for all nutrients [vitamins A, E, C, and K, and folate,
iron, zinc, magnesium, phosphorous, calcium, potassium, fiber, and total choline], the median estimated
nutrient intakes were lower with increased added sugars intake and the nutrient intake was lowest with added
sugars intakes greater than 25% (p 238). …
These data indicate that for all nutrients, but especially for nutrients for which the U.S. population is most at
risk for inadequate intake, the suggested maximal limit of 25% of energy from added sugars may need to be
revisited. …[E]ven the 0 – 15% intake range may need further consideration…for specific life stage groups (p
246).

By 2010, the argument to challenge American waistlines by moving beyond personal
responsibility and to changing food environments was mainstream:
Physiological considerations suggest that the apparent energy imbalance for much of the US population is 5to 10-fold greater [than the 60 kcal that walking an extra mile a day versus resting would burn off], far
beyond the ability of most individuals to address on a personal level. Rather, an effective public health
approach to obesity prevention will require fundamental changes in the food supply and the social
infrastructure. Changes of this nature depend on more stringent regulation of the food industry, agricultural
policy informed by public health, and investments by government in the social environment to promote
physical activity (Katan and Ludwig 2010; JAMA; p 66).

Katan and Ludwig are not more specific, but others are. Bleich et al. (2009) consider reducing
the standard serving size of SSBs in the workplace (e.g., from a 20-oz bottle to a 12-oz can),
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having found increased consumption per drinking occasion with the rise in package size away
from home. They also consider reducing the ready availability of SSBs, a euphemism for not just
restrictions on marketing as incentive building but on actual sales venues (p 378). Swinburn et
al., and Gortmaker et al., both in The Lancet 2011 article set featuring WHO researchers on the
global obesity epidemic, advocate changing the environments in which people make food
decisions. Swinburn et al.:
Obesity is the result of people responding normally to the obesogenic environments they find themselves in.
…[T]he priority should be for policies to reverse the obesogenic nature of these environments. Governments
have largely abdicated the responsibility for addressing obesity to individuals, the private sector, and nongovernmental organisations, yet the obesity epidemic will not be reversed without government leadership,
regulation, and investment in programmes, monitoring, and research (p 804).

Gortmaker et al. discuss an Australian survey of attempts to reduce childhood obesity, and find
eight that would be cost effective: a 10% tax on unhealthful food and beverages; front-ofpackage traffic light nutrition labeling; reduction in junk-food advertising to children; schoolbased education to reduce television viewing; school-based multi-faceted education for nutrition
and physical activity; school-based cuts in SSB consumption; family-based programs to counter
child obesity; and multi-faceted targeted school-based programs (p841, table). Hall et al. also in
The Lancet 2011 article set, advocate front-of-package traffic light nutrition labeling as well.
Gortmaker et al. note that while “...reduction of advertising of unhealthy food and beverages to
children was found to be one of the most cost-effective interventions…(p 840),” advertising
restrictions are unlikely to pass legislative muster in the current Australian political environment
(also a potential constraint for U.S. policy options). Instead they expressly advocate restricting
“corporate tax deductibility of advertising costs for unhealthy foods” (p 841), which while an
idea that has been floated for many years in some circles, seems to be surprisingly rare in this
debate, given the potential cost effectiveness of such a regulation.
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Gortmaker et al. also note that government requests to reformulate existing high-sugar (or
high-fat) product lines might prove useful, as might requesting companies to broaden current
voluntary bans on advertising of sCSDs. This follows a U.S. FTC proposal to Congress.
Brownell and Frieden’s careful warning about the degree of industry resistance to regulatory
attempts in the alcohol and tobacco fights of yesteryear make this last option less attractive. Even
if partially successful, broadening self-regulatory efforts could be well short of what is necessary
to create an environment conducive to better health outcomes, and could dull legislative force to
achieve adequate concessions. Why would companies give up a dime more unearned profits than
they believe to be politically expedient?
In an article intending to bridge the gap between the personal responsibility and public
responsibility approaches to policy, Brownell et al. (2010) recommend many devices, including
but expanding beyond the tax-and-inform platform to direct attempts to change food
environments. They seek policies to encourage nutrition education; to regulate food marketing;
to monitor the truthfulness of advertising information as a protection against information
asymmetry; to block access to junk foods in schools; to regulate food ingredients, e.g., banning
transfats; and to tax junk foods while dedicating the tax revenues to subsidizing healthy foods (p
384-6). Cohen and Farley (2008) clearly reference research such as Wansink is known for, that
demonstrates that (relatively well-educated) people are routinely unaware of the amount they just
ate, or the environmental influences that affect consumption quantities: “suggesting that focus
should be less on nutrition education and more on shaping the food environment” (p 1).
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By 2012, Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis 26 are calling sugar toxic (due to its extreme effects
on the liver), and while similar to Brownell et al. in advocating taxes and the limiting of SSB
sales during school hours, they go much further. Their suggestions for limiting availability
include serious regulations, taken from the alcohol and tobacco control playbooks, “reducing the
hours that retailers are open, and controlling the location and density of retail markets,” including
zoning ordinances to limit fast-food outlets and convenience stores around schools and in lowincome communities, while incentivizing proliferation of grocery stores and farmers’ markets.
Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis “would tighten licensing requirements on vending machines and
snack bars that sell sugary products in schools and workplaces.” “Many schools have removed
unhealthy fizzy drinks and candy from vending machines, but often replaced them with juice and
sports drinks, which also contain added sugar,” so Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis would “limit
sales during school operation, or…designate an age limit (such as 17) for the purchase of drinks
with added sugar, particularly soda” (p 29, for paragraph). Kersh and Monroe (2002) also
consider serious regulations to intervene in eating habits for the public good. Lustig, Schmidt,
and Brindis, having defined added sugars as always comprised at least in part of fructose
molecules, suggest that the US Food and Drug Administration: “consider removing fructose
from the Generally Regarded as Safe (GRAS) list, which allows food manufacturers to add
unlimited amounts to any food. Opponents will argue that other nutrients on the GRAS list, such
as iron and vitamins A and D, can also be toxic when over-consumed. However, unlike sugar,
these substances have no abuse potential” (p 29).
Some of these recommendations will appear draconian to the economist, who is trained to
view the widest choice opportunity as optimizing (a prospect that even Thaler and Sunstein
26

R.H. Lustig: (endocrinologist) Department of Pediatrics and the Center for Obesity Assessment, Study, and
Treatment, Univ. of Cal., San Francisco. L.A. Schmidt and C.D. Brindis: Clinical and Translational Science Institute
and Philip R. Lee Institute for Health Policy Studies, Univ. of Cal., San Francisco.
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respect as they argue for libertarian paternalism in the design of market environments), but the
extent of recommendations from the medical and Masters’ in Public Health communities does
indicate the degree to which many believe that controlling food environments has become a
necessity. Few from this network seem to believe that price controls or extra information can
begin to adequately slow the obesogenic juggernaut.
Economists, including behavioral economists (Thaler and Sunstein 2003; Wansink, Just,
and Payne 2009) and neuroeconomists, who argue from a Level 1 perspective – recognizing
psychological or biological inclinations toward compromises in RUMax behavior and the
skewing of market frames – make policy recommendations similar to those from the
medical/nutrition community. Wansink, Just, and Payne suggest that information will prove
inadequate to change unhealthful eating behaviors, and that changing food environments (cues)
and helping introduce new heuristics must augment individual efforts if desired outcomes are to
be achieved:
Portion control and calorie counting are difficult for even the most diligent. It becomes even more
problematic when environmental cues bias one's feeling of satiation. Given that only 1 in 20 dieters
successfully maintains weight loss (Hill 2009), it appears that strict, mindful regulation may not be the
winning strategy for many individuals. For some, it may be easier to change their environment than to change
their mind.
…It is less clear that consumers need more nutrition information than they need better heuristics to help
them develop a bias toward eating less and eating more healthfully. …The most effective heuristics entailed
little decision making (such as use a smaller plate or eating in the kitchen) and little ambiguity. Flexible
heuristics (eat a hot breakfast) were easier to comply with and more effective than more restrictive heuristics
(eat oatmeal for breakfast). … Interestingly, these heuristics may help individuals make better food choices
by taking their mind out of the game, effectively creating healthful heuristics and behavioral rules-of-thumb
(p 167, emphasis added). …
Keeping a focus on the mechanisms or processes behind consumption–the whys behind it–will help the
interdisciplinary area of food consumption progress in ways that can raise its profile and its impact on
policymakers, and ultimately on consumer welfare.
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… People are often surprised by how much they consume. This indicates they may be influenced at a basic
level of which they are not aware. This is why simply knowing these environmental traps does not typically
help one avoid them. Relying only on cognitive control and on willpower is often disappointing.
… [A] personally controlled environment can help people more effortlessly manipulate their consumption
and lose weight in a way that does not necessitate the discipline of dieting or relinquishing self-governance to
another. For some, this might involve repackaging food into single-serving containers, storing tempting foods
in less convenient locations, and pre-plating one's food prior to beginning a meal. Perhaps individuals do not
need more nutrition information, but information about their own behavioral tendencies and how they may be
more easily managed through heuristics (p 168).

Note the rejection of new information as a solution, with the endorsement of educating
consumers as to how to manage their own environment to preemptively avoid tendencies to
overconsume.
Bernheim and Rangel (2005), the neuroeconomists, are more severe, rejecting even
education as sufficient to overcome the force of addictive neural pathways: “Target populations
frequently ignore information, particularly when confronted with peer pressure and strong social
norms. But more importantly, education cannot alter the neural mechanisms through which
addictive substances subvert deliberative decision making” (p 134).
While this may not be strictly true given the option of educational methods that may
repetitively engender new heuristics and behavioral responses to familiar environmental cues, it
does reflect Bernheim and Rangel’s focus on strongly addictive substances that influence
individual behavior, not weakly addictive ones: “…[A]ddictive substances systematically
interfere with the proper operation of an important process which the brain uses to forecast nearterm hedonic rewards (pleasure), and this leads to strong, misguided, cue-triggered impulses that
often defeat higher cognitive control” (2004, p 1582).
Bernheim and Rangel perhaps dismiss the panoply of educational methodologies too
easily, but they do seek a balance between paradigms that suggests certain policies are likely to
be more effective than others in changing addictive behaviors: “Users and addicts are neither
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entirely rational, which would argue for minimal interference with consumer sovereignty, nor
entirely irrational, which might justify heavy-handed interventions” (2005, p 132). Bernheim and
Rangel’s theory of addiction “places a high value on policies that increase the likelihood of
successful self-regulation without making particular choices compulsory, and it identifies a
central role for ‘cognitive’ policies, including the suppression of certain environmental cues
(e.g., through limitation on advertising), and the dissemination of counter-cues” (p 139).
Counter-cues include potentially shocking images on packaging, like those of diseased organs
prominently displayed on Canadian cigarette packs:
“Since environmental cues frequently trigger addictive behavior, public policy can also influence use by
changing the cues that people normally encounter. One approach involves the elimination of certain
problematic cues. … In principle, a sufficiently strong counter-cue could trigger thought processes that induce
users to resist cravings, even though the same information is ineffective when offered in a less provocative
format” (p 136).

Use of advertising restrictions and counter-cues can help when an individual’s lone attempts to
monitor cravings and resist environmental cues may prove insufficient:
…policies that reduce the likelihood of cue-triggered mistakes by removing problematic cues or establishing
counter-cues unambiguously increase welfare. …these policies are attractive because they are noncoercive,
because they accommodate individual heterogeneity, and because they have the potential to reduce
unintended use without distorting choice. Though individuals may have some ability to avoid problematic
cues and create their own counter-cues, the government is arguably better positioned to do this (p 1580).

Bernheim and Rangel provide the important insight that marketing restrictions may be more
effective than taxation in dissuading the use of addictive substances, because taxation alone
leaves in place environmental triggers to use.
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7.12

Proposals for Effective Policies to Reduce SSB Consumption and Improve American
Health Outcomes

A great portion of the theory and evidence that we have considered makes clear that unhealthy behaviors may
not always be driven by consciously held intentions. Habit, automatic attitudes, and situational limitations are
just some examples of the factors that may compete with volitional control.
Maio et al. 2007 (p 129)

Empirical results from the Heckit model in Essay One include variables expected to
correlate with household-level weekly sCSD purchase response to weekly sCSD-industry
marketing variables. The range of results is rich and interesting. Folding these correlates into
predictions of household-level responses by education and income levels across racial groups and
gender of household head while controlling for head-of-household age and family size offers some
general insights into which policy recommendations to favor.
Predicted purchase outcomes for weeks in which a purchase was made varied significantly
with changes in the sex of the head-of-household (HHH), the HHH’s terminal level of formal
education, household income level, and racial group, even when levels or types within these
groups were interacted to identify fairly fine demographic sub-groups. Because these changes
were almost exclusively non-linear within rising categories such as education or household
income, and nonlinear across differences in racial grouping of household in different fixed
combinations of income and HH education level, results tend to foil simple targeting mechanisms
such as “give more information to lower-income households,” “or “restrict sCSD advertising to
male-headed Asian households.”
The largest predicted household (HH) purchase generally occurred for the combination
of lower education with lower HH income. This is generally consistent with other empirical
results, despite the difference in methodologies and my focus on purchase response to marketing
variables rather than estimated sCSD (or SSB) consumption based on surveys of dietary recall
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(e.g., Thompson et al. 2009). Predicted differences in HH purchase generally demonstrated a
larger span from lowest to highest education level of the HHH (for a fixed HH income level)
than for lowest to highest HH income level (for a fixed HHH education level). With a few
exceptions, the differences across education level (for a fixed HH income level) were larger in
span than differences between racial groups that share the same education and income levels. (If
this is confusing, consult the REFINED prediction tables and how to read them, in Essay One.)
Thus, one general takeaway is that insofar as the formal level of education of the head of
household proxies for level of nutrition education or critical thinking about household dietary
choices, this education level explains more variation in purchase than do changing levels of
household income or racial differences. So in aiming for the primary policy goal of reducing
sCSD purchase and consumption, policies stressing nutrition education and critical thinking
should be given precedence over policies using income-based incentives such as excise taxes on
sCSDs.
Controlling for HH size and sex of HHH, predicted purchases in ounces were often the
same or higher at the poverty level for a family of four than at four times this income level, with
the same level of education across both groups. This means that many poorer HHs already spend
four times more of their household budgets on sCSDs than a certain level of higher-income
households. 27 Given this pattern of commitment to purchase, how then would sCSD excise taxes
less than, say 50 or 100% of retail cost, be expected to have a large effect on lower-income HH
purchase? Taxes alone would seem unlikely to strongly dissuade heavier purchasers at low
incomes or low levels of education (or a combination).
27

For White, dual-parent-of-two households with high-school level of education for the HHHs, a family of four at
the poverty level is predicted from empirical estimation results in Chapter 5, Table 20a, to buy 329 ounces per
purchase week, versus 291 ounces for an otherwise similar family earning four times the poverty level. Results are
parallel for African-American households with similar attributes, and the difference is much larger for Hispanic
households.
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Education messages may target certain demographics, and may prove quite effective if
carefully designed to address highly marketing-responsive groups. But if a generally effective
message is proved in pilot studies, inattention to targeting specific racial-education-level or
racial-income-level sub-groups may still lead to a strong gain in overall public welfare. 28 For any
policymaker interested in targeting such sub-groups, the empirical results here provide a level of
specificity that by my search to date is unprecedented in the existing literature, given the copious
range of demographic sub-groups identified by the methodology in Essay One, each with a
unique response to a particular marketing variable (sCSD industry average price or level of
television advertising for the purchase week, and whether the household purchased sCSDs on
sale).
By demographic sub-group HH purchase responses vary significantly with weekly
changes in each marketing variable. The strength of the response to sale is not surprising. Some
of the seemingly reverse responses to price increase compared to the reference sub-group and
other demographic sub-groups is surprising, and is indicative of purchase habits that would prove
resistant to income-based (tax) mechanisms to reduce purchase. The strength and consistency of
HHs response to sCSD-category-wide advertising within the same week was surprising,
especially given the lack of apparent correlation between advertising and price, and advertising
and percentage of category on sale over the data period (Feb 2006 – Dec 2008) when these
relations were graphed. The correlation could be evidence of television advertisements triggering
a bypass of deliberative thought by quick emotional processes, as posed by decision theorist
Peters, or by engrained reactions to these ads in the form of persistent habits or automatic
28

This assumes a public benefit by coming closer to medical literature recommendations for added sugar intake by
reducing sCSD or SSB consumption without substitution by other high-calorie-low-nutrition foods. Direct
calculation of welfare changes in the classical economic sense cannot be conducted from these empirical results,
because they do not result from a structural economic model of demand, for reasons clear from the context and
explained in the first essay and this one, so my methodology does not accommodate counterfactual analysis.
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attitudes that resist deliberative override, as posed by Maio et al. (2007), and Rothman, Sheeran,
and Wood (2009).
There are undeniably common and significant HH purchase responses to sCSD industry
marketing variables measurable from the Nielsen HomeScan data set. There seems to be an
undeniably positive purchase effect from marketing variables that industry controls and that I
had data for. This could be no problem, or indicative of Level 2 or Level 1 problems. The quasiexogenous literature strongly indicates Level 1 problems, which would require a re-framing of
the sCSD market, and emphasis on building RUMax behavior in consumers who display
purchase patterns indicating they are RUMax compromised in their sCSD purchase behavior.
Because the RUMax failures that lead to overconsumption of sCSDs have been
empirically associated with biological, psychological, and social factors (including ubiquitous
marketing extending far beyond television advertising), policy must address each cause. There
can be no single lynchpin that once removed will break unhealthful consumption patterns.
Economists will benefit by casting our empirical net wider than our own quantitative estimations
of consumer demand elasticities responding to price changes. In some cases this requires
recognizing that rational utility-maximizing behavior has been compromised by combinations of
market environment and individual behavior.
There is a generality to this realization that suggests no compelling reason to particularly
target specific demographic groups with campaigns to reduce sCSD consumption, to the
exclusion of other groups. While the combination of low-education and low-income stands out as
very purchase-responsive to sCSD marketing variables, very few groups seem immune to
marketing variable influence – even less so when post-purchase responses such as those Wansink
and a variety of co-authors (including first authors) identify. Details like the odd responsiveness
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of Asian male heads of household to marketing variables at higher education and income levels,
and the odd resistance to decrease in purchase as African-American female heads of household
rise in average education level, are considerations that pale next to the need to raise the
nutritional and marketing awareness of a population that is more than two-thirds overweight or
obese, with high rates of CVD, hypertension, diabetes, and cancer.
Targeting of message can be useful, but ideally will not be forced by limited policy
implementation budgets, as will become clear below. (Recall that estimates of tax revenues of 1cent-per-ounce on American SSBs are in the $15 billion range.) I pose that given the massive
rises in the cost of diet-related disease, the policy days when the government’s primary healthfulfood initiative may be funded at less than 1/1000th the amount spent on commercial marketing of
food, beverages, and candy has quickly passed for any policymaker concerned with society-wide
costs and benefits. 29 The FTC 2008 report to Congress calculates that for food and beverage
brands marketed to children, when all audiences for the same brands’ advertising are included,
the 2006 figure is $9.6 billion. This includes restaurants, so while perhaps more carefully
calculated than figures from within the advertising industry, this figure verifies the overall
magnitude of the $11.26 billion Consumers Union calculated for 2004 (see previous footnote).
The degree of dictated market evolution in markets for unhealthful foods may in part be inferred

29

The 2005 Consumers Union report, “Out of Balance: Marketing of Soda, Candy, Snacks and Fast Foods Drowns
Out Healthful Messages” cites Advertising Age (June 25, 2005), and a conversation with the former director of the
5-A-Day program at the National Cancer Institute regarding the 2004 budget in claiming (Figure 5 in report) that in
2004, $6.84 billion was spent advertising food, beverages, and candy (with another $4.42 billion on restaurants),
versus the $4.86 million 2004 budget for the national (minus pilot state California) 5-A-Day program advocating
more fruit and vegetables be eaten. Adding the California 5-A-Day budget to the federal communications budget
raises the 5-A-Day total to $9.55 million, funded through the food-stamp program. This combination does break the
1000-to-1 ratio of commercial advocates of unhealthful foods versus federal promotion of healthful foods. Figure 8
in the CU report shows that in 2004 Coca-Cola spent $246.2 million, Pepsi spent $211.7 million, and Dr. Pepper
spent $104.8 million in “measured advertising dollars,” the only soda, snack, or candy companies to individually
break $100 million for the year. Each of these company budgets alone is more than ten times the combined 5-A-Day
budget for 2004. The industry expenditures do not include product placements, internet, special promotions, wordof-mouth marketing, or cell or text message campaigns. Accessed April 30, 2012:
http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/OutofBalance.pdf.
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when one considers the effect of such a funding gap on the preference formation of a generation
of Americans. A persuasive television, radio, or internet advertising campaign linking a bright
positive message with an SSB product that is repeated over years establishes norms in individual
psychology that seeing the odd “eat more fruit” public-service announcement is unlikely to
dislodge. “Coke adds life” and new zesty-flavored corn chips burst with excitement. Fruit is
fruit – and the varieties on shelves currently are bred more for bruise-free travel than for taste or
nutrition.
Given the strong correlations between SSBs or any high-added-sugar-low-micronutrient
product and a range of poor health outcomes when these are consumed at the current average
level in the U.S. (> 83g-e/d per capita, see 7.2), the primary policy goal must be to reduce
consumption of SSBs (of which caloric sCSDs are the primary component, see 1.2, 6.7.1.f). The
available science suggests that elements of the food environment and biology routinely engage
appetite and consumptive behaviors on a sub-rational level. The elements are not beyond the
scope of attention(/awareness) and personal control, but often influence behavior without the
conscious intent or even acknowledgement of the unaware individual. So reducing SSB
consumption must involve certain basic elements to correct Level 1 problems. All policy
recommendations should extend from sCSDs to the SSB category, because they are nearly
identical biologically (therefore medically), and medical/nutrition effects due to market failure
are the reason for policy correction. Including all caloric SSBs in policy designs would forestall a
simple substitution by manufacturer marketing strategies or by consumers to sports or energy
drinks, fruit drinks or fruit ades, etc., 30 from policy-targeted sCSDs. This fulfills the primary goal
while avoiding policy “slippage” and consequent inefficiency of operant policy mechanisms.

30

I would include pre-packaged fruit juices in this list, even to 100% juice content, but I do not believe there would
be sufficient support for this yet from the nutrition community. My argument is based on natural fiber and active

648

Policy mechanisms may be old or new, but must change elements of the SSB market
environment, must draw attention and improved critical thinking skills to individual choices
made in the context of the market environment, and must serve to re-enforce dietary heuristics
and habits conducive to healthful outcomes. In slightly more detail and in the vocabulary of this
essay, this means recognizing the necessity of the public role to rectify the dereliction in not
having provided the public goods necessary for a fair market to this point: a square and level
market frame, and sound information and critical thinking skills as part of a higher effective
dietary knowledge base than is the current norm in the U.S. This will mean undoing the “dictated
evolution” that favors the SSB industry, and training people to avoid compromise of RUMax
behavior in their habitual dietary choices. Policy must re-orient the market environment, induce
consumer awareness of both marketing techniques and their own diet-related heuristics, break
health-compromising habits, and build and re-enforce new ones consistent with sound nutrition
education. Verplanken and Wood (2006): “Successful habit change interventions involve
disrupting the environmental factors that automatically cue habit performance” (p 90).
All of the policy recommendations endorsed here are meant to engage elemental
mechanisms to achieve the primary policy goal. Many researchers now hold the conviction that
only a combination of policies to change environment and internal decision-making can be
effective in changing unhealthful dietary habits. Kersh (2009) offers for the obesity epidemic:
“At a minimum, a package of well-tested reforms would appear to be in order,” and quotes Kelly
Brownell from an article in the popular press, that “the social, economic and political factors

enzyme and micronutrient content, the factors that favor fresh fruit over juice, especially when it is more than a few
minutes old. If there is consensus in the nutrition community, then fruit juices should be in the list. As this would
then include “juice boxes” for small children, I believe at this stage, arguing to include juices would court further
controversy when there will be plenty of that already. While less economically efficient, political realities may
dictate that reforms evolve in stages. Fruit drinks and fruit ades have low fruit juice content, with the balance
comprised of added sweetener, water, and often added chemical flavorings.
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contributing to these problems [obesity and health] are stampeding forces that will thwart single,
easily concocted solutions” (p 310-1).

7.12.1

Preserving Choice: Taxes and Regulations Over Bans
Consistent with economic precepts, political-economic and legal realities, and people’s

(learned) ability as part of a utility-maximizing strategy to enjoy things in moderation that would
prove unhealthful in excess, no ingredient or product should be banned from sale or
consumption: not SSBs, not sCSDs, not HFCS, not refined sugars. The goal is to reduce
unhealthful levels of SSB consumption, not to prohibit consumption.
The findings of Jensen and Smed (2007) that taxing sugar will prove more effective than
taxing added-sugar products compels consideration of taxing HFCS, as it is the primary
ingredient in SSBs, after water. Given the particular effects of HFCS on the liver, postprandial
lipid profiles, hunger-influencing hormones, cardiovascular disease markers, and excessive
caloric ingestion (extensive discussion in Essay Two), a good case may be made for restricting
HFCS production and use in the food system by some means. While “most other developed
countries eschew HFCS” (Lustig, Schmidt, Brindis, p 28), there is no need to ban HFCS.
Reformulating U.S. SSB formulas back to sugar from HFCS need not be mandated, but could
assist in achieving public health goals. Restricting HFCS production and use is achievable using
production quotas, as the European Union does with a 2005 quota of 303,000 tons within an EU
sugar-production environment tending over 18 million tons. 31 In Japan:
The government regulates the production and price of HFCS in order to limit competition with sugar and
obtain funds to partially pay for the high support to sugar beet and cane producers. HFCS production targets
31

Mitchell, Donald, 2004. Sugar policies: opportunity for change; World Bank Publications. Collection Title: no.
WPS 3222; ISBN 0821358634;
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2004/06/01/000009486_2004060116
5704/additional/128528322_20041117173100.pdf, accessed April 30, 2012.
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are established by the MAFF [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries] for each producer and a
surcharge is paid to the government on production up to that level. An additional surcharge is added on
production which exceeds targets, which effectively establishes production quotas on HFCS and prevents the
balance between sugar and HFCS from changing. ... In addition to controlling HFCS production and prices,
high tariffs are imposed on imported HFCS and tariff-rate quotas are imposed on starch imports. Food
manufacturers are prevented from circumventing the high barriers to imports of sugar and HFCS by higher
tariffs on intermediate or final products that contain added sugar (Mitchell, from last footnote, p 35, emphasis
added).

Similar HFCS production quota and enforcement mechanisms could prove useful in the U.S.
Based on decades of policies protecting them from cheaper world sugar prices, sugar beet and
cane farmers in the U.S. seem likely to continue to find political support, so the EU and Japanese
methods are attractive means of protecting sugar farmers. Corn farmers have plenty of advocates
without bringing corn-derived sweeteners to the table. HFCS production quotas would
theoretically release corn for ethanol mandates and for trade in pricey world commodity markets.
This might prove useful in keeping high world prices partially in check. 32 Phasing out corn
subsidies in the U.S. farm program would also raise the price of HFCS, but by Zimmerman’s
estimate, only by 1.6 cents per 12-ounce can, so not enough to reduce SSB consumption. While
HFCS used in baking – where it is used in smaller amounts – has desirable humectant properties,
the only advantage in SSBs seems to be cost.
By 2010 and 2011 figures from the USDA’s ERS Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook
Tables, the price of HFCS seems to run about 20% less than for cane sugar, and some 80% less
than for Midwest beet sugar wholesale prices (per dry pound, or weight-equivalent). 33 A 50% tax

J. Roberts, Wolfram Schlenker, April, 2010. “Identifying Supply and Demand Elasticities of
Agricultural Commodities: Implications for the US Ethanol Mandate”; NBER Working Paper No. 15921
Issued in April 2010; http://www.nber.org/papers/w15921, accessed 30 April, 2012. Phasing out ethanol
mandates would be more effective in not inflating world grain prices, but production commitments have
already been made according to existing targets, which could lead to lawsuits against the U.S. government if
phase out of the mandate is proposed.
33
USDA, ERS, Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook Tables, Table 4--U.S. raw sugar price, duty fee paid, New York,
monthly, quarterly, and by calendar and fiscal year; Table 5--U.S. wholesale refined beet sugar price, Midwest
markets, monthly, quarterly, and by calendar and fiscal year; Table 9--U.S. prices for high fructose corn syrup
32 Michael
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on the HFCS wholesale price would be easy to implement, and could be enforced using
Japanese-style methods, if there is no American appetite for production quotas. Any policy
raising the HFCS cost to an average at least 20% above cane and beet sugar average prices
would seem from the medical literature to have good health effects, as market economics suggest
this would cause HFCS to be reformulated back out of products, reversing its reformulation into
them from around the mid-1970s. While HFCS 55 is used primarily in soft drinks, and HFCS 42
is used in other beverages and baked goods, it is important not to make any policy restriction so
narrow that the industry could simply change a formulation (say to HFCS 54) to avoid it. If corn
use could be traced back to the farmer, a halving of U.S. government subsidies to the farmprogram grower of corn going to HFCS could also provide a disincentive, but perhaps at much
higher policy implementation cost than other policy options for HFCS reduction.
Similar to avoiding the banning of any product or ingredient that is not immediately and
permanently harmful, rationing of even the least healthful food products (SSBs qualify) would
have to be very carefully (expensively) implemented in hopes of not removing choice from
consumers who rationally maximize their utility while including moderate consumption of
indulgence foods. Like banning, plausible rationing schemes for indulgence foods rub
economists and most Americans the wrong way – as they should, they are likely to penalize
many RUMax consumers in an attempt to greatly improve health outcomes for the worst abusers,
with indeterminate effect for those in the middle, at very high administrative cost (deadweight
loss). Such schemes therefore may only dubiously be argued to move society toward a Pareto
improving market equilibrium. Targeting certain foods as unhealthful for reduced consumption is

(HFCS), Midwest markets, monthly, quarterly, and by calendar and fiscal year; Source: Milling & Baking News (all
three tables). http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/sugar/data.htm, accessed 30 April, 2012.
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one thing; expressly limiting the amount available to a RUMax adult who may make the
conscious and fully-informed decision to overconsume is dictatorial and likely inefficient.

7.12.2

SSB Excise Taxes: Raising Awareness, and Revenue for Nutrition Education
Campaigns
We choose policies to change economic signals. These economic signals in part

characterize the market environment in which individuals make purchase and consumption
choices, they “shape the conditions that promote and sustain desired habits.” “…[P]rice changes
implicitly include the contingencies that drive effects of reinforcement: they make it aversive to
perform the unhealthy behaviors and relatively rewarding to perform the healthy behaviors”
(Maio et al. 2007, p 118, both quotes). Other aspects of the market environment may be
regulated or directly changed. Educational initiatives may help change the heuristics and habits
that internally drive consumer purchase and consumption. All of these may prove effective
elemental mechanisms to reduce SSB use and achieve more favorable health outcomes.
After the relatively heavy-handed options of banning or imposing purchase quotas or
making SSBs a controlled substance (with production, trade, and retailing regulations under
federal supervision as for products listed with Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, or the Food and
Drug Administration), come relatively light-handed economic signals: taxes, regulations, and
restrictions, cooperation with government requests, and voluntary industry initiatives.
An excise tax on SSBs (sCSDs) of between half-a-penny and two cents per ounce has
been proposed in one form or another for a decade (discussed above, 7.7.1). Given SSB’s
primacy as an unhealthful product category in Americans’ actual dietary profile, imposing a tax
projected by many economists to be too small to effectively reduce SSB demand on the order the
medical community suggests seems to be a quite reasonable proposal (section on industry
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resistance to policy initiatives to follow). Two cents per ounce of pre-packaged caloric SSB
(sCSD, energy drinks, sports drinks, sweet teas, fruit drinks, fruit ades, etc.) is a promising
starting point.
Remember from empirical results here that the income effects of a tax this size are not
expected to burden any household to the point of making SSB consumption economically
painful, and from other economists’ estimations of demand elasticity may not prove much of a
restriction to national purchase. Estimations other than Zhen et al. 2011 did not anticipate that
demand would rise again after an initial negative response to a tax. This rise is likely to the
extent that purchase and consumption are driven by marketing and habits/heuristics formed with
low levels of nutrition knowledge. A tax might temporarily dissuade, but without other changes
in the marketing environment and food-choice heuristics, habit would revert toward pre-tax
norms as people realize that $9/week for soda is not much more of a strain on the budget than
$6/week for soda. Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis demonstrate conclusions assuming a linear
tax/price effect. They conclude from Sturm et al. (2010), that soda prices would need to double
(be doubled) to significantly reduce consumption.
Particular to households participating in federal or state food assistance programs, Powell
and Chaloupka (2009, p 247) point out that households in the food-stamp/SNAP program are
exempt from state sales taxes on food. Given empirical results discussed in Essay One
demonstrating that household income at or below the poverty level for a family of four increases
purchase response to marketing variables associated with lower education and within most ethnic
sub-groupings, existing tax exemption from sales tax on food should be lifted for foods with
relatively large amounts of added sugars. On August 19th, 2011, the USDA responded to New
York City’s request to begin a pilot program exercising a waiver to lift the tax exemption for
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SSBs/sCSDs purchased through SNAP. 34 The request was rejected, but the grounds do leave
open the possibility that smaller-scale pilot projects of this type may be pursuable in the future.
Established science in medical and nutrition literature, behavioral economics, and social
psychology suggest little doubt that health outcomes from such a measure would be positive, to
the ultimate household savings of SNAP recipients, and to a public funding health care costs for
those on federal assistance. Established science suggests that the USDA’s rejection of NYC
Mayor Bloomberg’s proposal is backward-looking in its conservatism, protecting a very
unhealthful product from minor restriction for underinsured populations, based on rapidly
antiquating beliefs about individual choice and food environments as they apply to energy-dense
low-micronutrient products.
There is an argument for incremental excise tax rates within the SSB category, 35 say at a
half-cent per ounce for less than 10 grams (or gram-equivalent) of added caloric sweetener per
12 ounces, one-cent per ounce for 10-20 grams, one-and-a-half cents per ounce for 20-30 grams,
and two cents per ounce for 30 grams and above of added caloric sweetener per 12 ounces.
(Recall that 30 grams of carbohydrate translates to roughly 120 calories, above the American
Heart Association recommended limit of 100 kcals for added sugars for women for a day from
all sources, and approaching the recommended limit of 150 kcals for men.) A content-scaled
excise tax would incentivize product reformulations reducing added-sugar content.
The primary reason for this small tax would be to generate revenues for educational
campaigns and other initiatives, again, at a penny an ounce, perhaps in the $15 billion range. 36 A
34

Link available through Marion Nestlé’s website (link to letter is second address):
http://www.foodpolitics.com/2011/08/snap-soda-ban-usda-says-no/; http://www.foodpolitics.com/wpcontent/uploads/SNAP-Waiver-Request-Decision.pdf, accessed 07 May, 2012.
35
A concept briefly and generally discussed in Sturm et al. 2010. They favor the application of tax revenues to
educational programs to limit consumption.
36
I will not speculate on the revenue effect of a two-cent-per-ounce tax, as this would involve assumptions on the
linearity of elasticity and purchase effects.
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tax in the one- to two-cent range would make campaign coffers competitive with unhealthful
food industry television and print advertising. There are other ways to tip the scales toward a
public communication budget relative to the commercial advertising budget, and these are
discussed below.
There is a critical secondary effect of such an excise tax, which is to signal consumers
that prices have changed because the government is flagging the product category as unhealthful,
even if the sin tax is quite low relative to alcohol and tobacco products. Arguably, given the less
addictive nature of sugar relative to alcohol and tobacco, a sin tax may be set lower because the
addictive distortion toward overconsumption (or by Becker and Murphy 1993, the need to raise
the future cost of consumption) would be lower for a less urgently addictive product. Added
sugars are probably low on a biological scale of addictiveness and direct danger from usecompulsive behaviors, but by the scale of their use in society, added sugars are significant
contributors to morbidity and mortality. Added sugars’ champion is sCSDs. Given the extreme
rise in medical costs for diet-related diseases, the societal costs from overuse of added sugars
may, if honestly calculated, rival the social costs from all addictions to controlled substances
(“illegal drugs”), perhaps even including alcohol, and although less likely, perhaps even from
tobacco. While a smaller sin tax may be argued for SSBs, the principle of putting a sin tax on
pure vectors of added sugars like SSBs would likely be well defended by simple product-byproduct quantification of addictiveness (by some measure) times the societal cost of abuse of
each substance.
SSBs are quite cheap as portions of overall household budgets. Despite the two primary
objectives achievable by a 2-cent-per-ounce tax – generating revenues to fund policies and sin-tax
signaling – a larger tax that would double or quadruple the current SSB shelf price, even if it were

656

politically achievable, would unnecessarily punish the rational SSB consumer, whose use tends to
well under 24 ounces per week. It might achieve SSB use reduction goals, but perhaps at
measurable cost to rational users of what I yet argue should remain a legal product. The Pareto
improvement from a large tax is not as clear, and the regressivity of a 200-to-500% tax might
prove of sufficient scale to demand an offset by transfers to low-income users in order to merit
any consideration. A tax of 2 cents per ounce would raise the cost of a 2-liter bottle of soda from
roughly $1.99 to $3.33, a roughly 60% increase (closer to 40% if the original list price is 2.19); or
by 40 cents, or roughly one-third, for a $1.25 20-ounce vending machine bottle. This drops to 24
cents, or a roughly 20% increase, if the $1.25 vending machine soda is a 12-ounce can.
Note the implicit counter-cue to volume purchases, consistent with preserving the choice
to consume, while discouraging the unhealthful choice to overconsume non-nutritive, highly
sweetened products. Because the cent-per-ounce tax is irrespective of brand or SSB type (for
nutritional reasons), the percentage change will actually be smaller for higher-priced premium
brands, a relative pricing advantage from the policy for the very companies and product lines
best funded and situated to fight the tax politically – those who already enjoy higher margins due
to successful product differentiation through advertising and possibly product characteristics.
The primary use of SSB excise tax revenues should be public education campaigns to
raise consumer nutrition knowledge and consumer sophistication in processing marketing
messages (discussed below, 7.12.7). If there is enough funding from SSB taxes, subsidies of fruit
and vegetable provision to poor and poor minority neighborhoods, and of material costs incurred
executing ‘drink water’ initiatives in public schools (see 7.12.3) would be good uses of money.
There should be little overage from SSB tax revenues, given the large need that has emerged
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from underprovision of public goods (nutrition and consumer awareness of marketing
techniques) in the decades that aggressive marketing has been dictating the market frame.
Because a key mechanism is to get consumers to become aware of the strong negative
health consequences of habitual SSB consumption, multiple ways to trigger consumer awareness
of their SSB consumption should be employed. Chief among these are restrictions on venue of
sale, changes to SSB labels, marketing restrictions, and public education campaigns.

7.12.3

Re-Squaring the Market Frame: Reducing or Removing Marketing and
Consumption Cues From Non-Commercial Spaces
The medical/nutrition, social psychology, and consumer psychology literatures along

with the economists cited here who respect the influence of environment on purchase and
consumption choices together paint a very clear picture. We know to a certainty that our
youngest citizens cannot distinguish between marketing hype and truth 37, that young people
generally are less capable of making balanced rational decisions based on sound evidence, that
adolescent tastes for sweetness and for brands can strongly impact adult buying habits, that once
dietary habits are engrained through repetition, they are hard to disabuse, and that at any age the
effects of priming, anchoring, framing, and naïve decision heuristics can induce individual
choices to deviate from RUMax behavior consistent with assumptions of fixed preferences and
exponential discounting.
Cohen and Farley (2008; the MDs with MPHs, in Preventing Chronic Disease), cite
research proving that:

37

Pomeranz et al. 2009 cite evidence for this claim, and recall also that the FTC proposed rules under the Carter
Administration that would protect children from television advertising of sugary products as unfair and deceptive. In
response, Congress withdrew the FTC’s authority to enforce the “KidVid” provisions early in the Reagan
Administration (p 189).
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Because people are unaware of their behaviors, they are also unaware that the behaviors are not under their
control. Nisbett and Wilson [1977] have shown that people are often unaware of a particular stimulus that
elicits a response, and even if they are aware of both the stimulus and the response, they may be unaware that
the stimulus actually caused the response. Instead, people tend to fabricate reasons to explain their
behaviors, typically choosing the most plausible, culturally acceptable theories. Bargh and Chartrand [1999]
found that, even after people have been shown the results of experiments demonstrating the automatic nature
of their actions, they steadfastly refuse to believe that those actions did not result from conscious choice. Our
difficulty as a society in accepting how strongly our environment influences eating may stem from our
inability to recognize and our refusal to accept our own eating as an automatic behavior (p 4).

Elementary and secondary schools are forums for learning knowledge, critical thinking,
and responsible individual and social behavior. Allowing sale in any form of caloric SSBs in
schools undermines health and the formation of responsible dietary habits of students, by
providing environmental cues that trigger consumption: advertising, ubiquity, social
acceptability (popularity) versus the healthier option of drinking water, easy access, and large
portion sizes relative to recommended dietary limits on added sugar intake. All SSB vending
machines and lunchroom and sports-facility soda and fruit-drink fountains should be removed
below the collegiate level for all public schools. 38 This would mean no SSB vending machines in
administrative, janitorial, or teacher-only areas. The same is recommended for private schools. A
desirable stricter version would prohibit student importation of SSB containers (commercial or
privately filled) to school grounds without express permission (which would also make a black
market harder to establish, and therefore cheaper to control). Of course any SSB marketing of any
kind should be prohibited on school property (with the necessary exception of any internet
content that is unavoidable due to the breadth of the internet audience for the educational or
research programming being viewed, such as when target audiences include a significant
collegiate or adult audience). A compromise is conceivable whereby soft-drink manufacturers
38

Kersh (2009) proposes this for all “Foods of Minimal Nutritional Value,” “judged unfit for children’s
consumption in public school cafeterias” as defined by the U.S. government, but not enforced. For reasons similar to
those motivating my suggestion, Kersh should be endorsed in advocating a ban on all “competitive foods” in
cafeterias, including but beyond soft-drink vending machines, to include fast-food chain foods, etc.
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are involved in anti-soft-drink messages, but the dubious effectiveness of Philip-Morrissponsored anti-smoking television ads targeting youth raises concern in addition to the natural
fox-as-henhouse-guard concern. Regulatory implementation must be sensitive to existing
business contracts to avoid unnecessary litigation, but effort should be made to achieve in as
little time as possible a change in the food environment for a place that children are required to
be.
For similar reasons, policymakers may consider banning (outdoor) advertisements for
any SSB within 1000 feet of school grounds, and making it illegal to sell SSBs to minors within
1000 feet of school grounds on days when school is in session. In the interest of maintaining
consumer choice, note this recommendation does not prohibit teachers or parents from bringing
SSBs to be offered during exceptional social events or for their own personal consumption. It
does not ban convenience stores from selling SSBs at any distance from a school. It would be
onerous to prohibit school sports patrons from bringing their own SSB containers to sporting
events at the high school level. No child needs an SSB during any school day or sporting event
(Harris et al. 2011, p 14, quoting the CDC: “no reason to give a child a [SSB]”). School
administrations and coaches might be allowed to determine use on practice fields and during
games, meets, and matches, but this would rely on what is likely inadequate nutrition knowledge
(failing to match the literature) among these school/team authorities.
Exceptionally, this proposal set should include non-caloric/diet beverages, to encourage
the drinking of water and discourage patronization of highly marketed brands. The goal is to
break patterns that create automaticity of consumption of highly marketed products, this break
being a key factor in the establishment or recovery of RUMax consumer behavior. Students can
learn the ‘feed the vending machine and get a fix’ habit somewhere other than school grounds.
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Sturm et al. (2010) offer findings based on data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal
Study – Kindergarten Cohort, for children then in fifth grade. They average more than six sodas
per week, with wide variance, 15% drinking none, 25% daily, and 10% two or more per day.
“The average number of soda purchases at school is small. Four-fifths of children buy no soda at
school, although the remaining children average three soda purchases per school week” (p 1054).
So this data slice indicates that removing machines from schools is unlikely to lower the utility
of many, and effectively target the highest users – an efficient policy choice given the primary
goal. This conclusion would hold less in circumstances perhaps more reflective of older students
in junior and high school, among whom purchase at school may be more broadly distributed, but
is no less nutritionally damaging or inconsistent with broader educational objectives of fostering
responsible behavior.
Replacing existing primary and secondary school vending machines with fruit (and
lightly processed nut) vending machines may be an option, but junk-food vending machines are a
step in the wrong direction. Ideally, a school would provide cups or closeable containers to
students that could be filled at drinking fountains and would be turned in daily for washing in the
cafeteria. This would allow the portable hydration the generation has become accustomed to,
without training SSB use or spending a dollar a bottle for landfill-clogging water bottles. If the
SSB tax revenues are high enough, they could cover these costs or some portion of them.
Corporate sponsorship to cover initial costs and some maintenance might be useful.
The loss of soft-drink company exclusive pouring contracts as a revenue source, where
such contracts still exist, is a reflection on other revenue problems. A pittance from corporate
sponsors cannot be an excuse for fostering poor dietary habits in the young generation with
thrice the obesity rate of its predecessor. The practice is predatory, and should be discontinued.
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There are obvious advantages for similar biological, psychological, and economic reasons
to extend many of these proposals to college campuses, but the force of the claim for significant
marketing restrictions begins to dilute as adult choices are considered.

7.12.4

Re-Squaring the Market Frame: Reducing Marketing and Consumption Cues In
Spaces With and Without Food Orientations
The equivalent change of environment at adult workplaces would be to reduce or

eliminate SSB vending machines and fountains if agreeable to management, or replace them with
containers of fluids with different properties. These other fluids might include all calorie-free
options (including un-/flavored waters), for example, or anything less than a small number of
calories, say thirty kcals, including low-calorie energy drinks. If this cannot be agreed upon,
requesting manufacturers to replace existing machines with machines that dispense smaller
portion sizes for caloric SSBs could prove useful, while maintaining consumer choice. If no
caloric SSB might be in the vending machine in a container larger than 6 ounces, we might
expect lower individual health impacts, as well as expecting the manufacturer profit margin per
sales unit to rise. There is no reason that SSB manufacturers should not make money through
product reformulation, development, or repackaging as they establish their profitable niche in a
more health oriented system. The goal is to square the market frame and encourage RUMax
behavior by individuals, not to eliminate entire markets for manufacturers of legal products.
Choice should be preserved, albeit slightly altered choices from the ones that helped fuel current
diet-based disease epidemics (per, e.g., Thaler and Sunstein 2003).
Legislatively mandated controls on portion sizes in vending machines or for fountaindispensed drinks may push boundaries, but may bring advantages if carefully designed and

662

executed. Requesting SSB manufacturers, fast-food, food-court, sports-venue, and
theater/cinema chain vendors to commit to smaller standard receptacles for SSB drinks might
prove effective, especially when the excise taxes begin and the public education campaign begins
to build momentum.
Michael Bauer, food critic for the San Francisco Chronicle, reports in 2011 that AMC
Metreon, the second largest cinema chain in the U.S. with over 5000 screens, offered their
smallest soft drink in 32-ounce cups. 39 This is four times the average sCSD serving size in the
1950s. By an account from former Coca-Cola CEO Donald Keough, Coca-Cola finally relented
to any change in its standard 6.5-oz. bottle size in 1955, when it allowed “king-sized” 10-oz. and
12-oz packages to be created, along with a “family-sized” 26-ouncer (Keough 2008). College
students today think nothing of downing a 20-ounce bottle, because it is no longer double the
king size, but a dwarf to the family two-liter bottle.
Americans’ calibration for what an economically and gastronomically fair soda size is
has been ratcheted up in recent decades, but could be ratcheted back down. While perhaps not
appealing to those who resist acknowledging the behavioral economic forces of priming,
anchoring, framing, and other environmental cues, if policy makers federally or in any state
chose to impose portion-size definitions, then any particular vendor would be protected from
accusations that they are particularly stingy or unfair. ‘Society’ would have picked sizes that
begin to counter-cue the dictated market evolution. Leaving aside the volume of ice, if the SSB
in a small cup totals 6 ounces, in a medium 10 ounces, in a large 16 ounces, in a supersize 24
ounces, and in a giant 32 ounces, then after an initial round of disgruntlement people would
recalibrate their expectations down (and likely lose weight in the process).
39

Michael, Bauer, April 07, 2011, “When did a ‘small’ soft drink become 32 ounces?,”
http://insidescoopsf.sfgate.com/blog/2011/04/07/when-did-a-small-soft-drink-become-32-ounces/, accessed 30
April, 2012.
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This is not wishful thinking, this follows psychological and behavioral economic
evidence of consumer adaptation to marketing cues. A true society-wide standard would hold for
all restaurants, not just fast-food and food-court places. Many fountain soft-drink vendors offer
free refills, in which case sale might even be capped at a large. Of course there would be no limit
on the number of large cups one might purchase. With no possible knowledge of proposals
drafted many months earlier in this essay, in September 2012, spurred by Mayor Michael
Bloomberg, the New York City Board of Health approved a ban on SSB containers for fountain
drinks larger than 16 ounces, to take effect in the spring of 2013 (Grynbaum, NYT, 2012).
An excise tax incrementally larger for larger containers is possible, but while medically
defensible, is unlikely to find support because it grates against the learned expectation of volume
discounts. Legislating that machines not take cards or paper money, or coins other than pennies
or nickels, would send a clear market-environment message by breaking convenience, forcing
awareness and discouragement of high-volume drinking in exact accordance with elemental
mechanisms and the primary goal. Chandon and Wansink (2002) suggest the repackaging of
products in inconvenient-sized portions. Mandating a 25-to-50-cent container-deposit fee on all
pre-packaged SSBs, while imposing 4- or 6-ounce container size limits would remove
convenience while disincentivizing more littering as some people might begin drinking multiple
containers at a time. But as with the ‘small coins’ idea, this would be unlikely to find support,
because it would be perceived as punitively annoying. Neither option would limit consumer
choice however, only disrupt convenience in a way that may provoke deliberative thinking about
the choice.
As with any excise tax large enough to notice, any of these devices that make consumers
aware that policy has targeted SSBs would serve a useful role, and anything that reminds
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someone over and over opens the opportunity to break habitual modes of consumption, and
allow for the introduction of more healthful habits, consistent with findings in behavioral
economics and social psychology.
The libertarian paternalism that Thaler and Sunstein espouse to preserve choice while
also unskewing the market frame (to use my phrasing), moves default options so that
sophisticated marketing techniques built by decades of marketing research are less capable of
exploiting basic biological triggers. Empirical behavioral economics has demonstrated that
sophisticated marketing will almost certainly trigger automatic behaviors unless consumer
awareness is specifically evoked, or heuristics are specifically changed. “…[C]ognitive factors
such as price and health information might be less effective than policies that employ
sophisticated marketing techniques to combat obesity. These techniques could help individuals
by creating contexts that encourage healthier decisions” Just and Payne (2009, S53). Just and
Payne (2009) give the examples of the all-you-can-eat sunk-cost fallacy, wherein people eat
more when they pay more; of how paying with cash seems to make people more aware of tradeoffs than paying with credit; 40 and of people buying more unhealthful foods when given a debit
card where half the money can only be spent on “green dot” foods designated as “healthful,”
versus just giving them the same amount (as both halves) in cash. They suggest that while debit
cards are commonly used in school cafeterias as a convenience, they may promote overeating by
separating a person’s monetary involvement in the decision from the food choice. Just and Payne
suggest an advantage to using restricted debit cards that cannot be used for unhealthful foods
(like SSBs) as a way to correct for unhealthful food environments (S52-3).
Just and Payne (2009) note that companies and consumers might benefit from lifting the
ban on packaging claims that discourage overeating: “…policies that address lower order
40

Or paying with a voucher card or proxy money, a method exploited by Disney World™.
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behaviors of the consumer may be effective in creating both greater profits for the marketer and
better health outcomes for the consumer” (p S53). “Behavioral economic principals (sic) suggest
that…policies could encourage healthier eating without abridging the choices available to the
individual or reducing the profit opportunity of the food manufacturer” (p S54). Foodenvironment reconstruction could, based on numerous empirical studies, prove very effective in
changing choices (and possibly also habits). But it is likely that interventions need to be
voluntary, because legislation dictating payment types and rules for displaying foods
commercially would be onerous and very restrictive.

7.12.5

Re-Squaring the Market Frame Using Information: Nutrition Labeling Addenda
Package labeling falls into this same category of changing the market(ing) environment.

Front-of-package “traffic-light” labeling of certain nutritional properties is welcome. Mandating
an additional line on nutrition labels that defines “added sugars” versus naturally occurring
ones would be an important step forward for all foods with nutrition labels. On the same line
there may be room for a percentage comparison of that product’s added sugar content in grams
versus all discretionary calories available for a 2,000-calorie-a-day diet (the existing label
standard). This would be a welcome bonus to the added sugars line, and begin to better define
medically-recommended limits as a form of consumer education.
Assuming there is progress by the Interagency Working Group to categorize foods by
levels of healthfulness, there may soon be an agreed-upon standard. Say this standard ranks
foods from 0 to 100, which will save me the trouble of speculating with negatives. Then for
example a 20-ounce sCSD would be a 0, dry popcorn a 30 (fiber with slightly complex carbs),
and a serving of steamed kale would be 100 (micronutrient- and fiber-rich, protein, complex
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carbohydrates, no added fats or sugars). Then by some agreed-upon standard, no sCSD would
rank above a 20, and probably not even above a 5, even with the addition of vitamins, as some
manufacturers have played with. (I am assuming a responsible attempt at a scale will factor in
the bioavailability of added vitamins as eaten in the product, which would cut the nutrition
profile of many kids’ cereals substantially, as it would for “vitamin-enhanced” caloric sodas.)
For SSBs particularly, but perhaps extending to any very-high-energy-low-micronutrient
food (scoring, for example, below a 15 on this hypothetical scale 41), an FDA warning label
should be displayed adjacent to but outside the rectangular plane of the nutrition label. This
warning label should be in explicit contrast color to the manufacturer’s packaging and the
nutrition label (with the color for each package chosen by the FDA based on maximum contrast
for psychological notice), but mandated as with current nutrition labels to be printed as part of
the factory-printed label (not affixed post production). The wording on the label would be
determined by the U.S. surgeon general or an equally august panel, and parallel the tobacco
warning in medically sound content. For a bottle or can of calorically sweetened soda, for
example, a warning label reading: “HIGH LEVELS OF CONSUMPTION OF THIS PRODUCT OR ITS
PRIMARY SWEETENER HAS BEEN CLINICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH OVERWEIGHT, OBESITY,
DIABETES, LIVER DISFUNCTION, HYPERTENSION, CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE, AND SOME
CANCERS” is not a reach beyond current medical findings.

This label would serve the exact purpose that the warning label on cigarettes does – as a
constant presence that potentially or actively reminds the user that consuming this product
regularly and in large quantities is correlated with poor health outcomes. This may present
precisely the awareness vector needed to allow people to recognize then choose their
consumption behavior rather than allowing marketing, socialization, and habit to choose for
41

This would include a wide range of highly processed snack foods, across many categories beyond SSBs.
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them, as behavioral economists, consumer psychologists, social psychologists, and some in the
medical community have repeatedly verified occurs for unhealthful eating behaviors.

7.12.6

Re-Squaring the Market Frame: Limiting Socially Inefficient and Predatory
Advertising/Marketing
The marketing environment may also be changed by restricting the marketing practices

that SSB firms may use, or by regulating their methods. Zimmerman (2011), who refuted the
effectiveness of Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro’s (2003) explanation for the rise in U.S. obesity,
claiming instead that the unprecedented expansion in scope, power, and ubiquity of food
marketing more strongly correlated with expansion in food consumption, is assertive in his
prescription: “Only by reigning in or countering marketing power can rationality be restored to
the dietary choices of Americans” (p 285).
Television advertising has for decades framed the perception of sCSD products by
associating their brand with life-affirming, positive, and tender images that have little to do with
product content and divert attention from risks associated with consuming large volumes of
liquid candy. Accepting these image associations biases consumers against active RUMax
choice. It is obvious, fundamental, and recommended in a range of literature that laws allowing
the tax deduction of advertising/marketing costs for the promotion of high-energy-lowmicronutrient foods should be reversed (per, among others, Chou, Rashad, Grossman 2008;
Gortmaker et al. 2011). This should apply to SSBs, but extending the reversal to all high-energylow-micronutrient foods is common sense given current U.S . health outcomes. Why should a
government subsidize the marketing of foods that prove unhealthful to its citizens when eaten in
common amounts, and by no rationale contribute to a healthy diet? (Such junk foods may be
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marginally included in an overall diet that is healthful on other grounds, but are incapable
themselves of producing healthful outcomes if a primary food source.) That recommendation is
baseline, making economic sense to any economist (because the advertisements in question are
not informative, and the resources used are inefficient from a social standpoint; per Dixit and
Nelson 1978, for starters).
With the goal of resetting the market frame for unhealthful foods, there is another policy
that should be pursued whether or not the rescinding of tax exemption for advertising/marketing
budgets passes. For every dollar of marketing of such foods (it is easiest to visualize this for
television advertising expenditures but would extend to internet, and other marketing, including
giveaways and sponsorships), some matching percentage must be paid into a fund for public
education to raise consumer’s level of sophistication in how they process sophisticated
marketing messages, or perhaps into a common fund with SSB tax revenues to pay for nutrition
and diet-heuristics education. This proposal allows companies to choose their own marketing
packages and budgets, without government ban or extensive restriction, but at a level closer to
what would occur if the government had warily protected the market frame from dictated market
evolution over the past five decades.
This is where the demographic sub-group targeting that my Essay One methodology
enables may find the best application. Empirical studies indicated that African-Americans are
targeted with unhealthful food advertisements on television at a disproportional rate (Henderson
and Kelly 2005; Tirodkar and Jain 2003; Harris et al. 2011). For groups with high advertising
responsiveness as identified in my empirical work here, and for groups targeted with unhealthful
food advertising generally, the matching percentage based on company advertising expenditures
should rise accordingly. Sports or health-activity-related sponsorships should be matched at a

669

lower rate. Thus if Coca-Cola was paying into the fund at one percent for its banner placements
at Olympic venues with televised coverage, and two-and-half percent for its actual commercials
during Olympic broadcasts, it might match into the fund at 5% for advertising on television
programs with primarily African-American or Hispanic viewership. (These example percentages
might just as easily be doubled, to ensure firms get the message. Similarly they could be phased
in, or used as penalties for abuses of other regulations.)
Rather than relying on the effectiveness of voluntary advertising restrictions by certain
sCSD manufacturers, which was clearly undermined by Coca-Cola product placement on
American Idol, the higher-level matching percentage for marketing on programs with child
viewership can be determined by Nielsen estimates of child viewership for shows. Naturally, the
FTC and Federal Communications Commission would work with the Internal Revenue Service
to determine a grid so that percentage contributions remain fair and efficient across firms, in
accordance with this social initiative to reduce marketing to the most targeted and most
responsive demographic groups. And naturally, the regulation should be codified with treble
penalties for falsifying accounting records to mask advertising/marketing budgets.
If such a system is not adopted, there should be restrictions on gross-rating-point
exposure to groups vulnerable to SSB advertising, starting with children under 12, but including
all children, and the most advertising responsive lower-education, lower-income, and minority
demographic groups.
If any of these policies should change the marketing environment in a way that SSB firms
no longer make large television buys, the companies may have to rely on their century of brand
image creation, some of the most recognized logos on earth, and the available panoply of other
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marketing devices to eke out a profit. 42 That said, in the interest of public health, product
placement in movies or television shows should be prohibited for products that have unarguably
low (say, less than 10 on a 100 scale, as SSBs would be) standardized nutrition scores, once a
responsible standard has been set. 43 A prohibition on the use of successful sports figures to
market products with similarly low interagency-standardized nutrition scores would be welcome,
as this practice certainly sends the inappropriate message linking sports performance with sugar
water (Coke®, Mountain Dew®, Sprite®, Gatorade®, sugary energy drinks, etc.). Professional or
Olympic athletes burning 4000 or more calories per day can drink a 20-ounce SSB with less
chance of harm than any teenager or weekend warrior.
A third separate policy that could exist in conjunction with ending tax deductibility for
marketing and a marketing-budget percentage-matching fund mandate is a requirement to
include health disclaimers (similar to the warning label idea above, and as applied to
advertisements for tobacco and prescription drugs) as part of all SSB broadcast advertisements,
with a print equivalent as well. In France, television, radio, billboard, and internet advertisements
for processed, sweetened, or salted foods must include government-written health messages, and
companies refusing to comply “may be fined 1.5% of their advertising budget for that particular
campaign, with funds earmarked for the National Institute for Health Education” (Pomeranz et
al. 2009, p 191). For the U.S., at least in the first years of the campaign, government health
warnings may apply only to advertisements for high-energy-low-micronutrient foods such as

42

“Earlier this year, the Company also announced its 50th consecutive annual dividend increase, raising the
quarterly dividend 8.5 percent….” Muhtar Kent, Chairman and CEO of The Coca-Cola Company: “Our system’s
2020 Vision to double our revenues over this decade provides a clear roadmap….” “Coca-Cola Board Recommends
2-for-1 Stock Split,” April 25, 2012;
http://www.beverageworld.com/articles/full/15017/coca-cola-board-recommends-2-for-1-stock-split, accessed 30
April, 2012.
43
“Responsible” means determined by science, and less politically influenced than Nestlé (2002) describes the
USDA Dietary Guidelines process to be. For example, candy is not “healthier” (higher ranked) because it is low salt
and low fat.
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SSBs and sweet (or very high fat) junk foods. This would leave non-caloric and low-caloric
beverages off the list, at least until empirical studies of the first wave have been done. The U.S.
may never go so far as to attach warnings to all processed foods. As with advertising budget
matching percentages, codification of treble penalties against the ad buy cost for failing to
provide a government-approved or -generated disclaimer should lead to pattern self-compliance.
Of course product reformulation and the advertising of non-caloric lines within the brand
would limit SSB manufacturers’ economic exposure to new regulations. For the largest
manufacturers with more than a certain number of product lines, regulators might consider a
system similar to the fleet-wide mileage standards for Detroit automobile manufacturers, where
there must be a minimum nutrition rating average for the volume the manufacturer sells across
all its product lines. This would serve to reduce high-energy-low-micronutrient products within
manufacturer product sales, and directly reduce potential negative health impacts.

7.12.7

Re-Squaring the Market Frame: Raising Awareness and Consumer Sophistication
Through Public Education
The public responsibility to re-square the SSB market frame from its current state of

dictated evolution includes new taxes and regulations on industry, but also includes new
incentives for individuals, incentives that begin to correct the underprovision of public goods:
nutrition knowledge and knowledge enabling consumers to develop sophistication in their
processing of sophisticated marketing messages and manipulations of the market frame. Simple
cognition of elements driving desire, purchase, consumption incident, and consumption amount
is an important starting point, and some of the policies directed to the industry side will help
raise awareness among consumers, including excise taxes, product labeling, restriction on sale in

672

schools, and health disclaimers on advertisements. Lessons and prescriptions from social
psychology and behavioral economics will prove critical in designing effective messages to help
individuals break unhealthful consumption habits and heuristics, and establish and engrain habits
and heuristics likely to yield more healthful outcomes. Just and Payne 2009 warn that policy
recommendations based on rational or cognitive approaches have resulted only in modest
leveling off of overweight and obesity rates: “Significant improvements in reducing obesity and
overweight may come from approaches that account not only for rational consumers but also
consumers whose decision making is based on heuristics. … The heuristic component of food
decision making suggests that behavioral economics can inform not only the obesity epidemic
but also food policy created to fight it” (p S48).
There is every reason to believe that a well-designed broad and sustained campaign will
be successful in greatly improving American dietary health. When the anti-saturated-fat message
of the late 1970s proliferated, people adopted, adapted, and products were reformulated. While
much of this anti-saturated fat push is now understood to have been predicated on faulty
demonization of dietary fats, and drove people further down the dangerous path of excessive
consumption of refined carbohydrates, the fact that a fairly uniform message began in the
medical community and replicated across all media to establish a new understanding of basic
markers of healthful diet does set an encouraging precedent for the positive public reception of
diet-change messages. 44

44

FLATOW: So you think then that sugar, not fat, is to blame for the obesity epidemic?
LUSTIG: Look, we've had a reduction in percent consumption of fat from 40 to 30 percent over the past 30 years.
And in the process, our obesity and metabolic syndrome prevalence has gone through the absolute roof. Now, in
1977, the McGovern commission Dietary Guidelines for Americans basically told us that we needed to reduce our
consumption of fat. The question is: Where did that come from? Where did that directive come from? Very simple,
in the early 1970s, we learned about this thing in our blood called LDL, low-density lipoproteins.
In the mid-1970s, we learned that dietary fat raised our LDL, which is true. And we also then learned in the late
1970s that LDL levels in populations correlated with cardiovascular disease. So the thought was if dietary fat raises
your LDL and LDL raises your risk for cardiovascular disease, let's get rid of dietary fat, therefore cardiovascular
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The public service announcements (PSAs) to be funded by taxes on SSBs must fulfill
multiple objectives for multiple populations across a range of media. Messages could formally be
delivered in schools and doctor’s offices, but the epidemics discussed here are far too pervasive
and too well-rooted in populations beyond school age to wait for a generation to grow into the
new messages. Furthermore, with school curricula and budgets already stretched thin, mandating
a semester of nutrition classes for every student is unlikely to get off the ground, no matter how
many billions of dollars in social costs have accumulated. There are too many institutional
barriers for that to be a primary vector for change. This is not to discourage targeted programs or
the advantages of one-on-one interventions recognized in the literature, but institutionally and
politically this seems a non-starter, as well as likely being an inefficient use of policy budget,
requiring as it would an entire additional layer of nationwide institutional support. So while not
ruling creative and important smaller ventures out, the primary focus here will be on mass media
and social media messaging.

disease would go down. That was the thought process. And the AHA, the AMA and the USDA all bought into this,
and that is what was done, and the food industry went along with it.
They retooled. They reengineered all their recipes. That's how we got Entenmann's fat-free cakes. That's how we
got Snackwell's. They're still with us. Bottom line, not only has it not worked, but it's actually made things way
worse. Now, the question is: Was that logic rational? And I would pose to you that that logic was completely off
base. Why? Well, number one, dietary fat does raise your LDL - that's true - but there are two LDLs, not one.
There's one called large buoyant, and there's one called small dense.
When you measure your LDL levels in your blood, you measure both at the same time. It turns out the
large buoyant has nothing to do with cardiovascular disease. They float. They go along inside your blood
vessels. They're too large to get under the surface of the cells that line the arterial wall. They don't cause
anything. The small dense ones, though, those are the ones that are driven up by carbohydrate, and they are
small enough to get under the surface of endothelial cells.
They're the ones that start the foam cell process. They're the ones that start atherogenesis, and they're the
ones that have gone through the roof, because when we took the fat out, the food tasted like cardboard. We had to
substitute something. We substituted carbohydrate. So, yes, our percent fat went down, and our percent
carbohydrate went up astronomically, and that drove hyperinsulinemia, drove liver fat, drove all the
processes I've mentioned before, and that's how we got into this mess. We have to get out of it.
“Should Sugar Be Regulated Like Alcohol?”; Talk of the Nation, host Ira Flatow, guest Robert Lustig (of Lustig,
Schmidt, and Brindis of the 2012 Nature article cited in main text); February 17, 2012; Copyright © 2012
National Public Radio®; bold emphasis added. Last accessed May 6, 2012:
http://www.npr.org/2012/02/17/147047545/should-sugar-be-regulated-like-alcohol.
The confusion Lustig refers to about LDL being adversely affected by high fat versus high carbohydrate
content in diet is evident in Sacks 1994.
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Research already points to what works. Maio et al. (2007):
…[T]here is often psychological conflict [/”ambivalence”] between what people desire (e.g., fatty, sweet
foods) and the need to stay healthy. People’s mixed feelings and beliefs make any public health policy based
on individual choice more complex [the fatal flaw in neoclassical/neoliberal economic thinking, or the sCSD
industry’s likely counter-campaign]. … In this context [i.e. with inevitable psychological conflict and
“ambivalence”], it is unlikely that public information campaigns reminding people to avoid certain foods and
exercise will suffice. Behavior change programs that simultaneously inform, shift motivation, and provide the
necessary skills to maintain behavior change are required (p 102, emphasis added).

Maio et al. carefully stress that effective interventions must use knowledge from existing
research and conduct pilot studies to effectively “tailor interventions” to meet the needs of those
who will have difficulty in implementing changes:
Physiological processes and skills deficits contribute to the grip of certain habitual behaviors, including
smoking and eating behaviors (p 116). …
…[I]t is imperative that…[the effectiveness of interventions] be examined in small-scale studies that use the
best measurement devices available, before the messages are used in large-scale campaigns (p 117-8).
…[T]ransfer of knowledge from research to practice is foundational to the establishment of evidence-based
health promotion practice. …
…[M]ost health behavior interventions are combinations of many [between 1 and 13] discrete behavior
change techniques (p 124).

Commitment to using scientific evidence to determine and verify the effectiveness of the
messages and to update the message bank will protect against wasteful and ineffective
messaging, and allow the campaign to work out flaws before becoming a national staple. This
will involve direct research on the effectiveness of campaign methods and messages to change
heuristics and dietary habits associated with consumption of at least SSBs. Message research
should not involve popular construction of messages, as a “critical failing is an overreliance on
survey data or focus groups to develop the interventions. These methods reveal what people
think would work and not what actually does work” (p 127, original emphasis). Misapplication of
these marketing techniques (survey and focus group), would merely reflect existing ignorance of
nutrition and the constructed bias toward SSB consumption. The degradation of the social
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environment in which SSB consumption has tripled and health has eroded is severe enough to
engender some distrust in the public’s ability to value health and know what it is to be healthy:
People tend to consider abstract values, such as equality, freedom, pleasure, and family, to be very important,
while having difficulty describing reasons for why they are important (…). People’s values are based more
on learned feelings than on reasoned arguments (…). As a result, people’s behavior often fails to live up
to their values in situations that make it tempting not to fulfill the value (…). … In the context of healthy
lifestyle change, this evidence is interesting because the news media have recently noted a lack of
understanding of what it means to be healthy (…). If the value of health lacks cognitive support for most
people in the same way as other basic values, then people’s ability to resist temptation and perform
healthy behaviors may be improved by the provision of interventions that stimulate thinking about
health and health-related values (p 123; italics original emphasis, bold added emphasis; embedded citations
omitted, marked with “(…)”).

One can easily anticipate how industry and anti-intervention politicians will frame their
arguments against policies proposed to correct failures in the SSB market: they will call to
abstract values to evoke feelings that trump reasoned arguments. Zimmerman (2011) notes that
the “Center for Consumer Freedom, a trade group for soda and chain restaurants, has been
quoted as saying, ‘people should prevent obesity by getting regular exercise’” (p 298). As has
already been established quite clearly in the literature the overweight and obesity problem comes
from too many calories, and particularly added sugars and other refined carbohydrates. But the
industry is not concerned with empirical facts on the origins of American obesity, because the
evidence impugns them. Their concern is too call upon the failure of personal responsibility,
which protects their image, their brand, and their bottom line.
Despite the above indications of how much public ground and social value needs to be
reclaimed to create a health-conducive marketing and food environment, there may be some
‘shovel ready’ PSA message elements, and the campaign can proceed without years of repetitive
study and spurious fine tuning, while still managing efficacious targeting.
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The PSAs will have to make consumers aware of the market frame in which they decide,
make consumers aware of their own choices and how they make them (help expose their usually
tacit food-choice heuristics), help consumers to break unhealthful dietary habits, suggest new
food-choice heuristics and dietary habits, and build deeper nutrition understanding over time.
This will require dozens and dozens of different approaches, many targeting only one of this list
of objectives, some targeting multiple objectives, but all interweaving in effect, over at least a
decade. As stated earlier, current health epidemics have been decades in the making, and given
the acculturation and poor food-choice heuristics developed over these decades amidst a sea of
nutritionally-poor hyper-marketed products, the Level 1 problems will take a long time to
correct. People need to understand what the problem is in their own behavior in their own
kitchens, admit that part of the problem is under their control, know that regardless of past
mistakes they can change, and know that the information techniques and skills they will need to
do this can be acquired without exceptional initiative or stressful effort (Maio et al. 45).
…[H]ealthy choices are often made in environments that require psychological effort to combat temptation
(…). Freedom of choice makes it more difficult to resist temptation (…), and diversity of choice may have a
similar effect (…). Other research indicates that stress (…) and habit formation also impede the ability
to resist temptation (…), and this impediment is also evident for healthy eating behavior in particular. …
[O]ur emphasis is on the idea that the person and environment interact to determine behavior and behavior
change(…). …[O]ur review reveals useful principles that could be used to complement existing health

45

Maio et al. refer to the theory of planned behavior, which identifies how behavior is influenced, and how it can by
design be changed. The theory is: “supported by an impressive body of empirical evidence…and has proven
particularly useful in guiding the development of effective health messages” (p 106). This theory predicts human
behavior is guided by: 1) behavioral beliefs (likely consequences of own behavior); 2) normative beliefs (what the
expectations of others are); and 3) control beliefs (the individual’s belief that they have some control over
outcomes). By these same three behavioral guides, I believe the exogenous literature cited in this and in Essay Two
identify SSB marketing and ubiquity, low levels of effective nutrition education, and an implicit ceding of dietary
control to naïvely formed heuristics and habits to be the primary behavioral motivators of the current
overconsumption problem and attendant poor health outcomes.
“…[E]vidence suggests that successful interventions have their effects on behavior because of their impact on
these theory-specific cognitions. …[C]ognitive changes mediate the effects of interventions on behavior” (p 107). It
is for this reason that economic signals including taxes and labeling and removal of SSBs from schools signal a
change in other’s expectations, that PSAs must make consequences clearer and encourage self-reflection on dietary
patterns, and must support the belief that change is achievable and under the individual’s control.

677

promotion campaigns and social marketing approaches (e.g., using market segmentation to target messages)
to increase lifestyle change. …[M]ost of the problems [with our approach] arise primarily in the campaigns
that are not at all informed by relevant theory and evidence (…). When armed with the relevant theory and
evidence, public information and social marketing campaigns aimed at lifestyle change should be quite
successful (Maio et al. 2007, p 103-4; original emphasis in italics, added emphasis in bold; embedded
citations omitted and noted by “(…)”).

Attempting to achieve many campaign goals, some simultaneously, will not be done
quickly or on a low budget or using antiquated marketing techniques without diminishing the
prospects for success in helping individuals change eating behaviors. Remember from Essay
Two that research demonstrates that food choices are influenced by “implicit measures” beyond
those that a person consciously attaches to choice and self reports. These Maio et al. refer to as
“automatic attitudes”: “ …it is vital that interventions manage to influence the automatic
associations tapped by the implicit measures and not just the conscious attitudes obtained by selfreport measures. This change in the automatic associations may require repeated and creative
interventions to change attitudes—even a single powerful message may not be enough” (p 116,
embedded citation dropped).

7.12.7.a

Funding Options for Media Education Campaign

If some $20 billion per year is generated by the SSB tax and advertising budget matching
(possibly a low estimate), this should enable a media spread with enough frequency and
penetration to achieve target messaging for a broad range of demographic groups. The ubiquity
of SSB marketing must be matched or even temporarily surpassed to change consumers’
normative beliefs about SSB consumption. One should become surprised if one of these PSAs is
not seen or heard in an average media consumption day.
The excise tax appears to be the most efficient way to fund the campaign to reduce SSB
consumption, as it directly changes the incentives for users, scaled to level of use, and directly
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matches the source of the problem to the solution. To an extent the campaign may be expected to
change behaviors that will affect diet behaviors related to all high-energy low-micronutrient
foods, and would be funded by the highest-energy, lowest-micronutrient category (SSBs). The
efficiency is implicit. If the excise tax on SSBs does not materialize due to industry resistance (or
the U.S. Congress’s resistance to economic arguments), the PSAs should receive billions from
the general fund, due to the economic efficiency implicit when comparing costs of prevention to
costs of treatment.
Discounting the media purchase price for this spectrum of PSAs could be made a
contingency of having one’s FCC television, radio, or internet license renewed. The airwaves
are public until public bandwidth is licensed to private parties, so it seems further restrictions
could be put on such licensing, just as there are restrictions on the use of U.S. government land
for grazing. Such a contingency would greatly extend the capacity of annual PSA campaign
budgets 46. The Partnership for a Drug-Free America successfully leveraged pro-bono donations
by advertising agencies, and it is claimed, the value of $1 million per day for a decade by
broadcasters, for airing anti-drug-use television advertisements: “Thanks to the Partnership's
high-powered connections and unabashed arm-twisting, TV networks, newspapers, magazines
and other media outlets have donated more than $2 billion in free space and time to ensure that
the messages are seen.” 47 There is a critical difference in garnering support for a campaign to
thwart overuse of legal products, unless Lustig Schmidt and Brindis’s claim that sugar is toxic
begins to gain serious traction.

46

And perhaps set a precedent for the use of airwaves for publicly-funded campaign financing.
“Can You Just Say No? Pamela Warrick, Los Angeles Times, August 30, 1996. http://articles.latimes.com/199608-30/news/ls-38870_1_drug-user, accessed May 04, 2012.
47
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7.12.7.b New Media and the Construction of Effective Message Content
The Partnership for a Drug-Free America success demonstrates that creative solutions to
expensive PSA message dispersal are possible. For example, smart phone texting campaigns and
interactive mobile-phone “apps” could re-enforce or even develop basic messages to target
groups for infinitesimally less cost than the national television PSA campaign budget.
The PSAs will have to be constructed, worded, and tested for effectiveness in achieving
the specific goals of breaking old habits and food-decision heuristics and creating new ones, of
breaking passivity to marketing messages for highly processed foods, and training critical
consumption of marketing messages. With the goal of recovering the health of a majority of the
nation’s citizens, the simplistic “Just Say ‘No’ to Drugs” PSAs laughed off by many youth in the
late 1980s and early 1990s will provide some if little instruction. 48
The sophistication of the new PSAs must rival that of the best marketing agencies,
because these agencies have been the fonts of the marketing campaigns that have helped bend
the junk-food market frame for decades. Zimmerman (2011): “…the number one rule of
marketing…is to have a single, consistent message that is hammered home in many different
media and modes” (p 299). Coke Adds Life®, Be a Pepper®, Do the Dew®, Obey Your Thirst® –
these are all very successful, curt market-differentiating phrases that plant a suggestion, often
with a jingle to help remember the heuristic, to influence purchase and consumption behavior.
These trademarked slogans are offered as consumption heuristics and reinforced over years:
48

The “Just say ‘No’” campaign was successful by some measures, and unsuccessful by others, both perhaps rooted
in the simplicity of the message. The campaign seems to have been particularly effective in discouraging marijuana
use among high-schoolers (http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/infofacts/high-school-youth-trends; accessed 03
May, 2012). The slogan partially succeeded and partially failed to establish effective implementation intentions
(defined in coming paragraphs) or effective re-tooling of decision heuristics. In fairness the campaign preceded the
great body of empirical work by psychologists such as Loewenstein and co-authors, and Baumeister and co-authors,
by behavioral economists who have studied food-choice heuristics (including Wansink and co-authors), and by
social psychologists who have extensively studied how habits are formed and changed, including Verplanken and
co-authors. Most of this work was published after the Reagan Administration campaign began. A level of campaign
sophistication driven by scientific evidence is now possible that was likely unachievable in the 1980s or 1990s.
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“…marketers need to provide short, simple, and often repeated health messages to have any
sustained effect on purchasing behavior” (Just and Payne 2009, p S49). PSAs to help consumers
reconstruct a decision-making style that fostered health before the barrage of beverage bumpersticker slogans would be no different. PSAs must establish counter-cues to this type of heuristic,
and plant new ones conducive to health creation. Behavioral economics and social psychology
have contributed much scientific literature relevant to how to frame effective educational
messages to change decision behaviors. This literature must be consulted and checked in an
iterative design process.
Social psychologists Verplanken and Faes (1999), in “Good Intentions, Bad Habits, and
Effects of Forming Implementation Intentions on Healthy Eating,” speak of conscientiously
forming implementation intentions in advance of decisions as an effective method for changing
complex eating behaviors. “Implementation intentions are specific, “if-then” plans of action that
specify where, when, and how behavior is to be executed in order to accomplish a particular
goal. … Evidence indicates that opportunities to act that are specified in implementation
intentions do not easily escape people’s attention, even when people are busy with other
ongoing tasks” (p 111-2).
Maio et al. (2007) draw on this concept in recommending a fifty-year plan to manage
obesity in Britain. They address the gap between intentions and actual behavior, noting that for
health behaviors in particular, people enact their intentions only 53% of the time: “In other
words, although the motivation to change is a prerequisite to behavior change, it is far from
sufficient” (p 110). A primary reason for this, they draw from empirical studies, is that “physical
environments and social contexts are liable to activate thoughts and feelings that can undermine
progress toward one’s goals,” and one fails to start the new behavior, or “gets derailed” (p 110).
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The taxes, labeling and PSAs proposed here all seek to change the marketing/food environment
(in the spirit of libertarian paternalist change toward optimal defaults) so that individuals can
enact their implementation intentions with less drag.
Thus if PSAs or other policy interventions can convince people to define implementation
intentions for themselves, perhaps by suggested phrasing of new inner-voice food-choice
heuristics, they may prove effective even when people are choosing to eat while watching
television or driving (secondary eating behaviors), or shopping for food while on their cell
phones.
Without the ability or need to specifically define campaign-message language here, I
anticipate that certain methods prove promising. Successful educational jingles were achieved in
the 1970s with SchoolHouse Rock pieces (PSAs) threaded between Saturday-morning children’s
programming on the American Broadcast Company national television network. A similar or
more grown-up version of SchoolHouse Rock educational-jingle-PSAs, or both, could help
inform people why to break certain dietary habits and how to form new ones.
Social psychologists and behavioral economists ultimately must determine the best
wording to achieve different objectives in different populations, but one may imagine messages
planting such new suggested heuristics as: “I will not drink more than 30 ounces of soda in a
week”; or “I’ve already had a 20-ounce bottle of soda this week, do I really need another one?”;
or “How about an apple and a square of chocolate instead of my usual soda?”; or “That hit the
spot, but I don’t need to finish the bottle. It’ll still be good in a few days.” Zimmerman (2011)
recommends hammering home the message: “Processed snacks and sugary beverages cause
obesity” (p 299).
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Rothman, Sheeran, and Wood (2009) draw from a range of empirical studies, concluding
that “active inhibition over established eating patterns” is in part dependent on fluctuating levels
of self-control:
…[B]ehavior change interventions…can break habits by disrupting the processes that trigger them….
…[V]igilant monitoring…inhibits acting on the habitual response when it is activated in memory. …
…[P]eople taught to use this strategy were able to inhibit unwanted habits during an experimental task.
Because vigilant monitoring involves active inhibition over established eating patterns, its long-term use
might have a number of counterproductive effects…it is unclear whether people can sustain effortful
inhibitory efforts in daily life… (p S14).

Rothman, Sheeran, and Wood expect that people trained to “vigilantly monitor” their
environment and thinking about healthful eating will have the best effect only when combining
this vigilance with new habits, and with changes to (marketing and) food environments to
establish defaults less likely to trigger old habits (p S14). In this context, the desire to exercise
specific new habits may be called implementation intentions.
Building active nutrition knowledge will likely prove more challenging than suggesting
heuristics and implementation intentions. But the payoff can build over time. If people eat
balanced meals high in protein, fiber, nutrients, and fat, their blood sugar is less likely to flag and
induce the ego depletion that Baumeister (and various co-authors across multiple articles),
identify. The reflexive need to patch over these ego-depletion times with SSBs could thus be
avoided (or trained away, as Job, Dweck, and Walton indicate is possible).
There is a creative way to present nutrition-educational PSAs that may influence
perceptions at a level basic enough to re-frame expectations and prompt effective
implementation intentions. Use actual pictures of plates of food comprised of acceptable
“ratios” by USDA or WHO dietary guidelines for a daily diet, contrasted with concrete images
of discretionary calories allowed outside that meal. PSAs could show one of a set of three plated
combinations meeting children’s, young adults’, women’s, or men’s nutritional requirements for
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a day. For any combination, there would also be a demonstration of some food meeting exactly
the daily discretionary calories given the diet displayed. Thus “this much soda or that half of a
candy bar is OK for this balance of protein veggies fruit and grain, for the whole day.”
Obviously, some options would be displayed with and without meat, with and without
milk, etc. For example: breakfast lunch and dinner, emphasized with no processed foods,
balanced by half of a nougat-loaded candy bar as discretionary sugar and fat for the whole day.
Use of actual photographs of actual quantities that meet and do not exceed USDA recommended
limits by explained age, sex, and activity level would place accurate nutritional images in the
mind in a way that cartoonish pyramids and textbook numeric tables cannot.
There is no reason such PSAs could not be creatively shot and edited so that they were
actually attention-grabbing and memorable, especially if explicitly contrasted with what some
people actually eat, which is known from dietary recall surveys.
Current diet-based threats to long-term health will not be rid simply by pointing out the
danger. Once again citing copious empirical evidence, Maio et al. (2007) explain that “messages
designed to arouse fear…lead people to deny the threat.” Important threats historically have been
effectively addressed however, as happened when the U.S. deglamorized smoking in the mid1960s, and with anti-HIV interventions two decades later (p 105). Poorly designed and untested
messages can backfire. Simple messages that do not conform with theory and evidence fail for
recognized reasons, just as successful messages succeed by conforming with scientific evidence.
Changing the marketing and food environments are critical to establishing the space for
individual intentions to manifest without reversion:
…[T]he broader theories that we have described retain a high level of empirical support. … …[R]ather than
telling people what they should do and how to do it, campaigns should encourage more reflection on the part
of individuals.
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Such an approach might succeed in promoting healthier values, attitudes, and behaviors over the long term,
but this approach must also be maintained until there are matching changes in the environment. This assertion
is consistent with evidence regarding eating behaviors in particular: ‘Attempts to halt the weight increases
merely by imploring people to be more prudent in their food consumption or more physically active, without
modifying the environment that facilitates positive energy balance behaviors, are likely to have little impact’
(…). Across behavior change domains, it is clear that failures to change the environment cause cues to
older, habitual behavior to reassert themselves over time. As a result, behavior reverts to past tendencies
(p 126; emphasis added; embedded citations omitted, marked by “(…)”).

The form of marketing environment and food environment changes, as well as the form of
information/education PSA messages will prove critical. All must be done, and all must employ
lessons from existing and updated empirical results in their design, as indicated by studies, and
authors cited here. Failures exist, generally due to restricted scope, or design that does not
respect evidence from social psychology experiments, and now behavioral economic
experiments, among others. 49
To evaluate policy efficacy over time it is important to define policy benchmarks for
success, and to gather data and evaluate program effectiveness. Policy makers may define
success in many ways. Perhaps success would be moving the U.S. from world #1 in obesity and
heart disease rates to out of the top ten in under a decade, or perhaps would involve achieving
average weights from the mid-1970s in half the time it took for the average to reach current
levels, or perhaps bringing the incidence of Type 2 diabetes back to 1985 levels.
If it proves possible to avoid bureaucratic determination of program objectives rather than
scientific ones, as Marion Nestlé (2002) laments occurred in USDA Dietary Guideline
construction, that would prove useful, streamlining efforts and saving hundreds of millions of

49

Harris et al. 2011 write as if education fails as an option, citing only a 2007 Science Daily article, “Diet education
had no long term impact on childhood obesity.” Old standards for how to teach nutrition and diet will not be
adequate given the media diet of children today, and certainly not without changes in food environments. Block et
al. 2010 call the posting of a few signs in a cafeteria “education,” and find that education has “no statistically
independent effect on sales” (p 1429). Again, this method does not begin to meet the definition of “education” as
proposed here.
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dollars in false starts, backpedaling, and ineffective messaging. Former Food and Drug
Administration commissioner David Kessler, in a 2001 book, 50 discusses how the Office of
Management and Budget repeatedly funneled pressure from the White House as it bowed to
pressure from the beef industry to change wording of a final FDA rule, where in many drafts the
OMB’s recommended wording sometimes exactly matched what industry had proposed, a
perspective the FDA had “already carefully considered.” The U.S. government bowing to sugar
industry pressure attacked a WHO report recommending limited use of added sugars, even
threatening U.S. funding of the WHO itself (Brownell and Warner 2009, p 274).

7.13

Problems Associated with Achieving and Executing Effective Policies to Improve
American Health Outcomes
There are documented historical reasons to expect that the SSB-tax-funded-PSA idea will

prove politically difficult to implement, reasons including but not restricted to bureaucracy,
conflicting opinions (Nestlé 2002), and commodity industry battles. Beyond Nestlé’s careful
documentation of frustrations with the U.S.-Dietary-Guidelines sausage factory, there were the
blue-ribbon panels under President Johnson that included academics and industry executives, in
which there was strong disagreement on what anti-hunger and grocery industry structure goals
were or how to achieve them.
Short of statutory action, a simple declaration of the U.S. Congress’s intent to “address
complicated obesity issues” could not make it to the floor in either house in the 110th Congress
(2007 – 2009; Kersh 2009; p 303). Kersh also points to U.S. Congresses in the 1960s and ‘70s
waging a decade-long fight including several legal battles, finally settling on the U.S. Secretary

50

Kessler, D.A. 2001. A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle with a Deadly Industry. New York: Public
Affairs, p 58; cited in Brownell and Warner 2009, p 274.
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of Agriculture drawing a (shortened) list of Foods of Minimal Nutritional Value (FMNV),
“judged unfit for children’s consumption in school cafeterias,” including soft drinks, water ices,
chewing gum, and “certain candies.” Kersh explains the list is still unchanged and technically in
place since 1980, but unenforced. Kersh advocates the prohibition of all national brandcompetitive foods in school cafeterias (p 308, including quoted words). Mello, Pomeranz, Moran
(2008) point to a successful legal challenge from a 1983 National Soft Drink Association
lawsuit, in which the court ruled that the Secretary had no authority to put time-and-place
restrictions on sales of competitive foods. This authority could be specifically granted the
Secretary by Congress, but has not been passed.
The general inability to recognize the extent of Level 1 compromises of RUMax behavior
and market frame as causing many failures in SSB markets allows Level 2 approaches and
simple neoclassical theory to dominate the minds of academics, politicians, bureaucrats,
activists, and the general public, all of whom may to varying degrees influence policy debates.
Without agreed-upon science, political solutions are more likely to involve compromises of
political origin, rather than cleaving closely to what is necessary to correct market failures. “‘It’s
too complicated…there’s insufficient scientific proof’ is a familiar shibboleth of opponents of
legislative reform…,” notes Kersh (2009, p 311), but this argument can no longer apply to diet
vectors of pure added sugars for any academic reason, only commercial ones.
The science is clear that various aspects of SSB marketing in addition to the ubiquity and
cultural acceptance of SSBs tends to exploit psychological and even biological tendencies to
overconsume SSBs as they currently present as consumption choices. Government intervention
is not an intrusion on personal decision making, but an attempt to provide an underprovided
public good, to re-square a skewed market frame, and enable consumers to make choices with a
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more full information set, using deliberative rather than automatic decision criteria. Primary
obstacles to policies that would improve American health outcomes will draw primarily from
refusal to understand these truths, as they have been carefully documented in these essays.
To characterize diet-based health problems as primarily failures of personal responsibility
has the political advantage of being simple and convenient, but bears the disadvantage that it is
remiss in ignoring or refuting decades of related empirical results across at least a half-dozen
academic fields. It is always easier to blame a victim than admit co-responsibility for allowing an
exploitative environment to evolve, to evoke general principle or emotion rather than to
empirically identify and acknowledge causal factors.
The personal responsibility argument requires us to believe that an entire generation
failed in personal responsibility for eating behaviors for the first time in history, simultaneously,
and in proportion to the marketing penetration of highly-processed sweetened snack foods. A
major generational downtrend in the health markers for a country growing in wealth first
indicates systemic changes to food environment and decision processes (Level 1 factors). To
argue the alternative, one must claim that nearly 200 million Americans, RUMax in behavior
almost to a person by this same argument, each alone accurately perceived their environments
and their personal goals, and nonetheless decided to engage in slow-motion self-destructive
consumption as part of a long-term utility-maximizing strategy. 51

51

To be fully explicit, the discussion here is centered on habitual use of sCSDs (or SSBs). Acknowledging that there
is a degree of automaticity involved in the consumption behavior, a strictly RUMax individual must in the creation
of the habit or each incidence of soft-drink consumption within the habit: stop their current dominant decision
process to think about whether to drink an sCSD and exactly how much; devote rational decision-making resources
to all relevant facts and factors for the current decision, and all of these facts must give an adequate representation of
reality and the individuals’ future states to avoid a preference reversal later, with no hyperbolic discounting involved
in the current consumption versus the future health effect, and given all of these things, decide that the high
probability that the individual is negatively impacting future health is a small price to pay for the utility of
consumption. The neoclassical economist is bound by consistency of theory to argue that this occurs with sCSD
consumption, despite the fact that the process involves knowledge people have demonstrated they do not have

688

When this paradox becomes more widely understood, and repeated empirical findings
from the quasi-exogenous (to economics) literature become as well-known as neoclassical(libertarian-) value platitudes, the folly of the purist “personal responsibility” thesis may be set
aside in favor of empirically-driven policy. Personal responsibility will always remain a critical
component of food environments and individual performance. But it will only be the primary
determinant of eating behavior for informed aware deliberative individuals who are not
constantly surrounded by intentionally subtle marketing and consumption cues that encourage
quick emotional decisions to drink what by historical standards are gross portions of added
sugars. The assumptions about environment and individual decision behaviors that make
personal responsibility arguments so attractive generally fail to hold in food environments where
people consume large volumes of SSBs.
Harris et al. (2009) refer to examples in the U.K. and the U.S. where the personal
responsibility argument strongly influences legislative debate in ways that would tend to protect
industries making products that are unhealthful when consumed in even slightly large amounts.
They point to the irony of the (fast-food) restaurant industry backing personal responsibility
arguments, while simultaneously fighting efforts to get nutrient information on menus, and using
“stealth, viral, and guerilla marketing campaigns to conceal marketing intent,” while also
spending billions marketing high-sugar and low-nutrition foods to children (p 218-9). This
undermines the moral legitimacy of the industry’s “value-driven” stand for individual rights.
Harris et al. go on to describe the U.S. Supreme Court’s test to determine whether a
commercial actor’s First Amendment rights may be violated by regulations on marketing. There
is no strong indication that the Court understands the ways that dictated evolution of market

(USDA and nutrition literature), and decision resources they have demonstrated they will not mete to small food
decisions (behavioral economics, social psychology literatures).
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frame may undermine efficiency and to an extent undermine self-determination of choices when
marketing is designed to trigger reflexive rather than deliberative consumer choices.
The now established tension between the value-based defense of ‘right to selfdetermination of food choice,’ despite the resistance of this principle to copious scientific
refutation, and the empirically derived advocation of environmental and educational changes
including proposals here, confirms what may have become a stasis of grim import. “Incremental
approaches are the usual government response when sweeping reforms appear elusive [omitted
citation], but no single innovation appears effective in addressing obesity’s nationwide (and,
increasingly, global) advance” (Kersh 2009; p 310).
Kersh warns that as obesity levels hit a stable equilibrium in the U.S., comprehensive
reforms to limit rising obesity become less feasible, making it more necessary to employ rapidresponse research to identify promising reforms, and to combine this research with concerted
lobbying efforts, if any meaningful change is to occur. “…[S]tudies of ‘punctuated equilibrium,’
a metaphor borrowed from species evolution, indicate how rare major policy shifts can be once
an issue regime has achieved a steady state” (p 303).
The implicit fatalism here may only be shed as the preponderant science is accepted at
face value, in its negation of the misplaced value arguments used to defend large systemic Level
1 problems as if they are minor Level 2 individual deviations from a generally gainful norm.
Momentum will build from there, especially when it is clear that reforms are merely corrections
of previous market and government failures, that individual choice will remain fully protected,
and no one will be prevented by the state from eating what they as well-informed deliberative
and un-influenced decision makers choose to eat as part of their utility-maximizing diet plan. If
the market frame is square, people are reasonably aware of the consequences of their choices,
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and they actively develop their primary eating habits, then self-destruction through diet is a valid
and possibly utility-maximizing individual strategy. The various sciences weighing in here (and
most advocates of the empirically-based position) have no stake in curtailing individual liberty,
only in educating individuals and keeping them from a dictated market environment.
Given contentious political realities already described, there is a recognized legislative
tendency to compromise in a way that protects industries even when economists identify
efficient policy options by which these industries should bear much of the market costs of
actions to make markets fair. While perhaps less defensible on economic grounds, it therefore
may be politically strategic to call for SSB taxation at the 5-cent-per-ounce or 3-cent-per-ounce
level on SSBs, to achieve the desired 1- or 2-cent per ounce tax. Numerous econometric
estimates of consumer’s price-elasticity of demand for SSBs and related products indicate that a
tax of this small magnitude (compared to sin-tax rates well over 100% for tobacco and spirit
alcohol in some states) will not have strong negative impacts on SSB purchase. Among many
(including Sturm et al. 2010), Powell and Chaloupka (2009) discuss results concerning the taxing
of a range of energy-dense foods: “The current body of empirical literature that we reviewed
offers limited evidence that weight outcomes could be improved by using fiscal policies and that
substantial price changes are needed to improve these outcomes significantly” (p 246).

7.13.1

SSB Industry Resistance to Policies to Improve American Health Outcomes
The justification for new policies is to correct market failures (Levels 1 or 2). Taxes,

regulations including environmental controls such as marketing restrictions including point of
sale (public schools), public education campaigns, and other devices can help correct market
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failures, because they bind firm behavior where it has overstepped competitive bounds, re-square
the market frame, and build the capacity for individual RUMax behavior in food choice.
Brownell and Warner (2009) in a long detailed and intriguing piece, draw strong parallels
between how the tobacco industry fought government regulation and how the food industry is or
likely will use many of the same strategies. The first play is always the “personal responsibility”
card, already refuted as it may generally apply to routinely habituated food behaviors formed in
teen years and followed often without much awareness or effective nutrition education.
Strategies to follow include paying scientists to generate research that will plant doubt while
criticizing other scientists’ work as deficient (see 6.7.2.b here for SSB industry-funded authors),
making pledges to self-regulate or follow guidelines for corporate responsibility (as the CFBAI),
lobbying heavily to prevent government action (publicly this is to protect personal/corporate
freedom), influencing government processes in other ways, and denying that the product is
addictive while marketing it to children (p 259). The latter can include influence over
professional organizations, as occurred when Coca-Cola became an “American Dietetic
Association Partner” in 2008, helping make the case that there are no good or bad foods. This
last is an ADA platform that preceded Coca-Cola’s new “partner” status, perhaps influenced by
the many fact sheets that industry (at $20,000 per sheet) helped the ADA write, with sponsors
from the fast-food, distilled spirits, and gum industries/brand companies (p 277). To the case of
food, an emphasis on exercise rather than diet is used, despite indisputable empirical evidence
that weight gain over the last thirty years is due to extra calories (Swinburn et al. 2011; Cutler,
Glaeser, Shapiro 2003). Marketing “safer” versions of products is a further step in preserving
markets and profits. Examples include light cigarettes, trans-fat free processed foods, and the

692

introduction of primarily whole grains in RTE cereals in conjunction with the 2008 USDA
Dietary Guidelines (p 282-3).
The soft-drink industry has used many of these strategies, with large emphasis in recent
years on voluntary restrictions. As proposed to date, none of these bind member or distributive
agent’s behavior (Mello, Pomeranz, Moran 2008; Sharma, Teret, Brownell 2010), and are
virtually incapable of adequately correcting failures associated with dictated market evolution.
How can such efforts be judged incapable of adequate effect? Historical evidence consistent with
political-economic theory.
More than a generation of economic game theory supports the notion that companies will
invest in policy debates to protect every revenue source they legally can, up to the value of that
revenue source (plus the cost of protecting it, per Gordon Tullock’s rent-seeking). They will
protect brand image, seek positive public image, and offer the concession of self-regulation at
every turn, to protect profits. Firms must fulfill “their fiduciary obligation to maximize
shareholder value by maintaining and improving their market position” (Mello, Pomeranz,
Moran 2008, p 601). 52
The only incentive firms have to acknowledge that they have dictated market evolution
and skewed the market frame comes from public, interest group, and government (local, state, or
federal) pressure. Industries have every incentive to resist, and do, with every resource at their
disposal. This is all the more reason to be very clear about what the science is, what the

52

An appealing by-product of regulatory enforcement removing SSBs and similar products from schools would be
that it would remove the fiduciary responsibility of SSB companies to maximize profits in school environments.
This incentive will remain so long as SSB-company marketing does, even for fruit juices and bottled waters. Schools
are a mandatory attendance environment for education, not fairgrounds. The SSB industry’s decades of skilled
dictation of market evolution has perhaps blinded some to this civic reality.
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economics are (including the Level 1 - Level 2 split), and that there is no call to ban SSB sales or
even tax them to prohibitive levels. 53
Congress stripped the FTC of its authority to place rules restricting advertising, after the
FTC in 1978 moved to restrict television advertising of sugary foods to children under 11 years
old. Perhaps the science verifying children’s inability to react rationally to advertisements is
indisputable enough at this point for Congress to concede its error, and the Supreme Court to
recognize that the ability to manipulate customers cannot be a protected legal right in a fair
market. But the more than $1.5 million that Coca-Cola alone spent on lobbying in the U.S. in
2007 (Harris et al. 2009) perhaps indicates some reasons that certain Congresspeople may refuse
to acknowledge the preponderant science.
Industry resistance to government-imposed reforms waxes or wanes with the likelihood
the industry perceives that regulatory reforms will be imposed, or that the industry will lose
lawsuits or public face (a component of brand equity, from which premium prices are drawn in
differentiated product markets). When the government effectively banned certain foods in public
schools, the soft drink industry sued (Mello, Pomeranz, Moran). When state SSB policies began
to emerge around 2000, the industry ramped up “historically strong lobbying efforts,” then
industry-leader Coca-Cola suggested “Model Guidelines for School Beverage Partnerships,”
which would remove sCSDs from elementary schools, but leave them in high schools – “with no
mechanism for enforcement or measuring uptake of the recommendations” (p 597).
In 2004, the Public Health Advocacy Institute was planning to work with others on class
action lawsuits against sCSD companies marketing to children in school environments, on the

53

Being such a small budget item, a prohibitive level of taxation might be 300% or more of current retail price per
container. But the very concept is speculative from an economic standpoint, because no one has studied nonlinear
consumer price-elasticity-of-demand effects in structural models of soft-drink demand, although Yale School of
Public Health’s Jason Fletcher is working on it with co-authors.
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grounds that children are mandated to be in these environments. The Center for Science in the
Public Interest was considering similar action. In 2005, 200 bills addressing sCSDs and other
low-nutrition foods were introduced in 42 states. Perhaps then it was no surprise that in 2005 the
industry promoted a more restrictive self-regulatory response for school vending, again with no
enforcement mechanism (Mello, Pomeranz, Moran 2008, p 597-601).
In 2006 the top two and another sCSD firms allied with the William J. Clinton
Foundation and the American Heart Association to phase out sCSDs and SSBs from many public
schools, limit portion sizes for remaining vending machine drinks, and publicly report
implementation (the first agreement to offer this, although with no commitment to data collection
on student consumption). The agreement “is not intended to preempt existing laws or policies.
… is not as restrictive as many state and local policies. It permits a wider range of beverages to
be sold…” including sports drinks (think pure sugar like an sCSD, without the bubbles and with
a pinch of salt; 54 Mello, Pomeranz, Moran 2008, p 600). The self-regulations proposed simply
conformed to where the market was already heading, with lower purchase in middle schools, and
away from sCSDs and toward sports drinks, bottled water, diet sodas, and 100% juices in all
schools (p 601). The agreement does not bind signatories to any action but a yearly update of the
effect of the new plan, not even binding them to ask their bottlers to conform. Existing often
exclusive sales contracts with schools are not voided (p 600). The industries are fully aware that
brand loyalties for beverages are set in the teen years (Brownell et al. 2009).
The CFBAI restricting television advertising for unhealthful foods to children under 12,
honored by various sCSD manufacturers from January 2008, is also voluntary. The pattern of
proposed SSB-industry self-regulations is clear. It is slow, combative even when gaining positive

54

Coca-Cola Company now sells “POWERADE ZERO,” a calorie-free, vitamin and mineral enhanced sports drink.
The SSB companies’ ability to adapt to markets and or policy environments is not a thorny issue.
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press for cooperating with government, and entirely predictable by relatively unsophisticated
economic game theory.
Where industry and public health objectives conflict, an industry has incentives to create a public image of
concern and promise to change, but then to create weak standards and lax enforcement (Sharma, Teret,
Brownell 2010, p 245).
…[T]he industry itself may not remain committed to the agreement if pressure from public policymaking
and threatened litigation decrease. …
[T]he industry tends to act through statements of principle rather than binding commitments. By
emphasizing the decentralized nature of beverage production and distribution, it has preserved local bottlers’
autonomy to disregard its guidelines.
Again, the motivation appears to be preservation of the school market for beverages insofar as possible
(Mello, Pomeranz, Moran 2008, p 601). …
The findings of our study [a “50-state legal and regulatory analysis and a review of industry self-regulatory
initiatives”] suggest that policies to curtail students’ consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages tend to be
strongest when they originate with a statewide legislative mandate and give explicit implementation
responsibilities to an administrative agency (p 602).
Governance by all stakeholders, transparency in creating standards, and external, objective evaluation of
impact appear to be at the heart of the self-regulatory successes seen in some industries. These conditions do
not prevail in current food industry self-regulation (Sharma, Teret, Brownell 2010, p 245).

There is almost as little evidence indicating that SSB industry self-regulation will be successful
in achieving consumption reduction targets on the order that public health demands as there is
economic theory to support that it would. Level 2 economic analysis works quite well on this
front. The responsible and impressive wording of Coca-Cola North America’s October 2010
(restated) Council of Better Business Bureaus Pledge (including its CFBAI commitment) are
available in “Breaking Down the Chain: A Guide to the Soft Drink Industry” (NPLAN 2011;
The National Policy & Legal Analysis Network to Prevent Childhood Obesity; at
www.nplan.org).
When the U.S. Senate held hearings in May 2009 to discuss whether soft drink taxes
might be used to help finance health care reform, “the industry launched an aggressive national
anti-soft drink tax campaign in the summer of 2009,” Americans Against Food Taxes (Sturm et
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al. 2010, p 1053). A Wall Street Journal article points to the over 2500% rise in American
Beverage Association lobbying money from 2008 ($668,000) to 2009 ($18.9M) to fight a federal
soft drink tax. Of course this figure doesn’t include the amount spent battling state and local
taxes. When New York considered putting an 18% tax on SSBs, PepsiCo® threatened to move its
corporate headquarters from the state (Brownell et al. 2009). In 1992 when Ohio put a small but
unique general revenue tax on soft drinks, the industry campaign that outspent opponents to a
citizen repeal of the tax by over 98:1 was so brazen and effective that the day after the repeal
passed Republican governor George Voinovich called it, “the most despicable, deceitful fraud
perpetrated on the citizens.” In Arkansas, where the soda tax revenues were targeted to support
Medicare provisions, legislative repeal efforts failed (Dreier and Blumgart, HP, 2010).
When the threat of litigation or legislation grows dire enough, SSB manufacturers turn to
now well-known methods. They litigate, knowing their own pockets are deep, and their list of
political friends is long; they lobby knowing the same; or they play to the public and
policymakers with “values” arguments as previously discussed. The “don’t let the feds tell (y)our
community what it can and can’t drink” is the last, a card played by the American Beverage
Association in its desire to “enhance the role of community decisionmaking over the sale of
beverages in schools” (Mello, Pomeranz, Moran 2008, p 600). By framing big government as the
enemy of community choice, when the community has evolved over the last generation with
exactly the dictated market evolution and nutritional ignorance already described, the SSB
industry is playing to an advantage in large part of its own creation.
If the “public” is creating its own health epidemics by poor food choice over the last
thirty years, how are we to trust the same “public” to suddenly understand the problem? Powell
and Chaloupka (2010) site a 2005 study finding only 33% support for a tax on soft drinks and
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snack foods, even with revenues designated for health education. Why would a public that has
demonstrated nutrition ignorance through its own (often irrational eating) behavior be capable of
recognizing Level 1 problems or how to address them without these being expressly presented?
In the New England Journal of Medicine, Brownell et al. (2009), do find that polls show the
popularity of a soft-drink tax rises in New York residents from 52% to 72% if the tax revenues
are to be designated for promoting children’s health, media campaigns, healthier foods in
schools, etc. Chaloupka, Powell, Chriqui (2011b) claim that “new SSB taxes are a win-win-win
for policymakers: they will generate significant new revenues, lead to significant reductions in
SSB consumption that will almost certainly reduce obesity, and are popular with the public when
the revenues are used to support obesity prevention efforts” (p 652).
As always, the wording of public opinion polls matters, and phrasing that endorses use of
revenues to promote health, especially for children boosts the positive numbers (Brownell et al.
2009). But the larger issue is that if many in the public demonstrate poor understanding of
nutrition and RUMax-compromised behavior in their own eating, should policy turn to their
opinion before they are properly educated? Assuming the public is adequately educated on
dietary issues already is akin to assuming their eating behavior is RUMax – the evidence against
is too deep to ignore.
Recall the work cited above from Jonas et al. (2001), and Rabin and Schrag (1999) on
confirmatory bias (7.7.2). People will defend previously held positions and choices, will defend
them against pertinent correct new information as it flows in, even in infinite amounts. People’s
tendency not to fault their own previous consumption and what they allow their own children to
consume given their current level of applied nutrition information is almost certain to bias survey
results, almost as much as their ignorance of nutrition literature. The same will hold for school
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boards, principals, coaches, and even policymakers who are more interested in upholding
abstract values even when they conflict with proven science.
Public opinion should influence policy when that opinion is adequately informed and
rational, meaning it is at least roughly congruent with provable science. Otherwise there is an
irrational and potentially self-destructive tendency that may undermine the sustainability of the
democratic process.
When industry promises self-regulation, it is within the context of having dictated the
market frame for highly-processed (chemically) flavor-enhanced products. This is a multibillion-dollar-per-year industry that sees the writing on the wall, and attempts to cover it daily
while claiming to help the community by fighting graffiti. They are still trying to maximize
profit, but are stepping back just far enough to avoid government regulation while holding every
marketing and food-environment advantage they can retain. This is identical to Coca-Cola
agreeing to extract the cocaine from coca leaves, while leaving the less but still addictive
caffeine and sugar ingredients in the mixture.
Industries have other political options that allow them to exploit markets without
economically efficient oversight. Pomeranz et al. (2009), refer to efforts by the fast-food industry
to use the doctrine of “preemption” to prevent themselves from being sued by patrons. By
preemption, as guaranteed by the supremacy of the U.S. constitution, local laws may be
superseded or nullified by state action, as state law can be superseded or nullified by federal
action. This is a very useful construct. However, when bent to industry interests, federal
preemption of actions by lower levels of government can “seriously impede public health goals,”
especially when problems are not evenly distributed through the population, and there is a local
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need for protection (p 204). Twenty-four states passed laws protecting fast-food chains from civil
lawsuits between 2003 and 2006, after an attempt at a federal bill failed.
A compromised (skewed) market frame in which RUMax-compromised consumers
“choose” to damage their own health is not the ideal democratic platform to debate corporate
rights and personal responsibility. It is precisely the sort of platform where government must step
in and do its job of making sure that commerce is fair and naturally advantageous to no party.
The alternative is to abdicate a core responsibility of government, and thereby fail to allow
markets to function as we are taught to expect them to function. Companies know this, so seek
weak self-regulation to deflect government action. Ignoring Level 1 factors supports success in
that industry campaign.

7.14

Summary and Key Conclusions
Essay Three answers the question: what policies seem best-suited to solve actual market

failures associated with overconsumption of sCSDs/SSBs in the U.S.? This requires definition of
what the market failures are. As in Essay Two, this process draws on results from neighboring
literature (outside of marketing, industrial organization, and classical demand analysis). It also
requires a review of suggested policies, and endorsement and development of policy options
specifically designed to reform the bases of identified market failures. Current literature from
economists and non-economists clearly predicts that the standard economic tools – imposing
taxes and giving consumers more information about SSB products – will not curb consumption
significantly. So the path to the research objective here is not as clear and obstacle free as
conventional economic policy strategies would suggest. Primary elements of arguments in Essay
Three are summarized here, usually without citation unless directly quoted, and occasionally
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simplified, i.e., without requisite academic nuance that is in the main text. Both choices assist
brevity here.
Reviewing the classic four market failures in economic theory, I contend that while
market power and externalities certainly exist, a neoclassical economic understanding is too
narrow to immediately appreciate the public good and information asymmetry problems that
impact sCSD markets and consumption. While often unnoticed, these other market failures may
drive equilibria from Pareto optima just as surely as more commonly appreciated market failures
may. A long quote from “Chronic Disease: an Economic Perspective” (Suhrcke, et al. 2006)
highlights the difference between information asymmetry that can be cured by revealing
information, and insufficient information, which must be addressed by information campaigns.
Consumers unaware of health risks from their choices can be helped by providing health
information, with the recognition that health/nutrition knowledge is a public good, undersupplied
without government action. Interesting given the arguments in Essay Two which conclude at
least near-addictiveness for high added-sugar foods, this same long quote offers:
Time-inconsistency [of preferences] can be easily confused with insufficient information…, especially in the
case of addictive goods. …The outcomes of these market failures may be identical, but the causes – and
hence the policy implications – differ significantly. While the solution to limited information is to provide
more information, … the solution to time-inconsistent preferences is to provide individuals with effective
commitment devices (Suhrcke et al., p 37).

Thus providing consumers with an adequate level of health knowledge (a public good) might by
itself lessen behavior currently characterized as time-inconsistent (and therefore not classically
rational).
In my review of many aspects of food choice informed by neighboring literatures, I offer
a vocabulary and simple graphic model intended to emphasize where standard economic thinking
may disregard market characteristics and aspects of consumer behavior that impact choice
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(reproduced below). Drawing attention to these overlooked elements should elicit more
efficacious policies.
Elemental features of markets include the market frame, or the market environment or
transaction space, holistically understood; and rational utility-maximizing (RUMax) agents.
Either of these features may be compromised or may fail. For the market frame this would mean
either sellers or buyers enjoying or having built a natural advantage, “bending the market frame”
so they benefit more than would be possible under a fair or “square” market frame (benefits
“tend to roll toward them” in any transaction, given the current default market scenario). For
RUMax agents, compromise or failure involve not choosing in ways consistent with objective
utility maximization. These market failures involve decision and market processes, not just the
decisions – including price and quantity solutions – that are most easily observed (Cawley 2004).
Elements affecting the transaction space and aspects of individual decision making must be in
place before transactions occur. So these are Level 1 features, whereas transactions and records
of transactions occur at Level 2:

Level 2:

Discretely Economic Transactions
(character of transactions: freely competitive OR not freely competitive)

Level 1:
Holistic Market Environment  transaction-relevant info  Transacting Agents
(market frame)
(RUMax agents)
The arrows depicting how different types of information must flow show that inadequacy
or asymmetry of information is complex. Decades studying and adapting sales methods to
consumer psychology has allowed SSB companies to “bend the frame” by designing packaging,
image creation, and persuasive advertising that exploit human psychology at levels often too
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subtle to be appreciated as skewing the market. Underprovision of the public good “health
knowledge” set the stage in part for this skewing of the market frame. Economists focused like
marketers on “product, price, place, and promotion” will naturally focus on economic
transactions, Level 2 problems, and can easily dismiss as background the holistic transaction
space, and consumer-psychological elements, Level 1 problems, particularly when biases
develop over decades. When Level 1 market failures are ignored, the government right and
responsibility to correct market failures whose cost of correction is less than the benefit from
redress tends to be forgotten, even argued against, for this market failure type.
The general assumptions economists make about how consumers make decisions are
demonstrably weak for SSB consumption, as carefully annotated in Essay Two, and further in
Essay Three, using sound science collected from neighboring literatures. These results demand
that to remain scientific in our science of economics, we must drop assumptions where they are
not appropriate, and develop new techniques.
It is frustrating for economists to accommodate the likelihood that an individual seems of
freewill to make a choice that objectively given the individual’s own comprehensive priorities
does not achieve an optimal consumption of goods and services, as measured by highest
cumulative level of satisfaction. The frustration arises from the tension between the economic
assumption of utility maximization as a real and economically efficient process, and how people
eat. It is certainly logical that smaller economic decisions, like whether to have a Pepsi with
lunch should involve less deliberation than a decision with higher economic value on the line,
such as whether to buy a new or old car. The problem is that sCSDs are not like other small
budget items such as paper, batteries, or plastic forks. Regular use/ingestion of this product type
can greatly impact later utility by substantially degrading health and raising health costs and
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work loss. So the default logic an individual may seem to rationally pursue – deliberating only a
little or not at all over choice of snacks or drinks at meals – can fail to serve a long-term utilitymaximizing process when habits and their health effects over time reverse the utility effect from
sCSD consumption. 55
Biological limitations constrain decision-making capacity, just as time and limited
information do. Then efficiency takes on more than one meaning, and may tend toward
biological and psychological efficiencies, which would undermine the economic efficiency
achieved by deliberate rational optimizing as a decision process. People satisfice, accept the first
choice that meets a standard of adequacy, often treat the present as disproportionately more
important than the future in different ways for different choices, and even refuse or ignore
relevant new information that by economist’s thinking should be employed to update decision
criteria. Context matters. Factors physically defining the decision environment, including the
order of choices, visual cues designed to persuade, and sensual cues that subtly trigger one to
indulge a habit can and do affect choice before a rational process can engage.
Whether these processes and factors that pre-empt or confound rational optimization
processes occur for economic choices larger than food choices remains a matter of debate, but
there is sufficient evidence from decades of research across many fields that for low-cost
mundane food choices, the efficiencies that drive and result from many food choices are not
consistent with utility optimization for all but the most dedicated and present-biased hedonists.
The problem then is that when evaluating which from a range of decision criteria and
default and conscientious decision-processing modes seems to describe actual behavior, rational
utility-maximizing choice does not top the list for SSB consumption. If economists unilaterally
55

Many assumptions about decision psychology were borne of economists’ frustration with the inability of
psychologists a century ago to identify a reliable metric for pleasure (Camerer 2007). Further assumptions were
driven by mathematical restrictions requiring curves with discrete maxima and minima for optimization calculations.
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mandate (assume) it does, then there is no overconsumption. Medical evidence tells a different
story. Overconsumption at the individual or the societal level is an inefficient use of resources,
demanding redress.
If there is a small miscalculation in a predominantly rational process, taxes and more
product information should re-set consumers to an equilibrium consumption level closer to an
objective optimum. But they will not, as numerous researchers, economic and not, project. So
economists tend to look in the wrong place for a solution, because they are not looking at the
right problem. If people do not choose as we expect them to, then solving the overconsumption
problem means adapting policies to speak to what they are doing, not to correct what we hope
they are doing.
For many economists, Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro (2003) explain why Americans have
become more obese (their title). I offer this as a demonstration of well-done empirics that leads
to bad conclusions owing to a Level 2 perspective. They ignore the composition of the diet,
nutritional quality of food over time, and the relatively severe health loss versus the miniscule
time savings when they conclude that savings in food preparation time acquired when buying
processed foods is the driver of American obesity. Zimmerman (2011) picks their logic apart
rather cleanly, so my criticism draws in part from his insights while I use it to demonstrate the
terms I define for the simple graphic model here.
Conventional economic prescriptions for conventional market failures include new taxes
and better conveyance of product information. These recommendations have their place in SSB
policy, but are constrained in effect, because they tend to derive from Level 2 perspectives,
leaving Level 1 problems unresolved – hence the agreement that these mechanisms individually
must fail. Taxes are a flexible economic tool, although not currently used in the “sin tax” sense
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on any food. (This follows from the low price-elasticity of demand and substitutability of many
food types.) Empirical work shows that 20%, even 40% taxes on SSBs will have but small effect
– 37 kilocalories per day (kcal/d), and 12.7 kcal/d, by the respective authors. Compare this to the
120 kcal/d that SSBs have contributed in additional energy intake from the late 1970s to the early
2000s. Manipulation of tax pass-through rates could further undermine this effect. Powell and
Chaloupka (2010) conclude that SSB taxes will not lower obesity rates, but might affect children,
and lower socio-economic groups. This hope ignores mechanisms of habit formation discussed
in Essays Two and Three: “…failures to change the environment cause cues to older, habitual
behavior to reassert themselves over time. As a result, behavior reverts to past tendencies” (Maio
et al., p 126). Policy recommendations with taxes as the primary tool rely on rational economic
responses as the primary mechanism, when RUMax behavior is far from routine for habitual
consumers of sCSDs.
The type and scope of sCSD/SSB taxes will greatly affect policy impact. The category
needs to be quite broad, to avoid substitutability (and the broader SSB category will tend to be
less price-elastic than any sub-category, for higher pass-through of the tax). Excise taxes will
work better than sales taxes for SSB policy goals. I join other authors in demonstrating that
concerns about the regressive effect of any SSB tax are ill-placed given the likely magnitude
relative to household budget, even for the food budget alone.
As there are types of taxes and ways to implement them, there are many types of
information. Nutrition and health knowledge is low enough in the general American population to
be deemed inadequate. Providing information and providing education are different prospects
with different effects. Only education provides means of overcoming biases people tend to
formulate and live by, biases that justify previously made choices, biases that lead to the rejection
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or misinterpretation of new information. Giving consumers more knowledge without the means
and motivation to effectively apply it will not adequately reduce SSB consumption. Information
must be paired with education, and with a rubric to apply both in new ways to dietary choices.
Briefly, policy must raise effective nutrition education that will apply in repeated dietary choices.
Both self-deception and the manufacture of tastes by SSB marketing must be countered to break
unhealthful consumption habits. Policy to reduce SSB consumption can meet this tall order.
For at least a decade, some have recommended using tax revenues to increase public
information, and this is the new baseline for effective policy strategies. But a range of
recommendations for affecting environmentally-influenced behaviors, and food-related
behaviors specifically, remain. Section 7.8 explores recommendations by economists, section 7.9
recommendations generally by non-economists. Section 7.10 discusses issues particular to
advertising, and section 7.11 reviews strategies proposed by economists and non-economists
who appreciate what I call Level 1 constraints. Proposals I recommend are in 7.12.
The economists in 7.8 recognize that choice is context dependent, and that preferences
are formed or at least leveraged by environmental factors at the time of decision. Cawley
advocates providing health and nutrition knowledge as a public good. The behavioral economists
(including Thaler and Sunstein 2003) carefully document where judgment errors occur, and
recommend changing marketing environments (a Level 1 change). Behavioral economists Just
and Payne (2009) also recommend overcoming the large information asymmetry between
processed-food suppliers and consumers. Zimmerman (2011) carefully describes how Cutler
Glaeser and Shapiro fail to describe a mechanism to explain American obesity that is stable
before 1980, then increases – driving weights with it – after. He charges that the volume and
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sophistication of marketing of low-nutrition snack foods does correlate properly, and the prestige
effect of advertising, chemically enhanced tastes, and increasing portion sizes all contribute.
In section 7.9, doctors with MPHs Cohen and Farley (2008) cite environmental drivers of
obesity, and along with Katz (2009) advocate “structural interventions” that would influence
default options in food marketing environments, much as Thaler and Sunstein do. Chandon and
Wansink (2002) find that stockpiling – which my empirical work in Essay One confirms
definitely occurs for household sCSD purchases – directly increases consumption, an
environmental cue driven by the perception that one is economizing.
SSB Advertising is persuasive, not informative. As there also seems to be no Bayesian
learning (consumer updating of decision criteria) associated with increased advertising, positive
welfare effects from advertising cannot be inferred (Della Vigna and Gentzkow 2010). SSB
advertising forays into non-traditional areas such as product placement and in-school marketing
have helped them double the exposure of their ads to young people – even after the voluntary
ban on television advertising for children under 12 effectuated in January of 2008 by some
manufacturers. There is explicit evidence of sCSD industry targeting of vulnerable populations
as growth markets. Actual prestige effects from SSB advertisements does not limit later health
effects, so raising a consumer’s willingness to pay does not necessarily correlate with RUMax
consumer behavior. So even if these ads raise utility, the effect may be overwhelmed and
reversed by associated health outcomes later (Essay Two). Decision-theorist Peters (2009) finds
that consumers’ ability to process food advertisements and nutrition information can be quite
weak, concluding that marketers specifically design advertisements that trigger automatic and
emotional processes that pre-empt deliberative processing when preferences are constructed at
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the time of decision. Peters further concludes that consumers need training to resist such
influences.
A 2008 FTC report is plain and bold in its assertions: for limiting SSB advertisements to
those under 12 years; for a broad definition of marketing; for reformulating products to make
them less unhealthful and more nutritious; for holding manufacturers to reform pledges that have
generally proved to be empty promises; and for ceasing all SSB advertising in schools.
Policy proposals from health experts and Level-1-sensitive economists include: taxes;
labeling added sugars in foods separately; controlling aspects of food marketing environments;
reducing standard serving sizes; front-of-package labeling; cutting the corporate tax break for
advertising expenditures for unhealthful foods; and reformulating high-added-sugar products.
Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis (2012) go so far as to advocate not only soft-drink bans in schools,
but zoning against near-school private sales, and that added sugars no longer enjoy “generally
regarded as safe to eat” supplement status. Some neuroeconomists recommend advertising
restrictions and bold, even shocking labels to dissuade consumption of addictive goods, citing
pictures of cancerous lungs on some countries’ cigarette packages.
To these I caution that the goal should not assume that lowering SSB consumption will
lower obesity. Obesity reduction should not be a target, because obesity is an effect, not a cause
of bad choices and health problems. Policy tools must match policy objectives, because a close
matching can increase the chance that policies will be effective and efficient.
My own empirical results from Essay One identify purchase reactions to sCSD industry
marketing variables with a degree of precision by specific demographic grouping that is not
possible with commonly used estimation strategies. For example, purchase reactions to rising
price significantly vary by ethnic-group-income-level combinations and ethnic-group-education-
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level combinations, and by which sex heads the household. Sale responses are stronger for higher
income and higher education groups, and the influence of weekly increase in television
advertising of sCSDs on purchase is surprisingly strong and robust relative to price change.
These results could be used to direct targeting of non-tax policies to specific demographic
groups. But while the methodology was chosen to avoid presumptions of utility maximization or
even of rational choice, it is still grounded in analysis of market transactions. To rely on these
results alone while denying the empirically-based conclusions of neighboring fields would lead
to narrow policy prescriptions (tax and information) such as those repeatedly projected by
economists and others will fall short of intended targets for reducing consumption and positively
affecting American health outcomes. My prediction tables clearly show that families of four at
the poverty level are often already spending more than four times their household income on
sCSDs than very similar households earning four times the poverty rate (with heads of household
at the same level of terminal education). What tax rate could offset the dedication signaled by
this result? USDA ERS results and others indicate that lower-income lower-education
households already ignore currently provided nutrition information more than other demographic
groups. My results will be more important for targeting if the following recommendations are not
followed, which would likely limit any budget to affect change. These same results apply well to
efficient targeting for certain revenue proposals within the proposed set.
An effective policy set must seek to redress Level 1 market failures involving the market
environment and consumer choice psychologies that diverge from theoretical RUMax behavior.
Excise taxes and putting more information on product labels or in pamphlets in doctors’ offices
will only scratch the surface of Level 1 problems. The available science suggests that elements of
the food environment and biology routinely engage appetite and consumptive behaviors on a
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sub-rational level. The elements are not beyond the scope of attention(/awareness) and personal
control, but often influence behavior without the conscious intent or even acknowledgement of
the individual. So reducing SSB consumption must involve certain basic elements to correct
Level 1 problems. Policy mechanisms may be old or new, but must change elements of the SSB
market environment, must draw attention and improved critical thinking skills to individual
choices made in the context of the market environment, and must serve to re-enforce dietary
heuristics and habits conducive to healthful outcomes.
What follows is a set of policy proposals carefully designed to counter factors
scientifically identified as strongly associated with raising added sugar consumption in the U.S. I
maintain this is the first comprehensive policy set defended in each of its parts by scientific
evidence, that together would effectively set U.S. consumers on a path to reduce their added
sugar consumption to a degree that would lower health care costs by hundreds of billions of
dollars over the first decade in which these policies were administered as described here, with
savings inflating into the following decades (based on figures cited in Malik et al. 2010, amongst
others, see section 6.7.1.b). There is every reason to believe that BMIs, diabetes rates, and
incidents of cardiovascular disease would measurably and significantly fall as an effect of this
policy set, if enough elements are adopted, and adopted with the care in design and feedback and
re-tooling that the literature cautions will be necessary.
The first and primary goal is to reduce sCSD consumption to 1960s levels or lower,
without consumers switching to other SSBs, whether they are vitamin-fortified or not. So the
policy is to reduce SSB consumption broadly. Lowering liquid added sugar calories will lower
obesity creation more than lowering semi-solid or solid added sugar products in the diet. The
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education mechanism should ultimately generate a spillover effect that will lower consumption
of all energy-dense nutrient-poor (EDNP) foods.
The following policy recommendations are a collection and expansion from the italicized
policy elements in the main text.
The goal is to reduce unhealthful levels of SSB consumption, not to prohibit
consumption. Taxes, regulation, and education are preferable to any sort of ban. That said, sugars
differ in their medical effects, and the U.S. should follow Japan and the European Union in
restricting or subjecting to production and import quotas the use of HFCS. Alternatively the price
of HFCS may be raised by any mechanism, so that it is consistently 20% above the price of sugar
from cane or beet.
Excise taxes are better than sales taxes to achieve purchase SSB reductions. Do note that
excise taxes (versus sales taxes) will implicitly penalize large volume containers as a percentage
of shelf price, also properly signaling manufacturers to repackage, and consumers to re-think
their stocking behaviors. A tax of between one-half-cent per ounce and two cents per ounce may
prove adequate to send the proper policy signal and fund other policy elements proposed here.
Note from Sturm et al. 2010 that a tax doubling sCSD price is not projected to significantly
reduce consumption, given the small portion of household budgets and demonstrated price
elasticities. Two cents per ounce is therefore not onerous. Food tax exemptions should be
terminated for all EDNP foods. An excise tax on SSBs should not be phased in, so that
consumers perceive a clear policy message from the sudden price rise. This is in part a (relatively
quite low) sin tax on what may be the most unhealthful snack food. However, an incremental tax
that rises with sugar content of the SSB would properly incentivize manufacturers to reformulate
their products, and American tastes would re-calibrate, just the reverse of the last thirty years.
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SSB excise tax revenues should be pre-designated to fund education programs, to be
described below. Targeted clinical interventions are unlikely to be the best use of funds, as they
will be prohibitively expensive at the national level, but they may find use in specific
populations. If taxes generate a very large volume of policy funds, healthy food distribution in
poverty areas and reusable-container tap water options for schools may be funded, along with
some clinical interventions.
Removing biases that SSB manufacturers have built into the marketing environment over
decades will take attention, time, and direct policy focus. Food-environment reconstruction
could, based on numerous empirical studies, prove very effective in changing choices (and
possibly also habits). As public institutions designed to educate responsible and logical behavior,
schools are not the place to absorb SSB marketing tactics and build high-SSB consumption
habits. All vending of SSBs (machines and fountains) in schools below the collegiate level
should be cut, exceptionally including diet and no-calorie beverages by the same manufacturers,
and not to be replaced with vending machines for other EDNP foodstuffs. The main text offers a
perspective on how to deal with existing exclusive pouring contracts. In adult non-commercial
spaces existing vending options may be removed or reduced by agreement, and if they remain,
smaller container sizes should be requested. New state-level SSB container size regulations for
all venues (vending machines and all fountains) would deflect criticism aimed at particular
restaurateurs, vendors, or venues. The move from 6- or 6.5-ounce containers in the 1950s to
“king-size” 10-ounce containers and “family-size” 26-ounce containers seems to have been
medically bad, on the road to serving cups larger than the human bladder (Zimmerman 2011).
Re-setting serving-size standards denies no one access or profit.
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All of these recommendations (and lesser others in the main text) are intended to change
the marketing environment in ways that make consumers pay attention to their own choices.
New nutrition labeling can similarly contribute to this goal. A line for added sugars, as distinct
from naturally occurring sugars, should appear on nutrition labels. There should be an explicitly
large and contrast-color warning label on SSBs adjacent to the nutrition label (suggested details
and possible wording in main text).
The tax break for marketing/advertising budgets for all EDNP foods should be removed.
For marketing/advertising budgets for SSBs, a percent-matching fund scaled to the marketing
budget should be donated for the public education program. The percent-match could be scaled
by the degree to which at-risk populations are affected by the marketing – say double the
matching percentage for advertising on programs with high African-American teenage
viewership. A direct application of my Essay One results would assist. There should be no
product placement for EDNP foods in U.S. television or movies. All television, radio, and
internet advertising should include health disclaimers written by the CDC, with no influence
from industry or Congress (per lessons from Marion Nestlé 2002 and David Kessler 2001).
France has something similar already.
Re-squaring the market frame will further require raising consumer’s awareness of how
their market environment has been affected, and how their consumption psychology has been
manipulated by very sophisticated marketing techniques. Providing adequate levels of the public
good that is knowledge of marketing techniques must accompany provision of the public good
that is health and nutrition education. This extends beyond an effort to make people more savvy
to the tools used to make them buy, but must clearly and carefully extend to the suggestion of
new heuristics they might use in food decisions. (Yes, this advocates using sophisticated
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marketing tools in new ways, at the same time it advocates educating consumers to beware of
them.) The primary education campaign will implement a complex, targeted, tested (monitored
and improved by its designers), program of public-service announcements (PSAs) across the
media spectrum: print, billboards, airwaves, internet, mobile device applications (apps), and
health-care providers’ offices. Maio et al. 2007 write by request to address obesity in Britain
over fifty years (quote structurally condensed and re-arranged, for brevity):
…[R]esearch indicates that stress (…) and habit formation also impede the ability to resist temptation (…).
Behavior change programs that simultaneously inform, shift motivation, and provide the necessary skills to
maintain behavior change are required (p 102). …Physiological processes and skills deficits contribute to the
grip of certain habitual behaviors, including smoking and eating behaviors (p 116). …
People’s values are based more on learned feelings than on reasoned arguments (…). As a result, people’s
behavior often fails to live up to their values in situations that make it tempting not to fulfill the value....
[P]eople’s ability to resist temptation and perform healthy behaviors may be improved by the provision of
interventions that stimulate thinking about health and health-related values (p 123).
…When armed with the relevant theory and evidence, public information and social marketing campaigns
aimed at lifestyle change should be quite successful (p 103-4).

Message research should not involve popular construction of messages, as a “critical
failing is an overreliance on survey data or focus groups to develop the interventions. These
methods reveal what people think would work and not what actually does work” (p 127, Maio et
al.’s emphasis). Specific messaging must be carefully developed by social psychologists, but can
benefit by applying lessons learned from commercial and previous public education campaigns.
The message must include “implementation intentions” and how to use them, as well as specific
phrases to help even passive message recipients begin to change the internal voice they hear
when making EDNP food choices (new heuristics), and develop new habits (quote structurally
condensed for brevity):
…[B]ehavior change interventions…can break habits by disrupting the processes that trigger them. …
[V]igilant monitoring…inhibits acting on the habitual response when it is activated in memory. …[P]eople
taught to use this strategy were able to inhibit unwanted habits during an experimental task. Because vigilant
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monitoring involves active inhibition over established eating patterns, its long-term use might have a number
of counterproductive effects…it is unclear whether people can sustain effortful inhibitory efforts in daily
life… (Rothman, Sheeran, and Wood 2009, p S14).

Televised and internet PSAs presenting actual pictures of plates of food comprised of
acceptable “ratios” by USDA or WHO dietary guidelines for a daily diet, directly contrasted with
concrete images of discretionary calorie limits allowed outside that meal, could establish new
internal benchmarks for individuals to gauge relative volumes of their consumption choices.
The multi-pronged, multi-level PSA program should require at least a decade to undo the
market environment and RUMax compromising that has built for no less than three decades.
People need to be brought to understand what the problem is in their own behavior in their own
kitchens, admit that part of the problem is under their control, know that regardless of past
mistakes they can change, and know that the information techniques and skills they will need to
do this can be acquired without exceptional initiative or stressful effort (Maio et al.). Some $20
billion or far more may be generated by the excise tax and marketing-budget matching funds
mandate. 56 This money may be spread further by efforts to discount the cost of these PSA media
buys, or provisioning requirements into FCC airwave contracts.
Historical evidence, summarized by Brownell and Warner 2009, indicates strong
resistance to these proposals from industry, many politicians, and perhaps some neoclassical
economic theorists resistant to the weight of empirical evidence. But the magnitude of effects on
U.S. health outcomes demand that policymakers now respect the extant science and not as before
bend to political lobbying posturing and even credible threats by well-known SSB
manufacturers. The question is who we wish to be as a nation. Overconsumption of SSBs is not
in the current market frame and general level of nutrition and health knowledge primarily a
56

If one accepts as better than back-of-the-envelope calculation the SSB-tax revenue calculator algorithms designed
by Frank Chaloupka (cited elsewhere here), a two-cent-per-ounce SSB tax alone would generate $18.7 billion from
estimated 2012 consumption (www.yaleruddcenter.org/sodatax.aspx).
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matter of personal responsibility – although following the policies recommended here is
designed to make it one. The goal here is to evoke more RUMax-approximate behavior in EDNP
food choice – hence to reduce consumption for many. Resetting environmental default options
(per Thaler and Sunstein, Just and Payne, Wansink and many others) can allow us to use tools
developed by industry to correct their manipulation of the market frame and compromises of
RUMax behavior. Kersh (2009) warns of the danger of policy stagnation once factions develop,
particularly once American BMI growth has finally leveled out. Political compromise could
easily undermine the coherent and potentially effective and efficiency raising policy agenda laid
out here.
Brownell and Warner 2009 spell out industry strategies from the alcohol and tobacco
industry playbooks, and how the American Dietetic Association (publisher of a Journal often
cited in this dissertation) can and has had its message leveraged by Coca-Cola. In 1978,
Congress stripped the FTC of its right to block advertising of sugary foods to children under 11.
All efforts at reform have so far been leveraged to SSB industry advantage, even by conceding
reductions in sCSD marketing as they more than compensate the difference by developing their
sweetened sports-drink and energy-drink product lines. Voluntary efforts by industry are
designed not to bind, and do not have enforcement mechanisms (NPLAN 2011, in addition to
Brownell and Warner). When buying slanted scientific studies and endorsements proves
inadequate, and voluntary reform efforts are rejected by other stakeholders, industries will turn to
lawsuits and counter-advertisements, stressing the community’s right to choose their own
beverages. A compromised (skewed) market frame in which RUMax-compromised consumers
“choose” to damage their own health is not the ideal democratic platform to debate corporate
rights and personal responsibility. Public opinion is not a reliable ally or yardstick before the
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public goods deficit is made up, and a minimal credible level of nutrition and health knowledge
becomes common. Evidence of confirmatory bias (Jonas et al. 2001, Rabin and Schrag 1999)
must not be ignored in carving out the new process. People will defend previously held positions
and choices, will defend them against pertinent correct new information as it flows in, even in
infinite amounts. People’s own tendency not to fault their own previous consumption and what
they allow their own children to consume given their current level of applied nutrition
information is almost certain to bias survey results, almost as much as their ignorance of
nutrition literature. The same will hold for school boards, principals, coaches, and even
policymakers who are more interested in upholding abstract values even when they conflict with
proven science.
The stakes are too high, the trends too clear, the costs too overwhelming. A science-based
policy program to reduce SSB consumption as proposed here is the best way to solve the full set
of market failures associated with consumption of high-added-sugar products, and to achieve
more rational and efficient outcomes, at the individual, market, and societal levels.
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